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Executive Summary
The mandate of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)
was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the
conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to make
recommendations concerning these and other matters.
The Report comprises 5 Parts. Part I of the Report is an Introduction which
discusses the historical context of the violence; Part II is a narration of the
violence province by province. Part III deals with four cross cutting issues:
sexual violence, internally displaced persons, the media and the nature and
impact of the violence. Part IV deals with acts and omissions of state security
agencies and impunity; and Part V contains recommendations made with a view
to the prevention of future reoccurrence of large scale violence; the investigation
of alleged perpetrators; and how to tackle the culture of impunity that has
become the hallmark of violence and other crimes in the country.
Sadly, violence has been a part of Kenya’s electoral processes since the
restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the violence that shook
Kenya after the 2007 general elections was unprecedented. It was by far the
most deadly and the most destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also,
unlike previous cycles of election related violence, much of it followed, rather
than preceded elections. The 2007-2008 post-election violence was also more
widespread than in the past. It affected all but 2 provinces and was felt in both
urban and rural parts of the country. Previously violence around election periods
concentrated in a smaller number of districts mainly in Rift Valley, Western, and
Coast Provinces.
As regards the conduct of state security agencies, they failed institutionally to
anticipate, prepare for, and contain the violence. Often individual members of
the state security agencies were also guilty of acts of violence and gross
violations of the human rights of the citizens.
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In some ways the post-election violence resembled the ethnic clashes of the
1990s and was but an episode in a trend of institutionalization of violence in
Kenya over the years. The fact that armed militias, most of whom developed as a
result of the 1990s ethnic clashes, were never de-mobilized led to the ease with
which political and business leaders reactivated them for the 2007 post-election
violence. Secondly, the increasing personalization of power around the
presidency continues to be a factor in facilitating election related violence.
The widespread belief that the presidency brings advantages for the President’s
ethnic group makes communities willing to exert violence to attain and keep
power. Inequalities and economic marginalization, often viewed in ethnogeographic terms, were also very much at play in the post-election violence in
places like the slum areas of Nairobi.
One of the main findings of the Commission’s investigations is that the postelection violence was spontaneous in some geographic areas and a result of
planning and organization in other areas, often with the involvement of
politicians and business leaders. Some areas witnessed a combination of the two
forms of violence, where what started as a spontaneous violent reaction to the
perceived rigging of elections later evolved into well organized and coordinated
attacks on members of ethnic groups associated with the incumbent president or
the PNU party. This happened where there was an expectation that violence was
inevitable whatever the results of the elections.
The report concludes that the post-election violence was more than a mere
juxtaposition

of

citizens-to-citizens

opportunistic

assaults.

These

were

systematic attacks on Kenyans based on their ethnicity and their political
leanings. Attackers organized along ethnic lines, assembled considerable
logistical means and traveled long distances to burn houses, maim, kill and
sexually assault their occupants because these were of particular ethnic groups
and political persuasion. Guilty by association was the guiding force behind
deadly “revenge” attacks, with victims being identified not for what they did but
for their ethnic association to other perpetrators. This free-for-all was made
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possible by the lawlessness stemming from an apparent collapse of state
institutions and security forces.
In general, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of the attackers
and the relatively effective coordination of the attacks. However, in most parts of
the country affected by the violence, failure on the part of the Kenya Police and
the Provincial Administration to act on intelligence and other early warning signs
contributed to the escalation of the violence.
The post-election violence is also the story of lack of preparedness of, and poor
coordination among, different state security agencies. While the National
Security Intelligence Service seemed to possess actionable intelligence on the
likelihood of violence in many parts of the country, it was not clear whether and
through which channel such intelligence was shared with operational security
agencies. The effectiveness of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration
Police was also negatively affected by the lack of clear policing operational
procedures and by political expediency’s adverse impact on their policing
priorities.
The report recommends concrete measures to improve performance and
accountability of state security agencies and coordination within the state
security mechanism, including strengthening joint operational preparedness
arrangements; developing comprehensive operational review processes; merging
the two police agencies; and establishing an Independent Police Complaints
Authority.
To break the cycle of impunity which is at the heart of the post-election violence,
the report recommends the creation of a special tribunal with the mandate to
prosecute crimes committed as a result of post-election violence. The tribunal
will have an international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans
on the senior investigations and prosecution staff.
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PART I

OVERVIEW

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) began on
23rd May 2007 with an announcement published in the Kenya Gazette Notice
No.4473 vol. cx-no.4. The members of the Commission as appointed were its
Chair, Mr. Justice Philip Waki, a judge of Kenya’s Court of Appeal and two
Commissioners, Mr. Gavin McFadyen and Mr. Pascal Kambale respectively
nationals of New Zealand and the Democratic Republic of Congo respectively.
Two Kenyans, Mr. David Majanja and Mr. George Kegoro, were appointed the
Counsel Assisting the Commission and Commission Secretary.
The international members of the Commission arrived in Nairobi within a week
of the publication of the Gazette notice. As required by law, the Commission took
an oath of office before the Chief Justice on 3rd June 2008. The Commission held
its first press conference the same day.
Both the Government of Kenya (GOK) and the multi donor Trust Fund for
National

Dialogue

and

Reconciliation,

managed

by

the

United

Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), funded the Commission’s work. The former
provided the Commission with office space, security, and transport, while the
latter paid the Commission’s expenses, including staff costs.

The GOK also

assisted the Commission during field visits and hearings. In addition, the
Commission received support from the Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu and Mombasa
local authorities as well as from several religious organizations during its field
visits. Assistance included various types of facilitation from the Anglican Church
of Kenya’s Naivasha Diocese and the Catholic Dioceses in Nakuru, Kisumu,
Eldoret and Mombasa.
Setting up the Commission
Initially the Commission attended to a number of logistical and administrative
matters before beginning its substantive work. These included obtaining office
1

space, hiring staff, and collecting background documents. One time consuming
matter that kept the Commission from immediately addressing its substantive
work was the lack of office space. This was something the Commission did not
and could not have anticipated. The Panel of Eminent African Personalities
kindly assisted with temporary quarters even though they were not formally
responsible for the Commission. However, it took three weeks of discussions
with the Panel and various government officials until the Commission was
properly settled and was able to clarify which entities would provide the logistical
support needed to move forward.
During this period, the Commission assembled background documents and
other necessary material.
completed staff recruitment.

The Commission also identified, interviewed and
A full list of Commission staff is annexed.

To

ensure the independence of its investigators, the Commission advertised locally
and internationally for these positions. For the same reason, the Commission
decided that the head of its team of investigators should be an international
rather than a local. The Commission recruited a Canadian, Robert Grinstead,
for this post. Later, the Commission also recruited an international consultant,
Dr. Suzanne Mueller, a political scientist.
Apart from the above, it was agreed that because part of the Commission’s
mandate was to investigate the role and conduct of the security forces in the
post election violence, none of their serving members would be eligible to apply
for positions with the Commission. In addition, the Commission also recognized
the need for specialists who could investigate sexual violence. This was an
important part of the post election violence and something the Commission
wanted to probe comprehensively as an integral part of its mandate. The
Commission, therefore, recruited two female investigators to examine sexual
violence: one international, Ms. Melinda Rix of New Zealand, and another Ms.
Gladys Mwariri, a Kenyan. The Commission also had the assistance of a full time
psychologist counsellor, Ms Nyawira Kuria. The Commission also received
assistance from various UN, government agencies, and NGOs specializing in this
area, something discussed in detail in the full report below.
2

The Commission finally acquired office space on 17th June 2008. By 25 June
2008, most of the staff was on board and the Commission was able to begin
substantive work. Initially, the Commission consulted informally with a variety
of groups and held a number of consultative meetings.
The Commission concluded early in its tenure that it would not have enough
time to visit all areas that had been heavily affected by the post election violence.
The life of the Commission, as provided in the Gazette, was only three months
and set to expire on 22 August 2008. Hence, the Commission immediately wrote
to His Excellency the President of Kenya and to the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities asking for a 60 day extension so that it could plan ahead.

While

the Panel supported the request, the National Dialogue and Reconciliation team,
which was the final decision maker, did not. Instead the Commission was
granted only a 30 day extension, published in the Gazette Notice no. 7288 Vol.
cx – no. 67 dated 12th August 2008.
The Commission conducted hearings in public in the following areas: Nairobi
between 9 and 25 July 2008 and again from 19 to 27 August 2008, Naivasha on
28 and 29 July, Nakuru from 30 July to 1 August 2008, Eldoret from 5 to 7
August 2008, Kisumu from 11 to 13 August 2008, Borabu on 14 and 15 August
and Mombasa on 1 and 2 September 2008. Because of the failure to obtain a 60
day extension of time the Commission abandoned its original plans to conduct
public hearings and investigations in Kakamega, Busia, Kericho, Bungoma,
Laikipia, Thika and Limuru. Eventually, the Commission received another twoweek extension for the purpose of preparing this report through Gazette Notice
No. 8661 in Vol CX – 74 dated 12th September 2008. The difficulty of receiving
limited extensions piecemeal rather than all at once diminished the capacity to
engage in forward planning.

Establishing a communication strategy
The public legitimately expected the Commission to work transparently and to
keep the public informed.

Both to manage public expectations concerning
3

information and to develop a reciprocal relationship with the media, the
Commission appointed Ms Mildred Ngesa, an experienced journalist, as media
relations officer.
In addition, the Commission designed and established a website www.cipev.org
to facilitate public access to information about our mandate and our work. The
Commission also set up a secure email address, info@cipev.org for receiving
confidential information and correspondence.

Once the Commission began

hearings, the verbatim record of public proceedings was posted on the website.
Aside from the above, the Commission conducted periodic media briefings to
inform the public of its work. The three Commissioners appeared together on
television interviews in the initial phase after which the Chair issued press
releases and engaged with the media in other ways.

Publication of Rules and Procedure
The Commission also used its initial period to develop and publish its own rules
and procedure. The capacity to make rules is granted under the Commissions of
Inquiry Act and also under the terms of reference for the Commission. These
rules, other than providing guidelines to assist the Commission in its work were
designed to allow partnerships between the Commission and as many interest
groups as possible. The rules and procedure for the Commission were published
in the Gazette as Notice No. 4923 on 13 June 2008 as well as the newspapers on
24 June 2008.

Consultations with Government Departments and Others
As part of its preparatory work, the Commission consulted with officials and
departments of the government concerned with, or whose functions fell within
the scope of the investigations. The purpose of these consultations was, firstly,
to build a level of trust with these institutions that would facilitate the
4

Commission’s investigations. Secondly, the Commission sought to explore with
the concerned officials the various practical arrangements necessary to enable
investigations.
officials

with

The initial meetings with officials were held in private.
whom

the

Commission

met

at

this

stage

included

The
the

Commissioner of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons, the Commandant of the
Administration Police, the Chief of the General Staff, the Attorney General, the
Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) (represented by members
of his Commission), the Director General of the National Security Intelligence
Service, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion
and Constitutional Affairs, and the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the
President in charge of Internal Security and Provincial Administration.

This

Commission appreciates the level of co-operation received from the various
government departments throughout its work.
The Commission also sought audience with the political leadership and managed
to interview the Vice-President, the Prime Minister and one Deputy Prime
Minister. An appointment sought with the President did not materialize while the
former President declined to meet with the Commissioners.
Initially, the Commission also visited a number of areas within Nairobi that had
been severely affected by the post election violence, including Kibera. This
enabled members to interact with local communities, obtain feedback from
them, and also allowed the international members of the Commission to acquire
a feel for the issues they would encounter elsewhere.

Role of Civil Society
The Commission deliberately decided to work closely with Kenyan civil society
organizations and seek their assistance with information, contacts, and expertise
in areas related to post-election violence. A number of these organizations
attended the Commission’s hearings through lawyers who represented victims
and communities and provided useful feedback to members of the public on the
Commission’s work. These included Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice
5

(KPTJ), the Inter-Religious Forum, the Kenyan Section of the International
Commission of Jurists, (ICJ-K), the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC),
the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR), different chapters of
the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, and various religious and faith
based organizations.
Civil society and human rights organizations greatly contributed to the
Commission’s work by:
•

Providing background material and reports concerning the history and
patterns of human rights violations in Kenya. This helped the Commission
establish a foundation from which to proceed;

•

Giving access to their records, often including statements from witnesses
they had interviewed and helping map out geographic regions that should
be the focus of investigations;

•

Providing contacts with local community leaders, individual victims, and
other key contacts in communities where they had established trust and
credibility;

•

Assisting

and providing

victims the Commission interviewed in public

and in private with emotional support, based on long established
relationships with them; and
•

Offering various types of assistance to victims, including medical services,
counselling, and various types of community support.

Standing Before the Commission
The Commission addressed the question of legal standing from persons who
wished to participate in its proceedings. The following government departments
were covered by its mandate and hence were allowed to participate in the
hearings: the Kenya Police Service, the Administration Police, the Provincial
Administration, the Electoral Commission of Kenya, the National Security
Intelligence Service, the Kenya Prisons Service and the Armed Forces.
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Groups of citizens and civil society organizations also applied to participate in
the proceedings.

They included victims’ representatives, experts on specific

aspects of the Commission’s work, and organizations that had been involved in
addressing the post-election violence itself. All had useful information for the
Commission.
The Commission considered that the quality of proceedings would benefit from
allowing as many interest groups as possible to participate. In the end, the
Commission gave legal standing to the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) and
the Centre for the Advancement of Women and Children, both of which were
allowed to represent the interests of women in the context of the post election
violence. The Commission also granted the Kenyans for Peace with Truth and
Justice, the Rift Valley Internally Displaced Persons Association, the Centre for
Justice and Crimes against Humanity, and the Tegla Lorupe Foundation
standing as interveners. Outside Nairobi, the Commission granted regional law
societies standing in its proceedings. These included the Rift Valley Law Society
in Nakuru, the North Rift Law Society in Eldoret, and the West Kenya Law
Society in Kisumu, and the Law Society of Kenya (South Rift Branch) even
though the Commission did not hold proceedings in Kericho, where the society is
based.
The Commission declined requests for standing by Kenya’s two main political
parties, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity
(PNU) because it did not think their participation was necessary. However, each
of them testified through their Secretaries General.
All groups participating in the proceedings were asked to furnish the
Commission with lists of their witnesses and statements from the witnesses. A
significant number of the witnesses who testified before the Commission were
identified and processed by lawyers acting on behalf of various civil society
organisations. To maintain control over its proceedings the Commission insisted
that such witnesses coming in had to be processed with the full participation of
Counsel Assisting the Commission. This ensured that relevant and credible
evidence was presented.

Whenever necessary to avoid grandstanding, the
7

Commission intervened to limit questions from lawyers.

The Commission’s

experience was that allowing the diverse interests seeking representation greatly
increased the quality of the inquiry. The lawyers for the various parties brought
useful perspectives before the Commission that might have been missed
altogether, if they had been excluded. In addition, the participation of these
same lawyers enabled the Commission to reach out to witnesses who might not
otherwise have come forward. This broadened participation and enriched
understanding. Furthermore, a number of the lawyers admitted into our
proceedings had sharply opposing points of view. This increased the objectivity
and the credibility of the testified received.

Methodological Issues
Public investigative inquiries represent a methodological challenge: they are not
courts of law but are influenced by Kenya’s common law tradition. In deciding
how to proceed, we adopted a mix of chose a half way house that mixed both
adversarial and inquisitorial methods. The rules and procedures reflected this
choice. The Commission also felt this was the optimal means to uncover the
truth concerning post election violence and impunity in Kenya. At the same time,
the Commission went to great lengths to ensure that all witnesses were treated
fairly and developed rules to protect them from unfair accusations.
The Commission had to address a number of other issues. One was how to
utilize the reports and other material received from various organizations, as
provided by paragraph 2(a) (ii) of its terms of reference. The Commission treated
this information as it did any other: testing and evaluating it independently to
complement its own findings.
Although the Commission would have preferred to hold all its hearings in public,
paragraph 2(f) of its terms of reference allowed the holding of private hearings
when necessary to instil confidence in witnesses and to allay their fears of
reprisals. The Commission utilized both methods. Public officials mainly testified
openly, unless there were good reasons to do otherwise. A number of victims also
8

testified in public. However, many others chose to speak in private because they
feared reprisals or were too traumatized to come forth in public. The Commission
took great care to protect the privacy of witnesses who testified in camera.
However, we did not have a reliable witness protection program which might
have given greater solace to others who avoided speaking to us. One of the
greatest challenges was to find victims and convince them to testify, something
the Commission went to great lengths to do in spite of its constraints, including
time. The investigation team of the Commission was able to come to towns only
two to three days before the Commission. Hence, they had very limited time to
find and prepare witnesses, something that elicited disappointment, particularly
when the Commission was unable to stay long enough to hear everyone who
wanted to testify. Nevertheless, there was a general realization that the
Commission provided a unique opportunity and venue for individuals who had
suffered horribly to come and tell their stories. The Commission did whatever
possible to accommodate witnesses, in some cases holding extended hearings up
to 14 hours a day. The Commission appreciates very well that in the final
analysis only a miniscule sample of the avoidable suffering inflicted upon
innocent Kenyans was heard.
The Commission also faced criticism that it relied heavily on the testimony of
public officials in its hearings. The Commission viewed as it duty and within its
terms of reference to call upon public officials to account for their actions. It
was for this reason that for the first time Kenyans were able to hear and see high
ranking officers testify in public and be subjected to questions about their roles.
In addition, the political parties at the centre of the political dispute that led to
establishment of this Commission criticized the Commission for permitting them
only one afternoon to present their side of the story. The Commission had to
balance their desire for an open-ended forum, which already exists in
Parliament, with ordinary citizens who had far more limited opportunities to be
heard.
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Public hearings were to be managed to ensure a good representation of
individuals and issues, while providing a form of outreach for ordinary citizens to
hear from those entrusted with their safety and those who suffered from the post
election violence. As a consequence, the hearings elicited an overwhelming
response by members of the public who came to listen to the open proceedings.
In some cases, the premises in which the Commission held its hearings were
packed to capacity and others sometimes ran out of space. Interestingly, it was
only after the Commission had held its hearings that members of the public
came forward to the investigators seeking to testify.
The Commission’s Methodology by Province
Given the time constraints adverted to above the Commission was not able to
visit each province and therefore the methodology which the Commission
adopted for gathering evidence varied to some extent between the various
provinces.

Overall, the Commission relied on background material and reports from
government, nongovernmental, and community based organizations (NGOs and
CBOs) and individuals; recorded statements of victims taken by our investigators
and the sworn testimony, statements and exhibits of witnesses who came before
us.
With regard to the Rift Valley province, the Commission heard witness testimony
from 30 individuals: 25 in Eldoret and 5 in Nairobi.

These included officials

from the provincial administration (4), the police (1), the NSIS (1), medical
officers of health (5), hospital employees (2), and 15 victims and witnesses, all of
whom came before us in camera. In addition our investigators took signed
statements in private from 24 individuals, 17 of whom did not testify before the
Commission. We also made site visits to roads that were blocked with huge
boulders, to the Kiambaa church, where individuals were burned alive by
marauding youth and to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital.
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NGOs, church groups and other local organizations found and prepared
witnesses to meet the Commission. They also allowed their premises to be used
as safe havens for individuals who wanted to testify in camera. In Eldoret, the
Commission faced two main drawbacks. First, as in all places the Commission
visited, there were time constraints. Given that some parts of the North Rift were
major locus of the violence, the Commission could have benefited from more
than the three days it had. Second, and most importantly, there was a pervasive
climate of fear facing victims in the Eldoret area. Some witnesses who were
worried about their safety were not prepared to testify in Eldoret. A few came to
Nairobi to protect their anonymity. It is possible some witnesses who would have
liked to have testified to the Commission, did not have the courage to do so and
could not afford to travel to meet us elsewhere. It was our expectation that those
against whom allegations had been made, especially the so-called “Kalenjin
youth” would be available to testify before us or at least record statements.
However, none of them came forward and therefore we did not have the
opportunity to listen to an account of the violence from the perspective of those
in the North Rift against whom allegations are made.
Owing to constraints of time, the Commission did not hold formal sittings in
Central Rift, but was able to make a visit to Kuresoi and Njoro areas where
informal sessions were held with local administrators, the police and a number
of victims. During its sittings in Nakuru, the Commission received sworn
testimony from various witnesses who had a good overview of the district,
including the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner (PC).
The former Molo District Commissioner gave evidence in Nakuru Town.

In

addition, the Commission relied to a large extent on the Minutes of the Molo
District Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) (also supplemented by DSIC
Minutes from the neighbouring Bureti District noting that these 2 committees on
occasion held joint meetings, NSIS intelligence reports and the report by the
KNCHR, numerous statements taken down by CIPEV investigators but who for
reasons of time were never called to testify and used this primary and secondary
evidence to reconstruct the story of violence in Molo District. Some degree of
11

reliance was also placed on reports by NGOs and other civil society and faith
based groups and organizations.
The Commission received evidence on violence in Koibatek through district
government officials who testified in Eldoret as well as through statements by
victims and eye witnesses who talked with Commission investigators. No formal
sittings were held in the district though the DC gave sworn testimony in Eldoret
while another witness also testified in Naivasha on behalf of IDPs regarding the
violence in the district. Further, we received evidence in private from victims of
sexual violence and other forms of physical harm. We then used DSIC minutes
furnished by the Rift Valley Province PC and NSIS reports to supplement
available information. Finally, the Commission relied on statements provided to
Commission Investigators but who for constraints of time could not be called to
testify.
The Commission also received sworn testimony from a victim of the violence in
Narok. In addition, we relied on DSIC minutes for Narok South District, NSIS
intelligence reports and the KNCHR report. We also placed a high premium on
the Akiwumi Report in describing the historical context of violence in this
district.
The Commission did not conduct any hearings in Western Province due to time
constraints. In the circumstances, it was arranged that evidence from Western
Province would be taken when the Commission was sitting in Kisumu from 11 to
13 August 2008. In Kisumu, the Commission was only able to take the evidence
of

the

following

three

officials

from

Western

Province:

the

Provincial

Commissioner, the Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer and the Provincial
Medical Officer.
Because it did not spend time for hearing in Western Province, the Commission
and its investigators did not interact appreciably with the witnesses to a level
where it would be satisfied that the evidence presented reflected the full range of
information available in Western Province.

Further, unlike other parts of the

country, the Commission received little or no assistance in the mobilisation of
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witnesses and individuals who could testify from organized groups within the
region.

Correspondence to the local branch of the Law Society of Kenya, for

example, remained unanswered.1 The result is that when the Commission went
to Kisumu, there were no witnesses, other than the officials, who came to testify
on matters relating to violence in the Province.
The Commission however made a brief visit to Kakamega town on 9th August
2008 and toured the town where it saw properties that had been destroyed and
damaged during the PEV. The Commission also visited the Kakamega Police
Station IDP camp.

In writing this chapter the Commission relied on the

testimony of the three officials, its observations during the visit to Kakamega and
submissions made on behalf of some residents in Kakamega and other
secondary evidence.
The Commission held formal sittings for 3 days in Kisumu though part of this
was devoted to Western Province. Senior provincial administration officials and
police officers testified to get the perspective of the violence from Government
officials. This was then juxtaposed from the sworn testimony of victims that was
supplemented by information from the Ministry of Medical Services taking into
account that the pattern of violence in Nyanza was typified by shootings
attributed to Police. The Commission also relied heavily on professional
associations like the Law Society of Kenya, Western Chapter which furnished
detailed depositions from victims. Owing to the range of witnesses that were
required to provide the Commission with the broad range of issues it had to deal
with, focus was directed to the hardest hit regions namely Kisumu Town, Homa
Bay District and Migori/Rongo Districts from which most of the Government
witnesses were drawn from.
The Commission held no formal hearings to receive evidence and testimony with
regard to the violence in Nairobi. Senior officials at the highest levels of various
security agencies and also representatives from political parties did testify in

1

Letter to the dated 19th August 2008 to the Law Society of Kenya, Western Kenya Branch.
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Nairobi but with a view to setting the national context and not the violence in
Nairobi per se. The Commission was able to make a site visit in Kibera in July
2008 where it spoke to some local leaders, a number of administrators and also
the police. Further, sworn testimonies from victims of sexual violence were
received in camera. Taking into account this paucity of information, the
Commission relied heavily on NSIS Intelligence and situation reports, the
KNCHR report and reports by various civil society organizations. In putting forth
the background for Nairobi District, the Commission also relied on desk research
to explain the genesis of some of slum based violence that took the character of
rent disputes with an ethnic angle.
Although the Commission was not able to visit Central province due to
constraints of time, it nevertheless was able to solicit accounts of what happened
in that Province during the period. The Commission did not have opportunity to
interview witnesses and individuals affected by violence. It, therefore, arranged
for officials from the Province to provide statements on matters in relation to
which it was conducting the inquiry. Submissions were received from the
Provincial Commissioner, Central province, the District Commissioners of
Kiambu East and Kiambu West.
The Commission also received and considered the Minutes of the Provincial
Security and Intelligence Committee and District Security and Intelligence
Committee meetings for the period before and after the elections to enable it
appreciate the circumstances of post-election violence in Central Province.
The Commission also announced through the media, in its public hearings, and
elsewhere that Kenyans were encouraged to submit or send written submissions
to the Commission. However, very little information was received from Central
Province in pursuance of this.
The account on the post election violence in the Central Province therefore is
based on the material received from the officials identified above, and from a
consideration of various reports, including the Minutes of the PSIC, the DSIC
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and the reports of other organizations that have documented the post election
violence in the Province.
Much of the two days of formal hearings held at the Coast was devoted to
hearing the provincial administration and the police, and focused on the violence
within Mombasa City and its environs. Substantial evidence was also obtained in
private from key informants who had a good overview of the conflict and were
well placed to speak authoritatively on the violence. In addition, testimony was
received from victims and NGOs active in the region to piece together the history
of violence as it happened in the Coast Province.

Alleged Perpetrators: To Name or Not To Name?
We realize that Kenyans and the international community have been hoping the
Commission’s report will identify the individuals behind the 2007 post election
violence.

After all, the Commission’s first term of reference2 is to investigate

the facts relating to the post-election violence. An important part of that
investigation is to identify who planned, organised, facilitated, and committed
egregious human rights violations.
In carrying out its TOR, the Commission had to make a crucial decision: whether
or not to name names. The issue is whether, in narrating the facts and
circumstances relating to the post-election violence, the Commission should
publicly disclose the names of those persons alleged by

various witnesses to

have perpetrated violence at some level. It is a choice the Commission found
particularly vexing. Therefore, it expended considerable time in researching and
discussing this matter before making its judgment.
One possible choice for the Commission was to name the perpetrators publicly
given the

clear advantage in doing so. Kenya has an extremely troubled past.

Its history of ethnic violence has been papered over for years until it exploded

2

1(a) of the Terms of Reference.
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in horror

during and after the 2007 elections.

The causes of this sort of

violence, which began in 1992 with the first multi party elections, have always
been known from official reports of past commissions of inquiry. It isin these
Reports that some individuals have been identified publicly as being responsible
for the violence.

However, there has been no serious effort made by any

government to punish perpetrators of violence or to address the plight of their
victims. In sum, impunity has become the order of the day in Kenya. One way
of addressing impunity is to publicly unmask and shame those who have been
behind the chaos. A school of thought is that this should be done even if all that
is available as proof is the victim’s version of events which seems probable.
Where there is more than just the victims’ account available, there is even a
more compelling reason to name alleged perpetrators.

Legal and procedural

niceties, the personal safety and reputation of the person named, would in that
case be subjugated to by the national imperative of fighting impunity.

The

named individuals, in any event, would have recourse to the courts to seek
redress and the media to express their public rebuttals, if any.
An alternative is to be faithful to certain legal fundamentals prior to the naming
of alleged perpetrators in public. This Commission was appointed under the
Commissions of Inquiry Act (Cap 102) Laws of Kenya where its Commissioners
are required under section 7 (i) to make a “full, faithful and impartial inquiry”.
The Commission espouses the rule of law and is guided accordingly in the
discharge of its mandate.

One of the fundamental principles of law is the

application of the rules of natural justice in the adjudication of disputes. The
other is the presumption of innocence. And one of the rules of natural justice,
which the Commission jealously guards, is that no one should be condemned
without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Pursuant to this principle, the
Commission hoped that it would have an opportunity to serve all individuals
adversely mentioned during its inquiry with notices of such mentions and grant
them an opportunity to record their evidence with the Commission.

For this

Commission that opportunity never arose for a large number of adversely
mentioned persons except for a few who came before us. Even in these cases, it
would still be necessary for the Commission to carry out further investigations
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before naming names to verify all the material facts. The main reason why this
threshold was not met is that the time allocated to the Commission to complete
its task was extremely limited; it was in fact far too short to contact and hear
the side of all those who had been adversely mentioned during the Commission’s
hearings. Also, in some cases, the contacts and addresses of the named persons
were unavailable.
The second fundamental issue for the Commission is nevertheless to ensure that
the perpetrators of the post election violence are brought to

account for their

deeds and that the issue of impunity is addressed. For this to be successful, the
integrity of the evidence gathered by the Commission would have to be
safeguarded. The evidence the Commission has gathered so far is not, in our
assessment, sufficient to meet the threshold of proof required for criminal
matters in this country: that it be “beyond reasonable doubt”. It may even fall
short of the proof required for international crimes against humanity.

We

believe, however, that the Commission’s evidence forms a firm basis for further
investigations of alleged

perpetrators, especially concerning those who bore the

greatest responsibility for the post election violence. In the nature of things, the
premature disclosure of such evidence and those it relates to exposes it to
possible sabotage or other adulteration before investigators have an opportunity
to assess it. The Commission has in possession the names of powerful
individuals in politics, government, business, the police and elsewhere whose
capacity for interference with its evidence can neither be assumed nor
dismissed.
Furthermore the recently enacted Witness Protection Act 2008 which became
operational on 2nd September, 2008 has not been tested.

It is our

recommendation that the Act be fully operationalised to apply to the witnesses to
ensure their ability to testify against powerful individuals without fear of
retribution.
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The Commission has carefully weighed the choices available to it and has
decided against publishing the names of alleged perpetrators in its report.
Instead, these names will be placed in a sealed envelope, together with its
supporting evidence. Both will be kept in the custody of the Panel of African
Eminent Personalities pending the establishment of a special tribunal to be set
up in accordance with our recommendations.
In default of setting up the Tribunal, consideration will be given by the Panel to
forwarding the names of alleged perpetrators to the special prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague to conduct further investigations
in accordance with the ICC statutes. This is a major recommendation made by
the Commission.
Basis for Recommendations
Under its Terms of Reference the Commission was called upon to make specific
recommendations on specific measures. Throughout the hearings and in written
submissions, the Commission received a wide array of recommendations
covering a whole range of issues, within and outside of the Commission’s
mandate.

Some of these recommendations were general and others specific

while others related to the normal functions of government.

Many expressed

scepticism that whatever recommendations the Commission makes would never
be implemented and as such this commission was a waste of time and public
resources. For those reasons the Commission made a judgment on what was
relevant and important for recommendation based on the following factors;
1.

The recommendations should be deliberately specific to allow no scope
for avoidance of responsibility in implementation.

2.

A few recommendations are easier to implement and present a lesser
burden, financial or otherwise, on those tasked to implement them.

3.

It is important to identify short term and long term recommendations
and propose a time frame for implementation.

4.

Over the last five years or so there have seen enormous reform
initiatives in the legal and public sectors and it is therefore necessary
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to reinforce the ongoing reform process and agenda with the aim of
empowering Kenyan institutions to effect change.
5.

The Commission should also clearly set out accountabilities and
responsibilities for effecting recommendations and monitoring the
implementation process.

We

believe

the

recommendations

of

this

Commission

are

capable

of

implementation and monitoring and that where there is failure to implement,
accountability and responsibility can be assigned to a specific person or
institution.

Supporting Documentation
The

verbatim

recording

of

the

Commission’s

proceedings,

statements,

submissions and other evidence on the basis of which this report is derived have
been compiled and handed over to the President of the Republic of Kenya with
the request that it be placed in the National Archives for public reference. As has
been explained, material that was received in camera and which tends to show
culpability of certain individuals has been forwarded to the Panel of Eminent
African

Personalities

to

deal

with

the

recommendations.
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same

in

accordance

with

our

PART II

THE FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING TO THE POST ELECTION VIOLENCE
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CHAPTER TWO
Post-Election Violence, 2007 – How Deep Are the Roots?3
Introduction
The main body of this Report examines the post-2007 elections violence in
Kenya. This includes:
•

the facts and circumstances related to the acts of violence following the
2007 presidential elections;

•

the actions or omissions of State security agencies during the course of the
violence; and

•

sets of recommendations concerning measures to be taken to prevent,
control, and eradicate similar violence in the future; bring to justice those

3

This chapter is drawn from a synthesis of issues discussed by Kenyan experts in a consultative group meeting with
the Commission on 26 August 2008 and from the following sources including articles in edited collections: Republic
of Kenya – NEPAD, APRM: Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya (May 2006); Africa Watch, Divide and
Rule: State‐Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992; Republic of Kenya, Report of
the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire Into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (hereafter referred to as the “Akiwumi
Report”), Nairobi: Government Printer, 31 July 1999; Republic of Kenya. Report of the Parliamentary Select
Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other Parts of Kenya, Nairobi: Government Printer,
September 1992; Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” Journal of Eastern African Studies,
Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2008, pp. 185‐210; M. Katumanga, “A City Under Siege: Banditry and Modes of Accumulation in
Nairobi, 1991‐2004,” Review of African Political Economy, no. 106, 2005, pp. 505‐20; Peter M. Kagwanja, “Facing
Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca?: The Mungiki Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession,” 102, no. 406,
January 2003, pp. 25‐49; David Anderson, “Vigilantes, Violence, and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya,” African
Affairs 101, no. 405, 2002, pp. 531‐55; Various articles included in the edited works of Godwin Murunga and
Shadrack Nasong’o, eds., Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, London and New York: 2007; of Walter O. Oyugi, P.
Wanyande, and C. Odhiambo Mbai, eds., The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC, Nairobi: Heinrich
Boll Foundation, 2003; and of Marcel Rutten, A. Mazrui and F. Grignon, eds., Out for the Count: 1997 General
Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001; David Throup, “The
Construction and Deconstruction of the Kenyatta State,” in The Political Economy of Kenya, edited by Michael
Schatzberg. New York: Praeger, 1978, pp. 33‐74; Susanne D. Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya, 1919‐
1969,” Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, 1984, pp. 399‐427; Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, “The
Politics of Control in Kenya: Understanding the Bureaucratic Executive State in Kenya, 1952‐78,” Review of African
Political Economy, 107, 2005, pp. 325‐36; International Crisis Group, Kenya in Crisis, International Crisis Group, 21
February 2008; Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya, Nairobi: Kenya Human
Rights Commission, 1998 (Submitted to the Commission as Exhibit 21B); Behaving Badly: Deception, Chauvinism and
Waste During the Referendum Campaign. Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission, n.d. (Submitted to the
Commission as Exhibit 21 C); Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis
of Governance,” Vol. 20, No. 1 (A), March 2008 (Submitted to the Commission as exhibit 21M); Kenya Human Rights
Commission, “Elections and Human Rights Bulletin No. 1, 2007 ( Submitted to the Commission as exhibit 21G);
Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, “Post Election Violence in Kenya,” 2008 ( submitted to Commission as
Exhibit 21H).
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responsible for criminal acts; eradicate impunity and promote national
reconciliation; improve the functioning of security agencies; deal with any
other legal, political and administrative matters deemed necessary; and
•

make such suggestions to the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation
Commission as the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence
(CIPEV) deems necessary.

These are the basic terms of reference of the Commission.
This chapter examines the roots of the post-2007 elections violence in Kenya,
while the Main Report contains the narrative, findings, and recommendations.
This Chapter draws the views expressed at a consultative meeting which the
Commission held with a group of Kenyan experts on 26 August 2008 and also
from other studies and reports on the subject. Specifically, it attempts to isolate
factors that explain the causes of the violence and why it escalated as it did.
These factors demonstrate also how and why violence has become a way of life in
Kenya, a country once known for peace, prosperity, and its potential for
development.
We enumerate these factors below.
The first is the growing politicization and proliferation of violence in Kenya over
the years, specifically the institutionalization of violence following the legalization
of multi-party democracy in 1991. Over time, this deliberate use of violence by
politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish
perpetrators has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of
violence. This, in turn, has caused a further diffusion of violence in the country,
which now is largely outside of the control of the State and its security agencies.
Thus, violence has become a factor not just of elections but in everyday life.
What this means in practice is that violence is widespread and can be tapped for
a variety of reasons, including but not exclusively to win elections.
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Second is the growing power and personalization of power around the
Presidency. This has had a twofold impact. First, it has given rise to the view
among politicians and the general public that it is essential for the ethnic group
from which they come to win the Presidency in order to ensure access to state
resources and goods. Second it also has led to a deliberate denudation of the
authority and legitimacy of other oversight institutions that could check abuses
of power and corruption and provide some accountability, and at the same time
be seen by the public as neutral arbiters with respect to contentious issues,
such as disputed elections results. As a result, in many respects the state
agencies are not seen as legitimate.
Third, is a feeling among certain ethnic groups of historical marginalization,
arising from perceived inequities concerning the allocation of land and other
national resources as well as access to public goods and services. This feeling
has been tapped by politicians to articulate grievances about historical injustices
which resonate with certain sections of the public. This has created an
underlying climate of tension and hate, and the potential for violence, waiting to
be ignited and to explode.
Fourth is the increasing problem of a growing population of poor, unemployed
and youth, educated and uneducated, who agree to join militias and organized
gangs. These gangs have been alleged to intersect with parts of the Government
and the security forces. These groups now have become “shadow governments”
in the slums and even in other parts of the country and have been used by
politicians to attack their opponents; to secure their own security, and to gain
power. Furthermore, these proliferating militias also are said sometimes to
dovetail with the State and its security apparatus thereby not only reducing the
State’s capacity to control the violence but also increasingly threatening the
integrity of the State and the nation. This underlying endemic situation has
created a climate where violence is increasingly likely to be used and where its
use is increasingly unlikely to be checked.
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The Use of Political Violence
Violence was part and parcel of the colonial state, which used it to ensure
control. After independence, President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and
the stick to maintain power, with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the
hands of the State, rather than outside of it. Opposition parties were subjected
to political harassment and those individuals who refused to support the status
quo experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial.
Rallies, by students and others, were dispersed by the GSU using force. The
Government is believed even to have been responsible for the murder of three
political figures, Pio Gamma Pinto, Tom Mboya, and J.M. Kariuki, the last two of
whom were viewed as threats to the then regime and potential contenders for
political power. At the same time, individual members of the opposition were
weaned back to the fold through appointments to Government positions, and
allocations of land as well as provision of other perks.
For a variety of reasons, repression under Kenya’s second President, Daniel arap
Moi, became more draconian. First he did not start off with the same array of
resources (e.g. land, civil service jobs, and a buoyant coffee boom) available to
Kenyatta to reward his supporters and the general public. Second, in 1982, he
experienced an attempted coup against him. This followed an unsuccessful
attempt by parts of the Kiambu Kikuyu elite in 1978 to keep him from becoming
the President. For both reasons and perhaps for others, violence, including
detentions without trial and the routine torture of perceived and real dissenters,
became institutionalized early on under Moi’s rule. This in turn generated a
groundswell of dissent against his rule by a growing opposition movement,
including politicians, lawyers, students, and others from all parts of the country,
as well as members of the Kikuyu from Central Province whose economic power
he tried and partially succeeded in decimating. President Moi’s actions were
designed to destroy the economic base of his opponents and to bolster his own
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position and that of his supporters, who were mainly drawn from his
KAMATUSA4 allies from the marginal areas.
In the period leading up to independence and through to 1964 when KADU was
dissolved and its members joined KANU, KADU had campaigned for a federal
system of government known by the Swahili name of “majimbo”, in part to
protect the members of the smaller tribes from the numerical power of the larger
ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu and Luo. To consolidate his base after
becoming the President, Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin,
through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and
the military. Rightly or wrongly, these individuals given these were viewed by
President Moi’s opponents as not qualified or competent.
As the opposition to Moi’s leadership grew over the years, civil society became
increasingly vocal and donors increased pressure on him, including through the
use of financial sanctions, to democratize. In the end, President Moi very
reluctantly agreed to allow multi-party democracy in 1991 and he presided over
two multi-party elections during his rule, one in 1992 and another in 1997.
Although he agreed to multi-party democracy, President Moi did not accept the
idea that through this he might lose the presidency. Thus, it was in this period
in the 1990s that violence became institutionalized during presidential and
parliamentary elections. Under the amended Constitution, to win the presidency,
President Moi needed to win his parliamentary seat, obtain a majority of the
votes cast in the country, and receive 25% of the votes cast in five provinces. In
both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition to President
Moi and to the then ruling party, KANU, consisted mainly of non-KAMATUSA
voters. Various reports covering elections held during this period alleged that
high ranking political figures, civil servants, and others close to the heart of the
Government organized and used violent gangs to intimidate people in areas of
potential opposition support, most of whom were Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba,

4

Acronym for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu
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and other groups.

5

The strategy was to keep opposition supporters from voting

and the means used was to hire gangs in the Rift Valley and elsewhere to kill
people and displace individuals from their home areas so that KAMATUSA
candidates could win and President Moi could be assured of obtaining 25% of
the vote in five provinces, the majority of the votes cast for the President, and the
majority of elected Members of Parliament. In short, violence became a means of
securing political power and winning elections.
Elections related violence occurred not just in 1992 but also in 1997. In spite of
the death and destruction that these methods caused and the reports from
NGOs such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, and
two

Government

Inquiries

-

the

Kiliku

Parliamentary

Committee

and

Akiwumu Commission - no one was ever punished for this wanton killing and
destruction even though names of perpetrators to be investigated and those
“adversely mentioned” were contained in the reports of both Commissions. The
Akiwumi Report was not made public until 2002, even though it was published
in 1999.
This led to a culture of impunity whereby those who maimed and killed for
political ends were never brought to justice. This changed Kenya’s political
landscape with regard to elections, a point noted by Human Rights Watch. Each
of these reports implicated politicians as the organizers of the violence and
killing for political ends, and noted that the warriors and gangs of youth who
took action were both paid and pressed into service. Aside from this youths were
sometimes promised land and jobs after evicting up country dwellers. However,
from testimony in the Akiwumi Report, it is not clear if they got either. A pattern
had been established of forming groups and using extra-state violence to obtain
political power and of not being punished for it.

5

See NCCK, The Cursed Arrow: Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya, April 1992; Republic of Kenya,
Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate the Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya
( The Kiliku Report), September 1992, See pp. 19, 30‐33, 39‐40, 52‐53,pp.61‐62, 74‐76; Human Rights Watch, Divide
and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, 1993, pp. 28‐32; Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to
Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya ( The Akiwumi Report), 1999, See pp.286‐90 for a list of individuals recommended
to be investigated further as well as a discussion of their role in the ethnic clashes of the 1990s in various parts of
the report.

26

Some of the displaced individuals, including youth from Laikipia District, moved
to Nairobi and became members of Mungiki, which up through the 1980s had
been largely a cultural cum religious cult in the Kikuyu inhabited parts of the
Rift Valley. Later it metamorphosed into a Mafioso style gang that grew and
eventually became a shadow government in the slums of Nairobi and in parts of
Central Province. Initially, the Mungiki were seen as substituting for a lack of
public services in the slums. Later it started bullying individuals and
businesses, including matatus and owners of real estate, into making payments
for services which it would provide, including connecting electricity, providing pit
latrines, and meting out justice. Mungiki and other gangs across the country
(e.g. Taliban, Chinkororo, Kamjeshi, Baghdad Boys and many others) grew and
multiplied within the context of a political culture that both used and tolerated
extra state violence.
Gangs and militias continued to proliferate all over the country, thereby
increasing the presence of institutionalized extra-state violence both during and
after elections, a pattern that continued to increase up through the 2007
elections, even after President Mwai Kibaki took over power in 2002. Up through
to the last elections, Mungiki and other political gangs continued to sell their
services of violence on a willing buyer willing seller basis. As late as 2007 long
after the Government had banned a number of gangs including Mungiki, they
continued to operate with their leader Maina Njenga telling his followers to
engage in more robberies to compensate for the decrease in revenue from their
traditional matatu shakedown operations that had occurred as a result of the
crackdown by the Government.
As extra state violent gangs began to proliferate and continued to be used by
politicians, the political terrain was transformed. Violence trickled down into
daily life and the State no longer commanded the monopoly of force it once had
in a previous era. As such diffused extra state violence existed all over the
country, where it could be called up and tapped at any time, including being
used to arbitrate over elections as it has been doing since the early 1990s. Once
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the Government itself used both its own and extra state violence for partisan
political ends, it lost its legitimacy, was not seen as dispassionate, and
consequently has been unable either to maintain peace and security or to reform
itself.

The Personalization of Presidential Power and the Deliberate Weakening of
Public Institutions
Power has been personalized around the presidency and this has been increased
by changes in the Constitution under each President since independence. Laws
are routinely passed to increase executive authority, and those laws seen as
being in the way are often changed or even ignored. By 1991, the Constitution
had been amended about 32 times. Among the amendments was the insertion of
Section 2A, which made Kenya a de jure one party state until that provision was
repealed in 1991. Even following the election of Kibaki in 2002 still rules were
ignored within Ministries leading to financial scandals such as Anglo Leasing
and others underscoring the once again the fact that the personal power of the
President and his close associates trumped the law. Hence, as noted in the
Akiwumi Report and in a number of articles on Kenya politics, the checks and
balances normally associated with democracies are very weak in Kenya and are
deliberately so. Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the civil
service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of
the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. Hence, the
State is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in power.
The above syndrome has had various consequences.
The first is a sense of lawlessness that has led to Government institutions and
officials being seen as lacking in integrity and autonomy. One result of this in
the 2007 election was the perception by sections of the public that Government
institutions, and officials, including the judiciary, were not independent of the
presidency, were not impartial and lacked integrity. Hence, they were perceived
as not able to conduct the election fairly. That public sector institutions were
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seen as biased and unlikely to follow the rules increased the tendency to violence
among members of the public. Furthermore, as the Akiwumi Report and other
sources demonstrated, members of the provincial administration and the police
also understood that it was sometimes in the interest of their personal survival
to follow what they understood to be the directives or inclinations of either the
President or MPs in their areas rather than to uphold the law. This led to some
officials not following the law themselves, and sections of the provincial
administration and security forces even engaging in acts of violence themselves.
The second is the perception on the part of the public that given the power of the
President and the political class everything flows not from laws but from the
President’s power and personal decisions. This also has led the public to believe
a person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits
and as a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over
power, from taking jobs, land and entitlements. All of this has led to acquisition
of presidential power being seen both by politicians and the public as a zero sum
game, in which losing is seen as hugely costly and is not accepted. Hence, there
is tendency on the part of a variety of political actors to do anything, including
engaging in violence to obtain or retain political power, leading to what one
specialist has called a race to the bottom because of a fear of being dominated by
other ethnic groups and being subjected to the associated consequences of that.
This has created a climate of fear and suspicions which politicians easily exploit
and use to mobilize violence.
The attempt to reduce the personal power that had been accumulated by former
President Moi initially was the reason opposition forces sought to introduce the
post of Prime Minister. This culminated in an informal Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) before the 2002 election between the then opposition
coalition under which the coalition agreed to introduce the post of Prime
Minister after the election. Once elected, however, President Kibaki reneged on
the MoU. Discussions continued concerning constitutional change and the
devolution of power. The Kibaki Government then came up with a draft
Constitution put forward by Attorney General, Amos Wako watering down some
29

of the provisions in the draft agreed to during the “Bomas” discussions. The
Wako draft was put to the public at a referendum in 2005, where voters rejected
it. As soon as the MoU was scuttled, a group led by Raila Odinga left the NARC
coalition Government. President’s Kibaki Government was perceived as being
unwilling to abide by its pre-election agreement with its partners and as
retreating into an ethnic enclave. This was criticized by the public and was seen
as an attempt by the so-called “Mount Kenya Mafia” to keep power to itself
rather than share it.

Even though the MoU was not a legal agreement, the

Kibaki Government’s turning away from it and removing from government the
group of Ministers associated to Odinga had the effect of increasing the
polarization of politics along ethnic lines. Even though the 2005 referendum was
peaceful and the results were accepted rather than contested, the parameters
were nevertheless drawn. With the ethnic political fault lines clearly drawn after
2005, and the need to win the presidency seen as paramount, tensions began to
mount.
The post election violence therefore is, in part, a consequence of the failure of
President Kibaki and his first Government to exert political control over the
country or to maintain sufficient legitimacy as would have allowed a civilized
contest with him at the polls to be possible. Kibaki’s regime failed to unite the
country, and allowed feelings of marginalization to fester into what became the
post election violence.

He and his then Government were complacent in the

support they considered they would receive in any election from the majority
Kikuyu community and failed to heed the views of the legitimate leaders of other
communities.

Land and Inequality
Kenya consists of 42 ethnic groups who live in eight provinces. Many areas
outside the major cities and towns are relatively homogeneous ethnically.
Problems of inequality and marginalization thus are often viewed in ethno
geographic terms even though the inequalities between individuals of the same
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ethnic group are sometimes more pronounced than those between different
ethnic groups and geographic areas. Studies done elsewhere have not found that
the presence of a large number of ethnic groups or inequality per se explains
large scale violence even though most of the violence in the Rift Valley has
occurred mainly in ethnically mixed settlement schemes. Apart from this,
citizens everyplace are concerned that resources, including land, and services
are distributed equitably and are quick to point out inequities.
Constitutionally, individuals may own land in any place in Kenya and in law no
part of the country belongs to an ethnic group. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is
de facto a characteristic of many areas, particularly as many of the newly
created districts since the nineteen nineties have been ethno-specific, leading to
the creation of ethnically homogenous effective “native reserves”. This in turn
has created the notion of “insiders”, who are native to a place and “outsiders”
who have migrated there, a notion that has been tapped by aspiring politicians.
This raises the question of the balance between group interests and the rights of
individuals as entrenched in the Constitution, a problem that also has crept into
slums such as Kibera and Mathare which are now informally divided into
ethnically homogeneous zones.
Apart from the above, gross corruption in the acquisition, registration, and
administration of land matters has been a major problem in Kenya. The Ndungu
Report noted that throughout the 1980s and 1990s public land was illegally and
irregularly

allocated

“in

total

disregard

of

the

public

interest

and

in

circumstances that fly in the face of the law”6. “Land grabbing” and the
allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption
of this period. Those involved in this allocation were senior public servants, but
also local land boards, the courts, and a range of officials including members of
the provincial administration, politicians, and others. Land allocations were
therefore used to reward “politically correct individuals”7, and became heavily

6

Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/ Irregular Allocation of Pubic Land (The
Ndungu Report), Nairobi: Government Printer, June 2004, p. 8.
7
above,p. 14.
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politicized. Given that the recommendations of the Ndungu report were never
implemented, this has increased the sense of frustration in attempting to deal
with land tenure disputes. The fact that institutions which could have been used
to resolve land disputes have not been impartial has encouraged individuals to
take matters into their own hands and to use violence to resolve them.
Furthermore, as land is an emotive issue, politicians have capitalized on issues
surrounding it, including encouraging violence during elections.
In discussions of post-election violence, many Kalenjins argue that it is a
product of longstanding anger over land distribution following independence.
They argue that land was alienated by the colonial government and then unfairly
parcelled out to Kikuyus and other groups whom they view as outsiders. Many
Kalenjins believe that issues relating to land were the reason for both the preelectoral violence in the 1990s and the post election violence after the December
2007 elections8. Others, including the Akiwumi Report dismiss this explanation
pointing out that individuals from different groups lived side by side for many
years until the advent of multi party democracy when violence was used to kill
and displace opposition party voters to keep them from voting. Hence, the Report
argues that even though the promise of getting land from those who were
displaced was used to entice youth into violence, the desire for political power
and not land hunger was the causal factor.
Notwithstanding these views, the Ndungu Report noted that there has been
corruption in the misallocation of land both in settlement schemes in the
countryside and in the urban areas. Hence there is a land issue which needs to
be addressed, particularly in parts of the country which are not ethnically
homogeneous. Even now, this mentality and the fear that accompanies it has led
to a type of quasi residential apartheid as Kenyans move into more ethnically
homogeneous areas even within urban centers and towns.

8

See the statements of two CW no. 78 and 79 and Exhibit No. 78 prepared by the EMO Foundation.
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Beyond the above, another issue that looms on the horizon is that some
communities have done better than others which are poorer, less well developed,
and more marginalized from the mainstream. This in turn has generated feelings
of resentment and powerlessness, sentiments that can and have been mobilized
violently. Furthermore, there is a large and growing underclass of urban poor
who are not landowners and are unlikely ever to be landowners. The tendency
has been to think of Kenya almost exclusively as agrarian and of land issues as
paramount even though the number of Kenyans living in urban areas is
increasing, a tendency likely to continue.

Unemployed Youth
Although Kenya’s population growth rate has been reduced and is now
reportedly down to 3%, it still has an estimated two million youth who are
unemployed. Furthermore, between 1992 and 1996, the number of street
children increased 300% in just four years. Many of these initially rootless
children who are now adults are the product of displacement by ethnic violence.
They have grown up on the streets and are inured to violence, something that is
clearly very dangerous. In addition, although many youth speak English,
something that has raised their expectations, they have no hope of formal sector
employment. The combination of being rootless, having survived amidst violence,
plus their need for an identity and a livelihood makes them ready recruits for
violent gangs, which exist all over Kenya and are tapped by politicians,
particularly but not exclusively during elections.
The gangs are devoid of ideology and operate on a willing buyer willing seller
basis. Given the hierarchical nature of gangs and the upwardly mobile hopes of
their members to become as well off as their leaders, youth can be mobilized for
a variety of reasons, not just to meet their daily needs. This, in itself is a very
dangerous situation, helping to explain why since the 1990s violent gangs have
proliferated all over Kenya.

33

Additionally, there is also a growing problem of unemployment among youth who
are university educated, estimated to be around 40,000 a year, given that only
150,000 formal sector jobs have been created since 2003, raising the spectre of
whether these individuals will also be ready to engage in violence as well if they
are unable to find work9.
Violent gangs, consisting mainly of unemployed youth have been mobilized into
gangs along ethnic lines. Their power, to the point of having become shadow
governments in many areas, stems from two sources. First as the main aim of
Government in the 1990s was to mobilize political support to gain and maintain
political power, a good deal of revenue was spent on patronage rather than on
maintaining infrastructure and providing social services. This meant that the
country started to crumble, visually evident in the decay of roads and the
proliferation of uncollected garbage, even in the capital city of Nairobi, which
once had been called the “city in the sun”. This crumbling as well as a decline in
social services and security also paved the way for violent gangs which provided
them. This gave unemployed youth work, albeit within gangs, and made the
latter extremely powerful. Over time these gangs operated as Mafioso shakedown
gangs, with violence and impunity, as they continue to do. Increasingly, citizens
began to ask who was in charge of Kenya, gangs or the Government.
While one might have expected that the police could have dealt with the increase
in violent gangs operating as virtual shadow states in so many parts of the
country, the Government has been ineffective in dealing with them for several
reasons. First, many politicians themselves have used these violent gangs to
decimate their opponents, to protect themselves from a dictatorial state in the
1990s, and to gain power then and now. This has itself given gangs such as
Mungiki, the Taliban, Chinkororo and others a life and the ability to operate
without fear of being caught. Second, by the time government was serious about
banning the groups, they were large, controlled a number of areas, and
9

The numbers come from an expert’s discussion in the consultative meetings with the Commission on 26 August
2008. For other discussions of youth see Who is Guilty: Youth Perspectives on the 2007 Pre‐Polls Electoral Violence
in Kenya. Nairobi: The Youth Agenda, n.d.; Peter M. Kagwanja, “‘Power to Uhuru’: Youth, Identity, and Generational
Violence in Kenya’s 2002 Elections,” African Affairs, 105, no. 418, January 2003, pp. 25‐49.
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continued to operate in spite of the bans. Third, security forces including police
often were victims of these gangs themselves and used draconian but ineffective
force against them.
Furthermore, the fact that both the police and military are perceived historically
to have been recruited along ethnic lines to protect the particular government of
the day has increased the likelihood of their breaking down along ethnic lines in
a crisis and being either unable or unwilling to maintain law and order
impartially. This meant that post election violence proliferated and intensified for
a number of months and that politicians and businessmen allegedly chose to
hire gangs of youth to fight their attackers rather than call in forces whose
loyalties could not necessarily be counted on.
The post election period infused gangs of unemployed youth with more power
than before and has given them an added currency. While clearly there is a
problem of youth who grow up in slums and make their living by joining gangs
because of a lack of good alternatives and the prospects of upward mobility, the
issue is not one of poverty alone. Instead this situation intersects with other
phenomena, including that of weak institutions, ethnic polarization, and the
willingness of the political class to hire gangs to engage in violence to obtain
political power. Furthermore, the power of these gangs should not be
underrated, including their ability to force other poor unwilling youth to join
them as they remain unchecked, grow, and along with other forces threaten the
integrity of state and nation. In this sense, youth are both being exploited and
have become exploiters themselves.

Conclusion
All of the above factors have dovetailed to make violence the method of choice to
resolve

a

range

of

political

differences

and

to

obtain

political

power.

Furthermore, because the violence surrounding elections has been ethnically
directed, this has increased distrust among different groups and vastly eroded
any sense of national identity. Hence, ethnicity has now taken on a dangerous
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and negative connotation. The basic issue facing the nation is how to deal with
these issues. Attempts have been made to crack down on gangs and half
heartedly to reform institutions. Neither has been successful, in part because
the Government has not been serious, has not been willing to address generic
issues or underlying causes of violence.
Furthermore, the main perpetrators of systemic violence have never been
prosecuted. Currently Kenya is at a critical juncture. Violence is endemic, out of
control, is used routinely to resolve political differences, and threatens the future
of the nation. Because of the ethnic nature of the post-election violence, ethnic
fears and hatred have been elevated in importance and could turn violent again
even more easily than has happened in the past. What is required to address the
points discussed above is political will and some basic decisions to change the
way politics is conducted, as well as to address its intersection with other issues
related to land, marginalization and inequality, and youth. Short of that, violence
including that related to elections will continue to appear and will be ignited ever
more readily. Kenya needs to decide if it wishes to let violence, corruption, and
powerless institutions prevail or to introduce fundamental change. Simply put,
the individuals and institutions who have benefited in the short term from the
chaos and violence need to give up the methods they have used or Kenya could
become a failed state. The report which follows is dedicated to discussing the
Commission’s findings on the post 2007 elections violence and making
recommendations on transforming the current situation.
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CHAPTER THREE
Violence in Rift Valley Province

The North Rift Region
Introduction
The North Rift region comprises the districts of Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia West,
Trans Nzoia East, Nandi North, Nandi South, Marakwet, Keiyo, Baringo North
and Baringo South. The evidence made available to the Commission in relation
to those districts is examined below, but more so, in relation to Uasin Gishu and
Trans Nzoia which experienced the epicentre of the post election violence in that
region.
The Uasin Gishu District covers an area of 3218 square kilometres. It borders
Lugari district of Western Province to the west. To the east, it borders Keiyo,
Marakwet and Koibatek. On the southern side, it borders Nandi North and Nandi
South districts. The Trans Nzoia districts of East and West are in the north. It
shares a small boundary with Kipkelion at its south easterly tip. The district is
divided into six administrative divisions namely Turbo, Soy, Moiben, Ainabkoi,
Kesses and Kapsaret. Politically, it has 3 constituencies namely Eldoret North,
Eldoret East and Eldoret South.

It has three local authorities namely:

the

Municipal Council of Eldoret, the County Council of Wareng and the Town
Council of Burnt Forest.
At an annual growth rate of about 4%, the population of Uasin Gishu, estimated
at 744,083 in 1999, is currently close to one million people and a fair mix of all
Kenyan communities. The district’s economy is agricultural based. There are a
few industries in Eldoret, which is the district headquarters. Eldoret town is the
commercial hub of the North Rift region.
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It is well linked to the rest of the

country by rail, air and road networks. It has many institutions of higher
learning, a referral hospital and other vital installation such as the Kenya
Pipeline Oil Depot which serves some of the neighbouring countries.
More than in any other part of the country, with the exception of the Molo
district in Central Rift, violence in North Rift bore resemblance to previous cycles
of election related ethnic violence. It is worth noting that the Akiwumi Report
and the question related to acting upon its recommendation were most
discussed in our hearings on the North Rift. The Commission therefore felt
necessary to examine the pattern, actors and consequences of the 2007 post
election violence in this region in the general context of the legacy of ethnic
clashes experienced during previous election periods.

Pre-Election Period and the Legacy of the 1990s State Sponsored Violence
Previously, the North Rift had experienced serious violence before the
presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1997. In 2007, the main
difference was that the violence was more intense, more widespread, was urban
as well as rural, lasted longer, and occurred after rather than before the
elections.
The North Rift is one of the regions which was investigated and extensively
covered in the Akiwumi Report.10 According to that Report, the clashes broke out
in Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, on 29 October 1991 before spreading out
to other parts of the Rift Valley. Paragraphs 90 and 91 of the Report summarize
the general nature of the violence and are reproduced below:
“90. In each clash area, non-Kalenjin or non-Maasai, as the case may
be, were suddenly attacked, their houses set on fire, their properties
looted and in certain instances, some of them were either killed or
severely injured with traditional weapons like bows and arrows,
spears, pangas, swords and clubs. The raiders were well organized

10

Exhibit 134 (a) Pg. 59 – 189.
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and co-ordinated. Their attacks were generally under the cover of
darkness, and where the attackers were in broad daylight, the
raiders would smear their faces with clay to conceal their identities.
The attackers targeted mainly the Kikuyu, but also the Kisii, the
Luhya, and the Luo, other non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai communities
were not spared. The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated
to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, to cripple them
economically and to psychologically traumatize them. Many of the
victims were forced to camp in schools, church compounds and
shopping centres. There they lived in makeshift structures of
polythene sheets, cardboard and similar materials. They had little
food and belongings with them and lived in poor sanitary conditions
with their children who could no longer go to school. There was also a
general lack of concern by the Provincial administration and the Police
Force for their security and general welfare.
91. In general, the clashes started and ended suddenly, and left a
trail of destruction suffering and disruption of life hitherto unknown in
this country. The causes of the clashes have been given as conflict
over land, cattle rustling, political differences and ecological reasons
among others. As stated elsewhere in this Report, these reasons were
proffered to conceal the real motive or reason for the clashes.”
The Akiwumi Commission came to the conclusion that there were three
underlying reasons for the clashes:
1)
2)

3)

“Ambitions by Kalenjins of recovering what they think they
lost when the Europeans forcibly acquired their ancestral
land.
The desire to remove “foreigners”, derogatorily referred to as
“madoadoa” or “spots” from their midst. The reference was
mainly towards the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo and other
communities who had found permanent residence in the Rift
Valley.
Political and ethnic loyalty.”

The Akiwumi Commission also came to the conclusion that the security forces
and the Provincial Administration were negligent and unwilling to take firm and
drastic action to prevent the clashes from erupting or once these erupted, to
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bring a quick end to them. Tribal leaders and politicians were also found to have
instigated the clashes.11
Recommendations were made to prevent the future recurrence of violence
including

recommendations

for

the

investigations

of

named

individuals

suspected to have had a hand in the violence. But the findings and
recommendations of that Commission, as related to the Rift Valley, were rejected
by sections of the Government of the day and there followed no further visible
action on the Report12.

Build up of Tension
Although several Government officials testified that the lead up to the elections
was peaceful and did not experience any violence, there was also evidence that
in the lead up to the elections all was not well. For example, the DC for Uasin
Gishu Bernard Kinyua, started by saying that in his district “polling was smooth,
very smooth, indeed the smoothest I have ever seen”. However, when specific
incidents were put to him, he acknowledged that there were violent skirmishes
before the elections and these contributed to an atmosphere of ever-escalating
tension.
These incidents included the burning in Eldoret of a vehicle belonging to the
Brookside Factory on 26th December, on suspicions, later disproved, that stuffed
ballots were stored in the premises of the Company, the attempts to burn
another vehicle belonging to a bus company, Mololine, on the same day and for
the same reason and the suspension, two days earlier, of the transportation of
people to and from Eldoret, by bus operators who feared for the safety of their
vehicles. Witnesses testified that electioneering continued throughout the period
after the conclusion of the referendum exercise on the proposed new

11

Exhibit 134 paragraph 524

12

Exhibit 134 (b)
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Constitution in 2005, and that, on all sides of the political divide, inciteful
utterances were made by politicians and their cronies as part of the campaigns.
According Stephen Ikua, the Koibatek DC, the Kalenjin people were made to
believe that they had been marginalized by the Government and that their people
had been removed from Government positions unfairly. The NSIS district coordinator for Uasin Gishu informed the Commission that during the 2005
referendum, the Kalenjin viewed the Kikuyu as arrogant and also felt that the
Kikuyu looked down upon them, notwithstanding the fact that the Kalenjin were
host to a large number of Kikuyu people. The DC for Koibatek, confirmed the
extension of campaigns beyond the referendum period and also that there was a
build up of tension resulting from the messages that were delivered as part of
the campaigning. Although he was not able to furnish the Commission with a
single example to verify his claims, he added that during the campaigns,
vernacular radio stations were involved in the incitement of people along ethnic
lines. The “majimbo” debate was particularly divisive as it brought back the
issues of recovery of ancestral land by the Kalenjins and removal of “foreigners”
(madoadoa) from the land, all underlying reasons for the 1990s clashes.
According to the Uasin Gishu DC, Bernard Kinyua, references to madoadoa
“were used frequently even in normal discourse within the district”. As the
political temperature rose, so did incidents of violent confrontations between the
political actors before election day. As discussed later, in all those pre-election
incidents of violence, no one was arrested and those who were, were released
without any charges or prosecution.
Although it was the impression of many witnesses that violence in the North Rift
began on 30 December 2007 immediately after the Electoral Commission of
Kenya (ECK) announced the presidential results of the 27 December polls, there
was evidence that violence had began even before the election results were
announced. For example the DC for Nandi South, Mabeya Mogaka, testified that
violence in his district had begun on 29th December. The delay in the
announcement of the results of the presidential elections, allegations of
problems in the conduct of the election by both local and foreign observers, the
view that any ODM loss would be the result of rigging and hence illegitimate, as
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well as incendiary remarks and hate speech by politicians, FM local media
stations, and the public had built up noticeable tensions in many parts of the
country.
The Commission established that this was so also in Uasin Gishu District, which
was the epicenter of the violence.

Nature and extent of violence
Various administrative officials and senior police officers in the North Rift who
testified before us reported that massive violence all across Uasin Gishu District
in particular, as well as in various parts of Nandi, and elsewhere erupted
suddenly immediately after the ECK announced the presidential results on 30
December. In Uasin Gishu, the violence entailed large marauding gangs of
1,000-2,000 Kalenjin youth, brandishing machetes, bows and poisonous arrows,
occasional firearms, matches and projectiles filled with petrol. These menacing
gangs blocked and manned a variety of roads with trees trunks and huge rocks,
some of which were transported by tractors, throughout the district. They also
burned vehicles and tyres while refusing to allow anyone to pass as well as
engaging in killing, rioting, and looting.13 This included numerous simultaneous
attacks and cutting off all five entrances to Eldoret town, other roads and
highways, as well as the main artery to Kisumu and Uganda, and beyond from
Timboroa to Turbo.
The Director of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, Prof. Harun Mengech,
mentioned that some road blocks were established as early as 29 December. The
violence was so overwhelming that for some time, long term trade was at a
standstill with no supplies going in or out of Uganda and Eastern Congo. The
Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee (PSIC) finally decided to call in
the military to clear the blocked highways and other feeder roads, including
13

From testimonies of CW 59, 60, 67, 74, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86; also exhibit 125, pp61‐69; testimony from numerous
other eye witnesses interviewed by Commission investigators.
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escorting public service vehicles (PSVs) and tankers from the Eldoret Pipeline to
the Kenya Uganda border. Security personnel deployed by the OCPD also
assisted in protecting life and property, guarding IDP camps, and transferring
them from the interior to safer locations in the centre.
The barricades in town were so severe that, according to Prof. Mengech he tried
unsuccessfully twice to get to his hospital on 30 December, first through the
Moi’s Bridge/Matunda route and then through the Ziwa route. In each case he
encountered youths, estimated to be between 15-20 years old, who were
blocking the roads and who warned him he might not make it to the hospital. It
took until 2 January 2008 for Prof. Mengech to reach the hospital and then only
when the DC and the police gave him an armed escort.
Within Eldoret town, the less well off areas of Munyaka, Silas, and Langas
estates experienced heavy violence with a former international athlete, Lucas
Sang killed. According to evidence presented by the KNCHR, Yamumbi, a farm
area near to Eldoret was also seriously affected. Kalenjin raiders torched houses
owned by Kikuyus there. Two deaths ensued, with one person dying in the
presence of two police officers who had invaded the victim’s home. According to
the evidence, the Kalenjin gangs reportedly came from the rural areas to attack
Kikuyu residents in Eldoret town.14
The former OCPD for Eldoret Division, Angelus Karuru, told the Commission
that on 30 December, his office began receiving reports from all over the district
of arson, theft, the destruction and looting of property, and the taking of
livestock. Outside of town, gangs with crude weapons also barricaded access to
various sites, including farming communities in the largely Kikuyu inhabited
settlement schemes. Here, mostly unsuspecting and terrified victims were
suddenly overwhelmed by large numbers of Kalenjin youth who set fire to their
compounds, burned and stole their possessions, as well as maiming, gang
raping, and hacking to death large numbers of defenseless families, most of
whom were Kikuyu. The DC said that the main areas affected were Kiambaa,

14

Exhibit 125
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Rurigi, Rukuini, Kiamumbi, Moiben Division, Matunda in Soi Division, and the
area around Turbo.
The nature of violence was best rendered in personal stories the victims and eye
witnesses told the Commission. As one informant told Commission investigators,
“At about midnight on December 30…I was awoken by screams.
When I went out of the house I saw that neighbor’s homes belonging
to Kikuyu were on fire. I remained out up to morning. I went to check
what was happening. I saw houses burning at the boundary of
Langas and Kapseret”.
Another witness rendered yet another heart wrenching tale as follows:
“Some Nandi were running after people on the road. I ran away with
my children. I saw a man being killed by cutting with a panga and hit
by clubs when I was running. I fell near a seasonal river in Kipkendui
primary school while running away. My last born child fell a distance
away from my arm, was hurt, and was crying. Some people were
running after me and when I fell, two men caught me. They tore my
panties and they both raped me in turn.”15
In some cases, victims were attacked and killed by unknown assailants, in
others the perpetrators were people they knew, including neighbors. One farmer
from Chegaiya sub-location in Kesses Location testified to the Commission about
having watched seven members of his immediate family being hacked to death,
including his wife, who was hit on her head with a rungu and had her throat
“slit with a panga”. He knew many of the attackers, some of whom were his
neighbors and identified them by name to the Commission, as well as the
numbers and owners of the vehicles which “were used to transport the armed
youth from Meteitei”. A summary of his testimony is in the below.

15 IDP witness living in Eldoret showground interviewed by CIPEV investigators
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An Elder Watches as His Family is Attacked
70 year old Mzee Joseph Mwangi Macharia (Karobe) watched as seven members of his
family were hacked to death – his wife, three sons (aged 36, 33 and 23), one daughter
(aged 25), a grandson (aged 6) and a granddaughter (aged 6). He narrated his ordeal as
follows:
On 31st December, 2007 at about 5 p.m., he had a family get-together in his house at
Chagaiya village in Kesses location, when a group of about forty young people, among
them his neighbours, struck. They said they wanted five heads from that house – his
and his four sons’.
As he pleaded for mercy one of them struck his son on the chest with a club and
another shot him with an arrow as he tried to escape. Another son was pierced with a
spear and his throat was cut. The rest of the family tried to hide inside the house but it
was broken down and they were pulled out. His daughter and her child were pulled out
and their throats were slit. So was his wife’s throat. That is when Mzee Macharia
escaped into a nearby bush and watched as his house was set on fire. He stayed in the
bush until the following morning.
In the morning he went to a nearby AP camp where he collapsed and became
unconscious. Three days later he was assisted by the APs and neighbours to dig a
shallow grave where he buried his family before moving to an IDP camp in Limuru.
They were only exhumed on 28th April, 2008 and given a decent burial.
Mzee Macharia knew at least 14 of the assailants and recognized them during the
attack.

In a few cases members of the Kikuyu community were able to resist the attacks
and even hit back at their attackers. In Matunda Centre, for example, some 14 –
25 young Kalenjin men were hacked to death after they invaded the area in
January 2008 to raid businesses at the centre. They were overpowered by the
local residents who killed all of them. In another incident, an eyewitness told
Commission investigators the following:
“On the 31st December I saw Kalenjin warriors being ferried by lorries
from the Ziwa area. They were armed with arrows and bows.
Immediately after alighting from the lorries they met with a rival
group of Kikuyu youth from Munyaka. We had been told that a group
of Kikuyu youth were coming from there to defend us against the
Kalenjin attackers. They were armed with pangas (machetes) and
rungus (clubs). Then a confrontation ensued between the Kikuyu
youth and the Kalenjin youth. The Kalenjin would shout at the
Kikuyus who would in turn respond by charging at them with the
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clubs and machetes. Shortly thereafter, police arrived on the scene
and dispersed the combatants. The Kalenjins retreated towards the
bushes in the Junction area and the Kikuyu retreated to Beta Farm.
The Kalenjins set houses on fire as they retreated.”
Overall, though, both the police and members of communities perceived to be
both foreigners and PNU sympathizers (Kikuyu and Kisii in particular) were
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the violence and the number of the attackers.
Those who escaped death ran to seek refuge in places they thought would be
safe including churches, police stations, schools, and mosques. Among these
many tragic stories, the incident which captured the attention of both Kenyans
and the world was the deliberate burning alive of mostly Kikuyu women and
children huddled together in a church in Kiambaa on 1 January 2008. They had
sought refuge in the church following a 30 December attack on their village of
Kimuri, bordering Kiambaa. According to reports, including witness testimony,
mattresses and blankets were set ablaze with petrol and thrown into the building
while mothers and babies who were trying to flee the inferno were pushed back
into the church. Kikuyu men attempting to defend their church and loved ones
were hacked to death with machetes, shot with arrows, or pursued and killed.
The death toll for this horrific incident was 17 burned alive in the church, 11
dying in or on the way to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, and 54 others
injured who were treated and discharged. One woman who lost her mother in
the inferno captured the horror of what happened when she told our
investigators that:
“On the 1st of January 2008 at around 10 a.m., I heard people yelling
that some raiders were coming. I saw smoke coming from some
houses in our village and the houses were burning. Everyone in the
village started running away to the church (KAG). My mother who
was 90 years old was with me at the time. I decided to take my
mother into the church for safety. After a few minutes, I saw more
raiders coming towards the church….We thought the raiders would
not attack the church. Many people were being pushed into the church
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by the raiders. The raiders threw some mattress into the roof of the
church and threw more into the church. They were also pouring fuel
(petrol) onto the mattresses. All of a sudden I saw fire break out. I
took my mother toward to [the] main door to get her outside, but there
were many others scrambling toward the door as well. We both fell
onto the floor. I wanted to save my mother from the burning church,
but one of the raiders prevented me. I saw the fire had reached where
my mother was. I heard her cry for help as the fire burnt her, but I
could not help.”

An official of the Kiambaa Cooperative Farm, who testified in camera, also
confirmed the above account, noting that those who had taken refuge in the
church were surrounded on all sides and adding that when the “raiders” reached
the church:
“they started throwing stones, arrows and forcing children, women,
and old ones in the church. They took all mattresses pouring petrol on
and laying some at the roof…, against the wall and at the doors and
set ablaze so all men trying to come outside was killed. Others
escaped [and] survived with major cuts and inside were so many
dead and others burned beyond recognition and some escaped
severely burned….I saw many that I know them for many years but
the constitution of this country was made for Kalenjin because they
are able to kill, burn houses and also to loot livestock and there is no
law to prosecute them”.16

Although many attempts were made to quell the violence in Uasin Gishu District,
the testimony of Government officials to the Commission is that it continued
16 The Commission was informed that this particular incident is now the subject of a court trial (Nakuru High Court
Criminal Case No. 34 of 2008 [Republic v. Stephen Leting and 3 others]) and 4 persons have been charged with 8
counts of murder.
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almost unremittingly, with increasing numbers of IDPs pouring into camps.
According to officials, violence did not abate until the peace accord between the
two political aspirants for the presidency, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, was
signed in Nairobi, but even after this, according to the DC Bernard Kinyua, they
still continued to experience all sorts of incidents.
The Commission also received evidence on the nature and extent of violence in
the areas contiguous to Uasin Gishu, including Nandi North and Nandi South
Districts. In his sworn testimony, the former D.C. for Nandi North, Mabeya
Mogaka, told the Commission that there had been tension in the district for
some time in part the result of Luhyas having bought land in Kapkangani,
Kipkaren, and Chepkumia, as well as two Luhya candidates having been cleared
to contest a parliamentary seat, something that was not accepted by prominent
Nandi personalities in the district. He also noted that the administration had
expected trouble including violence if either Luhya candidate won the election.
According to the D.C., violence erupted immediately after the presidential results
were announced on 30 December, but had already started before then on 29
December. Overall the violence led to 1,475 homes being burned and destroyed
and 7,800 people being displaced. Even though one person died in the end only
12 individuals were arrested despite all the violence and destruction. Violence
was directed at PNU supporters, government departments and houses, and the
ethnically mixed Baraton University, with the worst destruction occurring after
the newly elected MP for Ainamoi was shot dead on 31 January 2008.
The Commission was also told that at the height of the violence, the provincial
administration allowed a demonstration of 70,000 individuals from Nandi North
and South to take place in Kapsabet, after having engaged with 12 Nandi elders
to ensure that it was peaceful. The mere idea of a large demonstration was
threatening enough to the displaced to make many of them move to the police
station for safety, while numerous Kikuyu and Kisii asked for assistance to
leave, something we were told the district administration helped them do. 8,000
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IDPs who had taken refuge in the Kapsabet police station and other in the
Kabiyet police station were also being threatened and therefore were moved.17

Impact of the Violence
According to District Commissioner Kinyua and SSP Karuru, 205 people died in
the post-election violence in the Uasin Gishu district. 167 of them have been
identified while 38 remain unidentified in the mortuary. Among those who died
were an Administration Police Officer, Ewafula Wakhungu and a District Officer
(DO). Both were killed in Cheptiret near the Chebii Primary School as they were
attempting to quell violence at an illegal road block on 1 January 2008.
From other witness testimony, mortuary records and other sources, including
the evidence of the Director of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital Prof. Harun
Mengech, the Commission was however able to determine that 272 persons died
in the post election violence in Uasin Gishu District. The Casualty Section of the
hospital recorded 521 victims of post-election violence. 50% were Kikuyu, 22%
Kalenjin, 4% Luo, 9% Kisii and Luhya and 10% other tribes. The majority of
these were young people. 161 of these were admitted while the rest were treated
and discharged. Of those admitted 36 died from their injuries. The police
brought another 107 bodies into the hospital’s mortuary, while the Kenya Red
Cross brought 20. The total number of deaths recorded at the hospital was
therefore 163.
Out of the 127 bodies received from outside the hospital, Langas had the highest
number of deaths followed by Kiambaa. The distribution was as follows: - Langas
30, Kiambaa 20, Huruma 14, Hawaya 10, Malime 8, Tarakwa 7, Munyaka 7,
Kimumu 6, Cheptiret 5, Kapsoya 4 and others 16 totalling to 127. Thirty three
(33) bodies remain unidentified in the Hospital mortuary.

17
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The causes of death according to the post mortems carried out showed that the
majority of the deaths were due to sharp/pointed objects (33%), followed by
burns (22%), blunt objects (14%), gun shots (14%), arrow wounds 6% and
broken bones, 3% and others in that order.
Of the 163 deceased, the majority were between the ages of 21 and 30 (27%), the
ages 41 – 50 (18%), ages 31 – 40 (15%). The possibility that there were dead
people who were not brought to the hospital was not ruled out.

The period

covered in the statistics was between 30th December, 2007 up to 6th February,
2008.
Property was also destroyed during the attacks. According to police records,
52,611 houses were burnt; 58 motor vehicles belonging to civilians and 2
government vehicles were also burnt.
A total of 21,749 people were displaced from their homes, other places of
residence and businesses and they were accommodated in IDP Camps. 13,417
have since been reportedly resettled leaving 592 still in IDP Camps.
From 30 December 2007 to 6 February 2008, the Moi Teaching and Referral
Hospital in Eldoret received 521 patients. It was assisted with cold storage
facilities and supplies by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
given that its own mortuary could take only 48 bodies. According to the
hospital’s Director, about half of the victims received at the hospital were
Kikuyu, about a fifth Kalenjin with others being Luhya, Kisii, Turkana, and
Muslim. Most of the deceased were under forty with a concentration of
individuals with almost 30% being between 21 and 30. The range in age of those
who were injured and died was between 3 to 85. The numbers include those
from hospitals outside the district as the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital is
the only one with a mortuary and hence when bodies were found they were
brought there. Even then, some victims of the violence never made it to any
hospital, which accounts for the higher numbers of 205 dead in District in the
police registry mentioned by the DC for Uasin Gishu.
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The Commission also heard testimony about the impact of the post election
violence in other parts of the North Rift, mostly from districts bordering Uasin
Gishu District. This, and other information received demonstrates the extent of
the post-election violence and the dislocations throughout the region, some of
which had spilled over from Uasin Gishu, and some from the Mount Elgon
region in Western Province.
Dr. Sammy Osore, witness no. 61 and currently the District Medical Officer for
West Pokot, was previously the District Medical Officer for Marakwet District,
which borders on Uasin Gishu District. He confirmed that his hospital did not
received patients with injuries from post-election violence. However, he noted
that they provided drugs and medical supplies to an IDP camp at Kapchorop
Division, bordering Trans Nzoia, where there had been a lot of violence. The
camp contained 140 adults and 70 children who took refuge there because their
lives were endangered. It was dismantled and consolidated with one in
Kachibora in Trans Nzoia. He also mentioned that four of his staff, including two
who lived in Chebyemit Market in Marakwet District had their houses broken
into while they were voting and two others were displaced but neither was
harmed or injured.
Dr. Stephen Kaiya, the District Medical Officer for Nandi South testified that his
District Hospital in Nandi Hills received 160 patients: 124 outpatients and 36 in
patients, due to the post election violence. The majority of the outpatient cases
had soft tissue injuries (48) and cut wounds (39), along with three rapes and
other problems. Of those admitted, there were 11 with gunshot wounds, 6 with
burns, 8 with cuts, and other injuries, with no recorded deaths. Most of those
who came to his facility were from within the district, but he also had some
patients who came from Nyando District which borders Nandi South and others
from as far away as Burnt Forest.
The District Medical Officer for Nandi North, Dr. Shadrack Keimi, testified that
the District hospital in Kapsabet Municipality is between Uasin Gishu and Nandi
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North, while the sub- district hospital is in Chepcherut. Although there were no
fatalities there, the district as a whole recorded seven casualties. He also testified
that 35 of his health care workers in various facilities in the District were
threatened, with some having had their property destroyed and becoming IDPs,
while another had to leave for “tribal reasons” resulting in the closure of the
Kaptenyaloi Dispensary. The District Hospital received 228 patients: 151 with
wounds from cuts (over half of which were women), 60 from blunt objects, 9 with
fractures, and 2 from gunshots, as well as well as some with other injuries. The
Mosoriot health center in the northern part of Nandi North, bordering Uasin
Gishu, received 120 victims of post election violence. 103 had cut wounds with
over half also suffering from blunt object injuries, and seven from gunshots,
while the Kapkangani center bordering Nandi North and Western Province saw
23 patients , 22 of whom had cut wounds as well as one from an arrow shot.18
The District Medical Officer from Trans Nzoia District, Dr. Philomen Too, witness
no. 64, is based in the Kitale Hospital which covers both the eastern and western
parts of the District. In Trans Nzoia West the most severely affected areas were
in Gituamba, Timbora Location in Saboti Division and Waumini near Kitale
town, while in Trans Nzoia East, Geta Farm Salama, Kalaa area, and Makutano
were the hardest hit. Five hundred and eight patients received treatment at the
Kitale District Hospital from injuries stemming from post-election violence,
including 119 gender based cases from rape or defilement, while the police
recovered 105 bodies, not all of which were retrieved from the conflict areas. The
injuries received included 137 from sharp or pointed objects, 329 due to blunt
objects, 36 from burns, and 9 from gunshots. One hundred and five patients
died, including 17 from gunshot wounds. The dislocation from the violence was
so extensive that 5 IDP camps were set up in Trans Nzoia West and 4 in Trans
Nzoia East.
Both DCs for Trans Nzoia West and East, Francis Mutie and Seif Matata said the
violence in their districts, including the torching of Gituamba town and the
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violence in Endebbes, which was involved in the ethnic clashes in 1992 and
1997, stemmed from a spillover from the conflict in Mount Elgon and
consequent attacks by SDLF militia.
Response by Police and Provincial Administration
In accordance with our Terms of Reference, one of the main areas of our inquiry
was to find out whether and to what extent the local administration and police
were prepared for the violence that erupted, and how they ultimately responded
to it. We shall now discuss the evidence presented before us in this area, which
indicates that the police and the local administration were caught totally
unprepared by the violence. We shall examine the police response in light of the
availability of intelligence information indicating the high likelihood of violence.
We shall conclude this section by discussing whether violence in North Rift was
planned or spontaneous with no prior planning, as was the testimony of local
administration officials.
The Provincial Administration and Security Forces
This issue is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Report. We shall limit
ourselves to aspects particular to acts and omissions attributed to the police and
the administration in the North Rift.
According to Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu’s District Commissioner and the
OCPD of Keiyo Division (previously OCPD of Eldoret Division) Angelus Karuru’s
testimonies before us, the DSIC was prepared for the possibility of pre-election
violence, including the likelihood of some celebratory violence after the election
in Uasin Gishu. However, they did not anticipate widespread post-election
violence, had not developed contingency plans for it, and had not beefed up their
existing force of 600 police officers.19 Their testimony to the Commission was
nevertheless that they were ready even though when the violence erupted they
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were forced to call in reinforcements from Baringo, West Pokot and Nairobi for
contingents of GSU, the Anti-Stock Unit, the Administrative Police (AP), and
some military personnel.
A resident of Langas estate in Eldoret told Commission investigators that the
police there were generally ineffective and unable to control roving gangs which
surrounded the estate until the Police Commissioner arrived by helicopter with
GSU reinforcements.20 That view has the support of a local religious leader who
asserted that the security forces were powerless against the violence and
furthermore there were ethnic divisions amongst them.21 Once reinforced, the
district used its forces to unblock the main arteries and to disperse the gangs of
young Kalenjin attackers in town and elsewhere. In conjunction with the DC’s
office they also assisted victims by bringing them to IDP camps which initially
were established in the area at the ASK Showground in Eldoret, at 8 camps in
the Mau Forest, and in Mathare. Later they took the initiative to move them out
of hostile rural areas when they received intelligence that Kalenjin warriors were
planning to attack and evict IDPs from the camps themselves.
The Commission was given evidence that the police were obviously overwhelmed
by criminal gangs who proceeded in large numbers and appeared to plan their
attacks. Roadblocks were manned and security forces and health care providers
denied free movement. This hampered the police ability to rescue distressed
victims of the attacks. The first time district officials heard of plans by Kalenjin
youth to attack the Kiambaa farm, for instance, was during a DSIC meeting on
31 December 2007. According to the OCPD, his office immediately dispatched
officers to the area. However, because the access road was heavily blocked with
rocks and old tractors at the turnoff to Kiambaa on the Nakuru Eldoret Road,
they could not proceed. By the time they arrived the church at Kiambaa had
been burned to the ground with the charred remains of the victims still inside.
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In some cases, police on rescue missions faced not just road blocks but also
attacks by hostile gangs of Kalenjin youths. The Commission heard about an
incident in which five policemen in a land rover on a mission to assist an old
Kikuyu man at Soi, encountered heavy road blocks from Huruma to Turbo and
from Huruma up to Kitale. They were repelled by gangs of youth armed with
bows and arrows, and had to return later to rescue him. A similar situation
ensued at Mailu Nne on 31 December 2007. In still other cases, the police
themselves were overwhelmed, attacked, and even killed.
Beyond this the police took two pre-emptive measures which may have helped to
minimize the violence. First, the OPCD for Uasin Gishu, Angelus Karuru, asked
all five petrol stations in town to stop selling small amounts of petrol to
individuals as opposed to legitimate motorists. He was acting on intelligence that
petrol might have been used to set Kikuyu and Kisii houses on fire. Second,
upon receiving intelligence of possible attacks on IDP camps that had been set
up in areas where there had been violence, also mentioned in NSIS’s intelligence
reports, he immediately deployed forces and vehicles to have them moved to
safety in town as did some officials in the provincial administration in other
parts of the North Rift. As witness number 86 from Chegaiya sub location who
had lost all his family members and who testified before the Commission noted:
“We remained in the Administration Police camp for four days.
The attackers continued to attack us even in the camp. The Kalenjin
officers in the camp joined their kinsmen in the attacks and the
Kikuyu Administration Police officer had to take rifles from them.”
On the other hand, there were numerous reports of the police and other security
forces being heavy handed and even worse. During the violence they chased a
group of demonstrators near the Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret and in the
process lobbed both tear gas and fired bullets into the hospital. The D.C. for
Uasin Gishu testifying before the Commission denied that this had happened
saying that the tear gas must have been a by-product of what was used outside
the hospital. However both the head of the Hospital and its guards told the
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Commission that the police tried to enter the Hospital by force. Cross
examination revealed that both canisters and bullet casings were found inside
the Hospital, the OPCD admitting in his testimony that it was possible that in
fact tear gas and bullets were fired into the hospital.
The Commission also received evidence of numerous other instances of police
brutality. Witnesses spoke under oath of horrifying tales of police brutality and
indifference. This included police standing by, doing nothing and not coming to
the assistance of individuals and communities under attack, joining in the
attacks, including raping already vulnerable victims, and taunting Kikuyu
victims with one of Kibaki’s campaign slogans, “kazi iendelee” (let the work
continue) as they stood by watching helpless victims being attacked. In other
cases there were reports of victims under attack seeking police help and being
turned away. Among many cases, the Commission was able to determine that a
senior police officer in Eldoret was responsible for personally shooting a number
of individuals. The Commission visited one such victim at a hospital where he
had been admitted with wounds sustained from gun fire. Similar allegations
were made in the evidence produced by the KNCHR.
The Commission was told that some chiefs either passively or actively
collaborated with the attackers. At least thirteen of them were later interdicted
after reports against them were made. In his sworn testimony, the District
Commissioner of Uasin Gishu, Bernard Kinyua, admitted to having “received
some information that the chiefs were not helpful” and “were not there for the
people”, although he claimed that he had no information that chiefs were
involved in the violence, nor were any names given in the intelligence reports he
received.22
However, evidence received by the Commission tells disturbing stories of chiefs
either standing by while violence was being committed, or even actively taking
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part in the commission of violent acts. A Kikuyu pastor from Burnt Forest had
this to say:
“The young Kalenjin men started attacking and shouting that nonKalenjin had to go. We tried telephoning the OCS Burnt Forest station
and the Chief countless times. Nothing happened. Kikuyu young men
started trying to defend themselves. There was no response. The
Chief arrived with his two police officers who were both Kalenjin. The
AP officers started pushing the Kikuyu men back as the Kalenjin men
burnt houses behind them. Everyone was pushed to the centre of the
Kikuyu farm”.23
Moreover, a resident of Kiambaa who testified to the Commission in private
submitted as an exhibit a memorandum from “residents of Uasin Gishu”,
identifying by name eight chiefs from “one ethnic group”, whom they claim had
fuelled tribal clashes in 1992 and 1997, who had been threatening “people from
other communities with eviction during the referendum in 2005”, and were
“frustrating” the return of those who were evicted from Burnt Forest and
Ainabkoi.
In short, while not denying many instances where police mobilized quickly to
assist victims to quell the violence or where they were overwhelmed, the
Commission also has evidence that in some other cases victims of post election
violence found the very people they thought would help and defend them as they
were under attack participating in the violence themselves or indifferent to their
plight.
Under these circumstances, it is not so surprising that many victims of post
election violence chose not to make reports to the police. This in itself was
another part of the tragic breakdown of law and order and indicative of the lack
of integrity of key government institutions including the security forces and parts

23

Statement recorded by Commission investigators

57

of the provincial administration. It is also a pattern that supports previous
findings from the Akiwumi Report.
Intelligence Concerning Post-Election Violence and Its Use
The National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the Provincial Security and
Intelligence Committee (PSIC), and the District Security and Intelligence
Committee (DSIC) each contributed intelligence information concerning security
in Kenya before, during, and after the election. Before the election, the NSIS
correctly analyzed the forces at work in the country and said that in the case of
either a Kibaki or Odinga loss there was a strong possibility of post election
violence, the worst case scenario being if the ODM candidate lost.24 Some of the
pre-election intelligence received by the Commission from the three agencies
predicted the post-election violence which engulfed the North Rift, particularly in
Uasin Gishu District.
The NSIS’s Situation and Hot Spot analysis from June 2007 until February
2008, given to the Commission,25 mostly concentrates on traditional conflict
areas such as Trans Nzoia, Molo, and other parts of the Rift and on gangs such
as Mungiki operating there and elsewhere. As early as three months before the
elections, the NSIS warned in its Situation Report of 25 September 2007, that “in
parts of Uasin Gishu, tension is brewing between the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu and
the Kisii following the Mugirango skirmishes with some Kalenjin tribesmen
terming the two communities their political enemies and threatening to evict
them. It added however with some premonition that “violence could engulf
different parts of the country if cases of incitement are not legally addressed as
they emerge.”
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In its “Hot Spot/Flash Point” Report of 19 October 2007, the NSIS noted that the
debate around Majimbo was already being used by some politicians in Nairobi,
Rift Valley and Coast provinces scheming and organizing local youth to attack
perceived outsiders in order to disenfranchise them and finally have the incident
blamed on Majimbo campaigns. NSIS added that “generally, the debate has
elicited a strong anti-Kikuyu sentiment due to the fact that the community is
also robustly opposed to the system.” The same briefing under the heading “Use
of Criminal Gangs” noted that as the campaigns intensify, the possibility of
various leaders/politicians resorting to reactivation and use of such gangs was
likely in Nairobi, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Gusiiland, Kuria and parts
of Central Province.
On 23 November 2007, NSIS noted that in Uasin Gishu District, “tension is
looming between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu within Timboroa Area following the
arrest of two members of the Kikuyu community for circulating anti ODM
leaflets.” And on 7 December 2007, NSIS warned that in Nandi North, the Nandi
and Luhya could clash at Os-Rongai area in Turbo Division where Nandi
tribesmen torched houses belonging to Luhya to avenge the killing of a Nandi
over alleged theft of property.
It is unclear from what the Commission has received and from its examination of
the intelligence reports from Uasin Gishu District whether the NSIS’s analysis,
and in particular its two case scenario was communicated downward to the
provinces and the districts or not, and why if the violence was planned and
organized, the NSIS either did not have this information or did not transmit it to
the field. Both the D.C. and the OCPD for Uasin Gishu testified to the
Commission that they did not receive any information about NSIS’s two
scenarios or potential problems if ODM did not win.
However, the NSIS Uasin Gishu District Co-ordinator who testified in camera
passed on some intelligence information to the DSIC about the possibility of preelection violence in Kesses as early as 30 October 2007. Furthermore, he also
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generated a security brief on 29 December 2007 which went to the DSIC stating
that “tension was high within Uasin Gishu district and that there was a
likelihood of violence targeting the Kikuyu community in a number of specifically
designated spots in the following divisions: Soy, Kesses, Turbo, Kapsaret, Eldoret
Town, and Ainabkoi.”26
Nevertheless, most officials from the North Rift, including the D.C. for Uasin
Gishu who chaired the above 29 December DSIC meeting as well as the OCPD
for Eldoret, and other officials testifying before the Commission said they did not
anticipate post-election violence. The Commission finds it surprising that
provincial administration officials would not anticipate some level of postelection violence while they were are that the pre-election period had been
extremely tense, filled with incendiary language, hate speech, innuendoes
concerning majimboism and the possibility of evicting outsiders, pamphlets
threatening war, and scattered references to politicians encouraging their
supporters to “violate the law.”
Having survived the 2005 referendum on the constitution without incident and
having completed what turned out to be a peaceful December 2007 election,
including the announcement of the parliamentary results on 27 and 28
December, officials did not think there would be serious problems after the
election, leave alone anticipate the debacle that engulfed the country. As
Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu District Commissioner noted, he had been
extremely vigilant and had intensified patrols before the election in areas that
had experienced pre-election violence in the past such as Yamumbi, Turbo, and
Burnt Forest, but he did not anticipate that violence could be on the scale on
which it happened. He explained in his testimony to the Commission that
previously nothing like this ever happened, adding that in the past, immediately
after elections were over, people would settle down to [their] daily business, but
this time it was the reverse. He said he had covered the district properly and
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thought he could handle any situation, adding, however, that in this case it was
“enormous”, “nothing like what we expected,” and “spontaneous.”
Nevertheless, he admitted that because of the utterances of some politicians, he
was aware that there was an expectation of an ODM win and that there might be
a refusal to accept anything else. However, he said he did not receive any
information from the NSIS or other agencies of unprecedented upheavals if ODM
did not win. This partly contradicts the intelligence information said to have
been relayed to the DSIC on 29 December 2007.
Notwithstanding this reality and similar sentiments conveyed from other officials
both in Uasin Gishu District and in other parts of the North Rift there were
reports of violence in the run up to the election indicative of heightened tensions,
as well as isolated attacks on businesses and burning of houses on farms even
before the ECK announced the presidential results on 30 December. This
included three houses allegedly having been burned in Lelmorok farm in Kesses
on 29 December, an incident about which the OCPD said he was not aware, but
which a resident who had been evicted four times previously, confirmed when he
testified to the Commission in camera, also naming some of those he alleged to
be the attackers.27
Furthermore, a former resident of Outspan Estate in Eldoret, said that the chaos
there began as early as 27th December, causing her to take refuge in a church
during the evening. In her statement to the Commission she said that “Kalenjins
started burning houses belonging to the Kikuyus on 28 December.” On 29
December, while checking on her property, she was then accosted and raped by
three men.28 Evidence submitted to the Commission by KNHCR also maintained
that some Kikuyu buried their possessions before the election in anticipation of
attacks29 while cross examination of officials from Eldoret suggested that some

27

CW. 85
CW 82
29
Exhibit 125.
28

61

Kikuyus had already left the area between 27th and 29th December to ensure
their safety. In addition, the D.C. of Uasin Gishu and the OCPD of Eldoret
Division noted that some public service vehicles stopped coming to town as early
as 24th December because of allegations that they were ferrying marked ballots.
There were also widespread allegations of rigging.
In spite of these incidents, it is not apparent that either administrative officials
or police refined their intelligence as a result, nor apparently was there any
sense of the unexpected impending disaster to follow. Furthermore, a witness
from Nandi Hills told the Commission that “[t]here were already tyres being
burned on the road from Nandi Hills to Kisumu” as of 26th December.30
Angelus Karuru, OPCD for Eldoret Division during the election told the
Commission there were four incidents before the election which he had
effectively contained, something that gave him confidence about handling
whatever might come up during and after the election. There was a shooting
incident on 17th November 2007 at Cheptiret Secondary School during the
ODM’s parliamentary and civic nominations when 200 of the party’s supporters
blocked the highway to the tallying centre, using logs, big stones, and their own
motor vehicles. The second was at Ziwa Sirikwa Trading Center on 27th
November 2007 when 100 ODM youth disrupted a PNU political rally. The third
was on 26th December 2007 when local politicians and foreign press stormed
the divisional headquarters to inspect a Molo Line Company minibus which was
alleged falsely, it turned out, to have brought administration police and ballot
boxes to be used to rig the election. Finally, on the same day in the early evening
at Keiyo Petrol Station, youths burned a pickup truck transferring ballots from
Keiyo Division to Kaptubei polling center, but the police moved in swiftly to
rescue the ballots. They also contained the other incidents, but no one was
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arrested, a point that was criticized under cross examination as having
contributed to a culture of impunity.31
Apart from the lack of anticipation of what might follow, the testimony by the
D.C. for Uasin Gishu and the OCPD for Eldoret suggests that neither followed up
on local intelligence and information they knew about. Had they taken the
initiative to do so, they might have pre-empted some of the post-election violence
which was experienced. It is not clear to the Commission if this was because of
the lack of capacity or the result of not wanting to tread on the toes of powerful
political personalities in the district for fear of retribution, something which had
been noted in the Akiwumi Report.
Neither the provincial administration nor the police investigated claims of
incitement by politicians or media stations. They claimed they did not know the
names of the two prominent athletes who were killed during the post election
violence. They appeared unwilling to discuss the ethnicity of their staff. They
said they did not know or follow up on reports concerning politicians engaged in
hostile acts or speech. They claimed they did not have any information on any
chiefs or police as having been involved in the violence. They did not look into
the source of hostile leaflets being distributed. They said they did not have
reports about which politicians were using the terms “madoadoa” and
“makwekwe” even though they had “heard about this generally”. They had no
information that youths were being trained to engage in violence.
In contrast, a witness told the Commission that the following “threatening
terms” were routinely used against Kikuyu: madoadoa (spots), maharagwe
(bean), bunyot (enemy), sangara (wild grass) with the additional notation that
they should be “uprooted”.32
When asked if he had followed up on some specific information the OCPD said
he had not. He argued that it was not the function of the police to follow up on
31
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general information as opposed to formal reports. The OCPD said that he “could
not rule out that the violence was planned,” but did not have any information to
this effect. Concerning incitement and hate speech he told the Commission that
he did not investigate “rumours” and that “you only investigate what has been
reported”, noting that “no one came forward to report and say ABCD said XYZ”.
When asked what he did about allegations that some athletes participated in the
post election violence, he said he had heard about it but “no one said so and so
was doing ABCD”, a phrase that was repeated several times following questions
directed at him when he testified to the Commission. He also did not formally
investigate the incident where the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital was
invaded and tear gassed by police, an incident confirmed to the Commission by
Jonathon K. Barno, head of the Security Department of the Hospital and Julius
K. Chelimo, the Security Supervisor at the hospital, who had tried to dissuade
the GSU officer in charge and who described the behavior of police officers at the
hospital as “merciless.”
This attitude of the OCPD is particularly troubling, but may not be so unusual
given the testimony of a senior provincial security officer that investigating the
post-election violence was extremely difficult given that witnesses were very
reluctant to come forward to give evidence for fear of reprisals,33 something also
reiterated by a resident of Nandi Hills.34
It is also possible that officials themselves did not want to delve too deeply into
matters that might come with the names of prominent, given that, as an Eldoret
resident noted: “[I]n the skirmishes in [the] Rift Valley no leaders from the area
condemned the violence”. As a Kikuyu from Lerumoruk farm in Nandi Hills
explained in trying to get the Commission to understand why even the multiethnic composition of the district administration was not a source of comfort to
him and others:
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“the DO is just two kilometres from the farm but anything can be said,
anything can be done with or without him there. We have very
powerful people in this District. The politicians here [in Uasin Gishu
District] decide what is to be done. It doesn’t matter what you say…”.
Furthermore, according to the provincial criminal investigation officer (PCIO),
even people like him have difficulty dealing with the “big fish”. As he noted in
testimony to the Commission:
“My Lord…when you arrest the so-called politicians, people don’t look
into the crime. They say the police have arrested one of our own. We
arrested some councillors in Buret and the council was so rowdy.
They stormed the whole Buret Police Station so much so that we were
compelled to release those councillors.”35
In the Commission’s view the lack of robust action by the administration officers
and the police to pre-empt the possibility of post-election violence can be put
down to several factors: complacency after peaceful polling given past history of
pre- rather than post-election violence; fatigue because so many officials from
both the provincial administration had been up for days either manning polls or
counting votes; lack of communication from the NSIS to the field; an
unwillingness to act on the of intelligence received, admittedly belatedly, by the
DSIC on 29th December; and a “play it safe” attitude on the part of district
officials who did not want to rock the boat, particularly given the tendency of
powerful politicians to call the shots at the local level and exact retribution,
problems tendencies reported earlier in the Akiwumi Report.
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Was the violence planned or spontaneous?
The question whether violence in North Rift was planned or spontaneous has as
many answers as there are respondents depending on the respondent’s ethnic or
political inclinations. There was also the view of the provincial administration,
that the post election violence in Uasin Gishu, indeed in the North Rift in
general, was spontaneous, was not planned. Thus the Commission heard
testimony in favour of both the view that the violence was planned and organized
as well as the view that it was spontaneous.
Those who hold the view that the violence was planned believe that it was a
contingency plan on the part of ODM politicians and supporters should the
election results go in favour of the PNU.
Those holding the view that the violence was planned and organized cite four
factors in support of their view: (i) testimony that information had spread within
communities prior to the violence that the Kalenjin would attempt attacks; (ii)
the testimony of witnesses who say they attended meetings or knew of
individuals

who

were

organizing

violence

both

before

and

after

the

announcement of the presidential results; (iii) information from NSIS intelligence
reports which have named key individuals and politicians as having been
involved; and (iv) circumstantial evidence pointing in the same direction.

We

shall now examine these four sources in light of evidence we received.
Advance Warning of Violence Conveyed to Communities
The Commission heard numerous testimonies indicating that advance warnings
were given to people in anticipation of the violence.

In most cases, advance

warnings are said to have been given to members of the Kikuyu community by
their Kalenjin friends, tenants, business partners, or relatives in inter-ethnic
marriages. In other cases, Kalenjin elders or church leaders who disapproved of
plans to attack Kikuyu are said to have sent advance warnings to their Kikuyu
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neighbors, congregation colleagues and friends. Statements collected by the
Commission investigators are illustrative of some of the warnings have been
given to individuals in advance of 30th December, including the following:
-“I wish to state that after the general election, I received information
from Kalenjin friends that there were some Kalenjin people who were
holding a meeting and preparing to burn my business. On 29
December 2007, I was warned to be careful by my tenants. Another
friend of mine called me on the phone and he informed me that there
were some people who had been sent with petrol to come and burn
the building down.” (Businessman from Tambach Trading Center in
Keiyo North interviewed by CIPEV investigators).
“On December 29th, I received a telephone call from the wife of the
Pastor at the AIC Church and she told me that young Kalenjin were
planning to attack the Kamuyu farm. On December 30, 2008
immediately after the announcement of the election result, homes
began burning around Kamuyu. The young Kalenjin men started
attacking and shouting that non-Kalenjin had to go. It all happened at
the same time in all the areas in Kamuyu”. (Pastor from Burnt Forest
interviewed by CIPEV investigators).
“A few days (before) the election KASS FM announced that there
would be rigging and in some of their open forums they encouraged
people to use the radio to incite people who gave their views. Most
people used the radio to say that whether PNU or ODM [won], Kikuyu
would be expelled from Rift Valley. So there was very high tension.”
(NARC activist from Kapseret Location, Uasin Gishu District,
interviewed by CIPEV investigators).
Furthermore, a resident of Eldoret town who testified in camera to the
Commission in Nairobi noted that “[f]rom 27 December all my friends from the
local community disappeared from town with their families, something that has
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never happened. On the eve of [the] announcement of Presidential Election
Results, the killings had already begun in such outlying areas such as Moiben”.
Incitement to and the Organization of Violence
The Commission heard from a number of witnesses who claimed to have first
hand information concerning the incitement to and the organization of the
violence in North Rift. Some of the witnesses were Kalenjin and had participated
in meetings they claimed were called with the view to organize the violence.
Others were insiders with information on planning of the attacks. Many were
Kalenjins who said they were threatened themselves or even attacked for not
joining or opposing the attacks on Kikuyu. Yet others were Kalenjins working as
campaign organizers for PNU and thus perceived as traitors to the cause of the
Kalenjin community. The Commission also heard from witnesses inferring
evidence of planning or organization from their own observation or personal
experience of the post-election violence.
A resident of Eldoret town36 maintained that the attacks on residents of the
outlying residential areas of Eldoret such as Ilula, Chepkoilel, Munyaka,
Kiambaa, Kambi ya Mumbi, and Turbo were part of “a coordinated attack”. In
defense of this view he notes that the road blocks were erected by young people
under the command of some senior and older people. He said that road blocks
were erected within five minutes of the announcement of the presidential
election results, making it impossible for his family and others to flee to safer
places like police stations and the Catholic Church. On the basis of his own
observations, he felt there had to be “lots of serious coordination and logistics
put in place for the warriors to approach Eldoret town from all directions at the
same time”, noting that in his area he observed over 5,000 in one go and that
they smeared themselves with the blood of the victims they had killed. He said
that friends who were under attack and called him from other areas observed
large bands of between 5,000- 7,000 youths approaching from Burnt Forest,
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Kaptarakwa, Kesses, Nandi Hills, Kapsabet and Turbo, wondering to himself how
they could have “travelled … hundreds of miles in five minutes”. He also thought
that the majority of those involved were from the “Kimnyengei age group” who
had been part of a massive oathing ceremony in August 2007 which took place
secretly in Kipkulei forest. This however had been disputed earlier by
representatives of the Kalenjin Community, including an EMO official, Bill Ruto,
and a Kalenjin elder, John Kiplagat Arap Koech, both of whom insisted this was
nothing more than a normal circumcision ceremony. This view was disputed by
the witness who claimed to have been told by some of his friends who refused to
take the oath that its purpose was to “conduct a cleanup operation” to “evict
foreign communities within their areas”.
Another witness, a Kalenjin resident of Nandi North and grassroots community
activist,37 testified before the Commission and said that the violence was not
spontaneous, a view which contrasted with the views of most government
officials interviewed by the Commission. He felt the violence was both well
coordinated and the actions well organized. He submitted videos of a campaign
rally on 5 December 2007 to the Commission to illustrate what he described as a
“systematic and deliberate effort by both the politicians and the media to whip
emotions both before the election and after[wards]”, also citing KASS FM as a
perpetrator. He also maintained that the incitement by politicians against the
Kikuyu explained the intensity of the post-election violence. He argued that the
politicians had prepared the masses to retaliate if elections did not go their way,
mentioning by name two sitting MPs, former and sitting councillors and political
activists. He also noted that as a result of these individuals’ behavior, it was “not
surprising… that the explosions in the Rift Valley and particular within the
Kalenjin Community happened almost concurrently and in the same manner’.
He claimed that “[t]hese activities were coordinated using cell phones, matatu
drivers and touts” and that [y]ouths who are considered to be idle were also
largely used.”
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Another witness, a Kalenjin resident of Soy Division in Eldoret North Division in
Uasin Gishu38 told the Commission that even prior to the election there was a
concerted campaign to evict the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley starting as early as
1st December 2007. He mentioned a meeting held on 1st December in Eldoret led
by a lawyer, which strategized on how to deal with the Kikuyu; a meeting held by
a prominent politician whose name he mentioned on 3rd August 2007 describing
anyone who voted for PNU as mad; and the destruction of eight houses belonging
to PNU supporters which were burnt after he had visited the area on 17th
December 2007. He also claimed that on 23rd December a meeting between some
athletes and a prominent politician, whose name he mentioned was held “to
prepare the youth for war” once they knew President Kibaki was winning. He
said that after this meeting an elder informed them he was going to get guns
from a friend in Mt. Elgon and that a retired policeman would assist with using
the guns and that somebody from Marakwet district was sent to purchase bows
and arrows from there. He also alleged that on 28th December 2007 after the
election an elder who was a point man for a prominent politician “…went around
Eldoret North with some athletes and other prominent people calling on youths
telling them to be ready for war, promising them support from the M.P…” The
witness also testified that on 27th January 2008, the MP held closed door
meetings at his house, promising to go on with the violence, after which the road
to Eldoret town was blocked and the violence went on. He said he was willing to
mention the names of persons he was referring to and information concerning
the vehicles that were used to transport the youth.
Furthermore, in a statement taken by Commission investigators, a businessman
at the Tambach Trading Center in Keiyo North alleged that two individuals,
whom he named, funded the violence in this area. Another witness interviewed
by CIPEV’s investigators claimed that “militias were ferried in lorries owned by a
local politician prominent, the attacks on the Kiambaa church was caused by
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some councillors who spread propaganda that the church held Mungiki
adherents from Central Province who were ready to attack the local Nandi
community.
Information Contained in NSIS Intelligence Reports
An NSIS official gave a statement to the Commission and also submitted several
NSIS “Security Briefs” which also had been received by the DSIC at the time.39
As early as 30 October 2007, there was a brief to the effect that a week earlier a
former Member for Parliament for Eldoret South, whose constituents were
threatening to unseat him, toured the Kesses area and told them they should get
rid of “madoadoa”. It was the assessment of the NSIS that the former MP likely to
use the Taliban thugs to intimidate his opponents during the campaign. Further,
on 29 December 2007, the NSIS identified the areas likely to be affected by postelection violence in Uasin Gishu District if Kibaki was declared the winner.
On 2nd January 2008 the NSIS said that the violence threatened to degenerate
into anarchy. From then through February they had intelligence concerning the
presence of gangs of Kalenjin and Nandi youth planning to attack Kikuyus and
Kisiis seeking refuge in Uasin Gishu District and of youth planning to burn
houses in Eldoret town belonging to ex MPs and others. They also noted early in
January that some ODM supporters intended to raid the Ngano factory in
Eldoret to steal munitions and were planning to seek the assistance of military
personnel guarding the factory who were sympathetic to ODM. Later on 4
January they identified an employee of the bullet factory in Eldoret as the leader
of youth groups involved in the violence there, further claiming that they shared
a password to be used to mobilize them for attack. On 8 January 2008, the NSIS
situation report identified an employee of the Eldoret Bullet Factory as a trainer
of the youth in the handling of firearms, use of grenades, and the destruction of
buildings, naming some of the training sites as being in the Sigowet Forest and
Kerio Valley. The Report also said that ODM leaders allegedly gave money to
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Kalenjin youth in Eldoret on 2nd January 2008 to attack Kikuyu at the Kipkaren
area in Eldoret town.
In a report of 8th January 2008, the NISIS said that “some senior Kalenjin
personalities were reported to be funding ODM activists to organize youth for
violence”. The NSIS say further that on 11th January, they received information
that prominent unnamed businessmen and professionals were financing the
acquisition of firearms and that Kalenjin youth from some divisions in Nandi
North District and that they had already had acquired some from Mt. Elgon and
Marakwet Districts which they planned to use to evict Kikuyu from the Rift
Valley. NSIS Situation Reports of 25 January maintain that “Kalenjin warriors”
were reportedly being trained on how to handle firearms within the Segoit area in
Moiben Divisions of Uasin Gishu District. The warriors were allegedly going to be
used to prevent internally displaced individuals from returning to their farms
and to raise funds to purchase land at “throwaway prices.” The NSIS reports
throughout January also warned of Kalenjin youth from Sima Division in Nandi
North regrouping to attack IDPs in Eldoret, in Burnt Forest, and elsewhere.
In addition to the above, the NSIS’s report of 8 February 2008, contained in
exhibit no. 19A to the Commission stated that certain unnamed Kalenjin
tribesmen were cautioning members of the community against disclosing or
volunteering information on the post election political violence to any group
investigating the clashes.40
It can be argued that these NSIS reports point to the possibility that the post
election violence was concerted and a product of organization and planning,
although this does not preclude the possibility that some of the violence was
spontaneous as well.
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Circumstantial Evidence
Most reports from witnesses and others describe large groups of Kalenjin youth
blocking roads with felled trees, large boulders, tractors, and the use of petrol to
burn dwellings and farms in numerous non-contiguous areas. For this to have
occurred, the invaders needed to have cut down trees, moved heavy rocks, and
obtained petrol, all factors which can be argued to point to some level of
organization and planning. The extent of this depends in part on the amount of
petrol used, where and how it was obtained, whether or not chainsaws were
necessary to fell trees, and what sort of equipment was used to move boulders to
create barricades in various parts of the North Rift.
In some other cases, reports describe what appear to have been simultaneously
coordinated attacks from different points and the need for transport to have
brought attackers from miles away to gathering points. Although the Kalenjin
youth engaging in these acts had a good deal of history to draw on given the
violence of the 1990s, the accounts of the violence do not suggest a breakdown
of law and order arising solely from spontaneous rioting.
Was the violence spontaneous?
A number of government officials testifying to the Commission described the
violence as spontaneous. A senior provincial government security officer who
testified in camera, told the Commission that “[t]his was not organized crime…[i]t
was a spontaneous reaction”. In response to suggestions that officials were
reluctant to investigate “the big guys” the same officer said they had followed up,
but found there was no concrete evidence. He nevertheless added that “recently
we got information …and my officers opened up investigations” into three major
political figures whom witnesses named as having been involved in the
organization and training of youth.41
Another senior police officer, the former Rift Valley PPO Everett Wasike, after
suggesting that Kalenjin don’t need preparation, mentioned that from the
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pattern of attacks there must have been organized support for attackers in form
of transportation, provision of food, etc. Evidence of such organization and
support appeared clear to him when he explained that “[…]of course to run from
one District to another burning and looting, there [must be] supervisors,” and it
would be difficult to go around “burning houses, killing people without eating
something, without the support…” He also told us about a meeting at the Nairobi
police headquarters in which politicians and other Kalenjin leaders were called
and told “we have information that you people are inciting your members against
other people.”42 The witness did not tell us whether there was any response from
the politicians.
Some of those who hold the view that the violence was spontaneous have sought
to explain its scale on the basis of what can be described as Kalenjin cultural
disposition towards war. In testimonies presented to the Commission, a number
of Kalenjin witnesses and experts used the idea of the so-called Kalenjin culture
to argue the violence could attain the level of magnitude it did in North Rift and
still be spontaneous; not planned or organized. Variances of the “Kalenjin
culture” theory aimed to explaining some cultural predilection of Kalenjins to
engage in warfare were offered by a former Rift Valley PPO when, answering the
question whether violence in North Rift was spontaneous or planned. He told the
Commission that the violence was probably spontaneous because “the Kalenjins
require just a ... They don’t need to plan. You injure
John Kiplangat Arap Koech, a Kalenjin from Tinderet, Nandi South District, who
introduced himself as a “Cultural Practitioner and Land Dispute Tribunal elder”
and “currently involved in carrying out research on the origin and customs of the
Kalenjin”, also resorted to elements of the Kalenjin culture to explain the
violence in North Rift. He emphatically stated that violence was spontaneous and
strongly challenged and dismissed as “false and malicious…the notion that the
violence was planned, funded and organized.” He explained that “given the

42

Rift Valley PPO, CW 57.

74

nature of the Kalenjin set up and cultural inculcation, when violence develops
into a situation akin to war then the entire community rises to defend itself.”43
Bill Ruto, a writer by profession, said: “The Kalenjins just like many other
pastoralist communities tend to be militarily organized and can respond to
perceived threats in an organized manner. This rapid and organized reaction is
what most people have confused for pre-planning of violence.”
But the “Kalenjin culture” theory as an explanation for the violence in North Rift
was strongly challenged by a number of Kalenjin lay members and community
leaders. A Kalenjin religious leader dismissed the theory and instead accused
political leaders who come up and use the ethnic background and the unity they
found to instil violence, and suggested that to end the cycles of violence we have
to break that. He added that “the same applies to the Maasai because they are
all the Nilotic group. So it is the myths that can be changed but it is this unity
the politicians are exploiting…”44
In his testimony to the Commission, Hon. William Ruto also dismissed the
Kalenjin culture theory, remarking “there is no DNA for people to fight.” Instead,
he blamed the Kalenjin attacks on Kikuyu during the post-election violence on “a
combination of factors”, including the history of violence since 1992 with
“friction [having been] higher in Uasin Gishu than any other area” because of the
cosmopolitan makeup of the district. He dismissed the land issue as a factor in
the 2007 violence. He told the Commission, “The issue of the PEV is not land, let
nobody cheat you. Kikuyus always sit on the land and the only problem is at the
end of 5 years. It is all politics. Land is just an excuse.” He also noted that “our
politics acquires ethnic dimensions” and communities support parties where
“their leaders ae at the front and that is one thing we have to change.” He finally
remarked that the 2007 election was very polarized and “the people in the Rift
Valley believed that Kibaki oppressed them in the last 5 years. They voted more
against Kibaki’s presidency than for Raila’s presidency.”
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A Kalenjin businessman concurred with the religious leader, noting: “The issue
of Kalenjin warriors does not arise here. To me, those are Kalenjin young men
who idle around and anyone can take advantage of them to be warriors. The
word “warriors” in the Kalenjin tradition is a respectable term. But nowadays
there are no warriors. They have just classified these young men as warriors.
They are not warriors.” He also added, “People hide behind culture….This [the
post election violence] is nothing to do with culture,” insisting as well that “land
wasn’t an issue either”, adding that it was just used to “cover what happened”.45
As to the real cause of violence, a Kalenjin resident of Eldoret offered that “the
violence was motivated by jealousy” against Kikuyu who had “succeeded in
business” as opposed to Luhya and Gusii who also owned land, with the postelection violence being “purely politically motivated.

Findings
In 2007, in contrast to the 1990s the bulk of the violence in the North Rift
followed rather than preceded the elections. Explanations offered for the timing
and scale of the 2007 post-election violence include: general spontaneous anger
by ODM’s Kalenjin candidates and voters at the announcement of a Kibaki win
amidst allegations of rigging; land hunger and a desire to evict so-called
outsiders whatever the outcome of the elections; and a desire by Kalenjin ODM
candidates to overturn the presidential election and assume power.
It is our finding that violence in North Rift caught the police and local
administration officials totally unprepared. We found this particularly disturbing
given the fact that intelligence was made (or should have been made) available to
local administration and police indicating the high likelihood of violence in either
case of the electoral outcome – but higher in the case of a Kibaki win.
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As a consequence, police reaction to the violence was chaotic, to say the least.
Some police officers joined the attackers and participated in the violence. Others
were able to display acts of personal courage that saved lives. In many cases the
default line was ethnic, along which the police force was divided. In general,
though, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of attackers and
what appeared to be a fairly high level of organization of the attacks.
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Central Rift Region
Central Rift Valley is to a large extent dominated by the larger Nakuru District
whose Kikuyu majority raised a feeling of unease and suspicion among Kalenjin
politicians following the end of the one party system in 1992. They felt that the
position of Daniel Arap Moi as President was under threat by the Kikuyu who
were at the forefront of the clamour for multi-party democracy.46 Thus in this
period, the Central Rift experienced a pattern of clashes where the non Kalenjin
and non-Maasai tribes were attacked, their houses set on fire and many killed
with a view to driving them out of the region since they were perceived not to
support the then ruling party KANU. Narok was one of the three places in the
Rift Valley where the pro-one party

rallies were held in 1991 and the key

message emanating from these political meetings was that violence would be
used to resist multi party politics. A key architect of this school of thought was
William Ole Ntimama, the MP for Narok North who stated that KANU leaders had
resolved to fight together and follow President Moi in the clamour to end the
debate for multi party politics by use of majimbo as the antidote against the reintroduction of plural politics47.
The larger Nakuru district due to its high Kikuyu population was the hardest hit
by the tribal clashes that came to be associated with the region from 1991 to
1998. Of note is that the larger Nakuru District was later split to create Molo,
Naivasha, Rongai and Subukia Districts.
For purposes of this Report, the Central Rift Valley covers the following districts;
Narok, Molo, Koibatek, Nakuru, Rongai and Naivasha districts. While Nakuru,
Molo

and

Naivasha

Districts

have

a

clear

Kikuyu

majority,

Narok

is

predominantly Maasai, while Koibatek has a clear Kalenjin majority. In Rongai,
the population between Kalenjin and Kikuyu is almost even with a slight margin
in favour of the Kalenjin. The rationale for dealing with the region separately was
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informed by the fact that it has been a theatre of internecine ethnic conflict that
first erupted in 1991 after the re-introduction of multi party politics. Further, it
is a cosmopolitan and strategic region which has attracted heavy focus from
different political parties seeking to hold sway. Nakuru Town, a highly multiethnic town is Kenya’s fourth largest town and the administrative capital of the
entire Rift Valley Province.
The politics of the region have been extremely competitive and volatile, no doubt
informed by the fact that this zone having once formed part of the former white
highlands saw different ethnic communities purchase land under various
settlement schemes some of which were set up prior to Independence. As noted
in the Akiwumi Report, “the different tribes in this area only tolerated each other
as there were deep seated ethnic ambitions and prejudices which were activated
by political events preceding the 1992 General Elections”. While political realignments had shifted in 2007-the Kalenjin and Maasai expressing support this
time round for the ODM and not KANU, nevertheless the patterns of violence in
2007 closely echoed what had transpired previously with slight differences i.e.
the use of criminal gangs suspected to be Mungiki by the Kikuyu in Nakuru and
Naivasha ostensibly to protect the Kikuyu community and largely Kalenjin gangs
in turn preparing to attack the Kikuyu in Nakuru, but this time without the tacit
support of the state security machinery that had hitherto aided their cause in
the 1990s.

Molo District
We received evidence on violence in Molo District during our hearings in Nakuru
and Eldoret. We also made site visits to Njoro and Kuresoi and interacted with a
number of officials from the local police, provincial administration and citizens.
The visit provided a unique opportunity for the Commission to witness first hand
some of the scenes affected by violence and hear additional explanation from eye
witnesses. Commission investigators also recorded statements and depositions
from displaced persons from Molo and Kuresoi and these accounts have been in
turn amply supported by District Security Intelligence Committee minutes and
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also published reports by other entities including public bodies. The totality of
such information pieces together the story of Molo and Kuresoi.

Background: A History of Ethnic Conflict
Molo District borders the Mau Forest which is one of Kenya's largest forest areas
comprising about 36% of the total forest cover in the country. The region is
situated along the Mau Escarpment and is one of the most fertile farmlands in
the country famous for growing pyrethrum, potatoes and other agricultural
crops due to its cool climate.
The District, on the other hand, has also been a theatre of ethnic based conflict
since the return of multi party politics in 1991. The Akiwumi Commission noted
that in the then Nakuru District, Molo and Olenguruone Divisions (parts of the
current Molo District) were the most affected by 1992-1993 clashes and that the
Molo Division was among the few areas declared security operation zones under
the Preservation of Public Security Act.48 The district has two constituenciesKuresoi (with a Kalenjin majority, a sizeable number of Kikuyu and a Kisii
minority) and Molo (with a largely Kikuyu majority and Kalenjin and Kisii
minority). Both constituencies also host a number of other communities mainly
the Ogiek (an indigenous hunter/gatherer community), Luhya and Luo
communities. The Akiwumi reportfurther noted in its findings that this ethnic
diversity had been a source of tension and ethnic conflict pitting the Kalenjin on
the one hand and the Kikuyu and Kisii on the other. Evidence tendered by the
KNCHR also notes that the area experienced ethnic violence in 1992 and 1997
where the pattern of attacks was Kalenjin raiders attacking and killing members
of the Kikuyu community and burning their houses and in turn the Kikuyu
community organizing themselves to launch counter attacks in which they killed
the Kalenjin and also burnt their homes.
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A witness testified that Kuresoi Constituency was carved out of the old Molo
constituency in such a way that the majority of the people in Kuresoi were
Kalenjin. The witness claimed that this was influenced by retired President
Daniel Arap Moi to ensure that the Kalenjin in that constituency could get a
representative in Parliament because a Kalenjin candidate could not win in the
bigger Molo due to the large Kikuyu majority.49
This history of ethnic tensions in Molo District was confirmed by the Rift Valley
PC Hassan Noor Hassan who stated that since 1992, elections had been the
excuse rather than the cause for the violence over land. Other witnesses
however, provided a broader perspective of the reasons for ethnic infighting
notably Gordon Ogolla Chairman of the Rift Valley Chapter of the Law Society
who gave a number of causes; firstly that violence was not over land as such,
but rather due to a feeling among the Kalenjin that during elections, the Kikuyu
and other communities opted not to vote according to the wishes of the Kalenjin
and instead followed the voting patterns of their kinsmen elsewhere which
general feeling led to animosity between the communities and secondly in the
areas of Nesuit, Mauche and some places around Njoro, the biggest problem
appeared to be centered, not on politics, but on allocation of the Mau Forest in
the 1990s to senior Government officials and well connected individuals which
enraged the Ogiek community who consider the Western Mau Forest to be their
ancestral home.
During cross examination of Mr. Ogolla on the issue of the democratic rights of
citizens to vote as they wished, he stated that the issue of voting patterns in the
Rift Valley where there were mixed communities-Kikuyus, Kisiis, Luhyas, Luos
and the Kalenjin-elicited feelings among Kalenjin that non-Kalenjin communities
tended to follow the political trends from their ancestral areas of Nyanza,
Western and Central Provinces which had antagonized the Kalenjin since the
return of multi party politics hence a feeling that if non-Kalenjins wished to live
harmoniously among the Kalenjin, then the Kalenjin expected them to vote
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together with them and not with the regions where they were deemed to have
come from. He did however concede that while such a proposition was patently
undemocratic, it nevertheless had the potential to realize inter- ethnic
coexistence in the province. Not surprisingly, Mr. Ogolla was of the view that
failure to heed the recommendations from the Akiwumi, Kiliku and Ndung’u
Reports had contributed to the violence since the underlying grievances
remained unresolved.

The Pre-Election Violence
The Commission established that before the 2007 Elections, Kuresoi and Molo
constituencies were experiencing violence between the Kalenjin on one side and
Kikuyu and Kisii on the other. The Commission was told that the problem in
Molo District in general and Kuresoi in particular was perennial in nature having
started in 1992 when the Kikuyu were forcibly evicted from Chepakundi in
Olenguruone division. The witness claimed that this was viewed by the Kalenjin
as a success because the Government resettled the displaced Kikuyu at Kapsita
near Molo town. Thus, according to the witness, there was a feeling among the
Kalenjin starting from the aftermath of the 2005 Referendum that the
Olenguruone precedent should be replicated elsewhere in the District since
Olenguruone was the only division that had managed to bring about the
complete removal of madoadoas through violence and that if this was repeated
elsewhere in the District, the Government would similarly resettle the displaced
Kikuyu as had happened with those from Chepakundi. The witness was
therefore of the view that the pre-election violence of 2007 had some connectivity
in one way or another to the violence in 1992.
During hearings in Eldoret, the Commission was told by the Kipkelion DC that
Kipkelion District had experienced the spill over effects of the violence in Molo
and Kuresoi prior to elections as a result of which ethnic animosity built up on
account of displaced persons fleeing to Kipkelion from Kuresoi. This was
corroborated by the NSIS security briefing for the week ending 3rd December
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2007 which noted that the animosity in Molo had spilled over to Belgut and
Ainamoi Divisions where Kipsigis youths torched kiosks belonging to Kikuyu
businessmen.
Mr. Mohamed Salim the DC for Molo informed the Commission that hostilities
began on September 25th 2007, though as we shall see later, violence had
already been reported as early as 2006. In fact, evidence produced by the
(KNCHR) noted that clashes broke out in Kuresoi after the referendum held in
November 2005 pitting the Kikuyus who were largely in support of the proposed
draft Constitution and the Kalenjins who had supported the Orange Movement
that opposed the draft Constitution and that these clashes involved the
expulsion of Kikuyu and Kisii from Kuresoi. Throughout 2006 and 2007, there
were attacks on a low scale in Kuresoi by the Kalenjin against those they deemed
not to have supported the Orange Movement which attacks intensified towards
November 2007 and rose to their peak on 30th December 2007. The DSIC
Minutes for Molo District dated 20th December 2007 corroborate this chronology
in noting that between 22nd November and 4th December 2007, ethnic hostilities
reached fever pitch and that as a result, deaths, injuries, displacement and
destruction of property through arson had occurred prompting the PC to visit
the area on 4th December 2007.
The Commission was told that violence in Kuresoi had erupted in May 2007 at a
place called Chepkinoyo where two children were burnt and several houses
destroyed through arson. This subsided up till September 2007 when Kalenjin
attackers from Ndoinet Forest raided Kamwaura and killed 2 people. There were
subsequent attacks in Gathiriga Settlement Scheme, and then Tetagik Scheme
where members of the Kikuyu burnt Kalenjin houses prompting the Kalenjin to
attack Karirikania, a farm occupied by former freedom fighters where the Kikuyu
put up stiff resistance, killing 2 Kalenjin raiders

50.

By the time of going to

elections, the Commission heard, there were already IDP camps in a number of
churches in Kuresoi.
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The Molo DSIC noted that on 20th October 2007 in Cheptagum Farm in Keringet,
a house owned by one Wambui John was torched by unknown arsonists in an
incident whose motive the DSIC believed to be revenge for a Kalenjin man who
had been killed in mid August 2007 during a suspected robbery at Tebere area.
Further, on 26th October 2007, the DSIC reported that an unknown number of
raiders believed to be Kalenjin had killed one Benson Njuguna, a Kikuyu, injured
four people and stolen livestock at Gathiriga Trading Center in Chemaner
Location of Keringet. During this period, incidents of widespread looting and
vandalism of deserted homesteads were reported by the DSIC in Kuresoi. It was
observed that criminals took advantage of the wanton lawlessness to loot
household goods, and stole food crops from abandoned farms, raising fears of
food shortages in 2008. Between 25th October and 4th December 2007, the Molo
DC stated that 16 people were killed, 67 houses torched and 300 families left
homeless after their houses were torched51.
Indeed, similar accounts were provided in detail to Commission investigators by
a number of witnesses who narrated how the pre-election campaigns were
characterized by tension with the Kalenjin saying that on election day, they did
not want to see “madoadoa”. This information was corroborated by the
testimony of the Chief for Sachangwany Location which we shall revert to
shortly.
The Commission further perused reports from the NSIS stating that in October
2007 a number of ODM leaders from the Kalenjin community were planning to
instigate killings in Kuresoi, Olenguruone and Molo targeting the Kikuyu
community domiciled in the area for showing support for President Kibaki.
Meanwhile

in Kuresoi, Commission investigators received a number of

statements stating that leaflets warning non-Kalenjins to leave the area had
been circulated as early as 2006. The deponents alleged that a former
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politician52 had been behind the violence of the previous years and that once
current MP Zakayo Cheruiyot53 came to the scene promising to end the violence
if the Kikuyu voted for him, the supporters of the politician went ahead to beat
and evict the Kikuyu. The Commission found this information credible since it
was corroborated by the Minutes of the DSIC meeting for Molo District held on
22nd November 2007 which noted that intelligence had been received that
supporters of the fpolitician were “poised to cause clashes to scare non-Kalenjins
away from Kuresoi for support for Zakayo Cheruiyot”. NSIS also stated that the
politician and a civic candidate were responsible for organizing and financing
Kalenjin youth who were reportedly paid Kshs 1,000/- for every house razed
down belonging to the Kisii and Kikuyu in Kuresoi.
From records made available to the Commission, it is clear that the district was
tense. For instance, on 1st December 2007, the DSIC reported that a
parliamentary candidate for Molo constituency had led a demonstration of about
3,000 youths in Molo Town to press for the release of 59 Kikuyu and Kisii youth
arrested on 30th November 2007 for erecting an illegal road block at Muchorwe
with a view to attacking Kalenjin motorists and passengers. During this
demonstration, looting of businesses by the demonstrators was reported in Molo
Town. For the above reasons, the evidence of Mr. Hassan Noor Hassan, Rift
Valley Provincial Commissioner, that the provincial administration did not
anticipate the violence in Molo District suggests that the administration was not
prudent to ignore clear warning signs.

The Post Election Violence
Just as in other parts of the Rift Valley, the Commission heard from Hassan
Noor Hassan the PC for Rift Valley that violence erupted in Molo and Kuresoi
immediately after the election results were announced on 30th December 2007
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involving attacks on mainly Kikuyu and Kisii many of whom were killed and
injured, their homes were burnt, animals stolen while roads were barricaded. As
we discuss elsewhere in this report,54 the PC testified that the Provincial
Administration had no prior notice of the attacks and did not expect attacks of
that magnitude in Molo and Kuresoi.
Evidence received from the NSIS however seems to indicate the contrary. For
example, an NSIS Security briefing for the week ending 23 November 2007
indicated that Kalenjin youth were already harbouring plans to attack the
Kikuyu and Kisii in Murinduko, Bochege, Kaplelach, Muchorwe, Kuresoi Trading
Center, Githima, Mwaragania, Mwahe Farm, Sondu River, Temuyota and
Kwawira Farms to disenfranchise the two communities for supporting certain
politicians. The NSIS security briefing for the week ending 3rd December 2007
had noted that parliamentary aspirants and their supporters were suspected of
fanning the hostilities for political expediency. One of the aspirants was alleged
to be behind the harassment of Kikuyu and Kisii and to have been rewarding
youth “according to the houses they burn”. The Commission was told that NSIS
Security briefing reports were provided to the Minister for Internal Security and
Provincial Administration.
Even without the benefit of such NSIS reports, it is the Commission’s view that
the Molo DSIC was in possession of enough intelligence from the ground to act
more swiftly and more decisively than they did. For example, a Molo District
Security Intelligence Committee meeting held on 20 December 2007 had
indicated that there was a likelihood of disruption of voting and that the morale
of police officers was noted to be low due to disaffection with a paltry pay rise of
10%. This was a clear early warning signal of a potential security breach. During
the same DSIC meeting it was highlighted that due to the ongoing insecurity and
pre-election violence, mobile polling stations had been set up by the electoral
Commission of Kenya in various places, including Molo Primary School in Molo
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Town, Chesengere Primary School in Muchorwe, Kamwaura Health Center,
Kenjogetty in Mungetho Trading Center, Full Gospel Church Muchorwe,
Kimkasia Primary School in Nyota and Kuresoi Health Center.
According to the Chief of Sachangwany Location Evans Mageto Kebira, violence
in Sachangwany erupted immediately results of the presidential elections were
announced on 30th December 2007 where Kalenjin youths burned houses owned
by Kisii and Kikuyu prompting him to call a meeting at Mukinyai on 31st
December. The witness stated that during this meeting, community leaders
accused a local politician, who was present, of having been behind the
violence.55 Following this meeting, there was a period of calm but violence
erupted after the killing of Josephat Kinyanjui, an elder in the area, allegedly by
the Kalenjin according to statements provided to Commission investigators by
several witnesses.
There is consensus from Commission witnesses that a new wave of violence
erupted in Molo on 30 December 2007. Commission Investigators received a
number of statements confirming that Kalenjin raiders started attacking and
burning Kikuyu homes on the night of 30th December 2007 and that the
attackers received support from some prominent Kalenjins in the area. Evidence
produced by KNCHR corroborates this information in stating that there were
reports of Kalenjin youth having been transported from outside the district and
housed and fed in the homes of well known Kalenjin personalities. KNCHR also
stated that the Kikuyu and Kisii organized counter attacks in Molo where they
were a majority and in response, Kalenjin politicians and wealthy Kalenjin
businessmen provided transport to bring in attackers from outside the district to
buttress the local Kalenjin population. This information was corroborated by
evidence received by Commission investigators, including from Kalenjins and
other sources, that gangs of Kalenjin were transported to Molo from Kericho and
Ndoinet areas.
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On 23 January 2008, the Commission heard that Jogoo Center in Mau Summit
was razed to the ground in an incident where police shot dead 2 people said to
be behind the attack. The Commission heard that members of the Kalenjin
community held Mr. Evans Mageto Kebira, Chief of Sachangwany Location,
responsible for having called the police who shot dead the 2 people, which
prompted about 200 Kalenjin youth to attack his homestead at Kimanyi Farm on
24 January 2008, burn down all his houses and escape with his 10 cattle and
30 sheep which they took to the neighbouring Chesoin Farm. At the time of his
testimony, Mr. Kebira stated that he was discharging his duties as area Chief of
Sachangwany Location from Mukinyai Farm since he had been declared
“persona non grata” by the Kalenjin in his location.
The Commission received evidence from Mohamed Aman56, Rift Valley PCIO,
indicating that on 24 January 2008, about 400 Kikuyu youths from Molo Town,
incensed by the frequent killings meted against their tribesmen by members of
the Kalenjin community, ganged up and proceeded to Sirikwa farm within
Kalenjin populated Kuresoi constituency on a revenge attack mission, armed
with pangas and other crude weapons. However, the Kalenjin got wind of the
impending attack and ambushed them just before Sirikwa farm. As a result, 13
Kikuyu were killed and several others escaped with arrows lodged in their
bodies.
Evidence was tendered by a witness who said he had attended a meeting of
Kalenjins held in the area on 28th February 2008 during which local Kalenjin
leaders discussed how to purchase Kikuyu farms cheaply from the Kikuyu who
had left.
The Commission also received video coverage of a demonstration on 16th
January 2008 in Kimalang village, Keringet Division of Kuresoi where some
Kalenjin youths armed with bows and arrows were secretly filmed while they
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smeared mud on their faces to camouflage themselves as they prepared for
attacks. When the witness was spotted by the youths he almost lost his life but
for the intervention of a Member of Parliament.
A total of 150 people were killed in the District, another 170 injured, 1,564
houses burnt and 66,000 people displaced by the conflict57

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
Allegations of partisanship among the police and provincial administration in
responding to the violence were made before the Commission. In Sachangwany,
for example, police shot in the air on 6th January 2008 to disperse a group of
Kikuyu who tried to put out a fire that was consuming Janet Mulinga’s Nursery
School which had been set ablaze by Kalenjin youth.58
In other instances, the Commission established that police were simply
overwhelmed by the numbers of Kalenjin attackers. In one such instance, there
were only 5 police officers confronting a mob of Kalenjin attackers estimated at
over 2,000. In Kuresoi, allegations were made against the local OCS that he
refused to intervene to stop Kalenjin raiders dubbing himself “ODM damu” (an
ODM follower) and that he in fact watched as houses were burnt down at
Mwaragania next to his police station.59
There is support for this allegation from the report produced by KNCHR which
accused the police of complacency and at times complicity in the violence and
that some police officers were not only seen in the company of Kalenjin raiders
but that some officers derided Kisii and Kikuyu victims “that they were paying
the price for voting “kazi iendelee” (let the work continue)” which was the PNU
slogan.60
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Further, allegations of laxity and failure to apprehend attackers caught in the
act were made which suggested to KNCHR that police were “overwhelmed, did
not want to stop the violence or were under orders not to do so.” The KNCHR
Report opines that the raiding gangs must also have had prior reassurance in
this regard or having observed that the police were simply shooting in the air,
carried on their attacks undeterred.”
We find these assertions credible on their own but they find further support from
evidence produced by Government officials from the area. The Molo District
Security and Intelligence Committee meeting of 4th February 2008 noted that
“discipline of uniformed forces had deteriorated a lot” and cases of police officers
drinking and fighting had been reported which prompted the DSIC to direct the
area OCPD to ensure strict supervision so that all officers worked as required.
All the above supports the conclusion that police force was so suborned by
external factors, including lack of sufficient resources, that it was incapable of
enforcing the law effectively.
One recurring feature in the DSIC Minutes was the lamentation that police
boundaries in Molo did not match the administrative boundaries which in turn
affected service delivery. This had been noted as early as 22nd November 2007
when the DSIC recommended the harmonization of Molo Police Division’s
boundaries to coincide with the administrative boundaries in order to centralize
operations. The same observation was repeated in the DSIC meeting of 20th
December 2007 which was of the view that harmonization of the police
boundaries was a matter of high priority. There had been no response to this
plea by the time intense violence broke out ten days later. It begs the question
whether the failure to implement the recommendation affected police response
and service delivery to prevent the loss of life and property that occurred.
The violence seriously affected Government service delivery in the District
Headquarters of Molo. The post office was completely closed after five Kalenjin
members of staff ran away leaving only the Kikuyu post master, while in Molo
District Hospital, operations in some departments were stopped all together after
20 Kalenjin members of staff fled. Similarly, the Molo Law Courts and the
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District Commissioner’s office were also affected. With the Olenguruone-MoloNjoro Road blocked, Kalenjin from Olenguruone could not access vital services
like medication, access to markets and shops especially in Molo, and Elburgon,
and conversely the Kikuyu could not access their farms in Muchorwe, Store
Mbili, Kibunja, Matumaini, Kuresoi, Baraka Farm, Sirikwa, Tombo, Ngenia,
Kiambiriria and Gacharage61. Further, the Molo DSIC meeting on 11th February
2008 alluded to the fact that intelligence had been received of some Chiefs
having been responsible for incitement and recommended their investigation.
The same Minutes also indicate that the DSIC would seek the help of the Army
in restoring law and order, a further confirmation that the police were incapable
of doing so on their own.

Koibatek District: Attempted Ethnic Cleansing
Koibatek District was carved out from Baringo District and comprises of two
electoral constituencies, Eldama Ravine and Mogotio. We received evidence on
violence in Koibatek through district government officials who testified in Eldoret
as well as through statements by victims and eye witnesses who talked with
Commission investigators. The pattern if violence in Koibatek is distinguishable
from that in other parts of the Central Rift Valley Province in that it is the only
district in which violence was committed mostly by members of the Kalenjin
community against members of the Kikuyu and Kisii communities, without
much retaliation.
The DC for Koibatek Mr. Stephen Ikua stated that the post election violence in
the District claimed the lives of 31 people, left 1,215 houses burnt and around
45,000 people displaced from their homes. He traced the causes to the 2005
referendum that widened the political gulf between the majority Kalenjin and
minority Kikuyu communities living in the area. In his view, the divisions were
exacerbated during the political campaign period by the debate on Majimbo with
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some politicians not only declaring the area an ODM zone but also asking
residents to vote as a block for ODM. A statement recorded by Commission
investigators from Joseph Macharia Nyaga, PNU organizing secretary for
Koibatek district, alleged that on 6th August 2007, ODM held a meeting which
the witness attended in Eldama Ravine Town during which Raila Odinga,
William Ruto, Otieno Kajwang, Martin Shikuku and Najib Balala spoke in favour
of majimbo. He claimed that one of the speakers asked the Tugen community to
remove all “madoadoa” from Rift Valley and “to be committed in voting so as to
remove Kibaki from power and Kikuyus from Rift Valley.”
The same witness claimed that chiefs from the area had organized meetings after
the referendum during which sentiments were expressed to the effect that
Kikuyus would have to leave and go back to Central Province. This statement
suggests that local administration in Koibatek was not able to maintain a level of
political neutrality during the campaign period, a proposition similarly observed
by district administration and recorded in the Minutes of the DSIC on 19
February 2008 which noted that some chiefs were partisan.
Mr. Nyaga’s statement further alleged that as early as 6th August 2007, there
was already talk by politicians on the campaign trail of bloodshed and
dispossession of land from Kikuyu which would be given to the young Kalenjin
men if the election was rigged. Credence to such allegation appeared to be given
in the DSIC Minutes of 13th February 2008 stating that Kalenjin in Eldama
Ravine had allegedly vowed not to allow displaced Kikuyu back but would
instead buy their land at a ceiling price of Kshs 10,000/- per acre and warned
that if any Kalenjin paid a price beyond this sum, their houses would be burnt.
The pattern of violence in the district mirrored that experienced in other areas of
the

Rift

Valley

populated

by

the

Kalenjin,

where

immediately

after

announcement of the election results on 30th December 2007, Kalenjin youth
especially within the market centers started burning properties owned by Kikuyu
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and Kisii, blocked roads and issued threats to any Kalenjin deemed to have
supported PNU62.
The Commission was told during its public hearings in Eldoret that the fact that
former President Moi declared support for incumbent President Mwai Kibaki did
not go down well with the Kalenjin and Moi paid the price for this stand as his
property was one of those that were burned during the violence. We were
provided with evidence that Kalenjins in Koibatek were forced by their kinsmen
to join in the attacks against Kikuyu and that those who did not, or were
perceived to be sympathetic to PNU or to Kikuyu were attacked by their fellow
Kalenjins.

Moreover,

the

Koibatek

District

Commissioner

told

us

that

Government officials were similarly not spared: a son of a Chief from Maji Mazuri
who was viewed as a PNU sympathizer was killed and in another incident, a
police officer was seriously injured when responding to a distress call.
One incident in the district involved the killing of a police officer on escort duty.
The Commission heard that the officer, who was Kalenjin, was among security
officers who were taking charge of the equipment of the China Road and Bridges
Construction Company Ltd which was re-constructing the Eldoret/Nakuru
Road. On the material day while escorting a lorry to the site, they met some
Kalenjin youths who were about to burn a lorry. The officer alighted from the
vehicle and tried to dissuade them in Kalenjin language but they would not
listen to him. Instead, the youth beat him up, cut him up with machetes and
took his gun which they broke. They also took the magazine from his gun with
20 rounds of ammunition.

The officer, according to the evidence, never even

shot in the air. The incident, in our view, highlights the helplessness of ordinary
civilians facing marauding gangs when armed security forces themselves were
defenseless.

Minutes of the Rift Valley PSIC meeting held on 3rd January 2008 record threats to evict Kikuyu from Timboroa and
Makutano
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Most of the violence in Koibatek was concentrated on the border with Uasin
Gishu, Kericho, Kipkelion and Molo where non Kalenjins were attacked and
killed, their properties burned and/ or they were forcefully evicted. On 26th
January 2008,

a catholic priest Father Peter Kamau, a Kikluyu, who was

coming from Nandi going to Nakuru was stopped at Muserechi Trading centre
where a gang of youth killed him, in an incident that was widely reported by the
mainstream media.

She Is Raped While Husband Is Being Killed
On 1 January 2008, 36 years old Elizabeth W. and her husband were attacked in their
house in Eldama Ravine by a group of Kalenjin, some of whom she knew. She was gang
raped while her husband was being hacked to death and her shop looted. Following is an
extract of her testimony:
On 1 January 2008 we were still fearful. We didn’t open our business. I worked
at the Eldama Ravine shopping centre at Mama Faith’s Shop. We owned the shop. It
was just next to my house – they are joined together. But I stayed at home that day
because I was scared. We left the shop locked up.
At about 3pm that day, people came to my home. At the time there was only my
husband and me at home. My children had gone to visit their grandparents in
Nyandarua. There were more than ten people who came. They were all men. They were
dressed in coats and they had smeared mud on their faces so you could not recognize
them. The mud was different colors on their faces – white back and red in spots -patches all over their faces. They were armed. They had arrows, pangas and rungus.
The first I knew they were there was when I heard talking and noises outside.
They were speaking in Kalenjin. They said “we have come to finish you”. The door was
not locked so they just came inside. My husband and I were in the sitting room. We
were sitting down but stood up when the men came in.
When they came in I started pleading with them because of what I had heard
them saying outside. I told them why were they doing this when we had lived with them.
They ordered me to shut up and said that the Kikuyu had migrated to the area and
taken up their (the Kalenjin’s) property. They said I should keep quiet or they were going
to kill me. So I just kept quiet then.
94

That is when they started attacking my husband. They were cutting him with
pangas and piercing him with arrows. They were struggling with my husband and trying
to get him to the ground. The men were crowding on him – it might have been most of
them attacking my husband. I was scared. They cut my husband on the neck with a
panga and that made him fall to the ground. It was a serious blow. After that they were
cutting every part of his body.
After my husband was cut, but before he died, one of the men came towards me
and asked me what I wanted to be done to me. I asked them not to kill me. One said we
need to know what she is like, now that she never talks to us.
There was another group of men who were looting my shop. I could see them
from the door – it was still open. They were going past carrying property from my shop,
such as sugar, cooking fat and other goods.
I was wearing trousers with buttons at the waist. The men tore at my trousers
trying to get them open and the buttons came off. There were about four of them there
doing this to me at that time. They lifted me up and put me on the ground. They were
arguing among themselves who was going to be first. Then one said that if I escaped
from the knife and arrows, I would die of AIDS. Some of them held my legs and some
held my hands while they raped me. When this was happening my husband and I were
both still in the sitting room, but by now I was not watching my husband but pleading
my own case. The last time I had looked, it was like he was dead. He wasn’t moving.
One man raped me and then the second one and the third. They put their
penises in my vagina. It was either the second or the third man who said they were not
able to get in me properly so they cut me. I think it was the panga they were carrying
that they used. They cut my vagina. When I had my children, the Doctor told me I had a
narrow opening. Both my children were born by caesarean.
They continued raping me. It was when the fourth man was raping me that I
went unconscious…I next remember – and it is vague – that a Kalenjin friend of ours
called Joseph was there and he was pleading with the men. He was asking them for him
to be allowed to take the body of my husband and take me to hospital. The men started
quarrelling with him and told him that he was in partnership with us. They threatened
to kill him.[…]

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The NSIS had in their election Security Situation paper noted that the ratio of
the police officers to the population which was already inadequate nationally
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would pose potential problems since the police would be over-stretched by
election related duties such as escort and guarding of polling stations. With such
demands being exerted on the police, NSIS was of the view that if there were to
be an outbreak of violence such as had been witnessed in 1992 and 1997, the
police would be unable to cope in responding to such emergencies.63
It is therefore not surprising that violence continued in the district until around
15th February 2008 before the provincial administration was able to assemble
some of the area leaders to discuss with them the need for the violence to stop.
This finding is supported by the DSIC Minutes dated 9th February 2008 which
noted that violence was far from ending and that 2 people were killed with
arrows at Makutano. The DSIC observed that the Kalenjin appeared determined
to displace the Kikuyu from their farms and that both communities reportedly
were arming quietly.
Notwithstanding that the PSIC had mobilized all serviceable public vehicles
which were handed over to the OCPD to facilitate deployment of security officers
to the affected areas and also along the highway to ensure the smooth flow of
traffic, we found the acknowledgement by the DSIC that some chiefs, security
personnel and other public servants were biased to be a matter of serious
concern. A Kikuyu lady recorded a statement with the Commission stating that
she was assaulted by two Kalenjin attackers on 31st December 2007 in Timboroa
Trading Center sustaining serious head injuries from which she fell unconscious
and was taken by good Samaritans to Timboroa Dispensary. She was then
referred to Eldama Ravine Hospital on account of the seriousness of those
injuries but, she says, the Kalenjin staff at Ravine Hospital refused to attend to
her because she was Kikuyu and she had to be taken to the Nakuru Provincial
General Hospital in critical condition where she was operated on and remained
in hospital for 3 months.
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Similarly a statement by Mr. Nyaga stated that he reported the theft of goods
from his house to Eldama Ravine Police Station but the officers refused to help
him in tracing his property. He further stated without providing the source of his
information that out of 126 Administration Police Officers, only 3 were Kikuyu.
Further evidence of partisanship and criminal conduct by the police was
provided by John Mwangi who testified in Naivasha stating that he and his
family had been displaced from Timboroa after being attacked by a group of
about 600 Kalenjin warriors-who had smeared their faces with mud and were
armed with bows, arrows, spears and pangas. The attackers appeared
coordinated and communicated through signals sent by blowing a horn and
carried petrol in small bottles which they used to torch houses belonging to
Kikuyu families. He alleged that they were assisted by a police officer who was in
charge of Timboroa Police Station whose name the witness was unable to
provide.
Thus it would appear that partisanship on the part of public service and law
enforcement agencies strained coordination efforts.64 Indeed, the provincial
administration recommended an effort to balance the ethnic composition of
security personnel.
Nakuru District: Organized Attacks and Counter-Attacks
Introduction
Nakuru District is an agricultural region best known for Lake Nakuru, famous
for millions of flamingoes that nest along its shores. Before the larger Nakuru
District was split, it was one of the biggest districts in Kenya with six
constituencies-Nakuru Town, Naivasha, Molo, Kuresoi, Rongai and Subukia.
Nakuru District has been synonymous with ethnic and political conflict and was
affected in 1992 and 1997 prior to the General Elections held in those years.
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The Akiwumi Report noted that the genesis of the ethnic violence revolved
around the re-introduction of multi party politics in 1991. Non-Kalenjin
communities especially the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya and Luo supported the return of
plural politics but the Kalenjin and Maasai communities, then supporters of the
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) were opposed to any challenge on
KANU’s monopoly of Kenya politics.
The purpose of the clashes in 1992 and 1997 was to evict the so called nonindigenous communities who were perceived to be unsupportive of KANU. The
district however still remains one of Kenya’s most cosmopolitan where most of
Kenya’s ethnic communities are found though the dominant ones are the Kikuyu
and Kalenjin with substantial numbers of Kisii, Luo and Luhya.

Election Related Violence
As was the case in other sites of violence visited by the Commission, the
prevailing atmosphere in Nakuru district prior to the eruption of violence was
described differently by different witnesses who appeared before us. Even
Government officers who testified gave different versions on almost every aspect
of the violence, including the date the violence actually erupted in Nakuru
district, the prevailing atmosphere in the preceding weeks, and the causes of
violence.
According to Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner, Hassan Noor Hassan, who
testified before us, violence in Nakuru did not erupt until Thursday, 24 January
2008 and was caused by “the arrival of thousands of IDPs in Nakuru” which
“elicited strong emotions and heightened tension in an otherwise peaceful and
cosmopolitan town”, and by “tensions, suspicions and acts of self preservations”
fuelled by “rumours of planned and impending attacks and evictions of members
of some communities […]” On the other hand, Wilson Wanyanga, the Nakuru
District Commissioner, told us that it was the release of the Presidential election
results on 30th December 2007 that “marked a turning point in terms of security
in parts of the District” and that clashes erupted on the evening of 30th
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December 2007 in areas of Nakuru bordering Koibatek district. He further
testified that the clashes could be attributed to existing ethnic tensions and
repeated allegations of rigging by politicians as well as coverage by the media.
The Commission established that violence in Nakuru district occurred in two
phases. The first wave of violence started on 30 December 2007, following the
announcement of the results of the presidential election, and was largely
triggered by spontaneous, election related incidents. The second wave of violence
started on 24 January 2008 and took a more planned and systematic nature,
pitting well organized ethnic based criminal gangs against each other.
The Commission was able to establish that much of the violence in Nakuru in
late December 2007 and early January 2008 was the culmination of ethnic
tensions built up during the electoral campaign and a reaction to perceived
attempts

to

rig

elections.

Commission

witnesses

were

unanimous

in

acknowledging that tension started building up in Nakuru town well before the
elections, and that the announcement of the results for the presidential elections
was preceded by a lot of anxiety among members of the public. A succession of
isolated criminal incidences before and after the elections, and the inadequate
police response to these incidents contributed to the increasing tension within
the district. In one such incident, on 28th November 2007 provincial security
agencies were alerted by members of the public that two individuals suspected to
be Administration Police officers were on board a vehicle heading towards
Eldoret from Kabarnet, carrying and distributing anti-ODM leaflets. The vehicle
was followed by anxious members of the public and was intercepted in Keiyo
where the two officers were confronted by a mob who were about to burn the
vehicle when the Keiyo District Criminal Investigation Officer (DCIO) appeared
and saved their lives from the mob. The two officers were later brought to the
provincial police headquarters in Nakuru where they were released in mysterious
circumstances without being charged.65
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99

As a consequence of these incidents and the perceived unwillingness of the
police properly to respond to them, tension was heightened in Nakuru district,
among ODM supporters, largely consisting of members of the Kalenjin, Luo and
Luhya communities, as well as among members of the Kikuyu community,
believed to be largely sympathetic to PNU. ODM supporters and members of
ethnic groups sympathetic to ODM felt that elections were being rigged in favour
of the incumbent President Kibaki.66 Within the Kikuyu community, rumours
started circulating that armed Pokot warriors and trained Kalenjin youth
planned to flush out the IDPs from Nakuru and push them beyond Naivasha
since Nakuru was deemed to be a Kalenjin territory. All tribes who had not
supported ODM would also be pushed towards Naivasha. Fears of a Kalenjin
attack on Kikuyus intensified on 31 December 2007 when Kikuyu IDPs started
arriving in large numbers in Nakuru from Eldoret, Burnt Forest, Kericho,
Western Kenya and Nyanza.67 At the same time, rumours were rife that Kikuyus
were recruiting youths in Naivasha, Laikipia and Dandora to come and protect
Nakuru town.
It is worth noting that, to contrary to previous election related ethnic clashes
which were mainly confined rural areas, the December 2007 violence affected
urban as well as rural areas of Nakuru district. The DC, Wilson Wanyanga, told
the Commission that on 28 December 2007, a day after the elections, incidents
of violence involving eviction of Kikuyu and Kisii farmers were reported from the
Rongai division, particularly in the areas of Kambi ya Moto and Rongai location,
prompting the DSIC to call an emergency meeting on 29 December 2007. On the
evening of 29 December 2007, Kalenjins started burning houses belonging to
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CW 47.
The Commission heard from a representative of the IDPs in Nakuru Mr. Peter Kariuki who was displaced from
Chepsion in Kipkelion District that the IDP Camp at the Nakuru show ground had processed over 100,000 IDPs who
passed through the camp on their way to other camps or other places to stay with relatives in other parts of the
country. At the time the Commission visited the Camp on 30th July 2008, there were 10,200 IDPs.

67

100

Kikuyus and Kisiis and chasing away members of the two communities. Some
Kikuyus and Kisiis left their houses out of fear before they were burnt.
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In urban areas, meanwhile, the Commission was told that ODM supporters
stormed the Nakuru Town Hall on 28th December 2007 demanding the release of
Presidential results and on 29th December, Luo youths took to the streets of
Pondamali Estate where they were joined by a losing Parliamentary candidate
who lent his support to the protests. Businesses and vehicles owned by Kikuyu
were attacked prompting a violent response by the Kikuyu from Langa Langa
estate.
The police had to intervene and create a buffer zone between the two estates. On
30th December, violence erupted again in the town resulting in the deaths of 7
persons. Club Lule’s, a restaurant along KANU Street owned by Nahashon Lule,
a Luo and former professional football player, was burnt by some Kikuyu
arsonists and the fire spread to the adjoining Summerland Club, another
restaurant. This precipitated the Kalenjin to burn houses and businesses owned
by the Kikuyu in Kaptembwa.69
On January 4th 2008, a member of the Kalenjin community who had brought
some charcoal to Nakuru for sale was killed by members of the Kikuyu
community at the Nakuru Bus Park near Ogilgley bar. The following day,
members of the Kikuyu community removed people from motor vehicles and
insisted that they identify their ethnicity. This prompted non-Kikuyus to start
leaving the town and there was open tension between Kikuyus on the one hand
and the Kalenjins, Luo, Luhya and Maasai on the other.
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Organized attacks
The Commission was told that a level of calm returned to Nakuru town until the
end of January 2008 when the district and town experienced the worst acts of
violence. Members of the Kikuyu community were enraged by stories of fleeing
Kikuyu IDPs and influential Kikuyu business people allegedly held meetings to
raise funds for attacks against the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin communities.
During this period of a tense and uneasy calm, a member of the Kalenjin
community was killed and to avenge his death, Kalenjin youths from Kaptembwa
and Kwa Ronda areas attacked Githima Estate-mainly inhabited by Kikuyu on
24th January 2008, torched their houses and stole property.
Kikuyu militias supported by members of the outlawed Mungiki sect and angry
displaced Kikuyu youth armed with new pangas, knives and petrol bombs were
assembled and deployed to various estates-Kaptembwa, Kwarhoda, Mwariki,
Free Area and Kiti to flush out ‘enemy’ communities. They rounded up Luo men
who were forcefully circumcised using pangas and broken bottles and those who
resisted were beheaded. The Provincial Medical Officer of Health for Rift Valley
confirmed that the Nakuru Provincial General Hospital attended to 4 cases of
Luo men who had been forcefully circumcised while another Luo man had his
penis amputated by his attackers on 25 January 2008. The Kalenjin community
living around Nakuru, who had already been mobilized and reportedly paid to
fight the Kikuyu70, retaliated immediately by attacking the Kikuyu dominated
areas of Kaptembwa, Mwariki and Githima where they burnt houses, business
premises and also killed a number of people. According to Commission
witnesses, the estates of Kaptembwa, Free Area, Kiti and Githima were the
hardest hit by this violence which lasted from the 24th to 27th January 2008
while Kiamunyi a middle and upper income neighbourhood was unaffected. The
Commission heard that in one night alone, the 26 January 2008, 48 people were
killed in the aforementioned estates of Nakuru.
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Planning of the violence in Nakuru
According to provincial and district government officials, the January attacks in
Nakuru were neither organized nor planned. The Rift Valley Provincial
Commissioner Hassan Noor Hassan was of the view that since 1992, elections
were the excuse rather than the cause of ethnic fighting and that a simple
incident such as a fight in a bar between members of different communities
could spark serious violence. The retired Rift Valley PPO was of the opinion that
the violence was not entirely unforeseeable. Emotions had been raised by the
high numbers of fleeing IDPs arriving in the town and this made it logical that
retaliatory violence was bound to occur. However, the Commission was able to
determine from compelling testimonies and evidence that the January 2008
violence in Nakuru was well planned and organized by both Kikuyu gangs
believed to be Mungiki members and Kalenjin and Luo gangs, and that security
agencies knew in advance about the planning and organizers of the attacks. The
Commission established that planning for and anticipation of violence in Nakuru
by both sides of the ethnic and political divide began in the weeks leading to the
elections and intensified immediately after elections, in the first week of January
2008. This view has ample support from evidence produced by NSIS and by
other witnesses who testified before the Commission.

NSIS Evidence
Evidence presented to the Commission by NSIS indicated that days and weeks
prior to these attacks, this security agency had been closely monitoring details of
planning for and organization of attacks in Nakuru by gangs affiliated to both
sides of the ethnic and political divide. With regard to the Mungiki/Kikuyu side,
an NSIS report dated 18 December 2007 noted that two Mungiki leaders of the
Nakuru chapter were engaging in a recruitment drive aiming at recruiting 300
new members from the Nakuru area.71 It was further NSIS evidence that in
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Sachangwan trading center along the stretch of highway between Nakuru and
Molo, Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities were planning to attack each other. On
9 January 2008, NSIS noted heightening of tension among the Kalenjin, Luhya
and Luo communities residing in Shabab and Langalanga estates in Nakuru
following speculations that Mungiki members would attack them between the 9th
and the 11th January 2008.
On 15 January 2008, a week before the most brutal attacks erupted in Nakuru,
NSIS was able to establish that some Mungiki members were planning to
discredit the government by instigating chaos in Nakuru, among other places.
After noting the heightening of tension in the Bahati division of Nakuru between
the Luo and Kalenjin on one side and the Kikuyu on the other following the
eviction of 50 Luos from rental houses belonging to the Kikuyu, NSIS concluded
on 18 January 2008 that “confrontations are likely.” Finally, on 23 January
2008, NSIS had information that a former Nakuru MP was organizing Mungiki
members to attack non-Kikuyu people residing within Nakuru town and that the
intended targets of the Mungiki included former Nakuru parliamentary
candidate and other ODM provincial and district leaders. Finally, NSIS received
information on 25 January 2008 that the Mungiki co-ordinator for Nakuru had
advised Kikuyu businessmen in Nakuru Town to close down their businesses
and join the sect members in attacking non-Kikuyu to revenge attacks on
Kikuyus in North Rift.72
On the Kalenjin and Luo side, NSIS was informed on 2nd January 2008 of a plan
by a group of Luo and Kalenjin youth from the Kaptembwa area of Nakuru to
attack the Kikuyu and government supporters and to set ablaze their business
premises. According to NSIS, Mungiki was informed of this plan and was able to
deploy its members in the affected areas with a view to counter the intended
attack. NSIS information on 7 January 2008 was that a Kalenjin chief was
leading a group of local elders in mobilizing youths from the Kalenjin community
to evict the Kikuyus living in the area, with the aim of selling the Kikuyu
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abandoned farms to Kalenjins. The same day NSIS learned that several Kalenjin
youths were receiving combat training within the farm of a politician within
Olenguruone for the purpose of being deployed to attack the Kikuyu and Kisii
residing in neighboring Molo District. On 24 January 2008, NSIS learned that
following an attempt by the Kikuyu to set ablaze a house of a former Councillor
at Muchorwe area, a former councillor in Nakuru was mobilizing Kalenjin youth
to attack the Kikuyu residing at Muchorwe and Nyakinyua within the Sirikwa
location of Nakuru district. In addition, NSIS was informed that on 25 January
2008 about 200 Kalenjin youth from the greater Kericho District arrived in
Nakuru where they were regrouping at Sewale in Mwariki B and at the residence
of a former Member of Parliament.73

Other Commission Witness testimony
The Commission was given evidence and testimony that corroborated NSIS
information on planning of violence in Nakuru. The Chairman of the Law Society
of Kenya, Rift Valley Chapter, told the Commission that sometime before the 24th
January 2008 had received a call from an MP informing him that attacks were
planned in Nakuru for the 25th and 26th January 2008 and that, through a third
person, he passed this information on to the Provincial Police Officer (PPO).74 The
then PPO, Everett Wasike, confirmed having received this information and
passed it on to Naivasha and Nakuru OCPDs.75 It is not clear what use was
made of that information before the attacks on 25 January. A special PSIC
meeting held on 6 February 2008 directed the Nakuru and the Naivasha DSICs
“to summon those believed to be funding the illegal sects (Mungiki) activities to
their respective DSICs for discussion/warning on the same.” Commission
witnesses, including district and provincial government officials, told the
Commission that some of the people who funded and organized the attacks in
Nakuru town included several Nakuru businessmen.
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Evidence presented by the KNCHR was that local leaders in Nakuru and
influential Kikuyu business people had held meetings to raise funds for revenge
attacks against the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin. The retired PPO gave the names he
received as being behind the retaliatory attacks in Naivasha and Nakuru.76
The involvement of Mungiki gang members in the violence in Nakuru led to the
continuing monitoring of this gang’s activities in Nakuru by both the Rift Valley
PSIC and the Nakuru DSIC members from November 2007 through March 2008.
A DSIC meeting held on 20th November 2007 noted “with concern the presence
of Mungiki adherents within Nakuru town” and recommended that intelligence
reports on Mungiki “be availed to DSIC promptly for immediate action instead of
having it sent to Nairobi, back to the PSIC and then to them.” At the provincial
level, the Mungiki menace in Nakuru and Naivasha continued to be discussed in
PSIC meetings, including meetings on 5th, 7th and 8th February 2008.

On

February 1st, 2008 the PSIC received information of another imminent Mungiki
attack on the Kwa Rhonda area and asked the Nakuru DSIC to arrange for preemptive raids in the area.77

Nature and extent of the violence
The violence in Nakuru District took the form of ethnically targeted killings,
maiming, forced eviction, burning of houses and business premises. Records
from health institutions and the Nakuru mortuary produced before the
Commission indicate that between 31 December 2007 and 3rd March 2008, 214
persons died as a result of post election violence, including 205 males and 9
females. According to post-mortems done on the bodies, 148 of the 214 died of
injuries resulting from sharp/pointed objects; 45 died of injuries resulting from
blunt objects; 23 died of gun shot wounds; 10 died of burns; and 1 died of
suffocation. From the records made available to the Commission at least 74 of
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these people died before 23rd January 2008 during the first wave of violence
while another 112 were killed after 23rd Jan during the second wave. We were
however unable to determine from the records available the dates when the other
28 recorded deaths could have occurred.
Traumatic (or forced) circumcision, a particularly barbaric form of violence, was
inflicted on mainly male victims who were Luo. 7 persons were admitted at the
Provincial General Hospital, Nakuru, where they were treated for traumatic
circumcision and penile amputation. 5 out of the 7 traumatic circumcisions
occurred on 25 January 2008.78 29 rape cases were managed at the Provincial
General Hospital, Nakuru. The Commission was given a complete tabulation of
post election related deaths and hospital admission cases, as well as postmortem references and details.79
The majority of the deaths were either as a result of arrow and machete wounds
(sharp/pointed objects) or inflicted by blunt objects, which is a pointer to the
savagery of the violence and barbarity of the warring gangs. In spite of

a

National Coordinating Committee established by the Ministry of Health to
respond to the emergency, such a high number of casualties in a district such as
Nakuru stretched medical facilities and especially the Rift Valley Provincial and
General Hospital to the limit.80
We salute the commendable efforts of Nakuru medical personnel who, while
facing great odds, managed to maintain an acceptable standard of health within
the IDP camps in Nakuru including the deployment of clinical officers to these
camps and establishment of mobile clinics to serve the IDP camps where those
displaced were unable to reach available health care facilities. We further
commend the sterling efforts of armed forces health personnel who had to come
in to help in managing the victims since health workers were overwhelmed
despite working overtime. As with other hospitals in conflict zones, the Rift
Valley Provincial & General Hospital was faced with an overwhelming number of
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survivors which was further exacerbated by displacement of staff members and
requests for transfers by staff who had received threats on the basis of their tribe
leading to shortage of staff. The Commission further heard that the blockage of
roads in many places in the interior hindered survivors from accessing the
facility after being referred from the health centers of first call. Finally, a problem
that was not unique to the Rift Valley Provincial General Hospital was the
inadequate mortuary capacity which made it difficult to preserve bodies. In some
areas, the Kenya Red Cross came in handy and provided refrigerated containers,
but in Nakuru the unclaimed bodies were disposed of.

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The Commission established that police and government authorities at
provincial and district levels were informed of the planned attacks in Nakuru
sufficiently in advance to be able to plan for adequate response. The Rift Valley
Provincial Police Officer, Everett Wasike, admitted having received information of
planned attacks by Kikuyu gangs before they were committed and, as discussed
earlier, NSIS had similar information which would ordinarily be passed on to
police and the district authorities. The Commission therefore found testimonies
by police officials and district authorities to the effect that the violence in Nakuru
in January took them by surprise unconvincing.
The Commission was given evidence that the police were very slow to respond
and some simply refused to enforce the law. Although tension had accumulated
and intelligence reports were clearly indicating a build up to attacks by both
sides, it was not until violence broke out and needlessly led to the deaths of 48
innocent people on 26th of January 2008 that the Provincial Security and
Intelligence Committee through the Rift Valley PC imposed a restriction of
movement (curfew) in Nakuru and Gilgil the following day, 27th January. It was
clear to the Commission that by this time the situation had gone completely out
of control and perhaps if the so-called “curfew” had been imposed before the
volatile state of affairs unravelled, more lives would have been saved. There were
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complaints from members of the Nakuru business community that the
restriction of movement had severely affected businesses within the town leading
to huge losses. But preserving life was certainly a much higher priority, and from
uncontroverted Commission testimonies, the curfew seems to have saved lives in
Nakuru.81 Yet, even before the curfew imposition, the authorities were already
aware that tribal gangs had been mobilized to attack certain farms; residents
and travellers were already being killed by rival gangs on an ethnic basis. We
were also told that in many cases police officers were deliberately refusing to
intervene and their enforcement of the law was unbalanced and ethnically
biased.82
Failure to plan for adequate deployment of personnel resulted in poor police
response to the violence in Nakuru district. Immediately following the
announcement of the presidential elections results, it was obvious to Rift Valley
provincial security agents that police officers on the ground were overwhelmed
by the violence that erupted across the province. A PSIC meeting held on 31
December 2007 decided to call for support from the military. In Nakuru District,
according to then PPO Wasike, the sheer numbers of the marauding gangs
heavily outnumbered the police and the Army was called in to assist in policing.
The Commission heard that there were very few police officers in the troubled
areas of Kambarari, Kaptembwa, Milima and Kiti, and that those who sought
help from police stations were told to resort to self help. The Commission was
further told that there were more than 100 idle police officers in their residential
houses within the town at Kasarani and thereafter they would be hired privately
at a going rate of between Ksh. 1,000 to Ksh. 2,000 per officer to assist with the
rescue of besieged people to safer areas. The inadequate number of police
officers resulted in individuals engaged in criminal activities not fearing to be
caught by police or even disobeying police orders to stop those criminal
activities. In Salgaa area, 10 armed thugs set a house on fire and refused to stop

81 Asked to discuss the legality and effect of the curfew, Mr. Ogolla, chairman of the Law Society Rift Valley Chapter,
stated, “[h]ad that curfew not been imposed, I think Nakuru would be no more”.
82 CIPEV Investigators Job Sheet
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when confronted by security personnel who opened fire resulting in 5 of the
thugs being arrested and the rest escaping with bullet wounds.83
We were told that in view of the failure of police, a number of private institutions,
including the Law Society of Kenya Rift Valley Chapter, were able to mount
commendable and risky operations to rescue individuals and families who were
at risk of being attacked. Between the 25th, 26th and 27th January, the Law
Society Rift Valley Chapter rescued approximately 300 to 400 people from Ponda
Mali, Kaptembwa, Githima and Mwariki areas who were taken to Afraha
Stadium and to the Nakuru ASK Show Ground. The Chairman of the Law
Society Rift Valley Chapter, Mr. Ogolla, who extensively interacted with the
police during the attacks in Nakuru, testified that the police were divided along
ethnic lines with each group helping their own and at that these divisions
escalated to the point where the officers were on the verge of turning against one
another. He further stated that he had learnt that a senior officer who was in
charge of operations at the Kenya Police Provincial headquarters was only
deploying Kikuyu officers which left a huge number of police officers idle within
their residential dwelling place of Kasarani.
In many instances the police and provincial and district authorities let criminal
or potential criminal activities go unpunished, thinking that dealing promptly
with them would worsen the volatile situation. The Commission heard that on
24th or 25th January 2008, a motor vehicle carrying four civilians armed with
AK47 rifles was cited in KANU Street and the police were alerted. The Police gave
chase and managed to stop this vehicle in Langa Langa Estate upon which it
was impounded but released after two days on instructions of the same high
ranking police officer. Further, the Commission heard from the PCIO Mohamed
Amin, that while on patrol within Mahiga area on 28 January 2008,
Administration Police officers spotted some people burning houses and managed
to arrest one arsonist whom they were escorting to Kampi ya Moto Chief’s camp
when they met eight men, among them the area chief. The Chief ordered the
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officers to release the suspects otherwise he would incite his people to attack
them with bows and arrows as they were harassing his community members.
The officers arrested the chief and his men and escorted them to Nakuru police
station where they were placed in cells for interrogation. The Commission heard
that the following day, the chief was released under instruction of the then OCS
Nakuru Mohamed Bakuli, with no consideration, to the nature and gravity of the
offence committed by the suspect. The OCS was himself later placed in cells for
interrogation, only to be released the following day, 30 January 2008 with no
further explanation.84
It is the Commission’s view that the poor handling of these criminal activities by
the police contributed to reinforcing the atmosphere of lawlessness in Nakuru
district. Failure to properly investigate and prosecute police officers and political
leaders involved in these incidents widened the gap between law enforcement
agencies and members of the public and promoted impunity. Those who
espoused ODM’s assertion that elections were rigged with the help of Kenyan
security agencies and local administration authorities were quick to identify the
mishandling of enforcement of justice as evidence of a politically biased state
security machinery. On the other hand, the state inability or unwillingness to
promptly deal with post election criminal activities resonated with the appeals
for revenge attacks from Kikuyus and other PNU affiliated sections of the public.
As incidents of mishandling of post election offences accumulated, the
consequent widening gap between law enforcement agencies and members of the
public became an increasing security concern, prompting a PSIC meeting on 4
February 2008 to issue a strong disapproval “of the way the Nakuru DSIO office
handled the case of the suspect in the shooting of the late MP for Ainamoi.” In
the PSIC words, “[t]he fact that the Attorney General’s Office Nakuru delayed the
case from being taken to court under flimsy reasons leaves a lot to be desired.”85

84 Exhibit 80, page 59. Mr. Wasike stated that the arrested Mr. Bakuli had called him informing he had been placed
under arrest and was seeking Wasike’s intervention on his behalf.
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In addition, the Commission received evidence that police and other security
personnel were involved with the very criminal gangs who were the authors of
violence in Nakuru. Some police officers actively sided with Kikuyu/Mungiki
gangs while other officers were aiding and abetting Kalenjin attackers. Evidence
presented to the Commission by NSIS was that during the attacks, armed
Mungiki sect members wearing Administration Police uniforms were moving
from house to house in Nakuru posing as police officers in search of members of
non-Kikuyu communities to attack and kill them.86 Allegations were also made
to the Commission that an officer in charge of special operations at Police
Provincial headquarters was in fact the secretary of Mungiki in Nakuru.87 NSIS
also learned that security personnel deployed within Rongai “[were] supporting
Kalenjin raiders and that weapons used by the raiders [were] being kept at a
local Councillor’s homestead with their [security personnel’s] knowledge.”88
Findings and Recommendations
From the available evidence placed before us, we are convinced that information
on the impending wave of violence was available to the relevant authorities early
enough to prevent the fighting that followed. Furthermore, the fact that the
violence erupted in the manner predicted, especially by the NSIS, discloses a
failure on the part of the police and provincial administration who showed no
signs of being pro-active. Instead they chose to fire fight when the prudent action
dictated pre-emptive measures against the organizers, planners and instigators
who, as we have seen, were implicated and sufficiently identified.
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Naivasha District: Planned Criminal Attacks by Mungiki and
Kikuyu politicians
Introduction
Naivasha is a sprawling town in Rift Valley Province located on the shores of
Lake Naivasha that is home to a variety of wildlife and a sizeable population of
hippos. The lake’s name derives from the Maasai name Nai'posha (rough water)
because of the sudden storms which can arise over the lake. Between 1937 and
1950 the lake was used as a landing place for flying boats on the Imperial
Airways passenger and mail route from Southampton in Britain to South Africa.
The area is well known for its population of European immigrants and settlers
and is a popular tourist resort and also a weekend haunt for Nairobi residents
due to its proximity to Hell’s Gate National Park, Longonot National Park and the
nearby Mount Longonot. The main industry is agriculture, especially floriculture
around the lake providing a source of employment and income for the local
population and CW 33 told us that there were about fifty two flower farms in
Naivasha area which accounted for almost 74% of all the flower farms in the
country.
Naivasha District further hosts Kenya’s geothermal plant at nearby Ol-Karia and
is therefore of strategic national importance since a significant component of
Kenya’s electricity generation is located here and the area thus represents the
future of the geothermal industry in Kenya. The majority of the population is
Kikuyu with substantial immigrant workers on the flower farms who are mainly
Luo and Luhya. Formerly a part of Nakuru District before it was hived off as a
separate district, the area experienced some ethnic violence in 1992 pitting the
Kikuyu on one hand and Maasai on the other as explained in page 127 of the
Akiwumi Report.
The Commission heard from several witnesses that there was no major violence
in Naivasha before and immediately after the 2007 general elections. According
to the District Commissioner Katee Lucas Mwanza, the district has no history of
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ethnic violence, with the exception of the Mahi Mahiu area bordering Narok
District, where there had been ethnic and land related conflicts between
members of the Maasai and Kikuyu communities.89 A Naivasha District Security
and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) meeting held on 6 December 2007 to review
security plan ahead of the general elections noted that in the past, parts of the
district that had experienced clashes during general elections included the areas
of Maella, Mai Mahiu, Oljarai, Longonot and Moi Ndabi. Naivasha town was not
mentioned. Indeed, several witnesses who appeared before the Commission
highlighted the history of peaceful co-existence between ethnic groups living in
Naivasha Town. Peter Otieno, a resident of Naivasha for 18 years and leader of
the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union representing flower
plantation workers, told us that,
“Naivasha had been peaceful until the 2007 general elections. With
the many tribes in Naivasha, they had been co-existing and doing
business together and they had been co-existing without any
problem.”90
Another witness who gave her testimony in private described her relations with
her Luo, Luhya and Kikuyu neighbors as follows:
“Q: How were you living with your neighbours before you voted?
Witness: We used to live very well with my neighbours. We even
used to borrow (sic) and help each other.”91
The Commission was told that incidents of violence registered before the
elections were of political, rather than ethnic nature, and they occurred in the
context of a highly charged political rivalry during the campaign period.
Appearing before us in private, a former Naivasha Councillor who worked as
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election monitor for the 2007 elections answered as follows to a question about
political tension during the electoral campaign:
“Q: I asked you what your assessment was overall in terms of, were there
political tensions there or was there an environment which was suitable for
such tensions?
Witness: Yes, there was a clear difference between ODM supporters and
also PNU supporters, but there was no actual violence.

But on 22nd of

December ODM people were attacked on their way to Suswa, they were
attacked in Mai Mahiu and some of the people in the team were badly
beaten up; and one eventually succumbed to the injuries […]”92
As was the case in the rest of the country, however, the political rivalry during
the campaign soon took a clear ethnic dimension and tension started to build up
in Naivasha between members of the majority Kikuyu community and those
from the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya communities, most of whom worked as wage
earners in the local flower farms. According to a witness, “We were divided, the
Kikuyus were in PNU and me with my other Luo colleagues were in ODM.”93
This politico-ethnic tension heightened immediately after the results of the
presidential election were announced on 30 December 2007. As members of the
public, mostly from the Kikuyu community, were celebrating the Kibaki win they
were also threatening members of other communities. The Luos in particular
were

threatened

with

eviction,

following

stories

about

the

pre-election

expectation of Luo tenants not to pay anymore rent if Raila Odinga had won the
elections. According to union leader Peter Otieno,
“On 30th when the results were announced many people poured on
the streets celebrating the results and the celebration continued up to
late in the night. […] as people were celebrating among them they
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were uttering words against other tribes which was scaring other
tribes away from celebrating. […] Some were uttering that the Luos
should be circumcised, my Lords. Those were the words coming from
the crowd.”
Other sworn evidence from a Luo resident was as follows:
“After Kibaki was declared winner, people in my area started
cheering and saying that those Luos who thought they would not pay
house rent once Raila was declared winner should be prepared to
leave – ‘wajaluo wajipange’. There was tension soon after the
announcement. Our landlord used agents in the house where we used
to live to collect rent. She ordered the agents to evict all Luos from her
property because there were rumours that houses hosting Luos would
be burnt down.”94
Kabati estate in Naivasha town was most affected by the eviction of Luo tenants,
some of whom started seeking refuge in the compound of the Naivasha
Maximum Security Prison. Duncan Ogore, then officer in charge of the prison,
told the Commission that the first group of mostly women and children from the
nearby Kabati estate arrived to the prison in the evening of 30 December 2007
and by 3 January 2008, the number of displaced persons in the Naivasha prison
had reached 112, including 68 children and 44 adults.95
The Eruption of Violence
By early January 2008 the majority of districts in the Rift Valley province were
theatres of large scale violence. Naivasha District, however, did not experience
violence of similar magnitude until the end of January 2008. The Commission
was told that the violence that broke out on 27 January 2008 in Naivasha was
as a result of a growing bitterness caused by the massive influx of IDPs from
other districts of the North Rift Province. The District Commissioner informed
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the Commission that Naivasha Town had started receiving Kikuyu IDPs from
other parts of the Rift Valley after announcement of the election results and that
at its peakthe town accommodated upwards of 22,000 IDPs displaced from
Eldoret, Kisumu, Kericho, Kipkelion, Kitale, Trans Nzoia District, Narok and
Molo District. The IDPs, who were mainly Kikuyus, brought painful personal
stories of ordeals experienced in places from where they had fled and pointed
accusing finger at members of such communities as the Kalenjin, Luo and
Luhya. This, combined with the accumulation of minor incidents throughout
December 2007 and the first half of January 2008, led to an extremely volatile
situation and laid the ground for the revenge attacks on non-Kikuyus in
Naivasha between 27 and 30 January 2008.
Consistent witness testimony and evidence tendered to the Commission suggest
that the attacks on members of the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya communities that
started on 27 January 2008 were executed in an orderly and well planned
manner by a coordinated group. The Commission was able to reconstruct the
events of 27 January 2008 as follows:96
In the morning of Sunday 27 January 2008, large groups of demonstrators
started congregating in different places in Naivasha, ostensibly to protest the
killing of Kikuyus in other parts of the province, demonstrate against the
restriction of movement (“curfew”) earlier imposed by the DSIC, and demand that
prison warders be withdrawn from the joint security patrols in the streets of
Naivasha. The District Commissioner acceded to the demand for withdrawal of
prison officers and a group of prison warders who were proceeding towards the
OCPD’s office to commence security patrols was called back to the prison. He
told another group of cheering protestors that the curfew would be lifted and
asked them to disband.
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Main roads within and through Naivasha were barricaded by the demonstrators,
including the Nakuru-Nairobi and the Gilgil-Mai Mahiu highways. The
demonstrations attracted big crowds and happened simultaneously in different
places of the town, which resulted in security forces and local administration
authorities spreading all over in attempts to respond to the situation by
addressing the demonstrators, dispersing the crowds and clearing roadblocks.97
The same morning, at around 10:00am, the Kikuyu gangs attacked Luo and
other non-Kikuyu families and burnt their houses in different estates of
Naivasha. The hardest hit areas were the estates of Kihoto, Kabati, Site, Council
(Kanjo) Estate and Karagita.
It later became clear that the attackers were organized so that groups of
“demonstrators” would keep police and administration authorities busy on the
streets while other groups were chasing Luos and other non-Kikuyus in the
estates, killing them and burning their houses. As the DC told us:
“…the time where we were trying to quell these clashes we thought
of using our normal method of addressing people in public barazas
and meeting and when we realized that there appeared to have
been an organized gang as we addressed people here another gang
was somewhere committing a more serious offence…”98
In at least one case, the same crowd that the DC was addressing at Kariuki
Chotara Road went on a looting and burning rampage targeting Luo and
Kalenjin shops as soon as the DC and the police left to go and address another
group.
The Commission heard that in the ensuing violence the Kikuyu gangs killed forty
people in one day. This included nineteen members of one Luo family who died
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on the afternoon of the 27th when their Kabati house was set on fire while they
were locked inside. Gangs of young Kikuyu men armed with machetes went
round the town, forcing other Kikuyu to join them, in search of Luos, Luhyas
and Kalenjins. The gangs blocked roads and public transport and searched
vehicles forcing passengers forced to identify their ethnic groups. A Catholic
social volunteer who involved herself into rescue operations in the morning of 27
January said she saw “young men…flagging down the vehicles and shouting:
“kuna mjaluo kwa hii gari!! Tunataka wajaluo!”99 In the evening of 27 January
one Luo woman was nearly caught at one such road block while on her way back
from the flower farm where she worked. She told us:
“I worked till 4:00pm when it was time to go home. At the stage inside
our place of work, the company drivers informed us that they had just
left town and there was chaos, that road blocks were being mounted.
The drivers advised Luos against boarding the vehicles. I decided to
board. I requested my friends to board with me so that in case we are
killed we could all die together. On reaching ‘sanctuary’ we found a
convoy of vehicles lined up. The vehicles were not being allowed to
pass. We found armed Kikuyus armed (sic) with pangas. The company
vehicles did not take us to the stage. It dropped us at the field called
kiwanja ndogo. The Kikuyus were waiting for Luos to alight from the
company vehicles so that they could run after them and kill them.”100
A Kikuyu woman who interacted with the attackers while rescuing her Luo
friends described the unfolding of violence as follows:
“Young men were walking in groups. Not only young men because it
was everybody in the society. They were all walking in groups, shoving
people up and down. In fact, they were chasing the non-Kikuyus like
rabbits and then when one is captured just hacked to death. They were
burning properties and the local women were following them,
looting.”101
The attacks were targeted against mainly members of the Luo community,
though Luhyas and Kalenjins were also targeted and among the forms of
violence perpetrated by the mobs was forced circumcision on four members of
the Luo community.
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The Ministry of Medical Services through the District Medical Officer of Health
gave a figure of 48 deaths were recorded between 27th January and 31st January.
Post-mortems carried out at the Naivasha District Hospital showed the causes of
PEV deaths to be burns (22), sharp object injuries (19) and gunshot injuries (6).
In addition, in 2 cases the cause of death was “unknown” while one person died
of injuries from arrow shot. Of the 50 deaths, 11 were female and 32 were Luos,
an indication that members of the Luo community were particularly targeted.
The attacks resulted in a serious humanitarian crisis when Luo, Luhya and
Kalenjin residents of the town took refuge at the Central Police Station-Naivasha
which was not equipped with sanitation facilities to handle such huge numbers,
estimated at 8,000 IDPs. Further, the number of non-Kikuyu IDPs seeking
refuge at the Naivasha Prison eventually rose to 10,000 by 3rd of February 2008
and by default the Naivasha Prison turned into a camp for IDPs.
The Killing of Eric Ouma Oyieko: An Account by His Sister
[…] On Monday [28 January 2008], I woke up and started thinking of my business that I
set up after obtaining a loan at my place of work. Even before I went to work, a
workmate of mine, a Luhya, came to me… He told me that my brother had been killed
while taking tea. My brother’s name was Eric Ouma Oyieko. I told the workmate that it
could not have been my brother because when we were fleeing I passed by my brother’s
house and I found a padlock. I knew he had also fled. My brother used to live near me
in the next building known as ‘makao ya amani.’
At about 10:00am something told me that I should go and check on him. I boarded a
Securicor car and paid Shs. 50. They were the only vehicles operating. I left to see my
brother. On arriving there I found a crowd of people including policemen who were
standing nearby but at a distance from the other people. They did not look bothered. I
found that his (my brother’s) penis had been cut and placed in his mouth; his testis
were chopped off and placed in his hand. I found blood was still pouring out of his body
and he was kicking as he was dying. I talked to the policemen around and requested
them to take my brother to the hospital so that even if he died, he would die at the
hospital. The police told me to get away from them, that I should not disturb them, that
if I insisted I would end up like my brother and that it was not their work.
I didn’t have anything to do. I decided to go back to Sher where we were seeking refuge.
I walked to Sher because I did not have bus fare with me. I left karakta at about
11:00am but got to Sher at 4:00pm. I took a lot of time walking and sitting down. I had
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a lot of thought on my mind. By that time my brother had died. I touched him and he
was no longer moving. He was dead. I informed my husband that my brother was dead.
He asked me if I had taken my brother to the mortuary and I told him I hadn’t since I
did not get any assistance from the police. The following day, another workmate of mine
informed me that my brother had not been moved to the mortuary and was still lying on
the road, that his head had been chopped off and that dogs were eating his private
parts. My brother was clobbered to death before he was mutilated. The people who did
that to him were using spiked clubs. They had fixed nails on the club and as they hit
his face the nails would pluck flesh from his body.
I was not able to go to work that day. I just sat on the road. It was then that I saw a
land rover full of police men. The driver was a Kalenjin because he was speaking in
Kalenjin. I talked to him and informed him that my brother had been killed in Karakta
and that his body was not collected. I boarded their vehicle and we went with them to
where my brother’s body was. I found that the dogs had eaten him just as I had been
informed. We picked him and took him to the mortuary. By then he was smelling badly
and he had started rotting because his body had spent two days on the sun before being
collected. His body had insects that had started to eat him due to rotting…
I learned that on that Monday my brother was taking tea from his house when some
Kikuyu told him that I and my husband had been killed. He left the tea and came to our
shop to look for us. He peeped through the glass window when some people said, ‘there
he is’. They were actually looking for my husband and when they could not find him
they killed my brother.
My late brother was married to Mildred Achieng. They had three children, Ochieng (5
years), Amam (1½ years) and Linet (4 years). Ochieng was present when his father was
being clobbered and mutilated. He has since gone mad. He keeps on saying, “baba
wanakata kichwa yako, wana kata kitu chako…Dad they are chopping off your head,
they are chopping off your thing (penis).”[…]
Extracts from Exhibit 36, statement by Judith A. O., 29 years old, taken by Commission
investigators on 25 July 2008, Naivasha, and submitted in evidence.

Planning of Violence in Naivasha: Political Leaders and Mungiki
The Commission received credible evidence to the effect that the violence in
Naivasha between the 27th and the 30th January 2008 was pre-planned and
executed by Mungiki members who received the support of Naivasha political
and business leaders. The Commission has also evidence that government and
political leaders in Nairobi, including key office holders at the highest level of
government may have directly participated in the preparation of the attacks.
Central to that planning were two meetings held in State House and Nairobi
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Safari Club in the run up to the election with the involvement senior members of
the Government and other prominent Kikuyu personalities.
Evidence produced by NSIS suggests that this agency was collecting information
on the planning of violence in Naivasha by Mungiki members and politicians, at
both local and national level.102 As early as 3 January 2008, NSIS had
information that two former MPs of the Kikuyu community were “said to be
negotiating with the outlawed Mungiki with a view to have sect members assist
the community to counter their attackers” and that Mungiki members were
meeting “in an undisclosed location in Nairobi with a view to carrying revenge
attacks on Luos/Kalenjins travelling along Nairobi-Naivasha highway on
undisclosed date.”
On 15 January, NSIS was informed that Mungiki members were planning to
discredit the Government by instigating chaos in Nairobi and Nakuru “while
others would raid Kamiti and Naivasha Prisons to rescue their colleagues held
there among them [Maina] Njenga.” This supported information presented to us
in camera by a senior police officer in Naivasha who had learned on 9 January
that “there was a likelihood of the so-called mungiki making a way into prison
with the intention of whisking away the chairman [Mr. Maina Njenga] who is
currently held in that particular prison.”103
Following up on this information, the Naivasha District Security and Intelligence
Committee (DSIC) chaired by the District Commissioner decided on 9th January
2008 to increase patrols within the town and additional officers were sought
from the Naivasha Prisons to assist the police. The Naivasha Prisons
Commandant, Duncan Ogore, confirmed having received such request for
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assistance and having furnished some prison warders to the OCPD Naivasha to
help in patrolling the town up to 27th January 2008.104
On 21 January NSIS received precise information on part of the planned
operation of violence in Naivasha, to the effect that Kikuyu youth in Naivasha
“plan to block Nakuru-Naivasha and Gilgil-Mai Mahiu roads, to block/intercept
vehicles from Western and Nyanza regions to fish out the targeted communities,”
which is exactly what happened on 27 January.
According to evidence presented by the KNCHR, local politicians received
support from Kikuyu elite from outside Naivasha to mobilize local jobless youth
who were bolstered by Mungiki followers from Nairobi and Central Province.
KNCHR had evidence of two planning meetings held on 23rd and 26th January at
a local hotel where influential Naivasha business people plotted the violence and
paid between Kshs 100-200 to the youth who would participate in the attacks
targeting mainly members of the Luo community.105 Information of these
planning meetings and participants was corroborated by individual witnesses,
including two Naivasha social workers and activists.
According to witnesses, evidence that Mungiki were involved in violence in
Naivasha includes a high level of coordination of the attackers, many of whom
were not Naivasha residents, as well as inside intelligence obtained from Mungiki
members involved in the violence. A Kikuyu political activist who testified in
camera told us that she learned from an aide to Ndura Waruinge, Mungiki
national Coordinator, that Mungiki was not responsible for all the violence in
Naivasha, and that one “could differentiate the Mungiki from the locals, because
where Mungiki went they were not looting they were just destroying properties.
But with the locals they were looting.” She further testified that the attacks
happened at the same time, around 9:00am, in the estates of Kayole, Kabati,
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Kihooto and Karagita, and so she thought the attackers “were dropped at those
areas and they had orders [to] start at 9:00am”, which she characterized “as
having the Mungiki type of organization.”
Acting either on NSIS or on its own intelligence, the Naivasha DSIC gathered
similar information with regard to a number of politicians and businessmen
whom it suspected of financing and organizing the gangs they believed to be
Mungiki, which were responsible for the Naivasha violence. Those who the DSIC
recommended for arrest for financing and organizing the violence included a
former MP of the Kikuyu community and other prominent Kikuyu personalities,
whose names were provided to the Commission. Further information in
possession of the DSIC was that prior to the attacks, a number of meetings were
held at a hotel in, Naivasha whose owner was allegedly also involved in the
planning and that a former MP from the area the master mind. The names of the
individuals who not only purchased the pangas from a local supermarket for use
by the attackers who had been transported from outside Naivasha but also
directed the attacks on the ground were also made available to the Commission.
Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The Commission established that response to the PEV in Naivasha by security
agencies and district administration reflected the same poor planning and lack of
professionalism and independence as was evident in other parts of the Rift
Valley Province. The police were obviously overwhelmed by the magnitude of the
violence, but breaks in the chain of command and parallel ethnic command
structures within the police meant that even with the best of planning the police
were too weak as an institution adequately to respond to the violence in
Naivasha.
The Commission also received ample evidence to the effect that police and
administration authorities were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the violence.
The Naivasha DC and OCPD testified that in the morning of 27 January they
had to deal with 2 to 3 groups of demonstrators each and that they spent too
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much time and energy in addressing each group at a time while trying to
disperse the crowds and clear road blocs, before moving to the next group of
demonstrators. A community leader who appeared before us in camera and had
been personally involved with the police in helping rescue persons in danger,
testified as follows:
“Q.: Now, may be you need to go back to the date of 27th. What can you
recall about that date that is significant for Commissioners?
Witness: There was a lot of violence and I can say, it is like the Police were
overwhelmed and there was no law in Naivasha on that day and also on
29th. The Police were just overwhelmed. Like when I went to the Police
Station trying to get any Police Officer even to talk, when I got there I talked
to the OCPD and then he started getting calls. I tried to organize the people
somehow and we tried to call others. I told them to call their friends to know
if they were all safe. So we started making calls and we found people who
were trapped in their houses. They couldn’t come to the Police Station or go
to the GK Prison. I started coordinating with the Police on how to go and
evacuate those people who were trapped and sometimes it was just difficult
because the Police vehicles were not enough. It was just chaotic. Sometimes
we were getting very desperate.”
Among the causes of police failure to adequately respond to the violence was the
breach in the chain of command within the force. The Commission was provided
with abundant examples of junior officers refusing to take orders from their
superiors and placing ethnic loyalty before professional ethical conduct. The
community leader involved in the police operations at the time testified as
follows:
“Q.: Did you get the sense the police who were doing the best they could
but were overwhelmed or was there incompetence amongst the police
officers or other security agencies?
Witness: On the first day, that was on 27th, I thought that the police
were being overwhelmed. But during that week when we stayed at the
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Police Station camp, because the last person we evacuated was on
Thursday and I could tell that there was some defiance. The junior
officers particularly from the Kikuyu tribe were not ready to take
instructions from their superiors; and I can say, for example there is a
time we went to evacuate a terminally ill lady who was trapped inside
an estate and getting the officers to come, they were just defiant, they
were just running and saying that it is the Deputy OCPD, because it was
the Deputy OCPD, Grace Kakai who was giving them those instructions.
They were saying that she is just being bossy.”
We were presented with ample evidence suggesting that the same ethnic fault
line that divided the community in Naivasha also affected security agencies.
Whether for legitimate reasons or not,106 members of the Kikuyu community
were generally deeply distrustful of officers of the Kenya Prison Department
whose commanders were believed to be Kalenjin and Luo ODM supporters. On
their part, Luo victims told stories about the indifference of Kikuyu police officers
to their suffering. A Luo woman told us that police failed to collect the body of
her relative and that she was not able to have the body brought to the mortuary
until a Kalenjin officer came to her rescue two days later.107
In perhaps the most serious security lapse, police and administration authorities
were too preoccupied with a false notion of peace and tranquillity that they
completely failed to promptly deal with the real threats to security. It is the
Commission’s view that on 27 January too much focus was on clearing roads
and dispersing crowds, which left the police and administration officials spread
too thin to deploy in estates where persons’ lives were being put in danger and
where police presence was most needed. In his desire to simply quell the
demonstrations and clear road blocks, the DC unduly gave in to demands of the
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The Commission was not able to categorically establish whether complaints from members of the public,
particularly Kikuyus, against prison officers were genuine and resulted from abuses by prison officers, or were a mere
reflection of the perception that the majority of prison officers were from the Luo and Kalenjin communities.
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mainly Kikuyu crowd that prison warders be called off the street on the very day
they were most needed in the OCPD’s estimation. For the same reason and on
his own admission, he also agreed to lift the partial ban on movement (“curfew”),
a gesture immediately perceived by the demonstrators as an encouragement to
carry on with their planned attacks. An eye witness recounted the immediate
consequence of the lift as follows:
“Q.: […]You said the meeting was being petitioned by these people, so
that he could lift the ban.
Witness: Yes, on the curfew.
Q.: The curfew needs to be lifted. What was the DC’s reaction?
Witness: He agreed to lift the ban and people clapped and people
dispersed and when they dispersed he went with his officers and
immediately the police left that Kariuki Chotara Road, that is when one
of the Chemists, it is in the Centre of the town it belongs to a Kalenjin
was looted and what they could not loot was burned outside the shop,
immediately the DC left with the police.
Q.: About what time of the day was this?
Witness: It was between 10.30 and 11.00 a.m., My Lords.”108
Despite the general chaotic response to PEV, individual police officers were able
to heroically rise to the occasion and save lives. Peter Otieno, a Luo and a union
leader, told us how one Mutuku, a police officer, came to his family’s rescue by
firing in the air to scare off a group of Kikuyus who were about to break into his
house and kill him and his family.109
The Commission also heard that the security forces – the Kenya Police, the
Administration Police and the Anti-Stock Theft Unit – received considerable help
from the Military who not only cleared the roads allowing police officers free
movement to handle the actual crowds but on 28th January 2008 over flew
108
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Karagita township in a helicopter gunship firing from the air and in the air to
demonstrate power, which helped to clear the gathered mobs.

Narok District
Background
Narok District has been split into two, Narok North and Narok South districts.
The administrative divisions are Central, Loita, Mara, Mau, Mulot, Olkurto,
Ololungua and Osupuko. According to the Akiwumi Report, the area experienced
ethnic fighting in 1992 between the Maasai and Kikuyu where the Maasai
complained that the Kikuyu living upstream of areas such as the Enoosupukia
water catchment area were diverting water preventing it from reaching
downstream to the Maasai.110
The area has experienced ethnic related violence in the past, particularly
between the Kikuyu and the Maasai. The Akiwumi Report notes at page 167 that
William Ole Ntimama, the area MP since 1988, at that time warned non-Maasais
that they would be evicted from Enoosupukia since they were residing in a water
catchment area and the interests of so called non-indigenous communities
(mainly Kikuyu) were subordinate to those of the indigenous Maasai community.
At the time, Ntimama was a powerful Government Minister in the ruling party
KANU and the Akiwumi report went on to note that in October 1993, Maasais
armed with bows and arrows had started attacks upon Kikuyu and that there
was no interference from the police and the provincial administration, and
neither did the police make arrests nor disable the Maasai from attacking the
Kikuyu even when they had opportunities to do so.

The major causes of previous violence in the area were claims of Kikuyu
encroachment of Maasai land, Kikuyu domination of retail and transport
business in the area as well as the choice by Kikuyu not to support the political
110
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parties enjoying support from the indigenous communities. But evidence was
given by KNCHR that the post election violence of 2007 was unlike previous
episodes of violence where the Maasai ganged up with Kalenjin to attack Kikuyu.
This time round violence fizzled out quickly after Maasai elders prevailed on the
youth to stop the violence in spite of incitement by politicians and local elites.

The Pre-Election Environment
The NSIS had indicated in a security briefing dated 27th September 2007 that
Narok was one of the places it considered a potential flash point likely to witness
election related violence due to incitement by politicians it did not name. Further
testimony was provided by Naivasha DC Mr. Katee Lucas Mwanza (later
transferred to Molo) that trouble was expected between the Maasai and Kikuyu
community on the border of Narok and Naivasha Districts over the disputed
Ngati Farmers Cooperative Society and the same evidence was corroborated by
the NSIS. At the Narok South District Security and Intelligence Committee
(DSIC) meeting held on 21 December 2007 it was noted that political
temperature in the District was high and that politicians had resorted to holding
night meetings contrary to the Electoral Code of Conduct while also engaging in
door to door campaigns.
Evidence was provided by the KNCHR that immediately prior to the elections and
more specifically on 24 December 2007, a local politician had held a meeting in
Narok Town during which he threatened the Kikuyu and Kisii communities that
they would be evicted if they did not vote for him, reminding them that Narok
was not their home.
The Post Election Violence in Narok
Serious violence pitting the Maasai on one side and Kikuyu and Kisii on the
other erupted on 3 January 2008 in Sogoo, Tendwet, Kimogor, Nkopen,
Olmekenyu Center, Oleshapani, Meleleo and Ololungua Division while tension
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was reported by the DSIC to be high in Mara Division and Ngoswani in Osupuko
between Maasai and non-Maasai.
A witness, Isaac Moipeli, testified in Naivasha that he was displaced from Narok
Town. He informed the Commission that he had witnessed an occasion where a
prominent politician had addressed a public meeting about a month before the
elections and incited the Maasai by asking them to uproot members of the
Kikuyu community from the area. This is corroborated in evidence by KNCHR
according to which, allegedly the politician organized and paid Maasai youths to
unleash violence in Narok Town and its environs.111 After announcement of the
results of the presidential election, the witness says the politician went around
Narok Town and asked that members of the Kikuyu community be evicted.
Further, the Commission was informed by former Rift Valley PPO Everett Wasike
that the politician’s name was one of those repeatedly given to police as being
behind the violence and we heard that a file was opened against him on charges
of political incitement and a warrant of arrest was procured but he was not
taken to court.
The DSIC noted that over 1,000 houses belonging to Kisiis and Kikuyus were
torched, 2 persons killed, 60 others seriously injured and about 3,000 displaced
during the violence. On 4 January at Olerai area of Mulot Division, Franklin
Bett, the newly elected ODM MP for Buret, and Isaac Ruto, ODM MP for
Chepalungu, addressed about 100 Kipsigis asking them to open the road and
coexist with the Kisii who had supported ODM but to keep pressuring for
President Kibaki’s removal and calling for a re-tallying and /or recount of the
votes alleging that ODM had been robbed of victory.
Evidence was received from the Narok South DSIC that on 5 January 2008 at
Mulot Police Station, the late Richard Kipkalya Kones (ODM MP for Bomet),
Otieno Kajwang (ODM MP for Mbita) and Omingo Magara (ODM MP for West
Mugirango) asked the local community not to attack the Kisii. But they called on
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residents close to the Kenya-Tanzania and Kenya-Uganda borders to close the
roads so that Tanzania and Uganda would respectively complain of lack of fuel
supply through Kenya thus bringing pressure to bear on President Kibaki to
resign.
On 8 January 2008 both the DSIC and NSIS reported that handwritten leaflets
had been found by members of the public at Ololulunga Trading Center (Narok
South) warning PNU friendly communities operating businesses along the
Narok-Olulunga Road to close their businesses and vacate the area. The NSIS
reported that on 16 February 2008, more leaflets aimed at whipping up antiKikuyu sentiments were dropped in Narok reading,
“We cannot share the same space any longer with thieves who stole
our votes and rights. We shall fight for our rights to the last. No Peace”
From the evidence made available by NSIS, it would appear that in Narok South,
the conflict between the Kipsigis and Kisii from neighbouring Sotik spilled over
into the area. For instance on 16 February 2008, the Narok South DSIC reported
that there had been burning of Kisii houses by the Kipsigis and that the Kipsigis
also started grazing their livestock on Kisii farms. According to NSIS, the Kipsigis
stated they were unwilling to let any of the Kisii return to their farms and would
continue to cause havoc if they attempted to return. Further, the conflict in
neighbouring Transmara District (Kilgoris Constituency)112 between the Maasai
and Kipsigis threatened to spill over into Narok South District where Kipsigis
youths on 17 February 2008 at Njipship forcefully grazed their cattle on land
owned by the Maasai. On 21st February 2008, hand written leaflets were
circulated at Meleleo warning Maasai of revenge attacks by Kipsigis to avenge the
killing of Kipsigis in Transmara.
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The NSIS had reported on tension between the Moitanik and Uasin Gishu clans in Olalui Location of Transmara as
early as 22nd June 2007 pitting the Maasais against the Kipsigis following a declaration by Johana Ngeno a Kipsigis
that he would seek the Kilgoris Parliamentary seat. The Maasai were of the view that the Kipsigis were outsiders who
should not seek leadership positions in Maasai territory, according to the report.
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Police and Provincial Administration Response
The Narok South DSIC acknowledged that there was an acute shortage of
Administration and Regular Police and that this was compounded by a shortage
of firearms and ammunition. Further, the DSIC observed the need for
replenishment to enable security officers effectively restore law and order and
protect the lives of displaced persons. While it is conceivable that the police and
provincial administration had to make difficult strategic choices to contain much
more serious situations that were underway in other places, one cannot help but
wonder what would have happened if the situation in Narok had got out of
control?
Further, evidence was received that in order to appease gangs that were bent on
violating the law, the authorities succumbed to public pressure and blackmail
where the DSIC unanimously strongly recommended that the OCS for Mulot be
transferred for his personal safety after he received death threats from the
Maasai community for causing the death of a person

The South Rift and Kisii Region
Introduction
A significant amount of the post election violence took place within the larger
Kericho district. One strand of the violence in this area involved the
neighbouring communities of the Kipsigis who live in south Rift Valley and the
Kisii people (also known as Abagusii) who live in south Nyanza. The traditional
homeland of the Kipsigis people, the largest sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community,
is the original Kericho district. A subdivision of the district has yielded five
smaller districts: Sotik, Buret, Kipkelion, Bomet and Kericho. The ancestral
homeland for the Kisii people is Kisii district, which forms a part of Nyanza
province.

The original Kisii district, after subdivision, yielded South Kisii,

Central Kisii, North Kisii, Borabu and Masaba districts.
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Following the subdivisions, Sotik district, created out of the original Kericho
district, borders Buret district to the north, Bomet to the east, Borabu to the
south and Transmara to the west. Borabu, on the other hand, borders Masaba,
Nyamira, Sotik, Buret and Trans Mara districts.
Another dimension of the violence in the larger Kericho district took place within
and around Kipkelion area, which is now a district on its own. Kipkelion district
is largely a settlement scheme comprising members from the ethnic communities
of the Kipsigis, who are the majority, Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Kamba, and Luhya. The
Kipsigis occupy three administrative divisions, Chilchila (formerly Fort Ternan),
Londiani and Kipkelion.
The discussion of the post election violence in the South Rift relates to the events
that occurred in the Kericho area, which in this case used to encompass the
original Kericho district, unless the intention to the contrary is clearly stated. As
the ancestral homes of the Kipsigis and the Kisii are contiguous, and as the
violence in this region also involved the two communities both along the
Borabu/Sotik common border as well as within Kericho district, it is convenient
to discuss the violence as a systemic whole.
The Build up towards Violence at the Sotik/Borabu Border
According to several witnesses, an important explanation for the post election
conflict between the Kipsigis and Kisii communities lies in an incident that had
occurred at Nyamarambe area, within the original Kisii district on 22 September
2007, barely three months before the general elections. The incident involved a
well-publicized assault on leading personalities in the main opposition party, the
Orange

Democratic

Movement.

The

assault

was

alleged

to

have

been

orchestrated by Simeon Nyachae, a prominent Kisii politician who was at the
time a Cabinet Minister in the Kibaki government, and who was viewed as one of
the President’s close confidantes.
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During the incident, William Ruto, a Kalenjin, Omingo Magara, a Kisii, both
national office holders in ODM, as well as Chris Bichage, a Kisii parliamentary
candidate in the ODM party, were attacked physically by youths attending a
public rally which Nyachae had convened in Nyamarambe. Bichage, who was
severely beaten, needed hospitalization. According to Grace Kaindi, who was the
Provincial Police Officer for Nyanza at the time of incident, the attack on the
three was captured on television and became the subject of considerable
national outrage.
Another witness, Samuel Omweri, informed the Commission that the attack on
Ruto, viewed as an affront by the Kisii on the Kalenjin people, triggered revenge
attacks by members of the Kipsigis community on Kisii people who had bought
land in the Sondu area, which forms a part of the Kipsigis homeland.

This

evidence was confirmed by the Kericho District Commissioner, Wilson Njenga,
who informed the Commission that the violence in Sondu led to the death of
three people and the injury and displacement of several others. According to
Omweri, members of the Kisii community who had bought land in Kipsigis
territory in Sondu area, where they had lived for up to 30 years were forcibly
evicted by their Kipsigis hosts, angry over the attack on Ruto. At the time the
Commission heard this evidence, these people had not returned as yet to where
they were displaced from.
The Commission sought to know from Kaindi what action, if any, had been taken
over the well-publicized incident in Nyamarambe. She informed the Commission
that all the persons who participated in the attack had been identified and
arrested and were then placed in custody at Kisii Police Station for two or three
days, as the police finalized arrangements to charge them in court. However, on
the orders of the Commissioner of Police, they were released unconditionally. On
this incident Kaindi testified as follows:
“You find that I get calls from Nairobi, my boss says, “Did you arrest
these people?” I say, “Yes, for this and that”. Then he says, “Well, warn
them and let them go home”. I comply.”
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Other than the Nyamarambe incident, the electioneering process also provided
opportunity for the building of tensions in the south Rift area. According to the
information presented to the Commission, several individual occurrences
contributed to the escalation towards eventual violence between the Kipsigis and
Kisii people. One of them was the appearance in Kericho town area of
inflammatory leaflets against members of the Kisii and Kikuyu communities,
both perceived to be supporters of PNU.

According to, the Kericho DC, the

leaflets contained such messages as CHOMA KIKUYU CHOMA; SHAMBA MPYA
ITAPATIKANA; and NOTICE: FACTORY REMAIN ASHES.
Several witnesses informed the Commission that there was much incendiary
speech by political leaders, in the context of campaigns for the presidential and
parliamentary elections. Eye witnesses who attended a number of rallies
appeared before the Commission and gave an account of some of the inciting
statements that formed part of these campaigns.

For example, a witness

testified that he attended a rally at Uhuru Garden in Kericho in August 2007
addressed by two leading ODM politicians.

The witness claimed that the

politicians exhorted Kipsigis people not to sell land to the Kisii people whose
number, he complained, was already too large in the town.

According to the

witness, the politician said that “at the end of the day, the town will remain
owned by only two tribes, Kisiis and Kikuyus.” Another witness testified that
although some of the speeches in rallies that took place in cosmopolitan areas
were delivered in Kiswahili, a language understandable to most of the audience,
the delivery of incendiary messages would often be done in Kipsigis, to cut off
other communities present at such rallies.
However, political incitement was not confined to rallies held in the Kericho area.
At an ODM rally held on 6 December 2007 at Manga in Borabu district, Kisii
people were informed that the land constituting Borabu district was originally
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part of the homeland of the Kalenjin.113 According to Omweri, the common
understanding by people within the Borabu area was that Kisii people

were

expected to vote in a particular manner for the continued favour of being allowed
to occupy Borabu district, which might otherwise have to be given up for the
Kipsigis.
At another rally in November in Kericho, Kipsigis politicians again complained
that “you cannot even speak because Kisiis bought the land and built”.114 At yet
another rally at Kapkatet, which a witness115 claimed was addressed by other
prominent ODM politicians, the Commission heard that the leaders rhetorically
asked whether any Kipsigis owned land in Kisii area, to which the crowd
answered “NO”. They then wondered why Kisii people should be allowed to own
land among the Kipsigis.
According to witnesses, there was an expectation of the eviction of non-Kalenjin
people from South Rift long before the elections were held, and this added to the
tension in the area. The evidence on this is provided by information gathered by
witnesses in the course of daily interactions with ordinary Kipsigis people before
the elections. For example, a Kisii woman who has been married to a Kalenjin
man for more than 20 years, and whose marriage survived severe pressure
imposed by the post election violence, informed the Commission that through
every-day interaction with Kalenjin people, it became clear to her that they
expected that, as a result of the enforcement of majimbo, other communities
would have to leave the Rift Valley, and that this included people like her, who
were non-Kipsigis married to the Kipsigis. According to the witness “they were
saying nobody should be left there who is not born into the Kalenjin”. This was
also testified to by another witness, a Kisii woman who had settled on the Sotik
side of the border for more than 30 years. She said, “We saw houses burning
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and people had been saying, you know the neighbours, ‘You don’t belong here.
This is our farm.”
The following account by a witness lends further credence to the view that
there was widespread expectation on the part of ordinary people that majimbo
would result in the permanent eviction of certain people from the Rift Valley:
“Meanwhile the Kalenjin were outside the house. They taunted us and
told us goodbye. They told us that our magnificent house was theirs
now as it stands on their soil. I recognized some of them as the sons of
our neighbour.”116
The final period before the outbreak of violence was marked by tension over the
outcome of the election results. The Commission heard that there were rumours
of the planned rigging of the elections in favour of PNU’s Kibaki. In Kericho, the
rumours were strong enough to cause a crowd of local people to march onto the
premises of a local church, Abundant Grace Church, which they suspected was
holding stuffed ballot papers for the PNU presidential candidate. This compelled
a police search on the premises. The search, however, yielded nothing.117
The Commission was informed that the theft of livestock from the Borabu area
into the Sotik district in the height of the tension between the communities
exacerbated the tension and, according to Borabu District Commissioner, Asha
Kiva, was the effective trigger for the violence. The DC testified that cross border
theft of livestock was a common occurrence in the area but because of the
prevailing tension, this particular incident was considered more aggravating
than would have usually been the case.
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Build up towards Violence in Kipkelion
Kipkelion district borders the districts of Molo (at Kuresoi), Koibatek, Nandi
South, and Uasin Gishu. This is a volatile region, which has borne the brunt of
clashes in recent times. The District Commissioner for Kipkelion, Aden Gedow,
(Commission Witness No. 68), testified that although the area was largely
peaceful in the run up to the 2007 general elections, there was considerable
tension resulting from the spill-over effects of the bordering Kuresoi, which
experienced considerable violence before the elections. Further, the events in the
neighbouring Molo district, where displaced persons and victims of land clashes
had sought refuge, had a spill-over effect, and elicited ethnic passion in
Kipkelion and the desire to retaliate, adding to the tension.
DSIC reports indicate that prior to the elections, leaflets warning Kikuyus and
Kisiis to vacate Kipkelion were circulated at Fort Ternan within Chilchila division
and Kasheen. When leaflets appeared, the DOs of the areas in which these were
found held peace meetings involving all the communities in their areas. However,
according to Gedow no politician had made inflammatory speeches during the
campaign period, a fact he attributed to the homogeneous nature of the ethnicity
of the candidates that were contesting elective office.
NSIS Evidence on the Build up towards Violence
The Hotspot/Flashpoint report issued by the NSIS for the week ending 28
September 2007 predicted that election related violence might exacerbate
misunderstanding between the traditional hotspot areas in, among other places,
the Rift Valley. Specifically, it was reported that the “area bordering the Kisii
districts and Rongo, Rachuonyo, Bomet, Kericho, and Trans Mara would
continue experiencing hostilities following the recent Nyamarambe skirmishes.”
The reports of the NSIS for the week ending 19th October 2007, reported an
escalation of the situation noted in the previous report when it noted that “along
the Kericho, Nyando border, tension persists between Kipsigis and Abagusii
communities within Sondu area that has led to several houses being set ablaze
by marauding Kipsigis youth armed with bows and arrows. This follows political
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incitement by some Kipsigis leaders coupled with the perception by members of
the same community that the Kisii were not reciprocating to their hospitality
despite settling in their area. The ensuing clashes have left several people
injured, seen an exodus of Luo and Kisii kinsmen from the area for fear of
further Kipsigis raiders…”
The NSIS fortnightly intelligence report for the period ending 30th October 2007
narrated that “the Kipsigis-Kisii acrimony remains explosive following utterances
by some political leaders in Sigowet division of Kericho district that Gusii be
rooted out of the division.”
The report for the week ending on 23rd November 2008, the last before the
elections, spoke of a further increase in tension in the Sondu area as a result of
threats of attacks by Kipsigis people on Kisii people who had returned to Sondu
following the earlier eviction.

Territorial Disputes as a cause of the Tension and Ultimately the Violence
The Commission learnt that the post-election violence at the Borabu/Sotik
border was in part the result of conflicting territorial claims by the Kipsigis and
the Kisiis. Witnesses testified that the Kipsigis consider the land comprising
Borabu district to be part of their ancestral land and the correct boundary
between their district and Kisii to be some way into the Kisii side, at a place
called Metamaywa.
We heard from Samuel Omweri, a community leader and a former Member of
Parliament, that the Kisii people refute the claim by their Kipsigis neighbours
and have a territorial claim of their own against the Kipsigis. According to Mr.
Omweri, the Kisii claim that they occupied not only Borabu but also all the area
up to a place called Kabianga, which is now a part of Kericho district. They claim
that Kabianga is, in fact, a Kisii name and that the name is evidence of the fact
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that the Kisii were the first occupants of the area.118 The Kisii assert that they
lived on the land up to the rivers Sondu and Oyani to the south and that they
were evicted from these areas in 1946 to make room for the settlement of
soldiers returning from the Second World War in Ethiopia and the Uasin Gishu
Maasai who had been moved from Trans Nzoia.119 As a result of being pushed
out of their homelands, the Kisii found themselves being administered as part of
what was called Sotik west during the colonial period. During all this time, the
Kipsigis and the Kisii were part of Nyanza province. However, the Boundary
Delimitation Commission acceded to a request by the Kipsigis to join with
Nandis to form the “Kalenjin Alliance” in the Rift Valley (the areas covered by
Sotik West, Kipkelion and Londiani), while the Kisii remained with the Luos as
constituent ethnic communities forming Nyanza Province.120
The former DC for Borabu, Asha Katheri Kiva, told the Commission that the
Kipsigis hoped that through the post election violence, they would drive their
Kisii neighbours out of Borabu and establish what they consider to be the
correct boundary between the two communities. The Commission heard that this
was not the first time that the Kipsigis had violently asserted their territorial
claim against the Kisii. They did so throughout the early years following the
establishment of the settlement schemes for the Kisii in the 1960s and that as
part of this there was fighting between the two communities in 1964 and again
in 1969. More recently, there was election-related violence in 1992, 1997, and
2002 also provided occasion for the violent assertion of this territorial claim.
The Commission was further informed by Ms Kiva that rivalry, which from time
to time broke into war, between the Kipsigis and the Kisii is an ancient
phenomenon, predating the establishment of the colonial state that, on both
sides, this rivalry has been passed down through folklore from generation to
generation, on both sides.
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The Kiliku Committee traced the conflict between the Kipsigis, the Maasai and
the Kisii to the post colonial arrangements in relation to land. The splitting of
the country into white highlands and native reserves was one of the practices of
the colonial state. At independence, the white highlands partly forming the
present border area between the Kipsigis and Kisii were apportioned between the
Maasai, Kipsigis and Kisii communities and, under the facilitation of the
Settlement Fund Trustees, members of the three communities bought land that
was formerly owned by the departing settlers. Members of the Kisii community
who had a higher population density settled in larger numbers in the area than
the Kipsigis and the Maasai. The Committee noted that the Kisii had initially
moved into the area through settlement schemes but lately they had done so
through direct purchases and leases. These factors explain the significant
presence of the Kisii in Bomet and Narok districts.121
In Kipkelion, according to the Kipkelion DSIC (Kipkelion District Security and
Intelligence Appreciation No. 1/2008 Held on 18th January, 2008) Reports, the
clashes underlie a history of ethnic animosity and hatred caused by disputes
over land which the Kipsigis claim to be their ancestral land, but which was
appropriated by the European settlers in the pre-independence times, and later
sold to members of other ethnic groups. The Nandis also claim that River
Kipchorian, which traverses the district, is their true boundary with the Kipsigis
and is part of Tinderet. The problem manifests itself in an ethnically polarized
environment and the land issue having been politicized. This explains why
heightened clashes have almost always coincided with electioneering periods,
with the question of displacement of the “indigenous” Kipsigis being the reason
for much political agitation.
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Execution of the Violence:
(a) In Sotik/Borabu
The Sotik District Commissioner, Humphrey Nakitare informed the Commission
that violence in his district began on 28 December 2007.

At this point, the

violence was confined to the district and had not spread to the border area. It
took the form of blockage of roads and, according to Nakitare, “sporadic rioting
all over the district”. It was the opinion of the District Commissioner that the
cause of the violence was “delay in announcing the presidential elections
results.”
The evidence of Nakitare was that the actors in these skirmishes were armed
youth from the Kipsigis community. Conflict started on the 28th of December
2007, with marauding youth barricading roads using stones and trees and
lighting bonfires. On the following day there was an upsurge of violence with
much action targeting persons of non-Kalenjin origin perceived to be supporting
the PNU. Property was destroyed and people hacked with crude weapons. On
30th December, the youths resorted to massive arson attacks in urban centers,
and more specifically, Sotik, Kaplong and Chebilat.
Eventually the violence moved to the border area between Borabu and Sotik and
now involved members of the Kipsigis and Kisii communities fighting at various
points on different days on the long common border. The Sotik DC was asked
the question as to who between the two communities started the inter-ethnic
fighting and he answered that it was the Kipsigis who first attacked the Kisii.
According to Asha Kiva, the Borabu DC, the first house was burnt by Kipsigis
raiders at a place called Esise, in Ekerubo location, within her district. This was
on 8th January. Before then, there had been no violence on the Borabu side,
although the Kisii/Kericho road, which passes through Sotik, had remained
barricaded. Kiva and members of her DSIC visited the place where the house
had been burnt and convened a meeting in the affected area where, she said,
there was a lot of tension. Even as the meeting went on, more houses were being
burnt. Thereafter, the violence took the form of spot torching of houses of Kisiis
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living on the Rift Valley side of the border, as well as sporadic fighting between
youths on the border.
The Commission was informed by witness number 123 that in the course of the
violence, a peace meeting was held in Sotik area and addressed by the leading
members of the ODM including Omingo Magara, a Kisii, and Kipkalya Kones, a
Kipsigis. According to the evidence, speaking in Kiswahili, Magara implored the
Kipsigis people to stop the fighting with the Kisii people. In Kiswahili, Kones
repeated the same message before he switched to speak in Kipsigis. In that
language, the witness alleges, he told the Kipsigis to continue with the fighting.
The Commission visited Ribaita Primary School on the Sotik/Borabu border and
was informed that the school had been burnt by the Kipsigis during the border
fighting between the Kipsigis and Kisii. Several other schools along the common
border, including Isoge, Rianyaemo, Saiga-Ngiya, Memusi, Magombo, Kebuse,
Raitigo Secondary and Gonzagoza suffered varying levels of destruction.
In Kericho, it was the testimony of Wilson Njega, the local District Commissioner
that violence broke out on 30th December, after the announcement of the
presidential election results. The following day, a large crowd of people armed
with improvised weapons marched on Kericho town from all directions. They
invaded the premises of the Co-operative Bank and Equity Bank as well as Stage
Mart Supermarket, and gained access after shattering windows and breaking
down doors. They helped themselves to whatever of value they could lay their
hands on and, according to the local OCPD Aliwa, some people attempted to
access cash in the automatic teller machines in the banks. Aliwa added that a
number of them who were armed with bows and arrows attacked the police with
arrows. Responding with fire, police killed six people and repulsed the rioters.
According to Aliwa, the severest violence in Kericho was on 30th and 31st
December, 2007 and 1st January, 2008. Thereafter, the violence changed form.
Whereas, in the first three days or so, rioters confronted the police openly in
Kericho town, the violence later moved away into the tea estates and the rural
areas. Further, some of the violence was now carried out at night. DC Jenga
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estimated that the violence lasted from 30th December, 2007 and for the next
two weeks or so there was intermittent fighting although, according to him, this
had been contained.
According to Aliwa, whereas the initial violence was committed by armed youth
in the immediacy of their neighbourhoods, the subsequent violence began to
display trends of raiders travelling long distances to commit acts of violence
outside their home areas. For example, the attacks in Kipkelion were carried out
by raiders coming from other districts. The attack in Mutaragon and Munistry
were carried out by raiders from outside these areas. In the particular case of
Mutaragon the raiders came from Nandi district. In the case of the attacks in
Kericho, some were carried out by people from the neighbouring Buret district.
Further, attackers also came from Bomet to attack tea estates which neighbour
the district.
The Sotik DC, Nakitare, confirmed the existence of this trend when he told the
Commission that, in the case of Sotik, attackers came from as far as Pokot.
The evidence of co-ordination of the violence is further supported by the Report
of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights which related the organized
manner in which they were carried out. According to that Report, in areas like
Kipkelion, in advance of contemplated attacks, Kalenjin attackers would place
distinctive marks in front of all dwellings that belonged to members of their
community as a sign to the raiders as to which houses to pass over when they
carried out the attacks. Traditional calabashes were mentioned as one form of
such distinctive marks. The report further stated that in the subsequent days,
attacks on settlements were done from all directions and at the same time with
clear direction, in a manner indicative of planning.
Another round of serious violence broke out on 31st January 2008, triggered by
the killing in Eldoret of the Member of Parliament for Ainamoi, David Too. One of
the outstanding incidents in this violence was the attack by a mob on the
Ainamoi DO’s office during which an Administration Police constable, Omar
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Ahmed Dado, was killed by the mob and his colleague sustained an arrow shot
wound. Aliwa described the incident as follows:
“When the message was received, a group of youths attacked Ainamoi
DO’s office where PC Omar Dado was stationed. He had a firearm. He
tried his best to shoot in the air to scare them but they chased him.
Where he went to hide, they burned that house until he was dragged
out, killed and burned on the road. They went further and shot another
Administration Police Officer with an arrow on the head, they snatched
his firearm and they robbed all the buildings… (Thereafter) the
criminals who stole the firearms sneaked them in the church where
they were recovered.”

A Tea Picker Is Violently Attacked by Kipsigis
One of the saddest personal stories that came out of the Sotik/Borabu violence is that of
Simeon Atandi Monyancha, who spoke to the Commission in Borabu. Monyancha was
working for the Sotik Tea Highland Company as a tea picker. On 1 February, while
picking tea, he was attacked and both his hands were amputated. His story as given to
the Commission is told below:
I used to be a tea picker at Sotik Tea until 1st February 2008 when I was attacked by
Kipsigis raiders who were attacking and burning property belonging to the Kisiis.
On this day, I was in the tea estate picking tea. At around 9.00 a.m. the head boy Mr.
Daniel Kimetto, told us that there was violence all over and advised us to go to our
houses to hide. I went to my house. I lived in Camp Five which consisted of many
Kipsigis. I heard them saying that Kisiis must move out of Camp Five and join fellow
Kisiis at Camp Majengo.
After securing a house at Camp Majengo, I packed my household items together with
my clothes and began to go to the Camp Majengo…. I saw six armed young men with
pangas, bows and arrows. They aimed at me with the arrows. I pleaded with them not to
shoot me. They put the arrows down and started assaulting me with the pangas. I tried
to block the pangas using both my hands to protect my head. I saw my left hand being
cut three times. Then they cut my head on the left hand side. Blood spilt all over my
face and I could not see what was happening. I lost consciousness.
When I gained consciousness, I found myself in Litein Hospital feeling a lot of pain and
both my hand had been amputated.

It is during the second wave of violence that Chebilat, a border shopping centre
between Sotik and Borabu was burnt extensively. A Kisii woman whose life time
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investments in a school, located on the Sotik side, was extensively looted
testified that there were requests by her Kipsigis neighbours that she should
reconsider her decision to flee to the Kisii side, just before her school was burnt,
as they feared that her flight would insight the Kisii community and attract
retaliatory attacks on them. In the end, however, she had to move to the Kisii
side because of fear for her safety when a gang of attackers arrived in her school,
and the local people were unable to give her protection. In her view, some of the
attacks were carried out by people from the inland and without regard to the
views of the local residents at the border area. The attackers on her school left
for her a message on one of the writing boards in the classrooms which well
sums up the feelings that drove the violence. On the board they wrote:
“KISIIS AND KALENJINS WILL NEVER LIVE TOGETHER”
(b) In Kipkelion
According to Gedow, the Kipkelion DC, violence erupted on 30th December 2007,
with the announcement of the final tally in the presidential election results. The
announcement was immediately followed by widespread incidents of arson.
Some areas within the district, in particular the areas of Molo, Soget and
Kamatins, had intense skirmishes. Initially, there was an ethnic angle to the
arson attacks but this later spilt over to all communities living in the district.
Illegal roadblocks were mounted by youth at various spots along the highway,
notably at Kapsoit.
The violence also targeted various government installations and resulted in the
burning of and vandalism on some buildings and vehicles. The offices of three
chiefs, 80 schools, 2 zonal offices and 7 dispensaries were vandalized. One forest
guard was killed and there was illegal logging of forests.
The Commission conducted an extensive tour of the South Rift Valley area and
was struck by the widespread nature of arson on homes of persons not
considered to be indigenous to the area.
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There was evidence of some level of training in preparation to commit violence.
The Commission received evidence in the form of a digital video disk (DVD)
recording that was captured in Kuresoi, which borders Kipkelion. The video
showed attackers being trained at Kimaranya village in Keringet. The evidence as
to training is supported by the evidence of the Kenya National Commission on
Human Rights, which asserted that training and oath-taking took place in
camps in preparation for the attacks. The report said:
“The training reportedly took place in the farms of senior leaders in the
area or in the region’s forests. One police constable, reportedly trained
attackers in Kericho Town. The attackers were well equipped with
weapons and materials that they would need to conduct some of their
activities, such as power saws used in cutting down huge trees that
were used to block the roads.”
According to the KNHCR Report the attackers in Kericho, Bureti and Londiani,
the latter of which is in Kipkelion, reportedly sent warnings to their victims of
the impending attack, before the attacks were actually carried out. Such
warnings were delivered by telephone. The Report concludes that on that
premise, there was a premeditated intent to forcibly evict the victims from the
region.
Further claims regarding the violence was provided by the testimony of a Kipsigis
farmer at Sachangwan location, Molo district. The farmer testified regarding a
review meeting, to asses whether the violence had met its objects, held in his
area at the end of the fighting. The witness informed the Commission that on
28th February, 2008, a meeting was convened by the Kalenjins at Baharini to
discuss the aftermath of the post election violence. The meeting was chaired by a
retired Assistant Chief, and attended by, among other local leaders. According to
the witness, the background to this meeting was that non-Kalenjin homes had
been burnt down and the owners having fled the area, the meeting sought to
discuss measures for ensuring the ritual cleansing of the area youth, who had
participated in the burning of non-Kalenjin homes during the post election
147

violence, as the burning of residences is considered an abomination under
Kalenjin values. He testified that in order to achieve the cleansing of local youths
who had participated in the burning of homes, the meeting agreed that a goat
would be slaughtered for use in conducting the cleansing. Secondly, the meeting
was the occasion for discussing how farms formerly occupied by those who had
fled, would be purchased or hired out affordably. At the meeting, the witness
said he disagreed with the idea of sharing out the property of neighbours who
had fled from the area to escape the violence. As a result of his opposition, he
was viewed as a traitor, and on 17th March 2008, his house was razed down by
fellow Kalenjins, most of whom he identified.
Following the killing of the area legislator Too, there was an escalation in the
level of violence in the area. According to police reports tendered by Gedow, 47
people died, 27 of them of arrow shots, 7 of injuries using crude weapons, 11 of
gun shot wounds and two of burning. Property was also destroyed, with 3568
buildings totally razed down, 23 buildings partially burnt and 1542 buildings
vandalized. According to Gedow, a large number of persons participated in acts
of arson and almost each of them carried a container of petrol for use in the
burning. The Commission heard that the main method of burning was by
placing accelerants on sticks which would then be propelled by hand onto the
targeted buildings. Others would just torch the houses directly.

Police and Provincial Administration Response
All the district commissioners and members of the police force that the
Commission interviewed pronounced themselves satisfied with their response to
the post election violence. However the Commission was concerned about a
number of specific issues raised by the evidence in relation to their response.
These are discussed below.
The account by government officials in Kericho was they were unaware the there
would be post election violence and therefore did to provide for it. The worst case
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scenario for them was the possibility of violence in the lead up to the elections
especially in the areas that they considered to be prone to violence such as
Nyagacho and Matobo in Kericho town. There were no contingency arrangements
in relation to the violence that ended up engulfing the multinational estates in
Kericho and, therefore, no provision to deal with the violence.
The response by the authorities in Kericho to the violence that they thought may
happen was to mount peace committee meetings in their areas. Amid the hate
messages that have been referred to in the evidence, the local administration
carried on with the establishment of peace committees and the convening several
meetings in the affected areas. All the officials that the Commission spoke to
participated in or facilitated these meetings, which were organized by the
Electoral Commission of Kenya. This was its preferred intervention in dealing
with the possibility of electoral violence.
The ECK and other government officials who came before the Commission
appeared to derive much satisfaction from the fact that these peace meetings
had taken place throughout the country before the elections. They all seemed to
regard the organization of such meetings as sufficient and exonerated
themselves from blame for lack of preparation in regard to the violence that
eventually occurred in the country. Officials seemed to ask this question: “what
else were we supposed to do if, against our advice, people chose to fight?” With
the benefit of what is now known, there must be asked serious questions as to
the whether the peace meetings that were convened by the ECK had enduring
value or whether they provided the easy option for public officials faced with the
hate messages that abounded in the period before the post elections and which,
in the view of the Commission, played a big role in the post election violence.
When violence broke out in Kericho town, which was invaded by multitudes of
rioters, the police were unprepared to deal with it. They responded with extreme
force, killing six people who they claim were among the rioters that had invaded
the Co-operative and Equity Banks in the town. The area OCPD, Walter Aliwa,
attempted to justify the killing by asserting that the rioters attempted to shoot
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the police with arrows but there is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.
On the contrary, Aliwa’s evidence that the police shot the rioters because “these
were robbers who were breaking banks” is not the real reason why police shot
into the crowd. In the view of the Commission, this shooting constitutes an
unwarranted use of force by the police and must be investigated. In Borabu, the
Commission was told that a policeman in plainclothes shot a man, Joshua
Nyarunda. Police later claimed that the shooting was accidental, but no action
was taken against the police officer involved.
The sudden onset of riots in the south Rift required police response to multiple
situations at the same time. At the beginning of the violence, the strength of
personnel in Kipkelion and Kericho districts was 350, of whom 100 were APs.
The OCPD had to request for additional personnel from outside the district.
These came from the Administration Police, Anti-Stock Theft Unit and the
General Service Unit, and arrived on 1st January 2008 or soon thereafter. In
Sotik, the DCIO sought fortification both from the Rift Valley and Nyanza
Provinces, and in all, an additional 200 police officers came in as reinforcement.
Had there been prior planning and appreciation of the possible eventualities, the
reinforcement would have been available much earlier and might have prevented
much of the initial violence. An example of the inability by the security agencies
to make contingency arrangements was provided by Aliwa himself when he
testified that he refused to even contemplate that ODM had a chance of winning
the elections and therefore did not provide for the possible consequences of such
an outcome.
Other than the excessive use of force by police, as exemplified by the Kericho
town incident, the Commission received information that police response to
rescue people under attack was slow or altogether absent, although in some
instances they faced real obstacles. In one incident in Sotik area, the house of a
retired couple was surrounded by raiders for nine hours before they were
rescued. The wife recounted to the Commission their ordeal as follows:
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“On 5th February, early in the morning my husband woke up and
went to till the farm. Shortly after he went out he came running
back to the house.

He ordered us to close all the doors and

windows. He told us that he saw a group of Kalenjin youth coming
towards our house.

A few minutes later we heard their voices

outside. They were calling us by our names and they asked us to
come out.

We recognized their voices.

One of them was our

neighbour.
At around 9.00 a.m. they started breaking the doors and the
windows of the house. They could not break into the house because
of the grill reinforcement. I called the Chief to come and help us. He
sent a vehicle and administration policemen. They could not reach
us immediately because all the roads leading to Chepilat were
barricaded by Kalenjin warriors. They came to us around 6 p.m. and
they escorted us out of the house.”
Another witness who sustained an injury when his home was surrounded and
attacked by raiders recounted the following:
“When I turned I found that I had been speared on the left, where I
am showing you. At that point, I called the Chief, the Chief told me
that there is no way he could assist me. The Chief advised me to
look for other means of assisting myself.”
Fortunately for this witness, police on patrol arrived where he had been attacked
and took him to hospital.
Police response to people in distress was hindered not only by the inadequacy of
personnel on the part of the security forces, who were simply overwhelmed by
the demands on them and were, unable to cope with the situations created by
the violence but also because those under attack were spread over long
distances in a rural setting. Moreover, the electoral process, to which the police
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had provided vital support had hardly been concluded by the time they were
called upon to deal with the post election violence. A large number of police
officers were still on the way back to their duty stations when the violence
erupted. Further, and as the police and other witnesses told the Commission,
the emergence of illegal roadblocks hindered police movement, or altogether
blocked off access to some of those in need.
To deal with the problem of blocked roads, the DSIC put in place a plan to clear
the highway. The police deployed personnel on the major highways to monitor
spots on the highway prone to blockages and, generally, conduct mobile patrols
in the potentially volatile areas.
Further, the Commission received evidence that police sometimes stood
passively as property was damaged and did nothing to restrain the violence or
arrest the perpetrators. For example the Commission heard that, “Chebilat was
not burnt in one day. It was burnt for almost three weeks. There were
destructions in front of the officers”.
The Commission received reports that, due to bias based on ethnicity, some
officers were reluctant to prevent the violence or to provide protection to the
affected persons. As part of such bias, there were reports that a Luo police officer
was accused of blocking the Kipsigis from reaching the road in their bid to
escape and instead redirecting them to their homes only for them to be attacked
by the Kikuyus. Further, Kikuyu officers stood aside as Kalenjins faced violence
and vice versa.
In some situations police failed to respond to situations of distress even where
early warning and pleas had been communicated to them. The KNCHR Report
states that a house was burnt a few metres from the Londiani Police Station in
spite of prior notification of the police of an impending attack. Where there was
police intervention, disproportionate force was sometimes applied. For instance,
the KNCHR Report implicates, a senior police officer, in the killing of several
civilians in situations that amounted to excessive use of force. The Report
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further states that an OCS accompanied by other officers shot about 17 civilians
in Londiani and Kericho during a riot.
After the death of MP Too which led to an upsurge in violence, the DSIC
reinforced the available security personnel with additional officers drawn from
the General Service Unit, Regular Police, Administration Police and the Criminal
Investigations Department. Further, 30 members of the Rapid Deployment Unit
of the Administration Police Department were sent in to reinforce operations.
At the Kipkelion DSIC meeting held on 12th February, 2008, the DCIO told the
meeting that he had instructed personnel to search various premises which he
believed were where the hate leaflets were being printed.
Response to IDPs
One of the issues authorities in the South Rift had to deal with, as a result of the
post election violence, was the emergence of internally displaced persons. Kisii
town became one of the largest reception centres for IDPs in the Western part of
Kenya. According to local DC Augustine Nthiga, the district received IDPs from
Upper Migori, Rachuonyo, Kericho, Siaya, Homa Bay, Bondo, Nandi, Bureti and
Kakamega. At one point, there were 23, 000 IDPs in Kisii town.
In Sotik, the DC said there were 8500 people displaced from the district. Most of
these were Kisii and Kikuyu. The Kipsigis returnees were absorbed by the local
community and did not go to displacement camps. A temporary camp was
established at the Sotik Police Station.

These IDPs were thereafter taken to

places of safety.

The Kikuyu were taken to Nakuru and Molo and places in

Central Province.

The Kisiis were taken to Ekerenyo, a camp established in

North Kisii district. Although Kiva, the DC in Borabu, told the Commission that
those displaced by the fighting along the border were absorbed inland and that
as a result, no camps were set up in her district, the Commission received
evidence that IDPs displaced from along the border were facing a life of neglect
from the authorities, including the DC herself, who had refused to even
acknowledge the existence of the IDPs.
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The Kericho OCPD told the Commission that that the number of IDPs from
among tea plantation workers stood at 9,000. Of these 6,808 had been returned
to their places of work by the time he testified before the Commission. 2000
business people had been displaced as a result of the violence out of whom 1269
had returned to their businesses at the time of his testimony. The last category
of IDPs were persons who owned land in Kericho before the violence. The
number stood at 250, of whom only 50 had returned to their land.
In relation to Kipkelion, the Commission received evidence that the district
received IDPs as early as November, 2007 who had escaped the fighting in Molo
and Kuresoi.

These were received in Chepsion and Londiani.

The District

Commissioner arranged for meetings with them and they were returned to where
they had fled from.
The conflict in Kipkelion led to the establishment of 17 IDP camps, with one
hosting those of Kalenjin descent and the other of mixed ethnic composition.
There were also heightened relocations of people moving to ethnically
homogeneous locations, which they considered safe. There were convoys to
Siaya, Kisii, Nyamira, Nakuru, Molo, Nyahururu, Nyeri and Thika.
Gedow admitted that initially, the Government did not facilitate these
movements, ostensibly because “it was not the intention of the government to
move people from their homes.” He told the Commission that what they put in
place were measures to protect life and property and not more.
Report of the Law Society of Kenya (South Rift Valley Branch) on Police
Misconduct in Kericho district
The understanding by the Commission of the nature of violence that took place
in Kericho district was greatly enhanced by the submission by the Law Society of
Kenya, South Rift Branch, for which the Commission is grateful. Through its
Secretary, Gideon Mutai, the Society submitted to the Commission the
depositions made under oath of forty two different witnesses, testifying to
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incidents of violence in the district, which either involved them personally,
members of their families, persons known to them, or occurrences which they
had personally witnessed. The first issue to be addressed is the credibility of the
information provided by the Law Society. Out of the 39 cases of shooting that the
evidence dealt with, it indicated that 23 people were shot dead while the rest
sustained severe injuries whose consequences varied greatly. The Commission
compared the list of the deceased persons provided by the Law Society and
confirmed that these are already part of the list of deceased persons in Kericho
which was provided by the MOH for the area, Dr. Ambrose Rotich. The
information provided by the Law Society is, therefore, highly credible as it
materially

corroborates

the

evidence

from

hospital

sources

which

the

Commission generally considers to be credible. A number of broad matters are
disclosed by the evidence collected by the Law Society, South Rift Branch, which
greatly supplements for the inability of the Commission to hold hearings in the
area. These are discussed below.
Out of the cases of 42 people covered by the evidence of the Society, it is
indicated that police shot 36 of them. Two of the remaining six persons were
Kalenjin men severely assaulted by police. As two others were shot by dead by
“unknown assailants”, there is no evidence that these were the police. The last
one was a Kalenjin man shot with an arrow in Chebilat by unknown people.
A review of the cases covered by the evidence of the Law Society indicates that
the epicentres of the violence in Kericho district included Kericho town, Ainamoi
shopping centre, the Londiani junction, and Chebilat centre, which between
them, accounted for 14 of all cases covered. The rest of the cases were widely
dispersed through the district, and occurred in such places as Chesinende
centre, Kapsuser centre and Chelimo estate.

In this regard, the evidence

confirms other available evidence which indicates Kericho town and Ainamoi to
have experienced the greatest of the violence in Kericho district. The severest
violence in Ainamoi coincided with the death of the local Member of Parliament,
which has variously been discussed.
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The evidence of the Society brings new insights into what happened in Ainamoi,
following the death of the M.P. It is alleged that the death of the MP resulted in a
large crowd of local residents marching on the Ainamoi DO’s office, apparently to
express their anger. It is indicated that these were met by police officers who
shot in the air as a way of dissuading them from coming near the office. It is far
from clear how many policemen were present but these could not have been
many. The evidence mentions the name of the ill-fated Omar Dado and another
policeman, Paul Chum, as having been involved in the unfolding stand-off. It is
alleged that a policeman shot a person as he bent over the body of his brother,
who had just been killed by the police and that Dado then gave chase of the shot
person, who was later arrested. An allegation from the Ainamoi incident is that
five villagers who were admitted in hospital as a result of gunshot wounds were
subsequently charged in court with the unbailable offence of robbery with
violence and were, at the time that the Law Society recorded their evidence, still
remanded in custody. According to one of them, Francis Kipng’eno, the sole
means by which they were identified was the fact that they sustained gunshot
wounds. Kipng’eno said, “I know that the basis for my arrest is because I had
gunshot wounds as all of us who were at Ainamoi were arrested and charged”.
Further, the facts constituting the offence that they face in court appear to
revolve around the violence that took place in Ainamoi. Within the time
available, it was not made clear to the Commission how an offence of robbery
could be sustained against the two under the circumstances described, but the
matter, we are told, is before the court. The regrettable violence in Ainamoi
would need to be fully investigated and appropriate action, as the evidence will
warrant, will then need to be taken.
The evidence of the Law Society adds to the already clear picture of arbitrary or
high-handed conduct on the part of the police. In one case, a man was beaten
and injured seriously by police who invaded a reconciliation meeting between the
Kisii and Kipsigis at Chebilat on 5 February 2008. He was then arrested and
abandoned on the roadside within Kisii area, in what must have been an
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exposure to considerable risk, given the existing ethnic animosity at the time.
His injuries must have been serous as he was hospitalized at Kaplong Mission
Hospital for four days. The evidence also relates the story of a man from Kapsoit
centre who claims that his place of work, a butchery, was invaded by policemen
(GSU), who hacked and seriously injured him on the hand, using the
implements for cutting meat that were within the premises. The policemen then
robbed him of Kshs.51,000, belonging to the business, and shortly thereafter
shot another man as he fled from the scene, having witnessed the hacking
incident. The man who was shot corroborated the hacking incident as well as
testifying to his being shot.
It appears that where police used ammunition on the crowd, they did so
indiscriminately and in many of the situations, the shooting was not preceded by
any form of warning. This conclusion is supported by the evidence of a
significant number of the witnesses who recounted that “suddenly the police...
started shooting at the crowd”, or “police suddenly arrived and started shooting
at us.” The indiscriminate nature of the shooting is further demonstrated by the
profile of the victims of the shooting, and the circumstances surrounding the
shooting. One of these was a teenaged girl shot while coming from the posho
mill, where she had gone to grind maize meal for the family. Two of the victims
claim that they were shot in the vicinity of hospitals, where they had gone to see
patients, and two others claim that they caught in a cross fire between police
and rioters.
In each of the cases provided by the Law Society, very serious allegations are
made against the police which, if true, would constitute grave offences on the
part of the police. These cases would need to be investigated independently, as
is discussed elsewhere in this report.
Evidence of Organization of the Violence in Kipkelion
The Sotik DC, in whose district violence began on 28th December, informed the
Commission that the reason for the violence was the delay in the announcement
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of the election results. The Commission found this difficult to believe, as voting
had taken place only the previous day. The commencement of violence in Sotik
so early and at any rate before the disputed election results had become an
issue, is indicative of the fact that there were reasons for the violence other than
the delay in announcing the election results, or the announcement of an
outcome that many people in the south Rift believed to be incorrect and unjust.
The Commission considered the evidence which suggested that the attacks in
the Kipkelion area were conducted in a highly co-ordinate manner. As part of
this, the question of the source of the petrol that was used to burn property in
Kipkelion was of some interest to the Commission. According to Gedow,
allegations that a known person had transported petrol that was used to
conduct arson were discounted by the investigations carried out by the police.
He, however, admitted that petrol was used but could not trace the particular
station where it was bought, partly due to the large number of persons who
participated in the burning. The DC added that the possession of petrol at that
time of the year (December 10th -23rd) would pass as normal as there was a
possibility of stocking of fuel by people for fear of possible shortage.
However, the Commission finds it difficult to believe that common people, most
of whom ordinarily have no use for petrol, would need to stockpile the
commodity as a contingency against possible shortages in the electioneering
period. The Commission wonders whether the widespread availability of petrol,
which was then used in the burning of property in the area, could be a pointer to
prior preparation.
As to the possibility of the violence having been planned, the DC denied
knowledge by the District Intelligence Committee of impending violence, and that
in any event, that was highly unlikely as it was largely a neighbour-againstneighbour conflict.
According to Gedow, no evidence had come to the knowledge of the DSIC of any
oath-taking before and after the elections. However, the position of the provincial
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administration that the violence was not planned must be considered in the
context of a number of other factors that came to the attention of the
Commission.
First, as discussed, the testimony referred to earlier that there was warning to
victims by perpetrators of the violence before this was actually carried out. This
fact is inconsistent with spontaneous violence and consistent with planning.
Second, a large number of people would appear to have known that there would
be violence long before this happened, as the Commission was told by Borabu
residents. Third, it is the view of the Commission that the scale and extent of the
violence is itself suggestive of planning. Fourth, there is evidence of some form of
training having taken place in preparation for violence. Fifth, although the
Commission was not able to establish the validity of the claim, there were
allegations that some form of oath-taking also took place in preparation for the
violence. Sixth, there is evidence of at least one meeting to review the situation
after the violence had subsided.

Conclusions
It is the view of the Commission, the Kipsigis were unhappy with the presence of
the Kikuyu and the Kisii in their homeland in large numbers. The tensions
between the Kipsigis, on the one hand, and the Kisiis and Kikuyus, on the other,
during the electioneering period resulted from this. It is the view of the
Commission that an aspect of the violence was spontaneous, and that the
disaffection with the election results or the perceived illegitimacy of the process
could have been as the cause of the violence. The targeting of the Kikuyu and
the Kisii during this initial violence was not only a backlash by the Kipsigis for
the unjustified loss that they felt had been inflicted on them, but also an attempt
to exact retribution against those in their neighbourhood who they felt
contributed to that loss by voting in a manner inconsistent with their own voting
patterns. Further, the violence was a form of vicarious vengeance against those
presiding over a political a system felt to have robbed the Kipsigis of an electoral
159

victory. As supporters of a political system that they believed had deeply
wronged them, the Kisii and Kikuyu were targeted in the violence that the
Kipsigis unleashed following the announcement of the election results. The
targeting of government property and businesses owned by Kikuyu and Kisii was
consistent with this feeling. This phase of the violence was spontaneous, broke
out

immediately

after

the

announcement

of

the

results,

was

mainly

opportunistic in nature, and found its greatest expression in urban areas.
However, it would be an oversimplification of the problem to say that the post
election violence in the south Rift was solely caused by dissatisfaction over the
presidential results, much as this was an important problem. Clearly, other
factors were at work as well. As indicated by a discussion of the evidence the
violence, initially spontaneous, increasingly showed signs of organisation, the
longer it went on.
Further, in parts of the Rift Valley, violence began on 29th December, before the
election results were announced. The Commission cannot therefore rule out that
some of the violence was planned. The reasons for this would not have been
dissatisfaction over the election results. It had to do with the interpretation of
the “majimbo system” that some members of the Kalenjin community, the host
community to a large number of other ethnic communities, had, which was that
these other communities would be made to leave the Rift Valley once the
majimbo system was put in place. Rising up in arms, in the context of the post
election violence, therefore was a self-driven imposition of this version of
majimbo, through the forceful removal of people from places that were not
considered to be their homeland.
As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Commission finds that there was
deplorable behaviour on the part of the police in the country, including in the
Rift Valley, but the problems of the Kalenjin-dominated parts of the Rift Valley
were not limited to police misconduct. These extended to citizen-on-citizen
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violence, which accounted for the bulk of the killings that happened in that part
of the country.
One of the explanations to the conflict in the south Rift is the competing claims
over ethnic territory between the Kipsigis and Kisii. The coincidence of this
conflict with the electioneering process, however, suggests, that whatever the
merits of the dispute, it is manipulated into becoming an electoral issue, and an
excuse for violence. The Commission did not receive sufficient information to
determine

the

relative

merits

of

these

historical

claims.

However,

the

Commission was struck by the lack of a formalised articulation of this dispute in
any form other than through violence. For example, the Commission did not
receive evidence that there has been a process of political engagement by the
leaders of the two communities that was aimed at discussing the existence of a
border dispute and its possible resolution. In the circumstances, the border
dispute is an occasional problem, manifesting itself when the two communities
have different points of view on a matter that is important to them like elections
and then vanishing until the next season of disagreement. The Commission does
not have the confidence to make a finding that a legitimate border grievance
exists between the two communities.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Violence in Western and Nyanza Provinces
Western Province
Introduction
Western Province borders Uganda to the West, Nyanza Province to the South and
Rift Valley to the East. The province is home to the Luhya ethnic group who are
divided

into

various

sub-groups.

Though

the

rural

parts

are

largely

homogeneous, there are parts of the province which have settlement schemes
inhabited by people from diverse ethnic origins. The urban centres are also
ethnically mixed.
The Province comprises 19 districts, namely, Bungoma East, Bungoma West,
Bungoma North, Bungoma South, Busia, Samia, Bunyala, Butere, Mumias,
Kakamega South, Kakamega North, Kakamega East, Kakamega Central, Lugari,
Mt. Elgon, Teso, Vihiga, Hamisi and Emuhaya.
Western Province is home to the mountainous and agriculturally-rich Mt. Elgon
district, which is at the centre of a long standing dispute over land and cattle
rustling between the Sabaot and other ethnic communities – Bukusu, Ndorobo,
Teso, Kikuyu and the Luo. The dispute has pitted security forces of the
Government of Kenya against a proscribed militia group, the Sabaot Land
Defence Force (SLDF).
Because the problems associated with violence in Mt. Elgon predated the
elections, the Commission was unable to establish any link with the 2007 PEV
and therefore did not integrate it into investigation of PEV in the region. It was
the evidence of General Mutinda Kianga, the Chief of General Staff of the Kenya
Armed Forces, that the conflict in Mt. Elgon started long before the elections and
continued even after the post-election violence. We were of the view that the
issues concerning Mt. Elgon were of such magnitude that the Commission could
not delve into them, given its limited mandate, time and resources.
162

Western Province has not been spared of the scourge of previous incidents of
tribal clashes occurring particularly in 1992 and 1997. The Kiliku Report and
Akiwumi Report identified some of the areas that were the subject of previous
clashes in the Province.
In the Kiliku Report, the then Mt. Elgon sub-district in Bungoma was cited as
having been rocked by ethnic clashes. The Report attributed the clashes to a
number of factors including hunger for land by the Sabaot who felt neglected by
the Government in that they had not, as a tribe, been considered for settlement
schemes like other communities. The region affected by the clashes during the
period covered by the Report now lies in Mt. Elgon District, which, for the
reasons stated above is not within the ambit of this Report.122
The Akiwumi Report indicated that the clashes in Western Province occurred in
the old Bungoma District, and to a very large extent in the old Kakamega
District, along the Nandi Escarpment which constitutes the boundary between
Kakamega and Nandi Districts. The causes comprised the incessant disputes
over land, which was then exploited by politicians at the introduction of
multiparty politics in Kenya. There was also violence as a result of the spill-over
effects of the neighbouring conflict-prone Trans Nzoia District in the Rift
Valley.123
Information presented to the Commission revealed a longstanding history of
resentment against the Kikuyu ostensibly because of their perceived hegemony
in political and economic areas at the expense of the indigenous communities.124
When a heavy deployment of security officers, who were perceived to be agents of
the PNU party, was noticed in the Province ahead of the elections, it only served
to accentuate the rumours that the PNU party was planning to rig the elections,
with the help of the State apparatus. The delayed release of the presidential
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results was therefore seen against this light and later, against that of the events
occurring at the election tallying centre at the Kenyatta International Conference
Centre, which served to heighten tensions.

Patterns of Post-election Violence in Western Province
The period before the elections was generally considered peaceful apart from
incidences

relating

to

political

rivalry

between

candidates

and

their

supporters.125From the evidence presented these incidents were within the
competence of the security forces to control and were dealt with accordingly.
Evidence was submitted to the effect that the violence in Western province
predated the general elections.
On 18 December 2007 at Harambee market, East Kabras Location in Kakamega
District, campaign vehicles belonging to Malava ODM parliamentary candidate
Musavini Nambwa were burnt down when his convoy was ambushed at a
roadblock created by youth allegedly allied to New Ford Kenya.126 The angry
youth also set ablaze a sugar plantation in search of Nambwa whom they
believed had taken refuge in it.127
On 23rd December, 2007, youths shouting PNU slogans stoned vehicles on the
Eldoret-Bungoma highway as they tried to block ODM supporters from travelling
from Bungoma to Webuye. This prompted intervention by police officers and
running battles ensued.
Post election violence in Western province was characterised by burning, looting
and vandalising of property belonging to the Kikuyu community and by those
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perceived to be sympathetic to PNU. The most affected towns were Kakamega,
Mumias,

Bungoma,

Mbale,

Lugari,

Busia

and

Vihiga.

The

Provincial

Commissioner, Mr Abdul Khalfan Mwasera,128 noted in his evidence that during
pre-election planning his team was mainly concerned about the violence
erupting in the urban centres of Busia, Mumias and Kakamega as there had
been pre-election tension.
The PC testified that post-election violence started in Mumias District on 27th
December, 2008 following suspicion of ballot boxes having been hidden in the
house of Joseph Mbacio Thiru, a businessman in Mumias town.129

Members of

the public proceeded to his premises, searched the house but found nothing.
The public, composed of rowdy, stone wielding youths, chanting anti PNU
slogans, began looting the house and in no time the rioters damaged his pick-up
car and burnt down another one and set ablaze his house after emptying it of its
contents.130 According to the PC, the police managed to quell the disorder.
Tension and anxiety grew as the election results continued to trickle in. The
Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer, Patrick Mugo Muhuni131 told the
Commission that on 28 December 2007 youths assembled into groups and run
along the streets of Kakamega town shouting ODM party slogans and praising
the ODM party Presidential candidate, every time the television stations
announced results in which their Party or candidate had emerged victorious.
The Commission was told that the violence in Budalangi, Busia District,
erupted on 29 December 2007 where it is alleged that armed supporters of the
PNU candidate Raphael Wanjala shot one civilian in the area dead. This was
followed by a retaliatory attack by supporters of the rival candidate, Ababu
Namwamba, but police managed to control the latter’s supporters and restore
order. However, the patterns shifted on 30th December when it became obvious
that the violence now targeted the property of the Kikuyu population, leading to
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mass evictions. At Site and Service Scheme Plot No. 100, in Mumias, a group of
rowdy youths invaded the home of Joel Ng’ang’a Wairire, and burnt two of
vehicles before looting his house and setting it ablaze. They also gutted a
supermarket he owned at Shibale market, and had his 35 acres of sugarcane
and 5 acres of eucalyptus trees smothered.132
The road infrastructure in the province was affected as protesters burnt tyres on
the roads and mounted illegal roadblocks. The major roads affected were
Kisumu-Kakamega; Kakamega-Mumias; Kakamega-Eldoret. The road destined to
Uganda was also greatly affected. The areas located near the Lugari/Uasin Gishu
border were greatly and directly affected by the violence occurring in Uasin
Gishu, hence

when on 30th December, 2007, public transport at Kakamega-

Turbo highway got paralysed with a large trench dug at Jua Kali in Turbo, the
impact was felt in Lugari.
We were informed that Nambale recorded its first incident of violence on 27
December 2007. NARC candidate, a Mr. John Bunyasi (who was later arrested)
was found with crude weapons in his car at a polling station. Earlier on,
supporters of Bunyasi and those of his ODM rival clashed in Nambale’s Urban
Primary School polling centre, at which several people were injured.133
On the 27th December 2007, a pick-up vehicle belonging to a Mr. Taabu Joingo
was burnt in Budalangi Constituency and pushed into River Nzoia following a
mix-up of Budalangi parliamentary ballot papers with those of Bura in Tana
River District. The vehicle was heading towards Bumadeya Primary School when
the driver ran into a crowd supporting the main parties.134
In Kakamega North, a man was killed and another seriously injured when New
Ford Kenya supporters and those of ODM clashed during a raid on the home of
an ODM supporter.135 According to information presented to the Commission by
Edward Macharia Mukora, a victim of the violence and a resident of Mumias
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Township before and during the period of the post-election violence, his property
was looted and vandalized. Stanley Ng’ang’a Gathirwa, a resident of Mumias
Township and a victim of the skirmishes, also stated that the police did very
little to rescue and protect his property, which was broken into and looted. On
31st December, 2007 when his property was being consumed in flames, the
police just stood by and watched as the arsonists went on.
The violence in Lugari took a different character in its organisation and target.
Lugari is generally a settled area occupied by several ethnic groups among them
the Luhya, Kalenjin and Kikuyu. Violence in Lugari was affected by events in the
neighbouring Uasin Gishu District where the attackers targeted and burnt
property of persons belonging to the Kikuyu community. It is alleged that the
attackers were armed with pangas and arrows and used matches to burn grassthatched house
According to the PC the violence that engulfed Western Province, “started on 27th
[December 2007] in Mumias and then reached its climax on 31st [December
2007] and that was the end of our violence. The climax of this violence spread all
over the province, most parts of the province except Bungoma North, Bungoma
West and Bungoma East.”
The Commission received evidence of opportunistic attacks by the youth who
engaged in wanton looting and destruction of property. One victim told us that
youths took advantage of the situation. She testified that before the elections,
she together with her parents used to live in Kefinco Estate in Kakamega town.
They had received eviction notices through anonymous calls and reported the
incidents to the police. However, she was told that due to insufficiency of
personnel, she could not get any protection, and was advised to seek refuge at
the premises near Mama Watoto Supermarket, owned by a Mr. Tharao. On 28
December 2007, at around 6 p.m. a group of young men numbering about
twenty forced themselves into their compound and demanded keys to the house,
claiming to have taken possession of it. She was ordered to leave as others
shouted her father’s name. She ran and took refuge at a house where local brew
was being sold and overheard a group of patrons plotting a raid on their house,
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ostensibly on the pretext that Kikuyus had unfairly acquired wealth at the
expense of the members of the Luhya community. After the departure of the
patrons, the lady host called the witness’s mother, who herself was hiding in a
friend’s shop. Mother and daughter proceeded to take refuge in a hostel. On 28
December 2007, the hostel was raided and they fled to a home adjacent to theirs
and owned by a person called Jeremiah. Before they reached, they were however
identified by two men. They managed to get into the house, but soon thereafter,
Jeremiah’s house was also the subject of attack for the reason that he had
hosted unwanted people.
Additionally, the Commission was told that the violence in other parts of the
country had a direct impact on the entire region. On 31 January 2008 a group of
youths blockaded the highway between Timboroa and Turbo Trading Centre, a
general shortage of commodities was felt in the province as supply lines had
been cut.136

Internally Displaced Persons
Most of the IDPs were members of the Kikuyu community and those sympathetic
to PNU and its affiliate parties. An estimated 55, 862 people were displaced in
Western Province. They sought refuge in police stations, schools, churches,
district

commission

offices,

district

officers’

offices,

chief’s

offices

and

administration police camps. Initially, the IDPs were hosted in 32 temporary
camps distributed among affected Districts-Kakamega North, Kakamega South,
Butere, Lugari, Bungoma South, Teso, Hamisi, Emuhaya, Vihiga, Mumias and
Busia.
The Mumias Special District Security Intelligence Summary No. 11/ 2008 for the
period between 24/12/2007 and 2/1/2008 indicated that persons willing to
relocate to safer destinations were escorted. The report also expressed concerns
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of real threat of attack on IDPS at the police stations, and recommended
deployment of security personnel at the stations to beef up security.
1,916 Kenyans crossed the border and sought refuge in Uganda, 500 of whom
were children. As at the time of receiving his testimony, 342 refugees who had
been camping at Mulanda and Kiryandogo had come back to Kenya.
Displacement of persons typically flowed as a consequence of the post-election
violence,

and

was

characterised

by

movement

of

people

to

ethnically

homogeneous areas to which they were linked either because of their community
lineage or their ancestral homelands. The region also witnessed the influx of
returnees from other parts of the country, most notably, Kericho, Nakuru and
Naivasha. Most of these returnees were absorbed back into the families of the
locals or their kin. Apart from facilitation of their transport to their ancestral
homes, we were not informed of any intervention from the Government or from
any of the agencies that were concerned with the welfare of the returnees, save
for the testimony of PC who informed us that the Government had been
distributing relief supplies to those IDPs who had assembled at the IDP camps.

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The Provincial Commissioner testified that the security agents responded against
charged mobs with restraint in a bid to reduce the number of casualties. He
recounted how at Sigalagala in Kakamega South and Lutonyi in Kakamega
Central the security officers used civilian vehicles to arrest youths who were
harassing motorists on the highway.
However, there was ample evidence from the data gathered at hospitals and from
the police to suggest that the

police used excessive force, and in particular,

firearms, in dealing with the demonstrations to control crowds which, in some
cases, had turned violent. Information on casualties and deaths submitted by
Dr. Caleb Olang’o Onudi, the Provincial Medical Officer, provides sufficient
ground for an inference that deaths in Kakamega, Busia and Mumias occurred
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as a result of injuries secondary to gunshots, or those as a result of assault by
the police.
The records which were collected and collated from 9 major hospitals in the
Province and harmonized with the figures from the police indicated that there
were 98 died as a result of PEV in the Province as follows;
•

Kakamega 31 deaths;

•

Webuye, 21;

•

Vihiga, 18;

•

Mumias, 12;

•

Busia, 9;

•

Bungoma 7.

Post-mortems carried out on the 98 bodies revealed that 74 of them died of
gunshots. Thus gunshot comprised 73% of all fatalities in the province. We were
informed that inquest files in these matters have been opened but no further
steps have been taken to investigate the killings. We find this state of affairs
wholly unsatisfactory.
According to the Western PCIO Patrick Mugo Muhuni, as early as October 2007,
Provincial Police Headquarters had formed a Committee to monitor all electionrelated events. The committee was expected to collect information from the eight
police divisions and report to the Provincial Police Officer and other senior police
officials, who would then evaluate and analyse the information before directing
on the right cause of action. The security officers in the Province had been
instructed to be on high alert for any possible disorder during the electioneering
period. All the eight Officers Commanding Police Divisions in the Province were
to conduct rehearsals on control of riots and generally, in maintaining law and
order during the period. While the content of this training was not revealed to
the Commission, the expectation was that it ought to have reflected in the
manner in which the police handled the rioters.
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The totality of evidence suggests that the police were overwhelmed and
unreasonably resorted to the use of firearms. It further reveals insufficient
manpower and facilities available to the police to counter the magnitude of
demonstrations witnessed in the period after the elections. Information from the
minutes of Butere District Security and Intelligence Committee Summary No.
07/2007 for the period between 14 November and 24 December 2007 indicated
that adequate security measures had been put in place and the polling stations
sufficiently policed. However, of concern was that with only a few days to the
elections and in the light of the anxiety that had gripped the region, concrete
plans were yet to be finalized with regard to fuelling and servicing of the vehicles
to be used. This pointed to the insufficiency of vehicles to respond to any
distress

call

during

that

period,

hence

making

it

easy

to

conduct

demonstrations, looting and destruction of property.
The PC testified that the peace building and reconciliation campaigns
spearheaded by the Provincial Administration in the province yielded quick
results. As a result of the reconciliation efforts of the PSIC and DSICs, 26,861
households moved out of the temporary IDP camps, with some returning to their
farms and others opting to stay with relatives and friends.
Additionally, Peace and Reconciliation Committees were set up in all districts
comprising elders from the various communities, religious leaders and civil
servants in Vihiga, Busia, Teso and Kakamega Central Districts. Workshops
were also held on diverse dates to address the issues of hostilities at the onset of
the conflict.
The Provincial Administration also established six temporary AP posts in Lugari
to assist in the resettlement exercise.
Planning and Organisation
From the evidence, it appeared that the violence in Western Province was
spontaneous, save for Lugari, which bore the hallmark of a planned and
carefully organised onslaught against their victims and their property. The
Commission received no evidence to suggest prior preparation for the violence
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that rocked Busia, Bungoma and Mumias and takes the view that the violence in
these areas was a direct result of disaffection with the final tally of the
Presidential election results.
In the case of Lugari, an inference of planning is buttressed by the evidence that
the attackers were under a central command. Additionally, the attacks came
from one direction, off the neighbouring Uasin Gishu District. There was also
some uniformity in the outfit of the attckers and the mode of attacks. The youths
were clad in black balaclavas and had their faces painted in white and divided
themselves into smaller groups once they entered a targeted area. However
beyond this, we did not receive any credible evidence pointing to the culpability
of any individual or group and we therefore recommend further investigations be
conducted to establish who the perpetrators and executors of the violence were.
Conclusion
The Commission established that the violence experienced in Western Province
was distinct from that experienced in other parts of the country in the sense that
it was a direct consequence of political differences. These differences led to riots
which were quelled by the law enforcement agencies thus resulting in a high
number of deaths. From the totality of the evidence received by the Commission,
the wave of violence, apart from Lugari, was spontaneous and directly flowed
from disaffection with the final tally of the presidential results.
The evidence the Commission received reasonably supports an inference of
planning in the case of Lugari However, the plotters, financiers and individuals
engaged in whatever stage of the planning and execution process and where the
attackers were trained, could not be identified from it, and remain obscure,
hence the need for further investigation.
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Nyanza Province
Introduction
“Luo Nyanza”, as it is popularly known, neighbours Lake Victoria, one of the
Great Lakes of Africa; the continent’s largest lake, the largest tropical lake in the
world, and the second widest fresh water lake in the world. It is the source of the
longest branch of the River Nile and is a biological hotspot with great biodiversity
which plays a vital role in supporting the millions of people living around its
shores. While Nyanza Province is inhabited predominantly by the Luo, there are
Bantu speaking tribes including the Kisii, Kuria and a few Luhya living in the
province. The Province derives its name from the Sukuma, a Bantu-speaking
tribe living on the Tanzanian side to whom the word Nyanza means a large mass
of water. The provincial capital is Kisumu, Kenya’s third largest city. The climate
in the area is tropical and humid.
Nyanza Province consists of 21 Districts of which 11 are predominantly Luo and
which are the subject of this part of the report. The main economic activities in
the region are crop farming focusing mainly on sugarcane, tea, coffee and
bananas, animal husbandry and fishing. Luo Nyanza has been politically active
since pre-independence times and tends to vote as a block for its candidate of
choice, especially since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991.

Raila Odinga, a presidential candidate during the 2007 Election though a
parliamentarian representing Nairobi’s Langata constituency, has his roots in
Bondo District and is the son of the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The fact that
Raila Odinga was the preferred candidate in the region and that the voters in the
region believed that the results of the presidential elections had been rigged
against him also contributed greatly to the wave of violence in Luo Nyanza that
we shall shortly explore. As we shall see, Luo Nyanza rose up to protest what
was seen as a rigged presidential election. Protestors thus suffered the brunt of
police killings. Unlike in other parts of the country that were ravaged by violence
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in the post election period, the majority of the deaths recorded in Luo Nyanza
were as a result of shootings attributed to police.

Immediate Pre-Election and Election Period
Nyanza Province had been generally peaceful during the electoral period,
although the ODM nominations were characterized by widespread violence. The
Commission was informed by Grace Kaindi, former Nyanza Provincial Police
Officer that as early as August 2007, reports of ethnic tension between the
mainly Luo residents, who “unanimously” supported ODM, and non Luo
residents, who were perceived to be sympathetic to PNU, had began filtering in to
the authorities. They were sparked by an incident in Karatina in Central
Province where the ODM presidential candidate Raila Odinga and his entourage
had been unceremoniously thrown out of the Karatina Tourist Lodge (an
establishment owned and run by an in-law of President Kibaki) in an incident
that was widely reported in the media. In response, intelligence sources
indicated that tension was building up in Rangwe, Siaya and Migori where ODM
supporters vowed that politicians affiliated to NARC-K (PNU was yet to be
formed) or any other party aligned to incumbent President Mwai Kibaki would
face hostilities if they dared campaign in the ODM strongholds of Luo Nyanza.
One such report indicated that a local ODM official had threatened to mobilize
Homa Bay residents to evict the Kikuyu from the area should such an incident
recur137.
The Nyanza Provincial Commissioner informed the Commission that campaigns
in Luo Nyanza were intense and the dominant ODM party was not keen to allow
members from other political parties to campaign in the region. The Commission
was told that from the month of October 2007, tension was heightened due to
smear campaigns undertaken by rival politicians and that for instance in Rang
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March, along the Kisii/Rongo border, some youth torched several sugarcane
plantations belonging to both Kisii and Luo farmers. According to Ms.Kaindi,
“ as the polling day approached, we continued to receive intelligence
reports to the effect that some Luo youths in Kisumu had threatened
to take unspecified action against the Kikuyu who had registered as
voters in the area should they exhibit any form of support for or
attempt to vote against ODM candidates”.
On his part, Simon Kiragu, the Kisumu OCPD, stated that he did not notice any
tension and therefore apparently made no preparation in anticipation of violence:
“We experienced no problems during the campaigns. We did not
anticipate any problems after the general elections. It took us by
surprise when on [29th] December 2007 a riotous mob stormed the
provincial works offices and burnt the main office block and nine
Government of Kenya Vehicles. Another riotous mob stormed the KBC
office and burnt five motor vehicles. By then the political temperatures
were very high, people demanding for immediate release of the
presidential election results by the chairman of the ECK138”
The Nyanza Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Paul Poland Olando, stated that the
Provincial Administration had put in place mechanisms to ensure peaceful
campaigns and through the police had
“made preparations for effective management of the campaign
calendar up to just before polling day and on 24th of Dec 2007, the
Provincial security team met under my Chairmanship to make sure
that plans were complete for effective management of the polling day
and thereafter the District Commanders were equally instructed to do
the same”.
We heard that the elections in the province including announcement of
parliamentary results and presidential tallies were conducted in a generally
peaceful manner and that when the Provincial Security and Intelligence
Committee (PSIC) team met under the PC’s chairmanship on 28 December 2007,
they were satisfied that polling had been successful139. While voting was
peaceful, the PC stated that the PSIC received intelligence from NSIS on 28th
December 2007 predicting that there could be high levels of excitement if the
results were in favour of ODM or protests if the results were not favourable.
138
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The NSIS had forwarded the information to the authroties for “information and
necessary action” and the PSIC accordingly instructed all Provincial Police
officers to mobilize the police to be alert and also made arrangements to ensure
law and order was maintained.
Eruption of Violence
The Commission heard diametrically opposing views as to the catalyst of the
violence in Luo Nyanza. The testimony of most Government witnesses can be
summed up thus, that the authorities were suddenly confronted by of rampaging
crowds and they had to restore law and order using all available means at their
disposal. On the other hand a Catholic priest who testified before us expressed
the view that “there were no indications of violence. As elections approached,
more Police and security forces were deployed” and that the general feeling
among the residents was that they had cast their votes peacefully and deserved
an outcome amenable to their reasonable expectations namely a Raila Odinga
win. The perceived delay to release the presidential results was therefore
interpreted as a pointer towards rigging and the Luo community thus acted to
pre-empt rigging but the police and the state machinery moved with
recklessness and disregard to their lives in suppressing their freedom of
expression during which serious crimes were perpetrated against the people
fighting for recognition of their democratic rights.

These two discordant views were repeatedly enunciated by the authorities on
one hand and the citizenry on the other. The priest told us that in his view, the
demonstrations in Nyanza were peaceful but the police disrupted them leading to
unnecessary violence. According to him, people went to the streets to
demonstrate without violence or stone throwing but that police shootings
provoked the residents who then turned violent as a way of expressing their
displeasure with the police for using live ammunition. Throughout our hearings
in Kisumu, we were confronted by these divergent views and we shall endeavour
to distil the truth from those two extreme versions of events.
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The Commission heard that the violence in Nyanza occurred in 3 distinct
phases. The first was directly related to the context of elections and took place
between 29 and 31 December 2007. It was characterized by demonstrations,
riots, acrimony and discontent. The second phase occurred in the New Year and
was reactionary apparently in protest against what was viewed as excessive use
of force by police and also in response to calls for mass action by the ODM
leadership which lasted until mid January 2008. The third phase was associated
with two unrelated events, first the targeting of Luo by Kikuyu gangs in Nakuru
and Naivasha leading to an influx of Luo IDPs from outside Nyanza and the
murders, towards the end of January 2008, of two ODM politicians, Mr. Mugabe
Were, MP for Embakasi and Mr. David Kimutai Too. Similar evidence was in fact
tendered by the KNCHR in their report.

The Provincial Commissioner stated that while violence began on 29 December
in Kisumu town, reports of violence were also received by the PSIC from
Rachuonyo, Migori, Siaya, and Nyando districts. He informed us that most of
this violence was particularly urban based and also concentrated along the
highways in the Province. The PC added that there was a perception among the
Luo community that the announcement of the presidential results had been
delayed, which raised suspicion that the delay could lead to mixing up and
rigging of the results.
The PSIC therefore instructed the provincial police officers to mobilize the
security personnel to be on the ready, to ensure that officers who had been used
on the polling day were available and that those who had been on leave were
recalled. Pertinently, the PC stated that it was not possible to engage political
leaders since at the time they were not on the ground. By 30 December 2007, we
heard that many business people and families had moved out of Nyanza and
virtually the whole of Luo Nyanza was engulfed in violence and security
personnel had been deployed everywhere. Mr. Olando further told us,
“All government offices were closed, communication channels were
not functioning, roads were blocked, telephone lines, land lines were
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dismantled. It was just practically impossible to assemble any people
for any kind of discussion and as a security committee; we were
concerned with bringing down the situation because you need to bring
down the situation before you can go into discussions...”
One of the main targets of the violence was the Government on the perception
that the polls had been rigged by Government agents and the feeling against the
institution of government, government facilities, and Government personnel was
extremely intense and hostile. According to the PC, it became difficult for
Government officials to discharge their duty:
“My Lord, at that time it was practically difficult to engage the people
in this Province about their perception because first of all, accessibility
was difficult. Our main mode of conduct with the people which is
public barazas was not possible, was not functioning, the people
could not turn up and so it would have been difficult at that point, My
Lord, the results have just been announced, people are taking great
exception…The leaders are not there, you want to bring them together
and according to them, you are the personification of the Government
in the area, My Lord, it was difficult.”
While the PC regretted the loss of life and property especially in Kisumu, we were
surprised when he told us that there had been no indication there would be
violence of the magnitude that arose after 29 December 2007. There was
intelligence which he acknowledged to have received from the NSIS had already
been made available to him indicating the possibility of an explosion of violence.
Evidence was received that the Nyanza PSIC sought reinforcements because the
magnitude of the violence and the time it was taking to suppress it had exerted
fatigue on police officers. Further, as a result of the violence many idle youth
resorted to criminal activities and at one point in time, the rioters and hooligans
overwhelmed the security officers.
In spite of the security forces being stretched, the PC emphatically stated that
there were no foreign soldiers called in to assist and that indeed there never was
need to bring in foreign assistance to Nyanza. This was confirmed by the Kisumu
OCPD, Mr. Simon Kiragu. The perception of there being foreign soldiers
according to the PC and OCPD resulted from the deployment of the Rapid
Deployment Unit (RDU), a unit within the Administration Police whose unique
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uniforms and gear (red helmets with an upper green coats both back and front)
the area residents were not accustomed to, doubting instead that these were
indeed Kenyan police officers. We established that the rumours about the
presence of foreign soldiers in the country were unfounded; instead it was the
appearance of the Rapid Deployment Unit of the AP whose uniform the local
population had not hitherto seen and thus wrongly tionally assumed to be
detachments of Uganda’s People Defense Force (UPDF).
The PC was of the view that the magnitude of violence that erupted after the
disputed elections pointed to the need for Government to consider preparedness
for large disasters that may occur in future.

Kisumu
Mr. Simon Kiragu, the Kisumu OCPD told the Commission that on 29 December
2007 a mob stormed the Public Works office, burning the main block and nine
GK vehicles. Another group attacked the Kenya Broadcasting Cooperation (KBC)
office and burnt five motor vehicles as tensions rose over awaited presidential
election results prompting the police to move in and disperse the crowds using
teargas. In the course of this violence, the Grand Kimwa Hotel was attacked. The
next day, on December 30th, violence erupted again in the entire city of Kisumu.
More than 4,000 people converged at Kondele market as early as 8.00 a.m
demanding the immediate release of national presidential results while
disturbances also erupted in other parts of the town with riotous mobs
vandalizing and looting from shops perceived to belong to people who were “nonindigenous”. Mr. Kiragu informed the Commission that riots then spread to
Kondele, Nyalenda, Otongolo, Nyamasaria and Manyatta. The rioters were
initially dispersed but they regrouped and violently stormed into the center of
the city where they engaged in vandalism and looting of property. On the same
day 7 people were burnt to death inside Minoki Building when there was massive
looting within the town.
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Mr. Kiragu’s evidence concurs with the PC’s testimony that from 30 December
2007, violence would start during the day and the rioting mobs would retreat at
night and assemble the following day to start again.

According to the PC,

Kisumu City was targeted from three directions where the rioting mobs blocked
the main entry points to the city: Kisumu-Nairobi highway at Karoki; KisumuKakamega at Kondele; and Kisumu-Busia at the railway junction. Violence was
then directed to Kondele area and the other outskirts of Kisumu.

The violence then assumed an ethnic dimension where it was targeted at
residential buildings, commercial buildings, business centres and enterprises
particularly belonging to the Kikuyu and Meru and later the Kamba and Kisii
communities. Similar evidence was also given by KNCHR. The burning and
looting of business premises belonging to some non-Luo individuals and also
companies that were deemed as foreign affected Crater Auto Motors, Minoki
House, Ramgharia Singh Rabha, Ukwala Supermarket, Imani Cycle Hardware,
Bata shoe shops, Alpha House, Gamorager Singh Server, Imani Cycle Hardware,
East African Cables Stockist, Njari Enterprises, Allkohols, Brontex House and
the ground floor of Swan Center.140

By 30 December 2007, with presidential results yet to be announced the
Government, according to Father Charles Oloo K’ Ochiel of the Catholic Peace
and Justice Commission, became a target for ventilation of public anger since
“ the people felt that the only language that they could speak was by
acting against the system that did not address their plight, their kind
of suffering, their kind of pain and I would say that it is not that the
people were prepared to destroy any Government institutions but I
think they were reacting to the excessive force used by the police and
the GSU”
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There were attempts to immobilize Government operations through the digging of
trenches and barricading of roads, burning and overturning of Government
vehicles. The Commission heard that rioters invaded the water company’s offices
where they looted, set ablaze the main office and burnt 17 motor vehicles and
one motor cycle. Police managed to disperse the rioters before they could set the
entire building on fire.
The Commission heard that the police kept chasing the crowds and using tear
gas until they eventually realized they could not contain them without using live
fire, and Mr. Kiragu took the decision that live ammunition was to be used:
“This is the time we now decided to use live fire to ensure that
buildings do not continue being burnt and by so doing, we managed
to chase the rioters out of the town and they retreated to the
estates…”

The PC stated that instructions to the Administration Police were channelled
from Nairobi through him and in the course of 30 December, a GSU platoon, 50
regular police and 50 officers from the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) of the
Administration Police were jointly deployed under the command of the OCPD Mr.
Simon Kiragu, bringing his total manpower to more than 300 security personnel
supported by ten vehicles. The RDU and GSU were assigned specific sectors to
cover and worked independently while the Administration Police officers were
put together with the regular police. After the lessons of the previous day’s
running battles and the difficulty of controlling the huge crowds, the OCPD
embarked on a deployment pattern which would lock the people from entering
the main city and containing them within the slum estates of Nyalenda,
Manyatta, Nyamasaria, Kondele, Mamboleo, Otongolo, Bandani and Kanyakuor.
In order to ensure that the crowds did not enter the central business district,
the OCPD placed “lock-ups” to prevent people from passing and going on into the
town center at various entry points, including Obunga next to Kenya Breweries
depot, Busia road at the railway crossing to contain the people from Bandani
and Otongolo and at the Railway station. Other lockups were placed at Swan
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centre (which was targeted and burnt by rioting mobs on December 29th),
Kamasi, Makasembo Road, Meru, the main bus stop, Kashok Junction, Tuskys
Supermarket, Kibuye and at Kondele city clock. According to the OCPD, ten
vehicles supported the lockups and patrolled the roads within the estates to
monitor the situation.

In the meantime, the roads heading to Kakamega, Busia and Nairobi were
heavily barricaded by rioters who used big rocks, posts and burning tyres which
made it difficult for anybody to pass through unless under police escort. Mr.
Kiragu stated that the orders on the use of lethal force remained applicable. On
30 December, Mr. Kiragu informed the Commission that over 1,000 rioters
armed with pangas and rungus forced their way into the Lake Basin Authority
offices within Migosi area near Kondele where they stole unknown quantities of
rice, beans and maize. Police were forced to use live ammunition so that these
stores could be protected from being burned and 3 rioters were shot dead.

Later, more than 3,000 rioters attempted to storm Mega City Supermarket where
they burnt a Kenol petrol station located along Nairobi Road while also
attempting to storm the offices of the water company but were dispersed by
officers under the OCPD’s command using live ammunition and though none
died at the scene several were believed to have been wounded by the bullets. Mr.
Kiragu further stated that some victims of the above shootings were shot
accidentally by stray bullets and killed while in the safety of their houses.
Kisumu Central Police Station recorded 38 cases of shooting, Kondele Police
Station 20 while 6 cases were from outside Kisumu municipality. Several of the
victims had multiple gunshot wounds. The appropriateness or otherwise of the
police tactics are dealt with at length in volume 2 of this report.
According to Mr. Kiragu, Kisumu experienced the worst violence on 31 December
2007 which was of extremely high magnitude and 25 rioters were consequently
shot dead by police. The witness described the mobs as being “very aggressive”,
charging towards police officers and stoning police vehicles and police officers.
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This, he said, prompted the police to use live ammunition to disperse the rioters
and to make sure that the roads were passable:
“This included ensuring that the fuel meant for Uganda…had to pass
through the Busia road which was heavily barricaded with burning
tyres, posts and even sometimes shells of motor vehicles. The
Government of Kenya was also under pressure to ensure that fuel
meant for Uganda reaches the destination safely…it was very difficult
for us.”

Part of the Kenya Uganda railway within the town was also uprooted. Mr. Kiragu
stated that at the time and while the police had anticipated a scenario of
celebration which could have turned violent, the crowds which engaged the
police in running battles from street to street were so huge such that the police
were overwhelmed. It was the OCPD’s testimony that the situation did not ease
and riots continued on a daily basis from 31 December with mobs retreating
each evening and re-converging on the following day which became a daily
routine only ebbing on 21 January 2008 when an Ecumenical prayer meeting
was held in Kisumu city stadium where religious and political leaders appealed
for peace. With the mediation talks proceeding in Nairobi, calm was slowly
returning to Kisumu and the situation only subsided after the National Accord
was signed. In total, police acknowledged having shot dead 48 people in Kisumu
though Father K’ Ochiel took the view that the number of alleged police
shootings were under-reported. We agree with that assessment since the
Commission received reports and post mortems confirming that at least 69
people were shot dead in Kisumu in this period. Mr. Kiragu informed the
Commission that police had arrested and charged a total of 98 suspects.

Homa Bay
Mr. Jimmy Munene a Senior Superintendent of police in charge of Homa Bay
divisional police headquarters stated that prior to elections; he had received a
total of 50 new officers from a total of 78. He stated that violence in Homa Bay
commenced on 29th December, 2007 at 6.00 p.m. and took the police by
surprise. The confrontation between the rioters and the police which marked the
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onset of conflict that was to rock this part of Luo Nyanza lasted more than a
month. On this day, the protesters were dispersed using tear gas though the
OCPD admitted receiving information that one person, Samuel Otieno Okungu,
was shot dead by police at Shauri Moyo Estate141.
The OCPD stated that on 30th December, 2007 he deployed all his available
officers to all vital places- the Bank, Hospitals, Cereal Board, Water Sections,
petrol stations and two supermarkets within the town. That notwithstanding,
violence erupted in all corners of the town, with a crowd of more than 5,000
people barricading roads, looting and vandalizing business premises owned by
Kikuyu, Kisii and Kamba.

After announcement of the presidential election

result, rioters stormed the Divisional offices and burned the main office block, 3
GK vehicles and a motor cycle. Another mob stormed the fisheries’ offices where
they burned three vehicles and the main office and one person was reportedly
killed.
All available 300 regular police officers also drawn from the rural areas and
prison warders from Homa Bay Prison were deployed within the town centre
where violence was concentrated with a view to securing the main town from
total destruction. The Commission was told that violence continued in the town
virtually each and every day until the National Accord was signed in late
February 2008.

The witness further stated that he had instructed all the officers not to use live
ammunition and at first only tear gas was used but once the situation
deteriorated, police were forced to use live ammunition to scare the mobs though
the instructions remained that the officers were not to shoot at people but in the
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On the same day the OCPD acknowledged having received similar reports that one Kennedy Otieno Odoyo had
also been shot at the pelvic area and had died at Shauri Yako estate while Wycliffe Ochieng Olela was found lying
dead along the Rangwe – Oyugis road with gun shot wounds in the abdomen.
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air. In spite of these instructions 3 deaths were reported as a result of gunshot
wounds and Mr. Munene agreed that his orders were disobeyed.

Migori / Rongo
On his part, Mr. Edward Mwamburi the Senior Superintendent of Police in
charge of Migori – Rongo police divisions stated that he was involved in pre
election security arrangements from August 2007. He said he was required to
provide 2 police officers each to a total of some 1,238 polling stations within his
division for the polling day on 27th December 2007. Since he only had at his
disposal 174 police officers, he requested for additional reinforcements and
received some 400 National Youth Service men and women from Nairobi, 204
Administration policemen from Migori and Rongo Districts, 122 Prison Warders
from Migori GK Prison and 8 forest guards from the District Forest Office who
were all appointed special police officers in accordance with the powers conferred
on the Commissioner of Police; which gave him a total of 1,274 police officers.
It was his testimony that he had prepared an operation order with regard to
some precautionary measures in anticipation of what could happen after the
elections mainly involving guarding of vital installations such as Hospitals,
Banks and Commercial undertakings within Migori District. After peaceful
polling and receipt of results, he stated that the 29th of December 2007 brought
a rude shock with a huge crowd of people descending first on the MigoriIsebania-Kisii Highway and then on Migori Township chanting ODM slogans.
The Commission heard that this crowd swelled within a short time and started
looting within the shopping center. The police tried to use teargas but the crowds
would not relent and that around the same time, similar events were taking
place in Awendo and Rongo Districts. Since tear gas was not effective, Mr.
Mwamburi stated that he issued an order for the officers to use firearms142.
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The Operation order directed that first, officers were to use teargas and if that was not effective, then they were to
switch on to the rubber balls and later on if there was real danger to loss of property and life, then would proceed to
use firearms.
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While the OCPD had anticipated dealing with lawful demonstrations he was
shocked once the initially peaceful demonstrators numbering about 4,000
attempted to move to the Migori Prison. Some in the crowd were carrying sticks,
pangas and stones and Mr. Mwamburi decided he would not let them reach the
GK Prison in Migori upon which he intervened. As the violence progressed, he
stated that he found it absolutely necessary to use live ammunition to fire in the
air if only to scare the demonstrators whose magnitude threatened to overwhelm
the 300 officers at his disposal. In his view, the situation was so unusual that a
baton charge was inapplicable since the crowd was almost overwhelming the
police and some fatalities eventually resulted when live fire was used.

The Commission heard that this first demonstration triggered off a series of
demonstrations from 29 December onwards including the barricading of the
Migori/Awendo/Rongo/Kisii Highway which is a major gateway to the Tanzanian
border town of Isebania. According to the OCPD,
“My Lords, they kept on going every day and barricading the road
everyday and whenever we made some moves to remove the stones,
the place that we had cleared, when we go to the other direction on
coming back those stones were back in place if not more than the
initial ones that were placed on the roads”
Mr. Mwamburi informed the Commission that 11 people were killed143 in the
process of quelling these riots. A total of 612 IDPs, majority of them business
people in the area, camping in police stations were threatened with attack by the
locals and a decision to move them to Nakuru was taken after mobs attempted
to invade Kamagambo Police Station with this intention. The Commission heard
that a police officer was killed at Sori in Karongo division by mobs who perceived
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According to Mr. Mwamburi, some of the bodies were collected from the hospital and buried by relatives secretly
without notice.
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him to be from a particular tribe. A total of 62 people, mainly youth, were
arrested but most were released except for 18 who were arraigned in Court.
On 3 January 2008, at St. Camilla’s patrol base, demonstrators attacked police
officers and snatched a G3 rifle from one of the officers who was injured. The
firearm was recovered 5 days afterwards without the ammunition. Further, four
police officers were injured during the period of the violence. Mr. Mwamburi told
us that he was transferred to another station on 4th February 2008.

Impact of the Violence
We heard from the Nyanza PC that by 11th February 2008, 102 people were
reported dead and 685 people injured in the province while 40,000 non-Luos
had exited the province. 9 government offices, 73 business premises and 415
residential houses were looted or burnt across the Province. 50 government
vehicles were destroyed, 16 public service vehicles damaged mainly on the roads
or where they had been parked and another 16 vehicles were damaged144. 2,886
people sought refuge as IDPs within the town. The Commission heard that the
province received 126,821 returnees from outside Nyanza because they had been
ejected from other provinces or they feared continuing to stay in those places
most of who were taken in by friends and relatives or hired places to stay within
the province.
The PC did not dispute the fact that a large percentage of the people who lost
their lives did so through gun shots and/ or bullet wounds which was confirmed
by the Provincial Medical Officer of Health Dr. Jackson Kioko who gave evidence
that 90% of the deaths in New Nyanza General Hospital were from gun shots.
We further heard that three security personnel were killed in the course of
suppressing the violence.
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The majority of these vehicles were destroyed in Kisumu, Rachuonyo, Migori and Homa Bay Districts.
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Dr. Jackson Kioko stated that though the Province had put in place systems in
the health facilities for disaster preparedness, they had not anticipated violence
of the magnitude that occurred in the post-election period. He also provided a
breakdown of casualties from the various districts145. According to him, the total
number of deaths recorded at the New Nyanza Provincial General Hospital was
64 while another 53 bodies were brought in from outside the hospital. He further
stated that 129 people bearing gunshot wounds were brought in. However, in the
Masaba Borabu area, he stated that most of the casualties received bore lodged
arrow heads and were referred to Kisii. Doctor Kioko therefore acknowledged
that medical facilities in Nyanza were overstretched and overwhelmed during
this period and the number of cases that needed attention was such that there
was not sufficient human resources to attend to the cases forcing surgeons to
spend hours on end in theatres, “because in some situations we had only one
theatre and one operation was taking close to twelve hours…”
He further presented statistics containing data from 33 public health
institutions in the province but did not include data from over 200 private health
facilities in the province clarifying that his records may not have been very
reliable during the period of post election violence as record keeping in public
health institutions was not conclusive and as such statistics given to the
Commission may not represent the complete picture. We can nevertheless
summarize his presentation as follows;
District Hospital
Gucha
Homa Bay
Rongo
Nyamira
Nyando

Casualties
received
7
27
21
29
55

145

Gunshot
Injuries
2
35
3
30

No of
Deaths
6
3

The Doctor stated that Kisii General Hospital treated patients brought in from neighbouring districts while Migori
District Hospital recorded a total of 19 deaths and 28 gun shot victims
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District Hospital
Kisumu
Siaya
Rachuonyo
Kisii
Bondo
Masaba-Borabu
Suba
Provincial Gen. Hospital-Kisumu
Migori

Casualties
received
47
18
58
12
63
6
256
47

Gunshot
Injuries
6
3
12
9
6
71
28

No of
Deaths
10
6
6
1
64
1

The Commission was told by Dr. Margaret Oduor, a pathologist based at the
Kisumu Provincial and General Hospital, that 56 bodies and 8 body parts were
taken to the Nyanza Provincial General Hospital out of which 50 bodies had
indications on the cause of death as gunshot wounds. 53 out of the 56 bodies
were male, 3 were female while 3 were of children aged less than 14 years. Out of
the 56 bodies, 50 were Luo. According to Dr. Oduor 53.6 % of the gunshot
casualties had been shot from the back pointing to the inference that police shot
people who were already in flight and not with an aim to immobilize but for
purposes of killing and maiming. After examining the bodies she was able to
recover 5 bullets.
Mr. Isaac Okero, a representative of the West Kenya Law Society, stated that his
organisation was galvanized into action sometime in mid January 2008 following
the killing of one George William Onyango whose shooting was broadcast on the
KTN news.

Following that event and the police reaction through Police

spokesman Eric Kiraithe suggesting that this incident was a concoction, they
contacted the deceased family members’ and facilitated media access to highlight
that this incident was not a ‘movie’ as alleged by police.
The Society furnished evidence comprising of depositions from affected members
and informed us that there was a marked reluctance from victims to come
forward and tell their stories. They attributed this to a very strong suspicion
against law enforcement agencies and the justice system. The Society further
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noted apathy from many victims who did not feel confident that recording
statements would result in any justice.

Further, victims especially of sexual

violence were too fearful to seek the help of the police because not only were the
police otherwise engaged but also due to a feeling of discomfort filing complaints
with the institutions that they felt were associated with the perpetrators of the
violence.

Among the depositions presented by the Society were some highlighting the
crimes perpetrated by gangs of youths who were taking advantage of the
lawlessness that prevailed. Other depositions related to attacks characterized by
ethnic identification of the victims in various locales in Central and Rift Valley
provinces. Mr. Okero indicted Government institutions charged with maintaining
internal security for the failure to contain the post-election violence in Kisumu,
“Well, more I think could have been done to arrest the escalation of violence at
that time. There seemed to have been other priorities that they seemed keen to
be engaged rather than to stop the violence and to protect those who are exposed
to violence”.

Notwithstanding the police version of events that they were confronted by violent
mobs prompting them to use live fire, Gregory Onyuro Ngoche testified that he
was shot outside his home and that when he went to report the issue, the police
officer on duty declined to record the incident at first on account of the
complaint being a gunshot wound. A senior police officer however intervened and
authorized the officer on duty at the report desk to take and record that
information. Similarly, Alice Atieno, a former security guard, was shot in the
head after arriving home from her place of work. She had as a result lost hearing
and sight on the left side and was unable to eat save for liquids146.

146

In spite of a pledge by Government that all post election violence related cases would receive free medical
attention, this witness stated that she had been unable to access treatment at Kenyatta National Hospital due to the
cost involved and which she was not able to afford.
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It would appear to us that the indiscriminate use of live ammunition by police by
design or default targeted vital organs, for instance John Opiyo Ondiek a
security officer with the Kisumu Municipal Council at Kibuye Market informed
the Commission that he was shot by police from behind at his place of work
sustaining injuries on his private parts. It would also appear that little or no
effort was made at all to use non lethal means in riot control. Live ammunition
was used indiscriminately to disperse peaceful crowds and /or demonstrators
armed only with crude weapons. As described by Father K’Ochiel,
“The situation was terrible. Whichever place I passed through there
were bodies and you could see the police everywhere and a lot of
people and chasing of people by police, shooting there was looting
going on.147”
Ms. Grace Kaindi the former Nyanza PPO stated that the security forces were
overwhelmed and that is why they sought reinforcements. Though many
Government witnesses did not mention the use of live ammunition and where
they did they pointed out that gunfire was used with the intention of scaring
rowdy mobs bent on looting, the catastrophic humanitarian effects of this type of
crowd dispersal tactics speaks volumes for itself and is a pointer to the
dysfunction within the police.

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The Nyanza PC informed us that once the violence erupted, the PSIC issued
instructions to District commanders to stop the violence but the guidelines on
how this was to be achieved was left to the individual commanders to manage
the security situation. To sum up the view of the police and provincial
administration, they were under a duty to maintain law and order and to protect
life and property and as such, the rioting mobs had to be kept at bay and the
vandalism they orchestrated from the 29th December 2007 had to be contained
using all legal means available.
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When the Kisumu OCPD was asked whether he had issued warnings before
using live ammunition, he answered that the situation was so chaotic and the
circumstances could not allow such a procedure and further, the situation was
neither conducive to issuing any warnings neither would anybody in his view
have abided by such proclamations. In such circumstances, he considered that
the law allowed police to obviate the need for issuing a proclamation and proceed
to use lethal force without even attempting a baton charge which he deemed to
be impossible:
“People in thousands trooped in the town in the morning engaged in
looting, breaking people’s premises…we were trying to chase them
using tear gas until when they became chaotic and started burning
buildings, that is the time we decided that we should use any lethal
fire…”
Allegations were made before the Commission that the police had been
responsible for burning some of the buildings recorded to have been burnt
through the indiscriminate use of live ammunition and tear gas that could have
come into contact with inflammable material in some of these buildings. But this
was denied by the OCPD Kisumu who was categorical that neither the use of
tear gas nor live ammunition could have been a possible cause of a fire in the
event that they landed on inflammable matter. He did, however, concede that
there were inflammable substances in Ukwala Supermarket which were
exploding when the building was burning.
The Commission noted that most police officers had to work 10-12-hour shifts in
particularly very difficult circumstances which tested their quality, training,
discipline, experience and ability in what were clearly very difficult operations.
Though Mr Kiragu agreed that where there was no threat to life-either of citizens
or police officers by rioting mobs-or a threat to property, then there was no
justification for using firearms, it is difficult to explain why over half of the
gunshot casualties had wounds from the back which suggests to us that they
were in flight and could not in such circumstances be construed as presenting
any tangible threat.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Violence in Nairobi, Central and Coast Provinces
Nairobi
Introduction
The City of Nairobi has through the years provided the barometer for Kenya’s
volatile politics from colonial times to the present. It began as a temporary camp
at the turn of the twentieth century upon a chance decision by George
Whitehouse the engineer in charge of construction of the Uganda Railway who
chose this location as the springboard for embarking on the challenging phase of
laying the railway tracks across the Rift Valley. This temporary camp-the most
unlikely of locations- by default became Kenya’s capital city and a commercial
hub for the East and Horn of Africa region.

The city which currently covers 684 square kilometres is divided into four
districts- Nairobi North, Nairobi West, Nairobi South and Nairobi East with the
main administrative divisions being Central, Dagoretti, Embakasi, Kasarani,
Kibera, Makadara, Pumwani and Westlands. Nearly 2 million of Nairobi’s
residents (estimates put Nairobi’s population at somewhere between 4-6
million148)

live

in

low

income

residential

neighbourhoods

and

informal

settlements like Kibera, Mathare, Dandora, Huruma, Korogocho, Kariobangi,
Kangemi and Mukuru where crime and daily violence- including extortion,
murder, illegal taxation and rape- has become something that ordinary citizens
living here have had to live with.

148

The total number of registered voters in Nairobi’s 8 constituencies during the 2007 Elections was 1,275,021
(Source is Electoral Commission of Kenya voter registration figures)
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The above areas which feature extremely high population densities and yet
occupy less than one fifth of Nairobi’s geographic area are of great significance to
the city’s politics and as we shall see, the ethnic differentiation in various
quarters would become a defining feature of the character of violence in the post
election period. Due to the neglect of most of these areas by the Central
Government and the Nairobi City Council, organized criminal gangs have come
in to fill the void left by the absence of the State and attendant services. Election
contests are to a large extent influenced by these outfits whose members are
available for hire by powerful political actors as instruments of intimidation
against opponents. It is not surprising therefore that the NSIS in its security
briefing of 24th December 2007 noted that all of Nairobi’s 8 constituencies were
potential flashpoints due to the fact that the stakes in the 2007 General
Elections were extremely high and some politicians had consequently enlisted
the support of multiple gangs like Mungiki to intimidate opponents.149

Mungiki (a largely Kikuyu gang active in almost all of Nairobi’s informal
settlements), Siafu, Bukhungu and Jeshi la Darajani (active in various
neighbourhoods of Kibera) and the Taleban (a Luo gang based in Mathare) had
before the elections, gradually taken over and were administering parts of the
city’s informal settlements where they created extreme fear. They argue that they
maintain security where the State has failed and in this way levy fees thus
dominating the population through the intentional use of terror as a means and
strategy to instill fear in the society, control matatu (public transport) routes,
changa’a (an illicit alcoholic beverage) brewing, sanitation facilities, water and
electricity supply, extract protection money from businesses and other
extortionist activities.150
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For example, in a briefing dated 5th February 2008 NSIS had observed that some parliamentary losers in Nairobi
had allegedly funded Mungiki to eliminate parliamentarians.
150

“Who Are The Mungiki?”, presentation to the Commission, Exhibit 27A
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As noted in evidence produced by the KNCHR, the above dynamics, tribal
loyalties and the ethnic mix of politics in the city’s poor neighbourhoods strongly
contributed to the pattern of violence that Nairobi witnessed.
The rent disputes between mostly Kikuyu landlords and largely non-Kikuyu
tenants are among the most serious underlying causes of ethnic conflicts in the
poor neighbourhoods of Nairobi.

The Immediate Pre-Election Environment
The situation report dated 19th October 2007 showed that Kikuyu landlords in
Mathare and Kayole had issued eviction notices to Luo tenants under the pretext
of renovating their houses. According to NSIS, the landlords feared that the
tenants could become uncooperative if the ODM presidential aspirant Raila
Odinga won since he had reportedly promised that an ODM Government would
regulate house rents. NSIS correctly pointed out that this issue was likely to
foment ethnic tension in the area and undermine security in the post-election
period. This alone should have forewarned police to make arrangements to
prevent commission of crimes and maintain law and order in Mathare, which as
we shall see later was never done.
Similar suspicion and acrimony among Kikuyu landlords on the one hand and
Luo and Luhya tenants on the other was also reported in Kibera, Kawangware,
Dandora and Pipeline Estate in Embakasi where tenants were likewise issued
with quit notices out of fear from the landlords that the tenants would gang up
and refuse to pay rent151. Further, talks of possible plans to rig the outcome of
the election in Langata constituency against Raila Odinga, the area MP, had
created anxiety and NSIS advised that the slightest suspicion towards that end
would trigger unparalleled violence.
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NSIS security briefing for the week ending 3rd December 2007
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The Post Election Violence in Nairobi
Witnesses who spoke to Commission investigators narrated how the violence
started in Kibera, Mathare, Dandora, Kariobangi and Kawangware upon
announcement of the Presidential results and the subsequent swearing in of
President Kibaki on 30th December 2007. From information gathered, violence in
Nairobi

occurred

in

3

major

phases;

the

first

immediately

after

the

announcement of the Presidential election results on 30th December which
continued into the New Year as police prevented ODM supporters from holding a
“million people” march to Uhuru Park within Nairobi’s Central Business District
to protest what ODM and its supporters believed was a stolen election victory;
the second wave of violence followed the announcement of a partial cabinet by
President Kibaki and appointment of the ODM-Kenya presidential candidate
Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka as Vice President on

9 January 2008

and the third

phase occurred upon the killing of the late Embakasi MP-Hon Melitus Mugabe
Were on 29th January 2008 in Nairobi’s Woodley Estate.
The Commission received evidence from many witnesses who suffered terribly
during the violence both in terms of their own ordeals and in dealing with the
devastating consequences especially the deaths of family members, trauma, and
stress for families, displacement from their homes, the loss of income,
businesses and property as well as coming to terms with living within IDP
camps. Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (SGBV) encompassing a
wide range of human rights violations in the chaos of the post election period
reached epidemic proportions in Nairobi and this area proved the most
problematic in terms of determining the extent of violations. These issues are
discussed at length elsewhere in this report. It is enough for now to note here
that the sexual violence experienced demands immediate responses through the
provision of more effective physical protection especially in the poorer environs of
Nairobi where women and children were and continue to be most at risk.
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A common thread in many of the accounts of the post election violence that we
heard is the wanton destruction of property and the severe effect arson has had
on people’s lives. For instance, a witness narrated to the Commission
investigators how she was forced to move from her house in Mathare 4A by a
gang of Luo men who were evicting Kikuyu on the night of 30th December 2007
and she was forced to take refuge at the Mathare/Huruma’s Chief’s Camp. When
she went to check on her property the next day, she found that all her
belongings had been stolen and another person had already occupied her house
which she had obtained through the Amani Housing Trust Mathare 4A
Development Program. Another witness informed the Commission investigators
that on 29th December 2007, gangs of Luo youth went around the Mathare 4A
area yelling that Kikuyu must leave and fearing for her own and her family’s
safety they fled the next morning leaving all possessions behind during which
many houses were set ablaze. She sought refuge at the Eastleigh Air Force Base
and when she went back to her house on 3rd January 2008, she found that it
had been razed to the ground.
A yong man from Mathare 4A told our investigators how two of his relatives were
killed on 30th December 2007 in Dandora by gangs of Kikuyu (Mungiki) youth
who were moving from door to door flushing out and killing non-Kikuyu. He
stated that in Huruma where he moved to, rival zones were created where one
zone dubbed Othaya had pro-PNU Kikuyus while two other zones housed pro
ODM Luo and Luhyas with each area being a no go zone for the opposing tribes.
Information made available to the Commission indicates that initial violence in
Nairobi appeared to target the Kikuyu in areas where they were a minority and
they in turn organized attacks in areas where they were a majority. We noted
one insidious form of violence that was visited on members of the Luo
community, the forced circumcision reportedly attributed to members of the
Mungiki Sect. Dr Jotham Micheni confirmed that Kenyatta National Hospital
attended to 2 such cases of forced or traumatic circumcision. Evidence was
received from a Luo lady who was raped in Huruma by a gang of 10 men on 29
December 2007 who told her they were looking for ODM people who were giving
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the Government trouble and that they wanted to circumcise them. After being
violated she was forced to watch as the hooded men cut off her husband’s penis
with a panga (see chapter 6 on gender and sexual violence). According to
evidence from KNCHR, on 1 January 2008 a 15 year old Luo boy was forcibly
circumcised during fighting at Kiamaiko. On 21 January 2008, eight Luo men
had their genitals chopped off and even young boys, some as young as 11 and 5
years, had their genitalia cut with blunt objects such as broken glass.152
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, Nairobi’s informal settlement
areas are balkanized largely along tribal lines and specific ethnic groups are
dominant in specific areas within the slums. We received information from
KNCHR that in Kibera for instance, the Luo are the majority in Kianda, Raila
village, Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo areas; Makina is mainly populated by
Nubians while Laini Saba and Soweto are dominated by Kikuyus. Luhyas
dominate in Mashimoni and Lindi areas. We were able to establish some of these
facts during our site visit to Kibera on 11th July 2008.
Once the violence broke out, looting, destruction of property and arson became
rampant forcing people to move to the “ethnic enclaves” they perceived as safe as
tribally aligned gangs took over and exercised total control. Toi Market in Makina
area which prior to elections had housed over 3,000 traders was burnt down.
During our site visit to Kibera we were informed by local residents and
community organizers that this market provided employment to perhaps a
similar number of people while thousands of suppliers depended on it for
livelihood not to mention the tens of thousand of customers it served.
The violence was also characterized by forceful displacement and evictions while
areas such as Dandora and Mathare North saw deep seated rent disputes
escalating to violence. As earlier explained, there was a perception that landlords
(mainly Kikuyu) over-charged in rent and discriminated tenancy on ethnic lines
which brought an expectation among ODM supporters of rent reduction if ODM
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Exhibit 125, paragraph 128
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won. Some tenants therefore took the opportunity provided by the catechism of
post election chaos to evict landlords and started charging reduced rents while a
new round of violence ensued when the owners hired gangs to reclaim their
property153.
Information was provided by the NSIS security briefing dated 21st February 2008
that tension was high between the Kikuyu and the Luo residing in Mathare
following a police operation to evict people who had illegally occupied other
peoples’ houses. The briefing went on to state that Luo youth were preparing to
resist future attempts to evict them and threatened to blow up such buildings. In
this state of affairs, the NSIS noted that the Mungiki had “taken advantage to
settle their differences with the Taliban largely composed of Luo and thus violent
confrontations were predicted to continue with devastating effects”. NSIS further
noted that Mungiki adherents were assembling at Lucky Summer Quarry,
Gituamba, Gitare Marigo and Dandora Dumpsite in preparation to attack
residents of Babadogo, Glue Collar, Kariadudu, Mugure and Kasabuni areas.154
Other areas that NSIS received intelligence as being targets for Mungiki attacks
were Mathare North, Kariadudu and Ngomongo where the objective was to evict
those who had forcefully occupied houses and refused to pay rent. Incidentally,
an NSIS briefing after the violence broke out points out that jailed Mungiki sect
leader Maina Njenga warned Mungiki members against being misused by
politicians in response to their being hired in Mathare, Kariobangi, Kibera and
Huruma to cause terror155
Noting that NSIS had forewarned on the potential conflict that was set to be
sparked by the rent disputes prior to elections, we fail to see why the police did
not take measures to prevent this from happening. The chaos in these informal
settlements could have been avoided if the police had taken contingency
measures as advised by NSIS and this attitude of indifference to the plight of
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NSIS Security briefing for 22 February 2008
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NSIS security briefing dated 25th January 2008
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those the police were meant to protect depicts a force that was perhaps
incognisant that their motto is “utumishi kwa wote” (service to all). Instead, the
police chose to deploy massively, not where they were most needed, but
concentrated at Uhuru Park to prevent the ODM rallies. In this respect, we agree
with the conclusion by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) Executive
Director Ms. Muthoni Wanyeki who told us that “It’s our summation that
prioritization should have been more in line to the responsibility to protect”.
Issues related to policing priorities and strategy during the post election violence
are discussed in more details elsewhere in this Report. It will be enough to
observe here that it would appear that, based on available intelligence which was
already in possession of the Commissioner of Police, the obvious choice ought to
have been quick containment of the violence in the slums for protection of life
and limb and freeing more police officers for deployment to the Rift Valley where
carnage of extreme cruelty was unfolding with the police numbers unable to
contain the situation.
In mid January 2008, NSIS reported that non-Kikuyu residents of Mathare
slums were alarmed by the migration of the Kikuyu community from the area
which made them apprehensive that this movement out of Mathare could be a
precursor of attack by Mungiki members156. In the meantime, as the Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process went on, tension remained high
and NSIS noted that ODM councillors were mobilizing for mass action in case
the Kofi Annan led talks collapsed157
Dr Jotham Micheni the Director of Kenyatta National Hospital told the
Commission that they had not anticipated the kind of violence that gripped
Nairobi and the country. Though they were prepared for some element of
violence, the scale and form it took was unexpected which was compounded by
the fact that a good number of staff had travelled upcountry to vote and those
who had travelled to the western part of the country were unable to come back
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NSIS briefing dated 15 January 2008
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NSIS Security Briefing for 26th February 2008
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for a whole month due to blockage of roads. Moreover, some staff members
became IDPs and in general the hospital staff was not immune from what was
happening to other members of public.
While it was the Police Commissioner’s testimony that 28 people died in Nairobi
from election related violence, the statistics the Commission was able to compile
tell a different story. It is incomprehensible that the Commissioner of Police
should state with finality that the police were the only source of facts in terms of
accurate figures when he produced statistics that purported to be the definitive
figures of deaths. The figures were contradicted by other figures obtained from
Government sources. For example, Dr. Daniel Mulwa Nguku head of the Nairobi
City Mortuary158 provided information showing that between 30 December 2007
and 30 January 2008 a total of 111 bodies were booked in by police who
categorised them as “Post Election Violence Bodies.” As we discuss elsewhere in
this report, we find it problematic that it is the police themselves who
determined that some deaths were due to the election violence without a formal
announcement to this effect other than the advice from the officer who booked in
a body. Incidentally, no body brought in by the police after 30th January was
designated as having died from post election violence and no reason was given

Response by Police
With ODM calling for countrywide mass action to protest what they deemed as
theft of their election victory, police were deployed to cordon off Uhuru Park to
prevent the ODM and its leader Raila Odinga from holding its meeting there.
This effort to prevent ODM’s meeting took a severe toll on the police and had
devastating consequences on law enforcement and maintenance of law and order
elsewhere in the city. The NSIS reported that police officers deployed on security

158

The facility has a capacity to store 250 bodies though most time it holds more than three times this number, in
the words of Dr Nguku, “Ours is a facility which…cannot afford to say it is full”
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duties at Uhuru Park complained of being overworked, delay in payment of
allowances and being unable to bathe or change uniforms and thus NSIS
recommended that police welfare be addressed in appreciation of their role in
maintaining law and order.
We received evidence that police action in various locales appeared uneven and
disjointed. As early as 13th December 2007, NSIS had warned that police officers
planned a go slow on voting day to protest the Government’s failure to award
them salary and allowances increments. This security briefing further noted that
police planned to report to assigned polling stations and do nothing more and
thus the NSIS warned that such action was likely to compromise security during
the election period. It is not understandable why this information was not acted
upon and it is not surprising therefore that a number of victims perceived the
police as either indifferent or missing in action when they were most needed. For
instance, a businessman in Huruma told our investigators that
“There was no police presence in the estates…The Kikuyu tribe most
of whom owned businesses started organizing themselves to defend
their businesses. There were Kikuyu zones and Luo zones and no one
was allowed to venture into others “territory”…The Kikuyu eventually
vacated their premises and left the houses to the Luo who started
renting out the houses for as little as Kshs 500/-. Some of them are
still occupying the houses to date. Most of those who perpetrated the
violence were gangs who took advantage of the situation”
On the other hand where the police were present, we received evidence that
citizens going about their business suffered just as much at the hands of police.
A pastor in Kibera (Darajani/Makina) stated how on 17th January 2007 within
Kibera, he had witnessed a police officer kicking some goods left behind by some
women one of whom was arguing with the officer asking him to stop destroying
her wares. He explained:
“As the argument ensued, I saw the policeman beating the woman
with the butt of his gun. The woman fell down and the policeman
stepped on her neck and started firing his gun upwards…since I
knew her I rushed out towards them”
When he tried to intervene, the police officer “asked whether I was the messiah
who came to save” and the pastor was warned that he would be shot. The pastor
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tried to help the fallen woman but all of a sudden fell down and woke up to find
himself in hospital where he was told he has been shot and had been in a coma
for 2 days. This story was corroborated by the victim who narrated how this
particular police officer hit her with the butt of his gun when she went to ask
him not to destroy her goods,
“It was a very hard blow. It made me fall down…I was very
frightened and shocked. When I was on the ground, this policeman
stepped on my neck. He was wearing boots. He had his weight down
on me…I saw the pastor coming towards me. I know this man…Even
though I was yelling and begging the policeman not to kill me, he
didn’t stop with the boot hard on my neck…I could hear him [pastor]
calling out as he came-asking the policeman why he was destroying
[my] things… I lost consciousness then… Next I remember a [woman]
was trying to pick me off the ground…I looked and saw the pastor
lying on the ground…The [woman] told me the pastor had been shot”
Likewise, a resident of Kibera stated that she was in her house in Kibera Laini
Saba on Monday 31st of December 2007 when she felt something hit her on the
left breast and she fell down bleeding. It was only then that she realized she had
been shot. She stated that good Samaritans were unable to take her to hospital
immediately since there were gunshots everywhere but she was eventually taken
to Mbagathi Hospital and referred to Kenyatta National Hospital where she
remained for a week after having been operated on to remove the bullet lodged in
her breast. Upon discharge from hospital, she found her house had been looted.

The Director of Kenyatta National Hospital told the Commission that 61 people
were treated for gun shot wounds at the facility, adding:
“what I can say is that a lot of gunshot wounds came from Kibera…
Mathare, Kariobangi and Dandora. Those are the areas that had a
great number of patients. But as I said, 61 patients out of 462
contributed to a percentage that was 13%.”
We therefore find that during the post election violence, the brunt of the
suffering

in

Nairobi

was

borne

by

poor

people

living

in

low

income

neighbourhoods. It is the obligation of the State to ensure that all its citizens,
irrespective of social status, have a right to live in a wholesome environment free
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from the fear of crime and it is the duty of the Government to ensure that this
right is not infringed by State neglect or acts of extreme cruelty perpetrated by
its agents on a segment of society. The citizens of some of Nairobi’s poorest
neighbourhoods found themselves in a quandary since those who were entrusted
to protect them were either not present, did not seem to care and in the cases
where they were present, they were just as brutal as the marauding gangs
causing the violence. This is particularly worrying since the Police Commissioner
when asked if, with wisdom of hindsight, there was anything he would have
handled differently, he retorted without hesitation or any iota of embarrassment
or regret that,
“If similar situations occurred today, I would do exactly what I did.
I would not change a thing my Lords that is the honest truth
because in the enforcement of law and ensuring that law and
order is brought about in the protection of lives and properties,
there is nothing that we shouldn’t do to ensure that our people are
safe. That is the incidences as to why there is police in the first
place. And in doing so my Lord we take pride in ensuring that we
have protected lives and taken all measures necessary to ensure
that people are safe. If anything was to happen like it did last
time, we would do it exactly the same way”.
A Luo man who ran an electronic business in Kijiji cha Chewa (a predominantly
Kikuyu settlement), told us that on 29th December 2007, the OCS Muthaiga had
posted 2 lorry loads of police to guard the area:
“but the youth were so many they overpowered the police who ran
away from the scene. After the election was announced ODM youth
overpowered PNU youth and the police…They came with paraffin and
[set fire to] the whole estate...The estate was burnt by idle youth in
the estate…I was targeted by the Youth because I was trying to
restrain them from doing bad things like looting and stripping women
naked…I lost business worth Ksh 70,000/-…I reported everything to
the police at Muthaiga Police Station, after recognizing the Youth [but]
nothing was done. The police said they were busy with post election
work and to date nothing has been done”
Not only did the police appear overwhelmed, but we were given evidence that
police were divided along ethnic lines and victims confessed to having received
assistance from police officers from their ethnic groups while facing hostility
from officers who were not from their tribe. According to the KNCHR:
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“Some officers from the Kalenjin and Luo communities when asked to
stop the looting are reported to have told the victims ‘wacha kazi
iendelee’ (let work go on, drawing from the PNU slogan). Some police
officers also took advantage of the situation to charge victims for safe
passage. This was fairly widespread in Dandora Phase 4, Mathare
and Ghetto. Police officers demanded money from people who wanted
to escape hostile environments or who had fled and were returning to
retrieve property…”
In hearings before the Commission, the police adopted an unduly defensive
attitude which in our view clouded any objectivity expected of them in assisting
the Commission in its investigating public inquiry. From the totality of the
evidence tendered before us, we find on a balance of probability that the
institution of the police failed the citizens of Nairobi at large and the residents of
the less privileged neighbourhoods in particular.
While there will be no doubt protests that we had no right to condemn the police
without conducting trials during which the police could defend themselves in
detail against all charges made, it is our considered view that full due process
protections of the type that are required in criminal trials were not necessary for
the purpose of stating whether or not the police as a public institution performed
to the expectation of Kenyans in their hour of need. In Nairobi, it is our view that
they did not.

Central Province
Introduction
Central Province is located in Central Kenya, bordering Rift Valley Province to
the North West, Nairobi province to the South and Eastern Province to the West.
It covers an area of about 13,220 sq. kms. and has a population of
approximately 4,226,515 persons and a population density of 320 persons/sq.
km.
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The province comprises 11 districts: Nyeri South, Nyeri North, Nyandarua North,
Kirinyaga, Thika, Muranga North, Muranga South, Kiambu West, Kiambu East,
Nyandarua South and Gatundu.
Central Province is the ancestral home to the Kikuyu community and has in the
past not experienced the ravages of election-related violence owing to its
ethnically homogeneous composition. The urban areas, particularly those close
to Nairobi, tea, coffee and sisal estates in the larger Kiambu and Thika Districts
have a large number of non-Kikuyu. The province voted overwhelmingly for the
PNU candidate and incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, during the 2007 General
elections.159

Build up to the Violence
Information submitted by the Provincial Commissioner, Japheth Rugut,160
reveals that the period leading to the elections was peaceful but highly charged
both at parliamentary and civic levels, with the majority overtly in support of the
PNU and its affiliate parties. Candidates from the other parties conducted their
campaigns in a non-confrontational and peaceful environment.
There were incidents of violence reported to have taken place in period leading
to the elections.

One such case is an incident took place on 24th November,

2007 at around 6.00p.m when supporters of Ephraim Maina Mwangi and those
of James Nderitu Gachagua, both of whom were contesting the Mathira
Constituency seat, clashed at Muberethi area. Many people were injured and one
person died as a result.161

In yet another incident which occurred on 10th

December 2007, supporters of James Nderitu Gachagua allegedly attacked and
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Exhibit No. 125, para 488.

160

See also presentation by Mr. L.N. Lenayapa, District Commissioner, Kiambu East to the Commission of Inquiry into
Post Election Violence.
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ECK Submissions to the Commission of Inquiry into Post‐election Violence, ECK Preparedness and the Security
Arrangements during the 2007 General Elections. This was the subject of proceedings before the ECK.

206

injured one of the supporters of Peter Ngibuini Kuguru, an aspirant for the
Mathira parliamentary seat.162 Other reports reveal incidences of harassment of
persons sympathetic to Raila Odinga and the ODM party.163

Patterns of Post Election Violence in Central Province
The Provincial Commissioner gave evidence to the effect that the news of the
final tally of the presidential results, which declared PNU candidate Mwai Kibaki
the winner, was received with jubilation and fanfare. However, soon thereafter,
this was replaced with gloom as information started trickling in to the effect that
violence had erupted in other parts of the country and members of the Kikuyu
community had been targeted. This news was given a human face when the
province started receiving IDPs from other parts of the country and from within.
Thirty people, majority of whom were of Luhya and Luo descent had pitched
camp at Karuri Police Station in Kiambaa Division. As the wave of violence in
other parts of the country billowed, Kiambaa division hosted a total of 8000
IDPs. Kiambu Municipality Division received a total of 1435 IDPs while
Githunguri Division hosted 2100 IDPs.
The Provincial Commissioner informed us that during the first three weeks of
January 2008, there was a state of anxiety, uncertainty and worry in the entire
province. This state of affairs had been caused by, “reports that things were
moving from bad to worse.”164

The PC recounted how around 18th January

2008, rumours started circulating that by Monday, 21st January 2008,
“members of other communities resident in Central Province would be attacked
to avenge the atrocities meted out on Kikuyus in Nyanza, Rift Valley and
Western Provinces.”165 These rumours were exacerbated by the harrowing tales
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narrated by the IDPs, who had fled from those regions and had arrived in the
Province.166
It is in these circumstances, the Commission was told, that the local Kikuyu
community started threatening people from other communities. These prompted
members of those communities, mainly Luos, Luhyas, Kalenjins and Kisiis to
vacate their houses and camp in the various police stations.
On 3rd January 2008, rioting mobs blockaded the Nairobi-Nakuru Highway, but
the barricades were removed after the intervention by the Limuru DO, who
convened and addressed a public meeting at Ngarariga.167
On 4thJanuary, 2008 at Gakeu Village, Kirima sub-location, Nyandarua North
District, 12 houses belonging to persons from the Kalenjin community were
torched. The police arrested seven suspects and charged them with the offence of
arson.168 On the same night, persons of Kikuyu descent displaced from the Rift
Valley, notably Molo and Nakuru, started arriving in Limuru Town and the D.O.
earmarked Kirathimo Red Cross Centre as a camp where they would be
accommodated.
In some cases, the centres holding IDPs from other communities were
threatened with burning by members of the Kikuyu community who demanded
that the camps should be broken up and those in the camps should leave and go
to their homeland. On 5th January 2008, fracas started in Limuru town outside
Bata Shoe Company gate and outside Kirathimo Red Cross Centre which was
accommodating the IDPs. Security personnel dispersed the riotous mobs who
were angered by the presence of the IDPs. It was the intention of the mob to
attack the Bata workers, majority of who were persons of non-Kikuyu origin.169
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first group of 14 IDPs of Kikuyu origin and their families arrived in Limuru Town on 4 January, having traveled from
different parts of the Rift Valley province like Nakuru and Molo where post election violence had started.
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The attack on 5th January 2008 instilled fear on people of non-Kikuyu descent,
prompting them to camp at the Railways Go-Down, opposite the Bata Shoe
Company. The next day, fracas erupted after youths clashed with the persons
taking refuge at the Railway Station. Once again it took the intervention of the
DO and the OCS Tigoni Police Station to quell the violence. However, the DC
assessed the gravity of the situation and directed them to evacuate all nonKikuyus to Tigoni Police Station.
Information from the DSIC reports indicates that in Limuru Town, about fifty
rowdy youths armed with crude weapons set ablaze business premises owned by
Nelson Oluoch Owegi, the Limuru ODM coordinator. Later the youths attempted
to attack members of the Luo community who had fled their homes and were
camping at the Tigoni Police Station, but were repulsed by police.
There were cases where business enterprises belonging to non-Kikuyus were
targeted for looting and destruction. In Kiambu West District, a commercial
building estimated to be worth Kshs. 800,000 and whose tenant was Odhiambo
Oluoch, the ODM Chair, Limuru, was gutted on 16th of January 2008.
On 22nd January, 2008 in the same district,170 a group of unknown arsonists
razed down 3 houses belonging to members of the Kalenjin community and one
belonging to a Turkana. The case, we were informed, was still pending under
investigations at Ol Kalou Police Station by the time of the testimony.
On 23rd January, 2008, PC Joseph Kiplangat of Tigoni Police Station was shot by
an unknown gunman from a roof top. He broke his leg and was taken to Kiambu
District Hospital. At around 7 p.m. on the same day, three men were shot by
police while in the act of looting the Limuru Bata Shoe Company display shop.171
On 23rd January, 2008 youths assembled outside Bata Shoe Company
demanding that the non-Kikuyus being accommodated by the Company be
asked to leave. They were addressed by the security personnel but they refused
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to budge. The intervention of the MP-elect did not bear fruits as the youths,
armed with crude weapons and numbering about 2,000 positioned themselves
on a fly-over , on top of buildings and in the area outside the factory. About 60
security officers established a buffer zone between the Company’s premises and
the youths.
At some point, the surging youths set ablaze the security guards’ office and
broke into the Bata Shoe Factory shop, looting the shoes inside. A scuffle ensued
and seven police officers sustained minor injuries and were treated at Tigoni
sub-district hospital and discharged. In the process of trying to control the
crowd, three people died.
On 24thJanuary, 2008, one Peter Odhiambo, a member of the Luo community
from Bondo was found slashed to death along a foot path within Karanjili area,
Limuru.172 On the same day, 2 people were forcefully circumcised using a blunt
tool, and were taken to Tigoni Sub-District Hospital where they were treated and
discharged.
On 30th January, 2008, a group of youths numbering about 100 from the
Holding Estate, Kiambu East, armed with crude weapons barricaded the roads
to the Estate intending to attack persons belonging to other communities. They
were however dispersed by Administration Police personnel.173
Previously on 28thJanuary 2008, within Nyandarua South District, a group of
persons set on fire 104 houses, 1 tractor, 1 harrow, 10 sheep and 6 cows
belonging to persons from the Kalenjin community. On the same day, a mob
lynched Lukas Matete, a Luhya casual labourer to death. Information from the
DSIC reports indicates that in Kiambaa and Nderi areas a group, mostly of youth
staged a demonstration to the DO’s office in Kikuyu town, demanding among
other things, the immediate stoppage of the Rift Valley killings and evictions and
destructions targeting their people; the immediate evacuation of the Kikuyu
people to safe places by the government and guarantee of their security wherever
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they were. The demonstrators also demanded that the Government issues them
with vehicles to transport their kin back to the Central Province away from the
conflict areas.
On 7th February, 2008, youths barricaded the Nairobi-Nakuru highway, but it
was opened by a joint operation by the regular police and Administration Police.
Three people were injured by the mob but were rushed by good Samaritans to
Thogoto Hospital where they were treated and discharged.

On 8th February

2008, two semi-permanent houses were burnt in Nderi, Kiambu West and the
fence surrounding the compound of Steel Rolling Mills partially destroyed.
According to the KNCHR report produced to the Commission as evidence, there
were threats and actual evictions of non-Kikuyu people in Nyeri in early
February. The report states that unsigned notices were circulated in Nyeri town
in estates occupied by non-Kikuyu such as Majengo, ordering non-Kikuyu
people to leave. This led to the exodus of non-Kikuyu people out of Nyeri,
especially when more leaflets started circulating. One of the leaflets read: “No
more clashes but war. Luo, Luhya, Nandi, we give you 24 hrs you pack and go,
failure to that we need 200 heads before peace holds once more.”

Internally Displaced Persons
The Commission was informed that the inflow of the IDPs was received with
mixed reactions, with some residents empathising with the incomers and
providing food and shelter. In areas such as Kikuyu township, the incoming
persons would be absorbed into the society by the local residents. This explains
the absence of major camps in the Kikuyu township area and other areas of the
province such as Muranga North. In other places, they would be left to fend for
themselves or settle in the camps, for example, in Ruringu, Nyeri. Yet still, there
were individuals who hosted them. In one such case widely reported in the
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media a woman hosted around 90 IDPs in her two-bedroomed house in
Othaya.174
Further, there were instances when youths within Central Province took
advantage of the unrest to engage in unlawful activities. There were instances
when non-Kikuyu employees working in various companies were targeted for
attacks and eviction so as to create employment opportunities for themselves in
those companies. Such companies included Universal Corporation Limited (UCL)
and Steel Rolling Mills, both in Kikuyu; KARI and KEFRI and other research
institutions also situate in Kikuyu; Tea Estates and Bata Shoe Company in
Limuru; BIDCO and other industries in Thika; flower farms in Ol Kalou.175
Nyeri Police station hosted 900 IDPs; Tigoni Police Station, 5,390; Ruiru Police
Station, 620; Juja Police Station, 600; Thika Police Station 552; Maragua Police
Station 68; Kinangop Police Station, 66; Karatina Police Station, 193; and,
Kikuyu Police Station, 500. The cumulative total was 8,889.

Those persons

willing to leave were facilitated by the Kenya Red Cross to their ancestral homes
which they considered safer, although many others were left to fend for
themselves and received no assistance or other support.
Meanwhile the number of IDPs ejected from Rift Valley, Nyanza Provinces
increased, with the figure of 18,406 recorded on January 31st, 2008 rising to
86,314 by the 5th day of March, 2998. The PC also tendered figures indicating
the number of IDPs hosted by each of the districts in the Province, Kiambu West
hosted 19,096 IDPs; Thika 5,437;Kiambu East,8,164; Nyeri South, 2,236; Nyeri
North, 3,872; Murang’a South, 2,503; Murang’a North, 2,910; Gatundu, 3,452;
Nyandarua South, 16,800; Nyandarua North, 19,605; and Kirinyaga, 149.
It was the PC’s evidence that the majority of the IDPs remained within the
Province until the tension subsided on around February 29, 2008.

174

Exhibit 125, paras 492 and 501.

175

Above.

212

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The heightened tensions at the time and episodic violence before the elections
reported pointed to the potential eruption of violence in isolated parts of the
Province. The expectation therefore was that the police and provincial authorities
would put in place adequate security measures to pre-empt any breach of peace
and order. However, it is our assessment that they were ill prepared to
satisfactorily

handle

the

overwhelming

influx

of

IDPs.

The

security

arrangements seemed to be trained on elections and more. The PC told the
Commission that in the light of the rising tensions in the Province, and in view of
the need to prevent the eruption of violence, he mobilised all security agencies
and local leaders in the district to be on high alert. From the security intelligence
reports, the DSIC had planned coverage of election campaigns as early as
September and attended each and every political rally within the district.
The PC testified that he also convened several meetings in the districts with the
members of the public with a view to promoting peaceful coexistence and
appealing against retaliation. He held meetings on 25th January 2008 in
Nyandarua North, Ol Kalou, Ngorika and Limuru. On 1st February, 2008 he
attended a peace meeting in Nyeri South and on 5th February, he convened a
similar meeting in Kiambu West.
There were peace meetings convened by the DSIC on 1st February 2008 in
Limuru town and Wangige town of Kikuyu division, and

attended by several

MPs including Fred Gumo (Westlands), Uhuru Kenyatta (Gatundu South), Lewis
Nguyai (Kikuyu), Peter Mwathi (Limuru), Elias Mbau (Maragwa), Johnstone
Muthama (Kangundo), Eugene Wamalwa (Saboti), and Momoima Onyonka
(Kitutu Chache). This may have pacified the situation. In total, the PC said 37
peace and reconciliation meetings were held across the Province.
According to him, these meetings down-scaled the hostilities towards other
communities. As a result, a significant number of them were able to report to
their places of work in the day and get back to the camps in the evening.
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Incitement
Witnesses informed the Commission that there had been several planning
meetings that had been convened in the Kikuyu-dominated parts of the Central
Province/Rift Valley Province border. These meetings had been used to recruit
fighters, to coordinate communal violence and to organize funding. There have
been reports that a pastor, a former MP and sitting one urged people to take up
arms in self-defense in the Limuru area.176The allegation is corroborated by the
intelligence reports covering the period between 15th January to 15th February,
2008, in a mammoth rally attended by some Kikuyu MPs and politicians. They
blamed the killing of youths on police officers hailing from Rift Valley and
Nyanza and called for their transfer from the area. The report states thus: “One
politician called on the Kikuyu community to be ready to defend themselves and
urged the rich to contribute money towards the cause. Another politician alleged
that ODM was being backed by Western countries to destabilize the
Government.”177
There were claims of prior planning of the violence in some parts of Central
Province. The Commission received reports alleging that a group of business
persons met on 26th January 2008 at Kikuyu Country Club to fundraise for the
eviction of non-Kikuyu residents. Weapons to be used in raids were supplied by
persons whose names were made available to the Commission. Small businesses
all in Kikuyu, supplied weapons such as machetes.178
The reaction from the security agencies to the crisis had been ad hoc and lacking
in direction. From the reports, it could be discerned that the DSIC did not see
any need to follow up on what appeared to be an overt call to arms, and instead
subjectively dismissed them as outbursts of anger. The report says thus: “The
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leaders were reacting out of anger following the killing of three youths who were
protesting the displacement of their kinsmen from Rift Valley”.179
The Central Province Security and Intelligence Committee Appreciation for the
period between 15th January to 14th February, 2008, reports that there was hate
mail circulated by unknown persons on the Kenya Power and Lighting Company
Limited web mail in Nyeri, calling upon the Kalenjins to rise and defend their
ancestral land, and to deliver them from the Kikuyu dominance.

The Resurgence of Mungiki
The resurgence of the Mungiki could be seen as a form of encouragement to
retaliatory attacks or, in the alternative, a response to the call to arms by the
politicians to defend the Kikuyu community against aggression by non-Kikuyus.
Further, despite noting the resurgence of the outlawed militia grouping, Mungiki,
there is little else in the appreciation by the Central Province Security and
Intelligence Committee indicating a decisive response to the threat to security
posed by the proscribed sect.180
The Kikuyu community seems to be slowly accepting the Mungiki sect
following aspersions that the government was unable to protect them
against hostile communities during the post election violence. This
could pose a challenge to security agencies, hence calls for concerted
efforts to stem the same.181
The resurgence is consistent with the claim as to the politicization of militia as a
vehicle through which ethnic hatred and animosity could be driven. Many of the
acts of violence perpetrated by this militia outfit at the time may be explained as
retributive violence that was specifically targeted at members of ethnic
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communities perceived to be supportive of the ODM Party, and against whom
accusations had been made for targeting members of the Kikuyu community in
other parts of the country.
Some of the encouragement to attacks also had a coercive aspect to them. A
report titled Special Brief on Civil Society Response and submitted to the
Commission as Exhibit 21J cites a witness as saying that,
there [sic] have also been reports of intra-ethnic violence in the
Wangige area of Kiambu District where Kikuyu men have been
attacked by gangs for “failing” to “defend” their own community from
“aggressors”. Local human rights defenders are being “screened” and
the security and safety of those of Kikuyu origin are at risk.”182
There were reports that landlords also became targets of the attackers. They
were forced to give notices to their non-Kikuyu tenants to vacate.183

Hate Speech
There were reports of the circulation of malicious cell-phone text messages that
propagated hate speech and alarming rumours. This had the effect of poisoning
an already tense political environment. The statements revolved around the
denigration of individual political actors and their affiliate political parties.
Examples are the hate leaflets on Raila Odinga found at Ndaragua, Nyandarua
North District. The leaflets read: “Raila is planning a revolution christened
December 28 Orange Revolution” with the assistance of Dick Morris and Prof.
George Ayittey of Ghana.” Similar leaflets found at Kahuro in Muranga, accused
Raila of being a terrorist, devil worshipper, communist, expert in overthrowing
governments, tribalist, and deceptive, dishonest, practising witchcraft to win
presidency.184
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Additionally, there were also reports of demeaning references by the Kikuyus to
persons of other tribes as nduriri (an imperious reference within the context of
the speech to people of non-Kikuyu descent) and specific references to the ODM
presidential candidate and the Luos as kihii (loosely translated as an
uncircumcised man in the Kikuyu language). The KNCHR reports one prominent
Kikuyu politician and former MP as having said that the Kikuyus cannot be led
by a kihii.185
The Commission also received information to the effect that religious leaders in
areas such as Limuru and Nyeri used the pulpit to convey messages amounting
to hate speech against non-Kikuyu communities, ODM and generally whipping
up Kikuyu ethno-nationalist passion. The leaders uttered phrases such as
“ciaigana ni ciaigana” (enough is enough), suggesting that the Kikuyu
community should no longer simply stand by while attacks against them
continued. The report continues, “In Kirathimo IDP Camp in Limuru, which
hosted returnees from other provinces, one religious leader urged the people
that, “The Kikuyu should be armed the way I am armed with the Bible.” Gospel
artistes performed in Limuru at rallies attended by the local community where
hate messages were disseminated.”186
KNHCR reported as follows on hate speech:
Local language media also disseminated hate speech to Kikuyu
audiences in Central Province and in the diaspora. Call-in shows on
radio stations enabled individuals to make unregulated hateful
statements. Inooro FM put on air highly emotional and distraught
victims of violence, a factor that tended to whip up the emotions of its
audience. Music in the Kikuyu language played on Kameme and
Inooro radio stations also engendered or raised ethnic tensions. One
such song variously played by Inooro FM, lyricised about Raila
Odinga and the Luo community in very negative terms.187
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Findings
The totality of evidence received by the Commission suggests that the violence in
Central Province was mainly targeted against persons perceived to be
unsympathetic to the PNU presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, and therefore
responsible for the evictions of non-Kikuyu from conflict-stricken areas across
the country.
The re-emergence of Mungiki and associated criminal gangs followed the killings
and evictions Kikuyus in ODM party strongholds in western Kenya.

The

turbulence, in our view, provided a perfect opportunity for these proscribed
militia to reinvent and package themselves as instruments for the advancement
of political and ethnically motivated violence.
The Commission also notes the distinct nature of the post-election violence with
respect to Central Province. In the past ethnic clashes, the major protagonists
were the Kikuyus and other the other tribes on the one side and the Kalenjin on
the other. This was a reflection of the political alignments of the day when the
Kalenjin who enjoyed the patronage of the regime of the time. Subsequent
political events saw the Kikuyu community isolated by the other ethnic groups
hence when post 2007 elections violence erupted in Central Province, the
communities from other parts of the country bore the brunt of violence in the
Province.

Coast Province
Introduction
Coast Province consists of 13 Districts and 21 Constituencies with a population
of slightly over 3 million people according to the Kenya Bureau of Statistics
projections of 2007. The main ethnic groups are the Mijikenda comprised of nine
culturally and linguistically inter related sub groups among them the Rabai,
Chonyi, Giriama, Mjibana, Kauma, Kambe, Digo and Duruma. Most of them
profess the Christian faith save for the Digo who are mainly Muslims. The non
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Mijikenda in the province are the Taita – Taveta, Orma, Pokomo, Munyoyaya,
Malokote, Bajuni, Swahili and people of Arab descent; the last 3 of whom mainly
inhabit the Coastal towns. In total there are 15 Coastal ethnic groups and
members of Caucasian communities living in the Province.
However, over the years there has been a significant migration of Kenyan citizens
from upcountry regions drawn to the Coast in search of better economic
prospects. The region has therefore become a mosaic of various identities. This
has had a profound bearing on the socio-economic and political relations within
the Province. Some ethnic groups have been classified as ‘insiders’ or indigenous
communities, while other communities are routinely referred to as ‘outsiders’.
These are the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and other upcountry people resident at the
Coast.
Mombasa town is the capital of the province whose mainstay is tourism and
related activities. Fishing and agriculture also offer livelihoods to a substantial
part of the residents. Over the years the indigenous communities residing in the
Coast have consistently complained of exclusion from the hinterland and
exploitation of their resources without reward which issues explain some of the
political dynamics. The persistent claims and allegations of exploitation and
exclusion are blamed on the so called non indigenous communities commonly
referred to in the Province as ‘watoka bara’ or wabara. Since the re-introduction
of multi – party politics in 1991, the politics in the region has become polarized
along tribal lines and politicians have exploited the existing latent tribal
animosity to intimidate certain communities giving rise to violence against other
communities depending on the prevailing political climate.

For example, the

Likoni and Kwale violence of 1997 was premised on the stereotyping of
upcountry people as having appropriated to themselves local resources and
having benefited unfairly at the expense of the indigenous residents and they
were thus targeted in the violence whose sole aim was to drive them from the
region and achieve an intended poll result188. The polarities and tensions created
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by this episode remain evident between the so called local ‘insiders’ and
upcountry ‘outsiders’.
As we shall see, these parameters surfaced in 2007 only that this time round,
the indigenous communities joined hands with some upcountry communities
like the Luo (themselves targets of the 1997 violence) to target the so-called
GEMA communities – composed of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru. The Kamba who
have a significant presence in the province were also targeted. Many GEMA
community members thus suffered a double blow since they had been victims of
election violence in 1997 and had barely recovered from their losses when they
were again targeted and attacked in the 2007.
Local communities have for years decried the perceived marginalization and
under development of the region without tangible action being taken by
successive Governments since independence to deal with these deep rooted
feelings. The issue of land at the Coast has specially been problematic and has
been described as a ticking time bomb. More recently other factors like perceived
mistreatment of residents at the hands of police in the name of fighting
terrorism, poor education levels and bad infrastructure have all served to fuel
feelings that successive Governments do not care about the region.
While the perceived manipulation of the presidential results was the trigger for
the 2007 violence in the Province, it is clear that there is deep underlying
resentment which has never been addressed by the State over the years. The
situation is further complicated by economic competition for resources with
migrant upcountry communities seen as benefiting at the expense of the
indigenous people and this background explains the salient issues, causes and
manifestation of the violence in the region as will be expounded in detail
hereinafter. As noted by King'ori Mwangi Coast PPO,
“My Lords, our assessment of the Coast Province was that there was
a potential violence much higher than any other part of the country
because of the underlying issues of poverty, their political feeling of
being excluded and a lot of unemployment. All these going by the
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history of the Coast… we felt the issues here, the threats were higher
than other parts of the country”.189

Pre-Election Period
The Commission heard from various witnesses that Coast Province was generally
peaceful in the run up to the elections and residents eagerly waited to cast their
votes. Many arrived at their respective polling stations as early as 4.00am on the
morning of 27 December 2007. The only hitch reported by voters was the
discovery at the last minute that voter registers had been split alphabetically and
this unannounced change created a lot of confusion and delays. Surprisingly,
and also commendably, this did not lead to any violence.

In Garsen

constituency of Tana River District the Commission was told of some low level
violence on 27th December after voting which was confirmed by Mr. Wilfred
Mbithi, ACP. In that incident, a police helicopter had brought in ballot papers for
tallying purposes sparking rumours that the incumbent MP Hon. Danson
Mungatana of PNU had flown in foreign ballot boxes with marked ballot papers.
There was clear evidence of a high level of competition between the two leading
presidential candidates, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga and therefore a palpable
divide between PNU and ODM supporters in the Coast. Witness testified that
the pre-election period had been characterized by a political environment that
was greatly polarized since the Constitutional Referendum of November 2005.
We heard that the Referendum had created very high expectations and the
majority of the Coastal people saw real hope for positive change in the ODM
party and its presidential candidate Raila Odinga who was widely expected to
win the presidential poll. The common belief in the region was that Raila could
only lose if the poll was rigged.
In the meantime, the NSIS was apprehensive and viewed the Coastal area as a
potential flashpoint where political party supremacy, religion and race had
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ignited violence in the past190. Another fear cited by NSIS was the land problem
between squatters and landlords where sentiments were high that the Coastal
people had been marginalized by outsiders. Tana River District featured
consistently in Intelligence reports where there was an ongoing conflict between
the Orma and Wardei communities within Bura and Galole Divisions and also
between the Pokomo and Somali over a disputed 3-mile strip along the banks of
River Tana. Finally, intelligence was furnished by NSIS regarding the activities of
an outfit by the name Revolutionary Republican Council (RRC) that was
reportedly training its militia within Mwagulu Forest of Kwale District with the
help of ex-military servicemen allegedly with the aim to “disenfranchise
upcountry people and later reclaim land owned by perceived outsiders”.
It was noted in Intelligence reports that the RRC had identified a training ground
for Digo, Duruma, Taita and Taveta communities in Kilibasi area of Kinango
Division, Kwale District. Indeed the Coast PPO did confirm the existence of the
RRC which he stated, “claims that they would like to have the Coast Province
declared as a republic, independent from the rest of Kenya…we did consider them
to be a threat to our security operation and we had taken measures to make sure
that they did not disrupt the election or wage violence against other people after
the election, my Lords.” Accordingly the authorities had neutralized the group by
the time of elections.
NSIS also noted that there were threats of eviction of upcountry people especially
Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba residing within Kipini Settlement Scheme in Malindi
District. NSIS reported that the majimbo debate had elicited a strong anti-Kikuyu
sentiment in Coast Province and that some unnamed politicians planned to use
majimboism as an excuse to mobilize local youth to attack perceived outsiders.
Consequently, the Kikuyu community inside and outside the province robustly
opposed the proposed majimbo system191. As the PC put it:
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“In the way it was being put was that Majimbo would ensure that
local people would benefit from the resources accrued from local
enterprises the revenue generated in Coast province would be for the
benefit of Coastals. I think this is how they were looking at Majimbo.
That key positions, revenue accrued from tourism, from the ports,
would be- will remain at the Coast here and benefit the Coastal
people”
Given the Intelligence that was available, we discern that there was reason to
prompt the authorities to make sufficient security arrangements early enough to
address these security concerns and perhaps this was done which is why the
Coastal region remained peaceful during the campaign period. This was also
alluded to by the Coast Provincial Commissioner Ernest Munyi when he stated
that due to the high level of competition during the campaign period, he had
found it “proper and imperative to put in place precautionary measures just to
ensure that his office could be in better control of the situation in the Province in
the event of any violence”. The PC further stated that in making these
arrangements, he had relied on NSIS security reports which information was
supported by the Coast PPO Kingori Mwangi and Wilfred Mbithi the Mombasa
Urban OCPD.
After the completion of voting, the Commission heard that people in the province
keenly followed the vote counting peacefully from various places through
television

and

radio

broadcasts.

Exhibit

149

was

tendered

containing

information showing that initial tallies indicated Raila Odinga in a clear and
widening lead over Mwai Kibaki before 30 December 2007. It was expected
therefore that this trend would continue and ODM supporters who were the
majority in the region started early celebration for the expected victory of their
candidate.

The Election Results Trigger
The Commission was then told that tension, anxiety and fear started gripping
the region and particularly Mombasa on the 28th and 29th December 2007 when
tallying of the final results had not been completed and when Raila Odinga’s
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margin over Mwai Kibaki was suddenly drastically reduced. From the various
witnesses, we were able to establish that the trigger for the chaos that rocked the
region was the declaration of President Mwai Kibaki as the winner coupled with
the suspicious manner in which the Electoral Commission handled the
situation. Indeed there were early signs of trouble when on the 29th December
2007 groups of young men gathered from 3.00 pm along Kenyatta Avenue, Abdul
Nassir road and Digo road roundabouts chanting slogans and expressing
disquiet. This early trouble appeared intended to share their feelings on the
prevailing political situation as it then was.
In the meantime, there was a lot of tension in many other places at the Coast as
people waited peacefully for the final presidential tally results. For instance, in
Kisauni, tension was reported to be very high with the youths contemplating to
hold a public protest on 29th December 2007 against the delay by ECK in
releasing the presidential poll result. We heard that many youth gathered in
various spots eagerly awaiting the announcement of the presidential results and
some in their conversations tried to envisage what a Raila Odinga win would
portend and how his Government would be.
Hussein Khalid, Programmes Coordinator for a Mombasa based NGO Muslims
for Human Rights (MUHURI), testified that violence in the region was triggered
by the announcement of the presidential results against a background of long
standing underlying issues which had not been addressed over the years and by
the conviction of many people at the Coast who happened to be ODM supporters
that they had been robbed of victory. After ECK announced Kibaki as the winner,
extremely disappointed, angry and frustrated youth were primed for violence
since the general feeling was that Raila Odinga had been robbed of a victory and
this bitterness was expressed in slogans such as,

“Haiwezekani”

( it is not

possible ), “Haki Yetu” (our right ), “No Raila No Peace”, “Tutamaliza wacky” ( We
shall finish the Kikuyus), “Maisha Bora” (Better Life), “Wakikuyu ni waizi”
(Kikuyus are thieves); as avenues to express anger while also singing in praise of
their favourite candidate Raila Odinga and ODM.
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A religious leader however told the Commission that the violence appeared to
have been planned prior to elections. He gave reasons for his belief that a
Member of Parliament from the Coast Province was responsible for organization
of the violence that rocked the area. This sentiment was further echoed by other
witnesses; for instance, a witness told us:
“I witnessed the violence that was going on at that time within Bokole.
At a shop we call Safaricom Building owned by a Kamba known as
Philip Kiluko, I found a group of youths trying to break in. They were
all former security guards for a politician during the campaign period.
I talked to them. I enquired from then why they were doing that and
one of them told me that each of them had been paid Kshs 300/- to
cause the mayhem to express disgust at the election results and that
even if ODM could have been declared the winner, the violence would
still have (happened)…I met a friend of mine and he told me that since
he had seen me during the ODM nomination, we should go to the
politician’s home with him at Mikindani to get funds for the violence...”
.
Another witness, appeared to lend credence to those accusations. He stated:
“I was told that the MP funded the youth to loot and burn all
businesses belonging to non ODM members so that they remain as
poor as themselves. One time during the violence, I accompanied some
to the MP’s home … he addressed us and told us that he is happy
with our actions meaning the violence and further told us that it
should continue until President Kibaki relinquishes the presidency.
Therefore, I believe the MP fully supported the youth’s action”
The foregoing are important leads to further investigations into the role played
by a local politician in the post-election violence considering that there were
intelligence reports from NSIS about the potential of violence in the area.
According to Hussein Khalid, some of the violence at the Coast was actually
caused by the police. He produced exhibit 149 stating that
“there were instances where we felt some of the skirmishes that were
witnessed could have been avoided, for instance had the police acted
in a more civil manner, where they dispersed meetings or processions
that were legally organized, where notices had been issued and they
had to come in to disrupt peaceful processions. We also felt that a
number of issues that came to the fore were ethnic in nature. There
were people or a certain community that were being targeted by
others and that very little was done or they were disjointed efforts by
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the Government. The Provincial Administration was calling meetings
to discuss and deliberate issues with local leaders, women leaders, it
was a bit disappointing to actually note that the police were actually
out shooting people, killing, sometimes injuring individuals to the
extent of even having them admitted to the hospital”.
His evidence was tested in cross examination, and he maintained that violence
broke out on 30th December 2007 at various points in the Province
simultaneously and that a particular community was targeted though, in his
view, there was no planning. People simply captured the moment and decided
there and then what to do with absolutely no prior arrangements. This
contradicted what the PC Earnest Munyi told the Commission, that during the
violence leaflets were circulated saying that "The Kikuyu community should leave
their properties and their lands and go back to where they came from". It was thus
the PC’s view that
“there was an element of feeling… that this could have been planned.
Because on 31st (December 2007) at exactly 11 in the morning groups
of people were converging simultaneously at that particular time in
Kisauni, Changamwe and were trying also to cross from the Likoni
side of the ferry trying to come to Island …so that kind of situation
one can conclude that there was some element of planning”.

Nature and Extent of Violence
As we have seen, the violence in Mombasa Town erupted on 30th December 2007
and continued unabated for 3 days. We were told that huge groups of youth
armed with crude weapons engaged the police in running battles including
stoning police in Mishomoroni and Changamwe’s Bangladesh area. The main
highway to Nairobi was blocked at Mikindani and the OCPD reported that riots
also broke out in Chaani, Bokole, Magongo Mwisho and Miritini. In the
meantime, the whole of Likoni was engulfed in violence.
According to the Police, 25 deaths occurred though Dr. Anderson Kahindi the
Provincial Director of Medical Services gave a figure of 32 people as having been
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killed192. Of these one died of arrow wounds, 5 from gunshots, 11 died in a
house fire, another 11 had multiple injuries, 2 were indicated to have been
lynched by a mob while it was not possible to ascertain the cause of death in 2
cases.
Further, we heard from the OCPD that 24 vehicles were burnt, 29 residential
houses destroyed and 240 commercial buildings, including kiosks and other
temporary structures were destroyed. The youth targeted property belonging to
the Kikuyu community as an expression of anger against them for allegedly
supporting Mwai Kibaki. In order to escape the onslaught, many residents found
it prudent to paint the letters ‘ODM’ on their property and motor vehicles as a
measure to avoid being attacked193 .
We were informed by several witnesses that most of the youths appeared to be
intoxicated.194 The PC observed that the Coast had a drug problem especially
among the youth and it was probable, therefore, that drugs were bought for the
youth to engage in violence. The further presumption is that the youth had the
benefit of leadership and coordination.
The Commission was told that demonstrators first vented their anger pulling
down unoccupied structures then lit bonfires and tyres and then barricaded
roads thereby paralyzing transport and leading to most people staying indoors.
What had started as protest demonstrations over the presidential outcome took
an ethnic twist with demonstrators targeting for destruction property belonging
to the GEMA communities, especially the Kikuyus whom they felt had
contributed to their marginalization.
By Monday 31st December 2007 about 20 shops had been broken into and 4
houses had been burnt in Changamwe. Most of them belonged to members of
the Kikuyu and the Meru communities who by this time were fleeing to safety
and seeking refuge at the Moi International Airport, Mombasa. This gave an
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opportunity to criminals to engage in an orgy of looting and destruction. We
heard that crowds shouting slogans of “Maisha Bora” (Better Life) and No “Raila
No Peace” invaded business premises belonging the Kikuyu and Meru
communities where they looted all the stock. The extent of the violence was also
felt as far as the Mombasa mainland shopping centre and Soweto where 4 public
Motor Vehicles were burnt and bars were looted. The orgy of looting was dubbed
“ODM shopping”.
Likoni, a largely peri-urban area bordering Kwale District and inhabited
predominantly by the Digo and other Mijikenda communities and a small
number of upcountry GEMA residents was not spared. Testimony was furnished
that 2 petrol stations were burnt down while Mt. Sinai Primary School and some
businesses owned by Kikuyu were destroyed. In this area, the Ngombeni Chief’s
camp was attacked and razed down on 5 January 2008 evoking memories of the
1997 pre-election violence where the Likoni Police station had similarly been
invaded.195 The Kenya Ferry services business stalls were vandalized and looted
and for 3 days the South Coast was cut off from Mombasa town which is linked
by the ferry service that was rendered un-operational due to the prevailing
mayhem.
In Kisauni, the Commission heard that there was low level violence on 30th
December 2007 where youths burnt tyres at the roadside at Mlaleo and GEMA
community members started to move out. We were further told that the police
did absolutely nothing to contain the situation and these protests continued in
Mlaleo, Mtopanga and in Bamburi Mwisho. Between 30th and 31st December
2007, Mshomoroni, Kadogo, Mtopanga, Bombolulu, Mwandoni, Kiembeni,
Bamburi, Mtongwe, Shikaadabu, Miritini, Bomu and Migadini areas remained
no go zones. On 31st December 2007 and subsequent days, there was massive
destruction of property especially those belonging to members of the Kikuyu
community. Furniture shops, supermarkets and select bars were attacked and
looted with the violence spreading to Mshomoroni and even Nyali west. On 1st
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January 2008 in Mshomoroni, Changamwe, Likoni and Kisauni there was
massive destruction of property, looting and burning of houses and kiosks. 20
shops were reported looted in Changamwe, four houses burnt and a young boy
reportedly shot by a ‘stray’ bullet.
Similarly, some violence was experienced in Taita and Taveta districts where on
2nd January 2008, ODM youths angered by the presidential poll result went on
rampage in Taveta, Mwatate and Voi towns. In Taveta, 15 shops were broken
into, goods stolen and or looted and some of these shops burnt amongst them a
popular establishment known as ‘Makuti’. Several people were injured in the
skirmishes and one person was killed.
Some Coastal areas did not experience any level of violence in spite of earlier
NSIS fears. For instance, though Malindi District remained tense following
announcement of the presidential poll result, no incidents of violence were
reported at all. In Lamu district, we received evidence that people merely
expressed their anger and disappointment through discussions and no violence
was experienced.
While Government witnesses stated that violence had been brought under
control by 1 January 2008, we did hear testimony that the situation only
became controlled sometime in mid January 2008.196 For instance, we heard
that on 3 January 2008 violence was reported in Kisauni, Maweni, Bombolulu
and Changamwe areas where kiosks were destroyed and used to block roads.
The demonstrators were dispersed by police using tear gas and shooting in the
air. In this incident, one man was reportedly shot in the head and many others
were seriously injured. On 5 January 2008 youth leaders in Mvita organized a
demonstration which disrupted shops, markets and matatu transport. The
Commission further heard that in Ukunda, shops were burnt while others were
marked with an ‘x’ as a sign that they would be attacked and 2 German tourists
were killed in Diani.
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On 10th January 2008 in Mvita, demonstrations were called after the Friday
prayers leading to the closure of shops as police dispersed the demonstrators
who then resorted to running battles with the police. This was repeated again on
18th January 2008 and we heard that organized demonstrations by youth and
some civil society organizations became the order of the day. One youth was
reported to have been shot dead in this mayhem and many people were injured,
shops remained closed while police fired in the air and employed tear gas to
disperse the demonstrators. Overall, we heard that a measure of calm returned
to Mombasa by 25th January 2008 as the Koffi Annan mediation process gave
many people hope of lasting peace.
The post election violence left 303 families homeless in Kisauni, Changamwe and
Likoni. 6 people were burnt to death in a house in Miritini and Dr. Anderson
Kahindi CW 143 informed us that the Coast Provincial General hospital handled
109 casualties while Jocham Hospital attended to 16 cases. 5 people died of the
bullet wounds in the province.

Response by Police and Provincial Administration
The PC stated that security forces who were deployed to quell the skirmishes did
their level best and that he was “satisfied because the violence was quite intense
in the two days and especially the second day and were it not because of the
presence of security personnel, then the violence could not have been controlled
within that limited period of time.” While we shall shortly revert to this issue, we
commend the PC’s decision to call a meeting of local leaders who appealed to the
public through the 5 FM stations in Mombasa to help bring peace back to
Mombasa and Kilindini. This action made a big contribution in bringing peace in
Mombasa and Coast Province in general. This was confirmed by the PPO who
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added that the voice of a bishop and particularly that of the Chief Kadhi197 was
very important in appealing to people to maintain peace.
The PPO felt that the police had dealt with the situation to his satisfaction and
that by 1st January 2008 the violence had largely been contained. He also
acknowledged that he had received a lot of complaints from citizens lamenting
that “our officers were not protecting their premises adequately enough”. He
explained that in response to the looting, the police had resorted to the use of
Albadiri, which in local terms is “giving people a number of days to return what
they had taken and they will not be prosecuted; a lot of property was returned.”
We heard that almost 10,000 people were displaced on the first night of violence
and sought refuge in various police stations. Not surprisingly, the police through
the PPO and the OCPD Wilson Mbithi told us that though they expected election
related problems at the Coast they had not imagined violence of the magnitude
that occurred. It is our finding that serious efforts were put to securing vital
public installations such as the Kenya pipeline depots, the port of Mombasa, the
Kenya Petroleum Refinery and fuel depots in Shimanzi which meant that with
the available security personnel, it was not possible to provide reasonable
protection to others’ property. This is borne by cross-examination of the OCPD,
Q.: Bwana OCPD, you're almost telling this Commission that the
police will be there to protect the bigger assets, the bigger
installations and that is why the pipeline - nobody - I mean the oil
depots, the ports, the banks were not touched, But mwananchi's
kiosk their shops were broken into. And you explain the logic behind
guarding that and not the mwananchi's kiosk.
Witness: My Lords without giving any other details, it was not
possible for the police to provide security to every individual's
business premises.
While obviously appreciating that police could not be everywhere all the time, we
were repeatedly told that police took too long to come to the rescue of citizens
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and property under threat and sometimes did not appear at all, in spite of giving
assurances that everything was under control. For example, a witness testified
that:
“The same day on the 31st December in the evening around 6 p.m, I
was called again by neighbours in Likoni, who told me that shops of
Kikuyus were being broken into and things were being looted. I also
called the police there and they assured me things are okay there
(are) no problems but within a short while I was told the shop was
broken into but they were even unable to open the doors so they had
to break the concrete. The steel door they were unable to open it so
they broke the walls.”
When he received news that another of his shops was under attack, he called
“the Nyali police Station and they told me everything was okay but within
minutes the shop was broken into and everything taken away.” He lost property
and goods estimated at Kshs 3 million. The witness furnished the Commission
with video footage capturing the looting of one of his shops which evidence he
also stated he had put in the hands of the police together with posters which
clearly depicted the faces of people who were looting his shops.198 By the time he
appeared before us on 1 September 2008, he said no action had been taken by
police against the perpetrators, some of whom could clearly be identified from
the footage and posters.
The lethargy and incompetence experienced by the witness and others depict
another hallmark of poor policing in addition to other negative allegations
including taking part in the violence and even worse, of having taken sides. The
evidence points to a serious degree of inefficiency and dysfunction within the
police, and we cannot therefore in such circumstances help but come to the
conclusion that either the police did not bother to prevent the commission of
crimes in this region or if they were willing to, then they were obviously
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the unfolding chaos. Surprisingly there was no
concession by the police that there were any lapses in their policing duties.
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Further, we heard from two witnesses that prior to elections, it was openly
discussed amongst the Coastal people that they would attack Kikuyu and
Kamba business premises if the election results were flawed. One would
therefore have expected that the administrative arm of the Government in
collaboration with the police and other security agencies would have verified
such warning signs and moved very swiftly to put in place some measures to
ensure that such eventuality did not occur. Of course no precautionary
measures were put in place despite the acknowledgement that some areas were
dubbed as hot spots. The information produced in Exhibit 150 is therefore
credible that security forces did not make any preparations to address the
anticipated violence, to forestall looting, destruction and other forms of chaos.
We were concerned by evidence tendered before us that there was a big presence
of GSU officers in Likoni but that they were only visible and not active. This gave
the impression to the residents that these particular officers were there with
specific instructions to protect tourists along the main routes but had no brief to
quell the violence and so they just watched as the tragedy unfolded. However as
stated by Hussein Khalid, the Provincial Administration led by the PC Ernest
Munyi made an effort at some point to meet the local leaders with a view to
finding a solution to the situation if only to avoid the escalation of violence. That
aside given the attitude of the security forces at this point in time we are not
surprised that a fairly manageable situation escalated into full blown violence
that took an ethnic angle and that not only were security forces caught
unawares but they were completely overwhelmed. Further, it emerged that the
riot drill pamphlet providing guidelines to the suppression of riots “was last
issued in October 1962 and if there is any one that came after this one I may not
be aware about it my Lord199”.
The OCPD said it was:
“just a show of force meaning that your presence at a scene of
disturbance is assumed to be enough to make the rioters disperse,
that is the first one. Number two, if they don't disperse after show of
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force then you are required to use the teargas. The third one if they
would not disperse after you throw teargas to them then the pamphlet
allows the use of the button, the truncheon now. And finally if they do
not oblige and the situation is so bad that is the only time you can
resort to the use of firearms my Lord”.
Another troubling aspect regards the evidence we received that in numerous
instances where the police arrived on time, “they allowed these people to loot
items but implored them not to cause any bodily harm to other persons”200. The
PC, the PPO and the Mombasa Urban OCPD categorically denied being aware of
a ‘loot but not kill’ order. They also rejected the suggestion that they were
overwhelmed for lack of adequate preparation, which would justify them seeking
to appease the mobs by allegedly telling them to loot but not to kill. However,
testimony was consistent from a number of witnesses that police who were
patrolling in Land Rovers gave the protesting crowds a go ahead to loot but not
to harm or kill anyone.
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PART III

Extent and Impact of Post Election Violence
This part of the Report deals with cross cutting issues arising out of the violence
which the Commission came across in the course of its investigations. These are:
•

Sexual Violence;

•

Internally Displaced Persons

•

The Media and the Post Election Violence

•

Extent and Consequences of PEV: Figures on Deaths, Injuries and
damage to property
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CHAPTER SIX
Sexual Violence
Introduction
One of the well known and regrettable tragedies of major conflicts and
breakdowns of law and order is sexual violence. This has happened around the
world. Sadly enough, it also was a consequence of the 2007 post election
violence in Kenya. Like others who either lived through or followed this terrible
period of Kenya’s history, the Commission heard anecdotally and from the media
about sexual violence against both women and men. These reports, admittedly
informal, included heart wrenching tales of rape, gang rape, sexual mutilation,
loss of body parts, and hideous deaths. In addition, the Commission also
gradually learned that the various forms of genital violence against innocent
victims were not just one-off tragedies but major life-changing events. Among
others, the Commission heard tales of family members being forced to stand by
and witness their mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, and little children being
raped, killed, and maimed: innocent victims contracting HIV AIDS after being
sexually assaulted because the breakdown of law and order and the
deteriorating security situation kept them from accessing medical care soon
enough to prevent it: husbands abandoning their wives who had been defiled,
and the inevitable psychological burden of powerlessness and hopelessness that
left individuals who had experienced sexual violence feeling alone, isolated, and
unable to cope, not just for one moment in time, but possibly forever. Worse still,
the Commission also heard that some individuals who had lost family members
and property, and who had been chased away from the only homes they had
ever known, also had experienced multiple forms of violence that included sexual
violence.
Hearing bits and pieces of these life shattering experiences alerted the
Commission to the need to make its inquiries into the sexual violence that
occurred following the 2007 election a central focus of its investigation into post
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election violence. At the very least the Commission thought it would be
appropriate to look in depth into the sexual violence that had occurred. Its
reasoning was twofold. First, sexual violence is a form of violence and as the
Commission was about violence, it felt strongly that there should be a focus on it
in the Commission’s investigations. Secondly, being ordinary lay people from
various walks of life, the members of the Commission also were personally
horrified by the stories of sexual violence that came to our attention. Like others,
members of the Commission too felt compassion for the victims of post election
sexual violence and wanted to learn and expose what had happened. The
Commission also felt that it should do something to make sure that the scourge
of sexual violence that happened after the election did not become an endemic in
Kenyan life that, could be one day could recur in the lives of ordinary people.
The Commission felt it needed to explore the situation given that like others it
only heard isolated stories and did not know anything concrete about the sexual
violence that happened. The Commission sought to the best of its ability to
answer four basic questions to fulfil its mandate to explore the full extent of
violence that Kenya had experienced, including sexual violence. First, the
Commission wanted to know whether sexual violence actually had taken place.
Secondly, the Commission wanted to know exactly what had occurred, how it
manifested, and its extent. Third, the Commission wanted to understand, how
and why it happened, and fourth what evidence there was for all of the above.
Being lay people rather than specialists in the subject of sexual violence,
members of the Commission understood that not only did they not have the
answers to the above questions, but that they also did not know how to go about
getting them. The Commission realized that while armed with reasonable
questions and good intentions, it could not embark on this inquiry alone. The
Commission needed assistance from specialists who knew Kenya’s social and
political landscape, were familiar with the history, causes and nature of sexual
violence in general, and who had worked with victims of such violence. The
Commission knew that while women normally are the main victims of sexual
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violence when order breaks down, men too had experienced horrid types of
sexual violence after the Kenyan election. These included sodomy, forced
circumcision, and even mutilation of their penises. Between hearing of women
who had been gang raped and mutilated, the accounts of ethnically driven
sexual violence against certain men was also horrifying. Furthermore, the
Commission also understood that any inquiries it might make into sexual
violence

would

also

involve

interacting

with

victims.

The

Commission

appreciated all the sensitivities associated with doing so, including the usual
problem of finding victims who would agree to discuss what had happened to
them.
The Commission wanted to make its inquiries into sexual violence part and
parcel of all of its investigations into the post election violence that engulfed
Kenya after the 2007 election. The Commission knew, however, that to do so it
would need the help of experts. Fortunately, there are a number of groups in
Kenya who work around the theme of sexual violence. These agreed to assist in
all parts of the Commission’s work, both before the Commission took evidence in
Nairobi and while gathering testimony in the countryside. In Nairobi, the
Commission held three planning meetings with civil society organizations that
address sexual violence, including those who had worked on these matters after
the elections in Kenya. In the middle of the crisis, forty organizations in Kenya
came together to reach out to women and others who had experienced sexual
violence following the 2007 elections. They gathered under the auspices of the
Inter-Agency Gender Based Violence sub-cluster co-chaired by the United
Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the National Commission on
Gender and Development. This umbrella group included a variety of different
groups from departments in the ministries of gender and
judiciary,

health, and the

various UN agencies (e.g. UNFPA, the United Nations Development

Fund for Women (UNIFEM)), the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and
from various local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOS).
Even before the Commission began its sessions, the sub-cluster had responded
to the post-election sexual violence, particularly against women, including
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providing victims with medical, psycho-social and other counselling services.
Hence the sub-cluster was in a unique position to help the Commission with its
work and did so.
During consultations with the SGBV sub-cluster, the Commission was able to
ask them questions about how sexual violence manifested, where the
Commission might find evidence of it, and how it should go about collecting this
evidence. The Commission also decided internally that matters relating to sexual
violence would be an integral part of its inquiry into the post-election violence.
As Justice Philip Waki, the Chairman of the Commission noted on the first day
of the Commission’s hearings, sexual violence is “silent” and “preying” because
it is “underreported, under-investigated and …insufficiently addressed”, also
adding that the Commission would focus on it in all parts of our investigation,
declaring ourselves open to “receive any credible information and evidence from
survivors”.201
The Commission realized that it probably would be easier to find out what had
happened in Nairobi than in the countryside, where lack of anonymity and fear
of speaking to the Commission might be a greater problem. The Commission also
understood that if all testimony from victims of post-electoral sexual violence
was taken in private rather than in public, the issue of sexual violence against
women in the post-election period might get lost and never be discussed or
flagged to the general public. To pre-empt these and other potential problems,
the Commission took five major steps. First, to help locate and speak to victims
of post-election sexual violence in various parts of Kenya, the Commission
enlisted assistance from UNFPA and UNIFEM as well as from four sub-cluster
members. They included CARE Kenya, FIDA Kenya, the Kenya Women
Empowerment Link, and the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru. As a part of this effort,
CARE did a study in the slums of Kibera and Mathare, while the Centre for
Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) did another and also produced a
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documentary about sexual violence in the Rift Valley. CARE Kenya also held a
workshop for victims of sexual violence to explain what the Commission was
doing and to find out who among them might be willing to testify before. Further,
they provided counselling services to women and prepared them to testify before
the Commission in addition to giving the Commission some recommendations to
be followed when victims, most of whom were women, appeared before the
Commission. Secondly, to ensure that the work on sexual violence was culturally
sensitive and to allow the Commission to contact specialists as needed, the SubCluster set up a committee, including a resident gender expert from UNIFEM, to
work with the Commission’s investigators, and to identify and prepare victims
who wanted to testify to the Commission.
Thirdly, to encourage victims of sexual violence to come before the Commission
and to make it less painful for them to speak to investigators and to the
Commission, the Commission hired two female investigators who had experience
in dealing with sexual violence against women in particular. They included one
international

police

investigator

and

one

Kenyan

lawyer.

Fourthly,

the

Commission made it a point to allow two lawyers to take part in its proceedings,
who had experience in dealing with gender issues, the Federation of Women
Lawyers (FIDA) and the Centre for Advancement of Women and Children202. They
had opportunity to examine every witness appearing before the Commission,
including government officials, the police, victims, and other interested parties,
throughout our meetings all over the country. Their questions added another
dimension to the Commission’s understanding of what had happened to women
and other victims of sexual violence and the extent to which the government and
others had assisted or failed to assist those in need. Fifthly, fully cognizant of the
potential challenge of

asking someone who had experienced sexual violence to

relive it by testifying before the Commission decided to hire a full time
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psychologist to interact with and assist victims both before, during, and after
they testified to the Commission.
Collecting Evidence
This Commission is the first investigation of electoral violence to focus on sexual
violence. This contrasts with the Kiliku and Akiwumi Commissions which did
not address it. As such, the Commission was in uncharted territory. Not only did
it seek advice as noted above, but also tried to take account of the difficulty
victims faced in coming forward. Some told the cluster group or investigators
that they were ashamed of what had happened to them and did not want to
discuss their experiences in public, fearing further humiliation. Others worried
that if they testified in the open, their attackers might retaliate against them, as
this increased the possibility of them being identified.
Understanding that potential witnesses had suffered incalculable physical and
psychological horrors from which they might never recover, the Commission
arranged for private hearings, which also allowed victims to describe what had
happened to them and enabled them to open up, in some cases to the point of
naming their attackers. In short, the Commission and the Kenyan victims of
sexual violence encountered issues similar to those faced elsewhere in the world
when dealing with its aftermath. Even then, with all of the efforts to sensitize
members of the Commission and provide a safe environment in which victims
could testify, it was still difficult for victims to steel themselves and come forth to
meet with the Commission. This accounts for the relatively small number of
victims, 31 in all, who testified before the Commission or submitted statements,
something the Commission understood and appreciated, but nevertheless regret
given the strong belief by the Commission

that the problem of sexual and

gender based violence in the post election period merited more time in the
Commission hearings. This not so unusual problem may also have been
accentuated by the sad history of Kenya’s past electoral violence and the reality
that perpetrators have not only gone unpunished, but have continued afterwards
as powerful political figures. That sobering reality as well as the relative
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powerlessness of Kenyan women in many areas of life may have made potential
witnesses shy away after considering that the potential cost of their testimony
far outweighed any perceived expectations that they may have had for obtaining
justice.
Furthermore, some cases of sexual violence against men that took place after the
2007 elections were hitherto unheard of and new to the Commission and to
Kenya. The tragic novelty of this experience meant that there were even fewer
support groups available to men than to women. That, added to the humiliation
of the violations meant that no male victims came forward to testify to the
Commission, something the Commission understood, but nevertheless found
regrettable.
The Commission heard from witnesses, some of whom were specialists or had
treated victims of sexual violence, and others who were victims. The former
testified in public about the character, magnitude, and extent of the violence.
This permitted the Commission to learn much about what had happened,
approximately how many people were affected, and how various organizations
had responded in the face of this crisis. Others, mainly victims, testified mostly
in private. The private hearings began in Nairobi after which the Commission
heard from victims of sexual violence in Naivasha, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu, and
Mombasa, but not in Kisii where no victims came forth.
Public Testimony by Expert Witnesses
The Commission received testimony from three specialists on sexually based
violence, most of whose work has been with female victims. These were: Millicent
Obaso,203 a Sexual and Gender Based Violence Advisor for CARE International
who also is an HIV/AIDS Advisor for East and Central Africa; Jane Onyango, the
Executive Director of FIDA Kenya; and Dr. Sam Thenya, an obstetrician
gynaecologist, and Chief Executive Officer of the Nairobi Women’s Hospital which
established a Gender Violence Recovery Centre (CVRC) in 2001 that has been a
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Mecca for women. They discussed the post election sexual violence in Kenya
between December 2007 and March 2008 and their encounters with it. They told
the Commission that sexual violence was rampant during this period consisting
mainly of rape and gang rape, defilement, genital mutilation, sodomy, forced
circumcision, and sexual exploitation.
Millicent Obaso’s testimony discussed the horrific experiences of women in
Kibera and Mathare where her organization had worked. There her organization
collected information from 40 victims, and analysed in depth the cases of 13 of
these victims. She the Commission that most victims were poor women who had
been raped in their own homes by youth, gangs of up to 20 men, GSU personnel
,and some police officers. The victims ranged in age from 25-68 with over 62%
being married, widowed or divorced, and 38%

single. Slightly over 61% had

attended primary school, 15 % secondary school, and 23% had never been to
school at all. Most were still homeless or living in IDP camps, having lost their
possessions, livelihoods, and homes. Ms. Obaso recounted several terrible tales
from victims of sexual violence which not only hit women worst but which she
told the Commission, was the direct consequence of existing inequalities
between men and women in Kenya, and something that affected the way in
which husbands responded to the rapes of their wives and daughters. She
explained that over 75% of the individuals her group interviewed said they had
been raped at home in front of their spouses and children, causing a great deal
of stress that resulted in their being abandoned by their husbands. As she
explained, “the man came, the father of the house and when he found that his
wife had been raped and the same man raped his daughter and rapes his
daughter-in law, he said I am finished with [this]; I cannot deal with this. I am
going to find myself another woman, [b]ecause this is the biggest taboo in my
home and I cannot even be cleansed and who are the perpetrators”204
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The witness told the Commission that abandonment after being raped,
sometimes by up to 20 men, was just the beginning of the horror visited on these
women. Most who were left had no place to go, the majority did not report what
had happened with the police or their chiefs, and when they did many were
received with hostility or turned away. Some contracted HIV AIDs because they
could not get to hospital in time to receive post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), a
drug which the Commission was informed prevents HIV infection if administered
in time, while others who were already infected with HIV/AIDS were unable to
get their daily doses of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVS) to manage the disease,
others became pregnant as a result of the violations. Furthermore, the witness
told the Commission that some women were disabled and when they were being
interviewed they could not walk properly while others who did not receive proper
treatment, still had blood streaming down their legs which was visible to their
children.
Ms. Obaso told the Commission that she felt these terrible violations against
women needed to be taken very seriously and made recommendations including
implementing the Sexual Offences Act, developing guidelines for police,
compensating women, providing psychosocial support to them and their families,
“looking at these women as human beings while...finding their perpetrators”, and
passing on the experiences

of what happened to women to the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission.
Jane Onyango205, testified about the work of FIDA in IDP camps in Nairobi,
Nakuru, Eldoret, Mombasa, and Kisumu Kenya that included legal aid,
counselling and humanitarian services which they provided to women and
children living in very poor, congested and insecure conditions. She told the
Commission that these conditions encouraged further sexual violence. She
reiterated similar experiences as those recounted by Ms Obaso: gang rapes, fear
of reporting to the Commission either in private or public, inability to access
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police stations, loss of property, homes, legal documents and possessions, and
abandonment by their husbands. One woman in Mathare, who was already HIV
positive, who had returned home to stay safe after being chased by a gang, she
experienced the terror of her house being knocked down by another mob who
proceeded to gang raped her before she passed out. In another case, a Luhya
woman married to a Kikuyu was abandoned by her husband on 30 December.
He returned two days later and threatened to kill her, and sodomize her, saying
he regretted marrying a Luhya, he threw her belongings out of their house, and
refused to let her see her children. Ms. Onyango also told the Commission that
women are traditionally seen as lesser human beings something that propels
sexual violence and the insensitive response of the police which leads to victims’
fears of reporting, believing they could be turned away or even killed for doing
so.
The Commission also received testimony from Dr. Regina Karega206, the
chairwoman of Kenya’s National Commission on Gender and Development,
which came into existence in 2004. She made a number of suggestions about
measures which she felt would increase the likelihood of perpetrators of sexual
violence being charged. These included having mobile courts and increasing the
number of centres for victims of conflict both to assist and protect them. Michael
Gachanja Wachira207, a program officer with the Centre for Rights, Education,
and Awareness (CREAW) presented a DVD of women in the Rift Valley who
voiced their experiences concerning sexual violence after the 2007 election. He
also gave the Commission a presentation based on an in depth study
undertaken in Nairobi, Nakuru, Burnt Forest and Eldoret from the end of
January through 25 April 2008. The Commission was interested to learn that
82% of the victims did not formally report their experiences of sexual violence,
especially to the police. The Commission was told that the reasons for nonreporting ranged from having been attacked by the police (32%), fear of being
attacked again (24%), thinking nothing would be done (45%), and not being able
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to identify the rapist (31%). Others, the Commission was told, did not know
where to report the incident, had been asked not to report the matter (34%), or
did not know how to do so (27%). The witness told the Commission that some
respondents, especially those raped by powerful figures in authority, including
police, who had sexually assaulted women, were effectively untouchable. This
finding mirrored other testimony given to the Commission concerning the
response both by government and security personnel to other types of postelection violence. The very individuals who might have helped them were people
to whom they could not go for help: perpetrators at the worse and otherwise
often indifferent bystanders to the plight of ordinary citizens whom they should
have assisted. The witness also testified that some women in IDP camps in
Naivasha were reduced to trading sex for money to buy food for their families
while others were raped by individuals who invaded IDP camps as was the case
in Nakuru, or did not have access to medical services.208
Dr. Sam Thenya209, the CEO of the Nairobi Women’s Hospital, which provides
free services to female and male victims of sexual violence, explained to the
Commission that his hospital offers comprehensive treatment to survivors of
sexual violence, including administering a drug, known as Post Exposure
Prophylaxes (PEP) medication which if given within 72 hours of rape reduces the
chances of the victim being infected with HIVAIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs). He also relayed to the Commission the other types
of services offered by his hospital including psychological and mental health and
other services.
Dr. Sam Thenya told the Commission that his hospital was inundated with
patients during the post election period. It treated 653 individuals to whom it
was able to offer comprehensive services, including the administration of PEP.
This number excludes others who came to the hospital after the 72 hour period
when PEP is in effective as the hospital’s statistics include only those who
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receive its “comprehensive services”, therefore to some extent not fully taking
account of the total number of individuals who came to the hospital to be treated
for sexual violence. Adding in those treated at other hospitals in other parts of
the country with whom he partners, Dr. Thenya testified to us that at least 900
individuals were treated, noting this was the just the “tip of the iceberg”. Many
more victims of sexual violence could not get to his or other hospitals to obtain
treatment given the lack of security and means of transport when law and order
broke down. This was an additional tragedy Dr. Thenya relayed to the
Commission, adding to the Commission’s understanding of the ways in which
sexual violence and the results of post election violence intersected. For those on
whom Dr. Thenya had collected data, 524 or 80%

suffered from rape and

defilement, 65 or 10% from domestic violence with the remaining 10%

from

other types of physical and sexual assault. The majority of the patients were
women, even though the hospital treated a small number of males who had been
sodomized and subjected to other form of sexual brutalization. About half of the
524 were adults and the other half were children with 207 knowing their
attackers. The majority of the attackers were known but not named, followed by
neighbors, relatives, and friends. Of the patients coming to the Nairobi Women’s
Hospital, 58% were from Nairobi, with the rest coming from Kiambu, Nakuru,
Naivasha, Eldoret, Makueni, Machakos, and Ongata Rongai.210
Dr. Margaret Makanyengo, a Consultant Psychiatrist and Head of the
Department of Mental Health Services and the Gender Based Violence Recovery
Centre (GBVRC),

211also

testified and said that their GBVRC acted as a “one stop

shop” offering psychological and mental health services to victims of sexual
violence. From December 2007 to June 2008 they recorded 184 cases of sexual
violence, 80% of which stemmed from the post election situation. Ironically, the
Commission heard that in January and February, at the height of the violence,
the numbers of patients they saw actually dipped, something the witness
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attributed to the lack of transport and the general level of insecurity in the city.
Here she echoed the statements of other witnesses.
Notwithstanding the abundance of information the Commission received about
the nature, numbers, and manifestations of post election sexual violence from
the above organizations and from other witnesses, the Commissioner of Police,
Major General Hassan Ali212

had told the Commission the police had not

collected any information or statistics on crimes such as rapes.213 Given the
evidence adduced by the witnesses above and the victims of sexual violence
against the police, the Commission was concerned over the apparent lack of
interest of the police in sexual violence in general and particularly in not taking
action against their own officers who perpetrated the crimes.
Testimony from Victims
The Commission received testimony from victims of sexual violence in public, in
private, from statements collected by investigators, including those from victims
who did not wish to appear before the Commission but nevertheless wanted their
stories heard. The Commission also obtained records of interviews given to other
organizations including those headed by the specialists above, who testified
before the Commission. This included evidence from women, men, girls and boys
who were raped, sodomized, and had their genitals mutilated. It is noted that
women and girls were the majority of those affected.
The Commission and its investigators collected testimonies and statements from
many different parts of Kenya even though was difficult to access victims in IDP
camps, particularly once the government began its program of to resettle IDPs,
“Operation Rudi Nyumbani” which made it more difficult for the Commission to
trace, reach, or obtain information from victims.

212
213

CW 1
CW 1

249

The people whom the Commission heard from in direct evidence and from
statements to investigators are real people with real lives. The combined horror
of post election and sexual violence they experience has destroyed their lives.
What began as one horror and one loss was quickly compounded into many.
These experiences continue to overwhelm those who heard them, including the
Commission. Mass violence can easily be reduced to anomic numbers. While
numbers are necessary to profile the sexual violence that occurred after the
2007 election, they also can turn tragic histories of normal people into a sea of
faceless anonymity if viewed in isolation. To avoid this and to retain the human
face of the post election sexual violence experienced by its victims, the
Commisison did its best to encourage victims of sexual violence to come and tell
about their experiences.
Hence, following the presentation of figures compiled by the Commission to help
in synthesizing what happened, the rest of this chapter tells the story of post
election violence through the eyes of the victims who testified to

the

Commission, mostly in camera. The chapter consists in either summarizing what
they told the Commission or using direct quotes from their testimonies and
statements to the Commission to illustrate broader points.

Who Were the Victims of Sexual Violence?
The demographic characteristics of the victims of post-election sexual violence
who testified and whom the Commission’s investigators interviewed are as
follows.214 The Commission received statements from a total of 31 women
ranging in age from 17-55 years old, some of whom testified in private and
others of whom just gave statements the Commission’s investigators, but did not
appear before the Commission. Many were victims of other aspects of post
election violence including being forced to flee from their homes, having their
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property destroyed, losing their family members, and suffering from other types
of violence. Twelve of the thirty came from Nairobi, two from Naivasha, six from
Nakuru, four from Eldoret, six from Kisumu, one from Mombasa, but none from
Kisii, even though sexual violence occurred there too. While the Commission
feels that much of what it heard was broadly indicative of what happened, its
assessment comes from a small group of people who do not constitute a
statistically representative sample. For reasons noted earlier, victims of sexual
violence are often reluctant to testify.
The Commission was able to find thirty women who agreed to testify. However,
while men and male children were also targets of sexual violence, none were
willing to be interviewed by the Commission’s investigators or to testify before
the Commission. This was the situation in Naivasha where there were many
forced male circumcisions, including on a teenaged boy who was near where the
Commission’s investigators were taking statements, but was too traumatized to
record his story.
Of those testifying to the Commission or whose statements were recorded, the
majority were not well off, if not poor. Before the post election violence many
were engaged in small business activities. These included selling cereals,
vegetables, and second-hand clothes, working in beauty shops and bars,
engaging in subsistence farming, and working as casual labourers on farms or
as house maids. In Nairobi, all those interviewed lived in the slums of Mathare
and Kibera, while the victims in Nakuru, Naivasha, Eldoret, Kisumu, and
Mombasa lived on the outskirts of the towns or in the rural areas. Eighteen of
the women interviewed were attacked in their homes, seven while fleeing from
violence, three while looking for food or children lost as a result of the prevailing
mayhem in their neighbourhoods, one while being dragged out of her house by
someone she knew, with the remaining suffering other experiences. Twenty four
of the thirty victims who gave statements to the Commission or to its
investigators were gang raped. Seventeen rapes were committed by civilians
involving 2 to 12 individuals while 7 were committed by state security agents
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involving the 4 by the GSU, 2 by Administrative Police, and one by the Kenya
police. The gang rapes perpetrated by the GSU involved 2 to 4 officers, 3 to 7 in
the case of the Administrative Police (AP) and 2 in the cases of the Kenya Police.
Six other cases of rape were committed by individuals rather than gangs, with
four cases involving civilians and another two officers from the GSU and one who
was an AP. Only one case involved forced circumcision. In Nairobi, six of the
twelve cases of sexual violence were HIV positive before being attacked, two were
infected after being raped, one was infected with an STD during the attack, while
the remaining three had not been tested and did not know their status. Seven of
these same individuals had been gang raped, five of which were committed by
GSU officers. As mentioned earlier, the Commission also heard from Kenyan
experts that the majority of the victims of sexual violence were either unable to
or did not seek out medical care.
Who Were the Perpetrators?
From testimony witnesses gave to the Commission and that received from
specialists who worked with victims of sexual violence, the Commission learned
that the perpetrators of the post election sexual violence included the following:
state security agents (e.g. administrative police, regular police, and members of
the General Service Unit (GSU)), members of organized gangs (e.g. Mungiki,
Kalenjin warriors, and others), neighbors, relatives, supposed friends, and
individuals working in IDP camps.
It is always impossible to get into the minds of perpetrators of violence
particularly those engaged in sexual violence. However, the testimony given to
the Commission suggests certain underlying themes, however irrational they
may seem to outsiders or to victims themselves. It appears to the Commission
different perpetrators acted for different reasons. In some areas, sexual violence
was a means used to pressure people to leave their homes, to retaliate against
them for having voted for the wrong candidate, tribe, or party and in tandem
with that to dominate, humiliate and degrade them and their communities into a
pit of powerlessness. Here it dovetailed with the overall post-electoral violence. In
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other areas, sexual violence was an opportunistic act played out against a
background of lawlessness and a vacuum of power that created disorder
bordering on anarchy. In other cases, sexual violence was used to coerce and
control helpless IDPs who traded sex unwillingly for basic needs with the
perpetrators being individuals in the camp, individuals from surrounding
communities (e.g. when women went out to collect food and water), or security
personnel, and humanitarian workers in the camps each of whom preyed upon
helpless women in different macabre ways.
Security Forces
In discussing their attackers, victims of sexual violence singled out members of
various security forces who were meant to have protected them. Two victims, a
50 year old widow,215 resident of Kibera who had lived there for ten years and
who had children and

216a

46 year old married woman with ten children, who

ran a shop selling vegetables and charcoal described their experiences of being
gang raped by GSU officers to the Commission. They told the Commission the
officers entered their houses under the pretext of looking for the weapons and
young men that were barricading roads and the railway line in Kibera. Another
55 year old woman from Kibera Laini Saba interviewed by investigators recalled
a similar horrendous experience. In her statement she told of looking outside,
seeing that there were security officers, and therefore not bothering to lock her
house. Worse still, as they were security officers, she let them in after which,
they ransacked her house while pretending to look for the members of the illegal
group, Mungiki, and gang raped her when they could not find the group they
were working for . She narrated her life altering story as follows:
“I went to my house. The GSU followed me and said they were looking
for young men who were involved in the violence. They were 3(three)
G.S.U men who got into my house. I had not locked my house and
when they came in I did not bother to lock because they were security
men who were supposed to care for us. One of the G.S.U officers stood
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at the door, the other two got in. They told me they were going door to
door looking for the young men who were involved in the violence. I
told them that they would check since I was not hiding anyone. I told
them that I was alone. By that time I was alone in the house. They
told me that we, women, were the ones encouraging the young men
because we were preparing food for the “Mungiki”. They were using
Swahili language.

I insisted I was alone and I have never seen

Mungiki. They told me that if they could not find Mungiki at least I
was available. I asked them “what have I done.” One G.S.U grabbed
me and said “we can’t leave you alone.” He then threw me on the bed
and hit me on the face. He tore my inner pants and then raped me.
Then the second one raped me....”217
Another 34 year old woman, also from Kibera Laini Saba had a similar
experience which was captured in a statement she gave to the Commission’s
investigators. She described the horrors visited upon her as follows:
“The army men started running after the young men who were said to
be “Mungiki” and had killed other people along the railway line.
Having seen that they were army men, I just went to my house and
locked the house. I had gone out of my house just to know what was
happening. The army men then came and found me in my house.
They were three (3) men. It was 5:00pm. They asked me ‘mama wapi
mzee-mother where is your husband’ I told them I don’t have a
husband. I only have one child and I have taken her... to my parent’s
home in Meru. They told me to give them my identity card and ‘the
weapon that my husband uses’. I insisted that I don’t have a
husband. They saw a PNU calendar hanging on my wall. They then
told me ‘nyinyi ndio wale watu tulikuwa tukitafuta-you are the people
we were looking for.’ One of the army men ordered me to climb on the
bed, the other was standing on the door and the other was

217

CIPEV Investigators Jobsheet, Nairobi, 10 July 2008.

254

ransacking the house looking for weapons or the people hiding in my
house. One of the army men told me ‘climb on the bed and remove
your inner pants’ I got shocked him being a security officer. He
pushed me on the bed and started raping me. The army man who
was ransacking the house was the second one to rape me and the
army man guarding the door was the third to rape me”.218
A 50 year old woman and a resident of Kibera testified in camera to the
Commission recounting to the Commission what had happened to her in the
following statement:
“…..[A]t around 6:30 pm two (2) motor vehicles came with GSU
policemen in uniform, green (with patches) and they had a cap the
same colour. Thinking that they were coming to assist us, we were
very happy but that was not the case. They hit a jiko that had fire
and it fell on my daughter Juliana and she got burnt on her
feet……one policeman hit my eyes. I fell down and my blood pressure
rose. He tore my clothes. He raped me I got unconscious as the other
ransacked the house. The same man raped my daughter J. She
became pregnant though on 5/7/08, she had a miscarriage”219.
In some cases, the security agents attacked individuals, including teenagers,
during flight. According to the statement of a 17 years old girl from Eldoret
currently living in a children’s home in Nakuru, she was attacked by 7
Administrative Police Officers who gang raped her. At the time of the attack, she
was running away from her sister’s house which had been attacked by some
raiders during the post election violence.220
Not only did the Commission hear of commissions by security officers, who
should have helped to prevent sexual violence rather than engaging in it
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themselves, but also of deliberate omissions on their part. The Commission
received information that some security officers refused to record cases having to
do with sexual violence.
221who

According to a married woman living in Mathare,

was able to identify some of her attackers by name, she went to Pangani

Police Station and the police “told me that they do not want to listen to cases
about rape. If it is about robbery I should report and I reported and they gave me
an OB number.” In addition, when a married female resident of Kibera who had
been gang raped, CW 18, went to report at the Kilimani Police Station, she was
told “to choose between the two, either the issue of the house being burned or
being raped.”222
The woman explained to the Commission that although she had identified the
men who gang d raped her and looted her property; the police at the Pangani
Police Station released the perpetrators without offering her an explanation. The
police only said that “this [was] about politics and that [she] should leave”. A Mr.
Magara, a police officer at the Pangani Police Station even went to the extent of
asking for a bribe. He asked the woman to pay him “shs.6,000 before he takes up
the case and [she] told him [she]could not afford that.”
Although security agents are expected to be neutral in the course of their work,
the Commission received information from witnesses that some of security
agents were ethnically biased, if not hostile, to individuals not from their own
ethnic groups or others that they perceived to belong to political parties that
they themselves did not support, According to a 29 year old married mother of
two, a Luo from Naivasha, who worked for a flower company223,the police
officers, who were from another ethnic group, failed to help her take her injured
brother to hospital and when he died, they refused to collect his body and take it
to the mortuary. A Kikuyu gang had been looking for the woman’s husband and
when they could not find him, they set upon her brother, cutting off his testicles
221
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and his penis. Not only did they refuse, but they warned his wife that if she
insisted, she “would end up like [her brother] and that it was not their work”. The
body thus remained uncollected for two days, started rotting and was eaten by
dogs.

It was only later that she got help from other police officers who were

Kalenjin.
It is the Commission’s view that the involvement of state security agents in the
perpetration of sexual violence and the fear of incriminating themselves may
partly explain why the police omitted data on sexual violence in the reports they
presented to the Commission. The Commission also felt that it was unfortunate
that the Commissioner of Police testified that he could not determine whether
sexual violence was fit to be reported and was unaware that anyone had been
arrested and charged for commission of such crimes.224 Furthermore, the
horrendous experiences of the women who testified before the Commission
illustrated the same broad concerns with the security forces. The Commission
also learnt about this from other witnesses speaking about the post election
violence in Kenya. These included those who were supposed to be keeping order
and protecting citizens but were rather

perpetrators themselves, a refusal to

help citizens who came directly to officers for help or to report crimes, a
breakdown along ethnic lines mirroring the way in which violence as a whole
manifested after the election, and a callous indifference if not outright hostility to
victims who often had experienced multiple tragedies and had their lives turned
upside down, sometimes in minutes and sometimes in days.
Furthermore, what the Commission heard from these witnesses once again
reminded the Commission about the precariousness of both state and society in
Kenya. The testimony the Commission received brought the realization once
again that if the current state of impunity and the belief that individuals in
authority and their followers have a license to maim and kill without being held
accountable continues, both sexual violence and other forms of post election
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violence would easily happen again. In short, while different in some respects, in
others the sexual violence after the election also mirrored many facets of the post
election violence in general.
Organized Gangs
According to statements received by the Commission, the victims of sexual
violence from some areas told us that they were attacked by members of
organized gangs. In Nairobi, Naivasha and Nakuru, there were claims that
Mungiki was involved, with their members targeting men as opposed to women.
This might explain why there were no reported cases of rape and defilement in
Naivasha, but instead there were cases of men being targeted and being forcibly
circumcised.
Dr

Kariuki

Gichuki,

the

current

Medical

Officer

of

Health

for

Nakuru225confirmed having received 6 cases of forced circumcision which he
described as ‘traumatic circumcision….because usually circumcision, either you
are in the hospital or in a traditional setting that is clean and boundary kind of
surgical procedure but this one was a bit crude and not orderly’.

The doctor

further referred to the cases as ones of ‘pilary amputation’ and explained that
‘usually, circumcision is the surgical removal of foreskin but in [a particular case] a
22 year old male [had his] whole penis actually cut’.
In addition to destroying property, killing and maiming, the members of the
Mungiki gang were said to target men from specific communities believed not to
practice circumcision and also believed to be in support of a particular political
party with a view to circumcising them. The cruelty of what transpired differed
from victim to victim. A married Luo woman with two children, originally from
Huruma estate in Nairobi but displaced to an IDP camp226 testified in camera as
follows:
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“…I heard many people outside saying that “even here there are some
ODM people we want to circumcise”. ….’they were many and were
making a lot of noise. They pushed the door saying that ‘Kihii-kikuyu
for uncircumcised man’ you are the ones troubling us……I saw my
husband lying… down. They opened his zip, lifted his penis and cut it
with a panga…. I managed to slip away and one alerted them and
they said it is okay I would go away and that it is my husband they
wanted to teach a lesson and circumcise.”227
As a result of this attack her husband died due to the injuries sustained during
this hideous incident.
In explaining the extent to which some victims suffered in the hands of such
gangs, a woman, whose testimony has been referred to previously in camera
that,
“I found that his [my brother’s] penis had been cut and placed on his
mouth, his testis were chopped off and placed on his hand. I found
that blood was still pouring out of his body and he was kicking as he
was dying…..the following day, another workmate of mine informed
me that his [my brother’s] head had been chopped of and that dogs
were eating his private parts. My brother was clobbered before he
was mutilated. The people who did that to him were using spiked
clubs. They had fixed nails on the club and as they hit his face, the
nails would pluck flesh from his body”.228
Neighbours and Others individual Criminals
The Commission also heard from witnesses that in some areas, the victims of
sexual violence were attacked by their own neighbours or by individuals from
neighbouring villages. Hence, most of these victims were able to identify their
assailants. In the cases where sexual violence was perpetrated by civilians, this
was often accompanied by other crimes such as theft, arson and other types of
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violence. As a 40 year old married Kikuyu woman from Mombasa229, told the
Commission she was able to identify one of her assailants while being gang
raped because he had worked at the same place. Among her attackers, who
screamed “ODM, ODM” as they stoned and entered the couple’s house she was
able to identify some individuals who also stole both her household and business
properties, torched a sitting shade .., burnt beddings, and slaughtered her three
goats. She subsequently made a police report. None of the looters were arrested
and the rapist was “set free shortly thereafter.”230
Humanitarian Workers and IDP Service Providers
The Commission was told by experts that some women were exposed to sexual
exploitation during their stay at IDP camps. Desperate and vulnerable women
were forced into prostitution to fulfil the need to feed their children, doing
whatever was necessary to do so. The testimony of Millicent Obaso, mentioned
earlier, told the Commission that that some women were subjected to sexual
exploitation by some persons managing the IDP camps in order to access basic
commodities such as food, tents, medicines and beddings. She testified
Commission that:
“Sexual exploitation …is really, using power and authority over
vulnerable people for sexual favours in exchange for services. Here in
Kenya, we saw a lot of that in terms of food distribution. [It is a form
of] forced prostitution of course when women are vulnerable, when
they have to feed their children. So if a man asks them to have sex
even though they may not want to, they will say yes to get the money
and feed their children”.231
It is unfortunate that the Commission did not hear testimonies of the victims of
such types of sexual violence. This could be explained by various factors. There
is a possibility that such witnesses feared that providing such evidence to the
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Commission would jeopardize their situation further. In addition, by the time the
Commission was at the heart of its hearings, many of the victims residing at the
camps and who would have had evidence to that effect, may have been relocated
to other areas under the government programme ‘Operation Rudi Nyumbani’.
Unintended Sexual Consequences of General Violence
The Commission obtained evidence from two men, both residents of Kisumu,
who were victims of police shooting. Although these did not present themselves
as victims of sexual violence, the general violence of which they were victims had
incidental sexual effects. In one case, Gregory Ngoche232 testified that he was
shot by the police while resting in his home with members of his family in
Kisumu. He sustained injuries on his leg and was hospitalized for several days.
As a result of the shooting, he suffered a sexual dysfunction. Another witness,
John Apiyo,233 testified that he worked as an askari in Kisumu and was shot
from behind by a stray police bullet as they tried to deal with a riot within his
place of work. He sustained an injury on his testicles from the shooting and now
has a sexual dysfunction.
Impact of the Victims’ Health and Socio-Economic Conditions
Victims of the post election sexual violence experienced a number of unintended
consequences in the aftermath of being attacked which the Commission heard
about from witnesses who testified and from those who did not but nevertheless
gave statements to its investigators. These consequences included infection with
HIV/Aids, physical injury and psychological
spouses,

trauma,

desertion by their

unwanted pregnancy, and loss of trust that they might have had

previously in state security agencies.
Some victims of sexual violence already had HIV/ AIDs and others contracted it
as a result of being raped and being unable to access medical services in time to
reduce the chances of or prevent infection. In addition, witnesses told the
Commission that even when they advised their perpetrators of their HIV AIDS
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status and showed them their medication, their attackers went on to rape or
gang rape them, thereby perversely choosing to risk becoming infected
themselves. As Millicent Obaso, of Care Kenya explained,
“Some of the women declared to the perpetrators that they were HIV
positive, but the men ignored and went ahead and raped them. My
Lord, this is very dangerous because most of the perpetrators, the
youth gang, were between 20 and 25 years. They have spouses or
they are planning to marry or have wives and they may be spreading
this virus, but who knows, maybe some of these perpetrators
themselves were HIV+ and they also infected the women they raped
who were not HIV+. I would urge my lord that you monitor the
HIV/AIDS prevalence in Mathare and Kibera over the next one year or
two years to see to what extent the prevalence is going up”.
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This same point was reinforced by Dr. Samuel Thenya, who explained that there
“are those who are on HIV treatment or who [were] HIV positive and
they were sexually assaulted. Now call it poetic justice or what you
may, but it means that the person who assaulted them then has also
been exposed to HIV/AIDS. And of course the perpetrators did not
come to us. So you have a group of people out there who assaulted
others who are HIV positive and therefore have been infected with
HIV/AIDS”.235
Many victims of sexual violence were injured extensively and suffered enormous
psychological trauma. A Mathare resident told the Commission that those who
circumcised her also cut her vagina to the extent that the attending doctors told
her it was impossible to stitch her and instead gave her a drug. A 36 year old
woman from Eldama Ravine told the Commission that when she was gang raped:
“it was either the second or the third man who said that he was not
able to get into me properly so they cut me. I think it was the panga
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they were carrying that they used. They cut my vagina.”236In
explaining the extent of the injuries she sustained after being gang
raped by GSU officers, told the Commission237, “...these people hurt
me because at my age I had stopped getting monthly periods. These
days I bleed a lot. I have a smelly watery discharge and I have heavy
bleeding and have sores around my private parts.......I feel a lot of
pain in my private parts especially when I am having periods and I
stopped having periods. This was caused by the men who attacked
me....”238
In describing the psychological r effects of sexual violence, Ms Obaso explained
the encounters of other women who did not appear before the Commission
because of fear and humiliation, as follows:
“This [sexual violence] happened to many. Some women were
seriously violated. They had bottles pushed up their private parts and
others had sticks pushed up into their private parts”239 After
witnessing the extent of the injury that her brother sustained, his
subsequent death and the fact that his remains had been eaten by
dogs

240told

the Commission, “I am traumatised. I usually have bad

dreams. I keep seeing how my brother died in my dreams. Even as I
speak, I fear getting nightmares. I get them every time I narrate the
story. …the day my brother was killed, I wished I could die. I walked
on the road and I was almost knocked by a car”.
The witness also indicated that her nephew (the late brother’s son), one ‘Ochieng
was present when his father was being clobbered and mutilated. He has since
gone mad. He keeps on saying ‘dad they are chopping off your thing [to mean
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penis]’”.241Some victims of sexual violence were raped in the presence of their
family members a situation that traumatised them as well as the members of
their families present during the ordeal. After both she and her daughter were
gang raped with her daughter becoming pregnant and later having a
miscarriage,
traumatized,”

a

witness
something

told

the

which

Commission
the

that

Commission

“[her]
reviewed

children
as

a

were
huge

understatement given the depth of the multiple tragedies visited on victims of
Kenya’s post election sexual violence.
Another horror awaiting victims was the fear of and actual abandonment of rape
victims by their husbands and even other family members which occasioned a
breakdown of families at a time when the very least a victim needed from those
close to her was comfort instead of castigation and additional loss. A witness
from Eldoret who recorded a statement with investigators in Eldoret on 6 August
2008, did not report or seek medical attention after being gang raped for fear
that her husband would beat and abandon her, which he did anyway. Other
witnesses who testified reported being kicked out of their homes or abandoned
when their spouses heard they had been raped.242, Furthermore, when the
parents of a 36 year old married Kikuyu woman originally from Eldama Ravine
with four children, who had been raped by the Kalenjin men who also killed her
husband, heard she had been gang raped and had contracted HIV AIDs, she told
the Commission in testimony and in her statement that her immediate family,
“… started separating themselves from me, “kujitenga”. My parents would not
even use the same utensils that I used. [They] extended the same sort of treatment
to my children…[M]y brother, [name withheld] even sharpened a knife and
threatened to kill me and my children because we (my children and I) were
suffering from AIDS’….. ‘after I got separated from my family members I had been
very lonely. I decided to get myself a partner, a person of similar (HIV) status so
that we could help each other”.243
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In addition, the Commission heard from other witnesses about unwanted
pregnancies, including the cases of two 14 and 16 year old girls who had been
raped after which they found themselves doubly burdened.244
These are a just a few examples of the unbearable and lingering consequences of
the post election sexual violence that witnesses were courageous enough to
recount and explain to the Commission. These same victims of gang rapes,
mutilation, HIV/AIDs, abandonment, psychological trauma, homelessness, loss
of property, and violence-induced poverty are in a state of utter misery, feeling
isolated and lonely. Some still are in constant contact with this Commission’s
psychological counsellor who assisted them when they spoke to its investigators
and testified before the Commission. Furthermore, a culture of distrust in state
security agencies has been heightened now that their role as perpetrators is
more widely known. This also has contributed to the broader culture of impunity
surrounding election related violence in Kenya since the 1990s. Furthermore, it
means that victims of sexual violence are now probably even less likely to report
the crimes against them given the response they received from some of the
security agencies which were supposed to help them rather than attack or abuse
them.
Institutional and Legal Challenges to Responding to Sexual Violence
Other matters affected the proliferation of sexual violence after the 2007 election,
coupled with the seemingly endless spread of post election violence in general,
thereby contributing to a large and unnecessary number of deaths and injuries,
including injuries resulting from sexual violence.
As mentioned elsewhere in the Commission’s report, the delay by government in
responding to the violence when it began, the failure to anticipate it, the
admission by officers in the public administration and security forces of being
overwhelmed, and their lack of coordination in dealing with the violence, all
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meant that law and order increasingly broke down, thereby inviting a further
spread of violence, including sexual violence. As the proprietor of the Pepper Tree
Restaurant in Naivasha noted, violence might have been controlled if security
had been enhanced as it was in Gilgil town where there was a heavy army
presence. This contrasted with neighbouring Naivasha and Nakuru, where there
was no intervention of security agents leading to a resulting free-for-all of
uncontrolled violence. The consequent spillover of the lack of government control
manifested in, roadblocks, lack of security, and lack of transport, all of which
kept victims of sexual violence from getting timely medical care. Furthermore,
this had a spillover effect in that many medical staff personnel were unable to
get to work, there were not enough trained individuals to assist victims, and
drugs often were in short supply.
In addition, the lack of a coordinated government policy, whether agreeing to
keep systematic figures concerning casualties and incidences of sexual violence
rather than ignoring it, as well as not communicating instructions to hospitals
and citizens that medical fees had been waived, meant that some victims of
sexual violence who could have received medical attention did not do so because
they thought they would have to pay with money they did not have.
In spite of the above, many institutions who had no official responsibility to
assist victims of post-election sexual violence offered invaluable humanitarian
assistance. The Commission received evidence of the remarkable work of the
Kenya Red Cross Society, Médecins Sans Frontières, the Nairobi Women’s
Hospital, a number of churches, organizations who came to testify and others
about which the Commission still may be unaware. Some of these groups such
as the Kenya Red Cross provided first aid, tents, food, clothing and helped
survivors reunite with their families, while others, such as the Nairobi Women’s
Hospital served as a front line facility, which gave medical care and psychological
support to victims of sexual violence and engaged in fundraising so that they
could offer their services to victims for free.
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Aside from the above and the Commission’s desire to dig deep into the horrifying
and life altering sexual violence that affected Kenyan women as well as some
men, the Commission itself was challenged stymied by a number of factors. By
definition, its work depended on the information that victims and institutions
were willing to share. However, for the reasons mentioned earlier, many women
and men did not want to speak about what had happened to them either in
public or private whether because of shame, fear, distrust of authorities
including us, their inability to identify perpetrators, or in contrast because of
possible retaliation by those who had attacked them, including people whom
they knew. Others who had never received medical treatment or counselling
worried about being traumatized again if they spoke of what had happened to
them. Even some individuals, who were courageous enough to come forth,
sometimes broke down in the course of testifying. Still others did not want to
give evidence because of cultural sensitivities that included discussing rape in
public. A case in point is Mombasa, where victims feared that they could be
shunned and ostracized by their communities for having lost their virginity
before marriage.

The Commission also faced logistical problems in finding

victims especially those who had fled to other areas or had left for unknown
places after some IDP camps were closed when government began its “Operation
Rudi Nyumbani” resettlement program. Furthermore, given the limited time we
had to collect evidence about sexual violence from victims, the Commission did
not have enough time to verify whether some of what was heard was specifically
related to post-election violence or part of other crimes outside the Commission’s
mandate, an issue that was compounded because most victims did not report
about the sexual violations that they suffered and most did not receive medical
treatment, Reports

would have been a means of verifying their evidence. A

further issue was that most women had little or no information about what to do
or where to go to report violations against them, something compounded by the
response of the police and indifference if not hostility to victims by communities
themselves.
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Legal issues arising from sexual violence in conflict situations also present
another set of challenges in terms of appropriate responses by government and
others. There is a general agreement that sexual violence has been used as a
weapon of war in most conflict situations. While Kenya has ratified a number of
treaties prohibiting violence against women, it either has not incorporated them
into its laws or acted on those parts of the law that reflect them including
Chapter V of the Constitution or the Sexual Offences Act of 2006. Others speak
about other areas where there is an alleged legal lacuna concerning AIDS and
family protection, areas where bills pending before Parliament may assist.
However, the Commission is not of the opinion that sexual violence stemming
from the post election breakdown occurred because of unresolved legal matters.
Rather it is the result, in part, of the failure to enforce laws that have already
been passed by Parliament.

Recommendations
As a result of the Commission’s focus on the sexual violence stemming from the
post electoral violence following the 2007 election, it recommends the following:
In the course of its inquiries, the Commission found that, although the
government hospitals had established Gender Violence Recovery Centers
(GVRCs) offering free medical services to victims of sexual violence, victims of
sexual violence mostly did not know they existed. Hence, at the minimum the
Commission takes the view that citizens should be informed about them in
awareness campaigns, something that is going on already in places like
Mombasa and which will need to be replicated in other parts of the country.
The Commission also believes there a need to establish GVRCs as departments
in every public hospital with their own staff, facilities, and budget. Currently, the
GVRCs fall under other departments and rely on them for funding as well as
personnel, something that has reduced their prominence and ability to provide
services.
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In addition, with some reservations, the Commission proposes the creation of
gender unit/sections within every police station where victims of sexual violence
can be treated with sensitivity and where their cases will be properly recorded
and investigated. Currently the existing units are limited and do not entail any
more than having a female officer available to deal with female victims. However,
for any such unit to be effective would require a complete change in attitude
within the security forces themselves, including the police. Training the police
how to handle cases of sexual violence and in first aid would be of use only if
mechanisms for accountability within the security forces themselves are
established and acted upon. At the very least, this would include police and
other security personnel being severely punished for perpetrating crimes of
sexual violence and being dismissed if they mishandled victims of sexual
violence. In short, new units without new patterns of behaviour and new
sanctions would be utterly useless.
The Commission also encourage Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
working in the health sector to partner with medical institutions and share
information to ensure a swifter and improved response to sexual violence.
The Commission considers there is low level of awareness about the possibility of
help that victims of sexual violence can receive. Further, there no pressure on
the part of law enforcement to do the right thing when dealing with cases of
sexual violence. The Commission, therefore, recommends the establishment,
under Kenyan law, of the office of rapporteur on sexual violence. The
responsibility of the rapporteur will be to highlight, on a continuous basis, the
fact that sexual violence is a serious crime and needs an equally serious
response on the part of law enforcement authorities. The rapportuer should have
an appropriate staff to assist in the discharge of the functions of the office. The
rapportuer should be required and empowered to work with existing government
institutions that address sexual violence, including the courts, the police, and
the National Commission on Gender. The rapporteur should be required to
present, on an annual basis, a report to the National Assembly, outlining a view
on how, during the year, cases of sexual violence were handled.
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That said, in all societies sexual violence and how it is handled is reflective of the
broader social and political culture. In Kenya, the issue has been magnified
because of the diffusion of electoral violence since the 1990s. Hence, ordinary
citizens, including women but also men have been victims of the cannon fodder
of violence perpetrated by politicians. Violence as a whole consequently has
grown unchecked, has become increasingly dispersed, and is a product of a
larger breakdown of order and lawlessness that came to a head after the 2007
election. In this context, the Commission was dismayed and shocked to hear in
graphic detail about the unspeakable horrors of sexual violence visited on the
witnesses who spoke to it as well as the many women and girls and the men and
boys who did not. But, in the end the Commission was also not surprised as the
sexual violence after the election was just one more unspeakable aspect of the
violence that engulfed Kenya following the 2007 election and could do so again
unless checked immediately.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Internally Displaced Persons
Introduction
The point of discussing the plight of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) here is
to make recommendations to promote and enhance their future protection. IDPs
have been defined as, “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or
obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as
a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disaster,
and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border245”
IDPs are the human face of the problem caused by PEV. The extent to which the
problem is or is not addressed will be the barometer by which the government
will be judged in addressing problems and effects of PEV.

Hence, where

possible the Commission visited IDP camps and talked to IDPs specifically about
their problems and experiences.

Moreover, most of the witnesses who

interacted with the Commission had some experience with some form or other of
displacement hence the importance of addressing the issue.

The Commission

went out of its way to hear the evidence from residents of IDP camps and others
who were displaced. However, given the mandate of the Commission, its scope
was limited to IDPs from the PEV.
The Commission was made aware of the fact that internal displacement has
been a permanent feature of Kenya history from colonial times onwards.
Starting with the eviction of natives from their ancestral land to make way for
settlers in colonial Kenya to recent violent evictions accompanying the 1992,
1997 and 2002 election, IDPs have been a constant feature of the country’s
political landscape. Even before the 2007 General Elections there was already a
problem of population displacement as a result of the following factors amongst
others:
245
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(a)

Pre-election violence in Molo district.246

(b)

Border and land disputes in places like the Sondu which is the
confluence of three districts; Nyamira, Nyando and Kericho
occupied by the Kisii, Luo and Kipsigis respectively.247

(c)

Cattle

rustling

and

banditry

in

the

Pokot/Transnzoia,

Transnzoia/Marakwet District border.
(d)

Natural disasters such as drought in large parts of Northern Kenya
that often lead to conflicts over natural resources like water
leading to displacement.248

These multiple causes of displacement make it very difficult to come up with
accurate statistics concerning causs of displacement, gender, age, social and
economic standing. This makes it difficult for both the government to devise
comprehensive

policies

and

interventions

to

deal

effectively

with

IDPs.

According to the government there were 350,000 persons displaced as a result of
PEV after the 2007 elections.249
Some of these already existing causes of population displacement were
exacerbated by the PEV. A particularly disturbing feature of the PEV brought to
our attention is that some of the IDPs have suffered successive displacements as
a result of previous election related violence. Several witnesses testified that they
had suffered multiple evictions in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007.
Extent of Displacement Resulting From the 2007 Election Related Violence
The Commission toured various hotspots of violence and IDP camps to get a
firsthand view of the extent of displacement as well to hear from the IDPs
themselves.

We heard testimony of aspects of flight and departure and the
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struggles endured at the camps.

It was sadly clear to the Commission that

internal displacement as a form of violence has been a permanent feature of the
conflicts in Kenya that have accompanied the transition from a single party to a
multi party system.
The election related 1992 and 1997 “ethnic” clashes resulted in displacement of
thousands of people. According to the Kiliku Report, an estimated 54,000 people
were displaced in the 1992 clashes.250 The Justice Akiwumi led Commission,
which was appointed in 1998 to inquire into the tribal clashes that rocked the
country since 1991 did not make any findings as to the number of persons
displaced as a result of the clashes either in 1992 or 1997.251
The internal displacements following the widespread violence that hit the
country after the announcement of the 2007 presidential election results were,
however, unprecedented in terms of the number of victims and the widespread
nature

of

the

phenomenon.

While

previous

conflicts

led

to

internal

displacements concentrated in the multi ethnic regions of Western, Rift Valley
and Coast, the 2007 PEV resulted in massive country wide forced displacements,
which were urban as well as rural in contrast to the past.
Violent and sudden displacement from a place one considers their home is often
the worst form of loss entailing, as it does, a sense of loss of self. Most of the
IDPs the Commissioners interacted with had no other home apart from the place
they were evicted. Displacement meant not only the loss of a home but loss of
friendships and other relationships, economic and personal, built over many
years, dispersal of relatives, a loss of memories that constituted one’s being.
That most of the displacement was violent in nature aggravated the loss.
Whatever interventions this Commission purposes to alleviate the suffering of
IDPs, it regrettably cannot make up for the mental and psychological trauma
associated with displacement.
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The sudden departure and flight by IDPs was necessary to protect lives. In very
exceptional but isolated cases IDPs succeeded in salvaging property or other
valuable possessions.

IDPs were subjected to violence and in extreme cases

members of families were split up and even a mother lost her child during flight.
“AB was a 46 year old married woman with 9 children. They
were aged 19 years old to 2 ½ years old. She originally lived
in Kipkaren and was a businesswoman in Eldoret town while
her husband was in the matatu business.

In 1992, as a

result of the clashes, her house was burnt and she lost all her
merchandise and belongings. Despite this, she managed to
recover form the ordeal and rebuilt her life once again.

In

2002 she was attacked again and unfortunately her right
hand and breast were burnt.

In 2007, her family was once

again attacked. Her husband and older children managed to
flee once the violence began on 28th December 2007.
stayed behind with her six younger children.

She

At night some

men broke into her house, raped her and beat her. She was
once again burnt when the raiders poured on her the food she
was cooking. The following day, she left her house with her
six children but one got lost in the ordeal. She had to walk up
Eldoret town where she was re-united with her three elder
children. She is now residing at the Eldoret Showground IDP
Camp.
When

asked

what

government, AB said;

recommendations

she

had

for

the

“We would plead to the government to

assist us because right now we have nowhere else to go, we
have nothing.

I don’t have land; I don’t have any money to

start a business. I cannot support myself in any way.

I have

no direction, sometimes I wish I could just die but I remember
that I have children and if I die I do not know who I would leave
my children with.

My children are the one who give me
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strength, they are the one who make me live in this earth.

If I

was alone right now, I would be dead by now.”
In some other cases the departure of individuals stemmed from threats or the
anticipation of violence. However, in most cases IDPs were forcefully evicted
physically through violence against them and the destruction of their property.
Most IDPs left their homes under emergency conditions not knowing where to go
or their ultimate destination. In certain circumstances the IDPs left while under
attack from marauding gangs of youth. The most common destination was a
police station or administration police or chief’s camp, church or trading centre
which were considered secure.

Other persons in distress hid in the bushes and

forests until they felt it was safe to proceed to a place of relative safety.
The Commission was also told of instances where the general public and the
police were fully involved in the evacuation and protection of IDPs.

Individuals

and institutions involved in protecting IDPs should to be commended since this
was fraught with risk particularly during the time of intense violence. According
to Bishop Cornelius Korir, the Catholic Bishop of Eldoret Diocese;
...... [I] asked the watchman (of the church compound) to open the
door in case somebody needs to be rescued so we opened the door
and the people started coming in. I did not know there was fire all
over the place so by evening there was no space here. The church
was packed they slept inside we had the closing prayer on 31st
evening which is 10 o’clock to midnight. There was no space for us
but we said the prayers inside. There was no fighting outside. .......
By 1st [January] more people were coming, 2nd there was no space
here even outside. Even where we were passing there was no space.
People kept on coming and it was tough but it is now ODM and PNU
......... [W]e were getting information, people had been trapped so we
did a lot of evacuation. We were evacuating people using our lorries.
The goodness is that the elders were looking after the people
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especially after this church was burnt with people inside. So of the
people had gone in our churches in the interior parts and the elders
could look after them, feed them and there was a fight between the
youths and elders. The youth want to finish the other group. So the
Kalenjin elders had to look after them. They were really harsh so we
had to do evacuation as far as Plateau, far in and we were using
ourselves and the Kenya Red Cross and the Government.
Duncan Okore, who was the Officer in Charge of the Naivasha Maximum Prison,
instructed his officers to open the doors of the prison compound on 31st
December 2007, to women and children from Naivasha town who came as a
result of threats of violence received. It is important to note that at this stage no
incidents of violence had been reported in Naivasha Town.

According to the

witness, there were no arrangements made to receive IDPs but despite this, the
original 40 to 50 IDPs, mostly women and children, were duly accommodated
within the prison staff canteen and church. From the 27th January 2008, the
prison began to receive more IDPS whose number peaked to about 10,000 on 2nd
February 2008.

Subsequently, the Kenya Red Cross Society, the Catholic

Church, Medicin Sans Frontiers, World Vision came to make an assessment and
provided humanitarian assistance.
IDPs had to find a safe means of transport as well as safe passage to the camps.
Once again ordinary individuals and public officers acted admirably in providing
safe passage for IDPs. Of special mention is the role of the Kenya Armed Forces,
who in their statutory duty of ‘aid to civilian authority”252 provided safe passage
by clearing roads, providing security and ferrying IDPs to safe and secure places.
Settlement Conditions in IDP Camps
The IDPs fled to the nearest places which they considered safe. These were
mainly located in churches, trading centres, chief’s camps, administration police
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camps and police stations. In many areas the camps in which the IDPs initially
settled were the subject of attack or threats of attack by criminal gangs and
marauding youth. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the North Rift
Valley and in Nakuru.
A further characteristic of these camps was that they were ethnically divided
reflecting the ethnic divisions at the time. In Nakuru, when the violence erupted,
the IDPs were initially taken to the police quarters at Kasarani and the Central
Police Station and thereafter relocated to one of two camps. The DC testified that
when the non Kikuyu IDPs were taken to the Nakuru ASK Showground Camp,
they were rejected by the IDPs there and had to be moved. Depending on their
ethnicity, IDPs opted to go to one of two camps. The Luos, Luhyas, Kisiis and a
few Kalenjin were accommodated at the Afraha Stadium IDP camp while the
mostly Kikuyu IDPs chose to proceed to the Nakuru ASK grounds. Only Kisiis
ended up in both camps. The former camp comprised mainly Nakuru town
residents while in the latter IDPs came in from other parts of the Rift Valley.
Coincidentally, this situation mirrored the prevailing political situation.253
In Naivasha, the two main camps established were also ethnically divided. The
Kedong camp consisted mainly of Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjins who were mainly
displaced flower farm workers working in Naivasha while the Naivasha Stadium
camp consisted of Kikuyu’s displaced from other parts of Rift Valley.254

Security
Initially, IDP camps were set up on an ad hoc basis without any planning. The
first port of call was in areas which were considered secure for settlement.
These included police stations, administration camps, trading centres and
churches. However, because these camps were set up in an ad hoc fashion
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security soon became a major concern, with numerous threats of attack coming
from the outside.255 Illustrative of this situation is the testimony of Angelus
Karuru, the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) of Eldoret;
“..... during the skirmishes we were ferrying people from the interior to
various Police Stations and churches. There were various IDP Camps
at the time, we had one at the Divisional headquarters which is at the
Police Station, Holy family Catholic Church we had another one, Soi
Police Station there was also another one, Kipkabus there was
another one and also at Iten Police Station. When we realized that
these people were almost being attacked in these camps, they
requested to be moved to a safer place and that is when we started
moving them to one central place for ease of protection.”
The former Rift Valley Provincial Police Officer told us, the locals around
Kaptagat wanted to attack the IDPs who had sought safety at Kaptagat Police
Station.

The OCS broke all protocol and called the PPO directly and told him,

“Afande, send me reinforcement, these people are going to kill us here.”

The OCS

managed to negotiate with the gangs surrounding the station who allowed the
OCS to give safe passage to the IDPs camped at the station.
IDPs in most camps organised themselves into representative committees to
access services, security and other matters.

Young men were mobilised in what

is commonly referred to as vigilante groups to provide security within the
camps.256

Another security problem was that individuals who had to seek food,

water or other services outside the camps. Here, we received reports that some
women were victims of violence when they sought food or water outside the
camp.257
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Survival and Sustenance
As stated earlier, most IDPs had to leave their home with nothing except the
clothes on their back.

The situation was aggravated during the height of the

violence when basic services were not available and the supply lines were
blocked.

The IDPs depended mainly on relief food and basically had no way of

earning a living.
During the initial stages of the violence, there were concerted efforts by both
local and international NGO’s and well wishers to provide food, water and other
basic needs to the residents in IDP camps. However, as the violence subsided,
the burden of providing sustenance to the IDPs was left mainly to the
Government and the Red Cross. The IDPs complained that the food rations were
drastically reduced.258
Access to other facilities
Evidence

presented

indicated

that

access

to

basic

facilities

such

as

medical/health services, education, social and economic services, was generally
more difficult for IDPs and their families than it was in general

due to the

violence being experienced at the time. A lot of rape victims and those who were
HIV+ did not have access to essential medical services.
Initially, IDPs had to settle at Police Stations, DOs offices and Administration
Police and Chief’s camps which, while secure, were ill suited in other ways. A
witness described the situation at the Naivasha Police Station on 29th January
2008, in the following terms;
“When we arrived at the police station, what I saw was a sea of
people. It was packed with so many people on arrival everybody was
calling me, “ Sister, we are here, we have been here for the last two
days without food, the children are cold, can you get us help”? There
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was a cry from all over. You can imagine the crowd and everybody is
trying to state their needs. I also decided to also talk to the Deputy
OCS and the first thing which I saw was children who were so
dehydrated and I learnt that there was no water because the tank
which was there was empty. I don’t know when water had been
brought to the camp.
So, the first thing was to try to find out who owned that so that we
can mobilize to get water. I was told it belonged to Oserian Flower
Farm which is around the lake and I got some contacts to call. Later I
got a driver and the police promised me security so that we can b able
to get water. So, I asked the parish whether they can allow us to
draw water from the borehole to bring to the police station because
what I saw was so pathetic. So, that is what we did, I got security to
escort the truck and then the driver arrived to go and bring us water.
I also called the DC that same morning and asked for a meeting with
him because I wanted to find out who were the actors on the ground
trying to bring humanitarian services and how can we come in and if
there was anything we could do to ease the suffering of those people.
So, when we met with him he said that the Red Cross were already
on the ground. We told him that we were concerned about the women
and children and we have a hall in the parish and if we could
evacuate the women and children to the Catholic Parish Hall where
there is water and sanitation because the situation at the police
station was deplorable. At that point there were no toilets and you
can imagine with so many people”.
At the camp centres, ad hoc schools were set up for displaced children but they
were hardly equipped to handle students. Most camps had education facilities
for young children but the older primary and secondary school children
presented a greater challenge.259 Due to the existence of free primary school
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education, it was easier to have children admitted to the nearest primary
schools. Hence, for example, children from the Nakuru ASK grounds were readily
admitted to the neighbouring Lenana, Moi and Prison primary schools.260
Police Response
As the influx of IDPs was neither anticipated nor foreseen, there were very few
officers, police or administrative, to guard the IDPs. Hence, decisions had to be
made to move the IDPs to larger more secure camps in urban areas. In any
event, it is understandable that during the time most security officers had been
involved in election and related duties as one witness states;
“Our officers were a bit tired because the campaign period had been
long and they were covering and again there was a holiday in
between which they were alert especially the Christmas and boxing
day and they were also covering the election day at polling stations,
they were there at the counting and tallying of parliamentary and
presidential votes in all polling stations within the district and their
efforts were mainly diverted towards evacuation and saving lived
immediately after the incident”.261
Quite apart from the lack of security to protect convoys of IDPs, the initial
movement of IDPs was hindered by blockage of roads, by menacing gangs and a
lack of adequate means transport.
As we have noted earlier, initial IDP camps were set up within Police Stations
which were wholly unsuited for holding large groups of people.262 Subsequently,
more formal camps were set up as the violence stabilised. Perimeter fences and
security lights were provided in most of the camps with a number of police
officers also patrolling the camps especially at night. However, the general
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complaint was that there were an inadequate number of police officers to provide
sufficient security to the IDPs in camps.263
Government Organisation
On 4th February 2008, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation mediated
by H. E Kofi Annan with the Panel of Eminent African Personalities issued a
statement which set out, amongst others, immediate measures to deal with the
humanitarian crisis gripping the country. The statement set out the framework
for dealing with displaced persons in the following terms;
The final goal of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation is to achieve
sustainable peace, stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of
law and respect for human rights.
1.

With

Respect

to

Immediate

Measures

to

Address

the

Humanitarian Crisis:
a)

Assist and encourage displaced persons to go back to their
homes or other areas and to have safe passage and security
throughout

b)

Provide adequate security and protection, particularly for
vulnerable groups, including women and children in the camps.

c)

Provision of basic services for people in displaced camps:


Ensure that there is adequate food, water, sanitation and
shelter within the affected communities – both those in
displaced

camps

and

those

remaining

in

their

communities.


Provide medical assistance with a special focus for
women, children, people living with HIV and AIDS and
the disabled, currently in displaced camps.
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Ensure all children have access to education. This will
involve reconstruction of schools; encouraging return of
teaching staff and provision of teaching materials, and
assistance for children to return to their learning
institutions.

d)

Provide information centres where the affected can get easy
access to information regarding the assistance that is available
to them and how to access it, for example, support for
reconstruction of livelihoods, or tracing of family members.

e)

Operationalise the Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects
and Resettlement of Victims of Post 2007 Election Violence
expeditiously by establishing a bipartisan, multi-sectoral Board
with streamlined procedures to disburse funds rapidly.

f)

The Fund is open to public contributions and all citizens and
friendly countries, governments and international institutions
to donate generously.

g)

Ensure

close

linkages

with

the

ongoing

national

and

international assistance to enhance the effectiveness of delivery.
h)

Ensure that victims of violence in urban areas are not neglected
in the implementation of the above.

i)

In order to promote food security, displaced farmers should be
assisted to return to their farms. All farmers affected by the
crisis should be assisted and encouraged to safely resume their
farming activities.

The coordinating agency for matters concerning IDPs in Kenya is the Ministry of
State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security through the Disaster
and Emergency Response Co-ordination Department. There is also the Ministry
of State for Special Programmes (MSP).264 While Kenya has specific policies and
interventions to deal with the problems of IDPs, it lacks a legal framework
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governing the issue of IDPs. Hence, a number of issues are dealt with in an ad
hoc manner.
In January 2008, the Ministry for Special Programmes established the
Mitigations and Resettlement Department. The department assists IDPs in
resettling and return to their former livelihoods. This involves amongst others,
the following activities; reconstructions and rehabilitation of destroyed homes,
profiling, provision of transportation, construction of social amenities, and
provision of food.
The Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of
Post-2007 Election Violence265 is also managed by the MSP. The government
formed the advisory Board for the National Humanitarian Fund for the
Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of Post -2007 Election
Violence.266 The government injected an initial amount of Kshs 1 billion in to the
fund and is expected to raise money from other donors. The purpose of the fund
is to, among other things, provide ex-gratia funding for:1. As part of its work, the Resettlement of persons displaced as a result of
post-2007 election violence;
2. The replacement of basic household effects destroyed as a result of 2007
PEV.
3. Enabling the victims of the post 2007 election violence re-start their basic
livelihood.
4. The reconstruction of basic housing, rehabilitation of communities utilities
and institutions destroyed as a result of the 2007 PEV.
MSP drafted the National Disaster Management Policy in April 2007. The policy
deals with a myriad of disasters and is not specifically focused on the problems
of IDPs. There is currently a National Disaster Operations Centre whose role is to
co-ordinate disaster management.267

265

th

Legal Notice no. 11 of 2008 dated 30 January 2008.
th
Gazette Notice no. 1038 of 15 February 2008.
267
Testimony of Dr Hezron Nyangito, PS Ministry of Medical Services. CW 28.
266

284

Dr Sam Thenya, the Director of Nairobi Women’s Hospital, speaking of his
interaction with the centre stated as follows;
“Without giving excuses, the post election violence caught us all
unawares, but the general response was that when we called on the
National Disaster Management Committee or whatever they are called
….. they asked us what did we expect them to do and my
understanding would be they would be telling us what to do”.
The obvious conclusion from that interaction is that there exists a gap in the
level of response to disasters including one that makes specific reference to
problems related to IDPs.
At the district level, we found that most areas had a Disaster Management
Committee constituted to deal with the humanitarian issues related to PEV.
While initial arrangements were usually made by the DC and the DSCI, they also
set up committees to deal with IDPs but the membership of those committees
was fluid and varied from district to district. Augustine Kimantirie Nthiga, the
OCPD Kisii Central District gave an account of how arrangements were made;
“When we started receiving IDPs, the DSIC met and we discovered we
needed to have the people close ranks in Kisii. So we called the
businessmen, the medical practitioners and the disaster management
committee. We also called church elders for those who could have
knowledge of counselling because those who were arriving were giving
different stories and we felt that they required counselling.

So we

called and formed lots of committees, also sub-committees to feed IDPs
who were arriving with nothing”.
In Nakuru, the District Commissioner gave evidence that the Disaster Committee
was composed of government officials, the Nakuru Business Association
membership, local and international NGOs led by the Kenya Red Cross Society,
and the churches.
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Special mention must be made of the Kenya Red Cross Society. The Kenya Red
Cross Society was the lead co-ordinating agency for relief and humanitarian
efforts throughout the PEV period. Set up by an Act of Parliament, it
nevertheless operates independently and in conformity with the principles of the
Red Cross Movement.268

Their efforts and those of their volunteers must be

recognised and commended. We also wish to commend the efforts of various
international and local NGOs who stepped up to the call to assist Kenyans in
distress.
Government Response to IDP Crisis
The intensity of the PEV, confronted the government with a rare dilemma about
how to approach the displacements that were occurring. There were reports,
exhibits and testimonies from authorities on the government’s lack of
preparedness to deal with the initial IDP crisis. The general consensus among
government officials was that whereas violence after the general election was
anticipated, the magnitude of the violence was not and was overwhelming. This
problem notwithstanding, the government success or failure to deal with the PEV
crisis will be judged by the number of IDP camps standing.
During the Commission’s consultations and hearings, two groups of IDPs with
competing or divergent interests emerged; those in camps and those who had
been reintegrated within various communities.

Because of their visibility, the

problems of those in camps could easily be identified and dealt with. Further,
mobilisation among those in camps was much easier as evidenced by the fact
that most camps we visited had constituted representative groups. On the other
hand, the re-integrated IDPs were dispersed, not easily identifiable and because
of their dispersal, they could not easily be found to present their grievances.
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The government asserted the constitutional right of every Kenyan to acquire
property and live in any part of the country. Hence its policy on resettlement was
largely governed by this principle. For example, the DC of Kipkelion testified
that, “it was not the intention of the government to move people from their homes
or from their farms.”269 A clearer statement of the government policy came from
the DC of Naivasha, Mr Katee. In the following verbatim exchange;
Mr David Majanja:

............ There was information that it is no

government policy to transport people back to their ancestral homes. Is
that the position?
Mr Katee Mwanza: Yes, my Lord, at least at the time although the
transport was not there. We were saying that as Government we will
look like we have been defeated by the situation, by saying A says
move out, then we assist person B to move out.

We are saying as a

Government we are agreeing with what the A says.

So in this we

would have looked very bad and we start now transporting people from
outside Naivasha while these people, my Lord, you know some of them
have been here for more than 20, 30 years. They have been working
here they earn their livelihood. No to kick these people out to take them
to a rural area where there is no source of livelihood, then you are
pushing them into a grave without any alternative.
Mr David Majanja:

So it is the Government policy to take them

back where they were removed.
Mr Katee Mwanza:

It is the Government policy to take them back

where they were removed. Indeed that is why my Lord, I requested
Kedong Ranch which is a private organisation to give us part of their
land so that we could construct the tents for our people.
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We knew

these people provided labour for the flower farms. They also earn some
revenue. Now to take them to Kisumu, would mean the end of the road.
The general perception amongst the IDPs was that the government was keen to
resettle those who had land hence there was a great expectation that IDPs would
be resettled by being given land. This is captured by the sentiments of the
Nakuru ASK IDPs who recommended that, ‘the government firstly relocates the
IDPs to some safe area until a lasting solution is found. The government should
use the Ksh. 10,000 it is offering to IDPs to purchase a piece of land for them as
stop gap measure.”270
The main challenge for re-settlement is to guarantee security in areas from
which IDPs were displaced and help them reconstruct of their lives. One witness
stated that that the reasons IDPs do not want to go back is that, “if they went
back, their neighbours are the same people who killed them. They cannot go and
stay in a tent because an arrow can penetrate the tent.”271 The success of this
effort would largely depend on peace and reconciliation efforts.
For the IDPs who remain in camps, the problem of re-settlement continues even
upto now. According to a witness, Mr Peter Kariuki, who was at the material
time the chairman of ASK Ground Nakuru IDP camp, the camp had about
10,200 people comprising the following; 10% were land owners, 60% were tenant
farmers; 25% businessmen and women and 5% squatters.272

Obviously, it

would be easy to identify and assist individuals needing to be resettled on their
own property once a level of security was guaranteed.

However, finding

solutions for the remaining 90% is more difficult. Other than paying them
outright, the government would need to find ways to assist them including
providing start up capital on concessionary terms.
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The reintegrated IDPs also face problems as illustrated by the evidence of

Ms

Asha Katheri Kiva,273 who was the Borabu District Commissioner just after the
election. She testified her district, situated along the volatile Kisii-Sotik border
received a few IDPs who went to camps in Keroka. However, it was clear from
subsequent witnesses that most IDPs from the Sotik side of the border, who
were predominantly Kisii, were easily accommodated by family and friends.274
They were initially given food rations by the government when the violence
started but no further interventions were made despite various entreaties to the
government to look into their plight. Similarly, the most of the Kipsigis displaced
during the skirmishes along the Sotik-Borabu border did not proceed to camps
but were housed by their neighbours and relatives.275
At the peak of the PEV, Nyanza province received 129,821 IDPs. The Provincial
Commissioner told the us that, “ they were popularly known as returnees, that is,
people from Nyanza Province who were coming back to Nyanza presumably
because they had been ejected from other provinces or they feared to continue
staying in other provinces. They are not in camps; they are living with their
relatives and friends. Some have hired places to stay in the province.” The PC
gave testimony that to assist these returnees he had to give blanket orders that
their children be admitted to school immediately.
In April 2008, the government engaged in operation rudi nyumbani (operation
return home). The aim of the operation was to encourage the IDPs to return to
their homes. As part of operation rudi nyumbani the following interventions were
made;276


Payment of Kshs. 10,000.00 to persons leaving the camp.



Provision of transport to home areas.
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Relocation to transitional camps nearer farms and areas of displacement
while awaiting provision of proper housing.



Provision of building materials.



Provision of seed, fertilizer and ploughing services.

The Commissioners visited North Kisii farm in Geta Sub sub-location of
Cherengany Division of Trans Nzoia East District.277 According to evidence
received, on 2nd January 2008, hundreds of armed youth invaded the farm and
burnt over 100 houses. Two people were also shot dead with poisoned arrows.
The farm residents abandoned their homes for temporary encampment at the
neighbouring trading centre.278 By the time the Commissioners visited the farm,
most of the residents had been resettled by the government which provided
construction materials, ploughing facilities, fertilizers and seed. They residents
were expecting the sum of Kshs. 10,000.00 to be paid shortly thereafter. The
residents of that farm were on the wholly satisfied with the measures taken by
the government to deal with their plight.
According to the government, as at 8th July 2008, 210,594 IDPs had been
resettled leaving 21,431 in camps. The resettlement programme cost the
government an estimated Kshs. 30 billion.
Because of time limitations, we were unable to assess the overall success,
efficacy and other matters related to Operation Rudi Nyumbani. However, certain
complaints stand out. Firstly, the sum of Kshs. 10,000 given per family is too
little given the losses suffered by the IDPs. We also received reports from IDPs
that they had no choice but accept the resettlement. They also indicated that
this was used as a means of getting the IDPs to leave the camps. This took the
form of a coincidence between the launch of the program and a shortage in basic
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amenities such as water and the intention and scheduled closure of camps have
left IDPs no choice but accept the government handouts.279
Conclusion and Recommendations
As we have stated previously, the subject of IDPs is not a new phenomenon in
Kenya, it is not one that neither lacks political recognition nor prescribed
solutions. Indeed the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Country Report
of the Republic of Kenya280 prepared in May 2006 recognised the problem. We
quote the relevant paragraphs of the report:
APRM: Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya
[.....]
3.1.9. OBJECTIVE 9: TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS
OF
VULNERABLE
GROUPS,
INCLUDING
INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND DISABLED PERSONS
i. Summary of the Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR)
Internally Displaced Persons
Regarding the internally displaced persons who are forced to migrate
from their natural locations due to clashes, the report reveals that,
in contrast to refugees, they lack adequate relief support and
security, and only receive occasional food and blankets from
politicians without any follow up. In addition, there is no
resettlement or economic programmes to aid them.
Vulnerable groups in the report were characterized as those groups
marginalised from the mainstream society and, due to years of
neglect, do not fit into society at a political, economic or social level.
The report asserts that this group is numerically a minority, and
identifies the Yaaku, Galjeel, Ogiek and Endoris in this regard. The
Yakus were evicted from the forest where they had been better
protected. During the screening of Somalis, the Galjeel had their
identity cards confiscated, were asked by police to leave for Somalia
, and, as the report indicates, were also attacked by security forces
in August 2005. The Ogiek have lodged a lawsuit to resist the
Government’s decision to evict them from their ancestral homes. The
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report states that little protection or special polices have been
designed to address the needs of these vulnerable groups.
[…]
ii. Findings of the Country Review Mechanism (CRM)
[…]
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
The CRM visit to Nyeri Provincial Headquarters confirmed that IDPS
were scattered in the Rift Valley districts of Kirinyaga, Thika and
Muranga and resided in the slums. No government resettlement
policy or development programmes had been put in place at
Provincial level, and after the clashes, the district leaders had
encouraged the IDPs, in the absence of any resettlement measures,
to go back to their former dwellings. The inaction displayed by the
district leadership in integrating the IDPs into the mainstream
society has implications for long-term reconciliation of ethnic groups
in Kenya, and poses a challenge for unity and nation building. The
lack of concerted central Government policies and interventions to
alleviate the plight of certain segments of society following conflict is
likely to be taken advantage of at the local level to the detriment of
vulnerable groups like IDPs.
iii. Recommendations
The Panel recommends the following:
• The Government of Kenya to enact and implement a clear policy on
refugees and internally displaced persons [Government of Kenya].
[…]

A further review of the implementation of the APRM for the period June 2006 –
June 2008,281 in respect of promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable
groups including internally displace persons and refugees addressed the issue as
follows;
[...]
3.10 Objective Nine: Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Including Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees

Vulnerable Groups

The Government, through various poverty reduction programmes such as HIV/AIDS, ASAL
programmes and educational bursary funds has focused on mainstreaming the vulnerable
groups (including orphans of HIV/AIDS, the youth, women, the physically challenged, older
persons and the ageing) to participate fully in national development agenda.
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This objective called for mechanisms to protect the rights of the vulnerable groups through:
i.
ii.
iii.

Enactment and implementation of policies and programmes aimed at
empowering and protecting the rights of vulnerable groups;
Stepping up security and strengthening response capacity of law
enforcement agencies in conflict prone areas;
Streamlining
immigration,
screening
procedures
and
eliminating
discriminatory screening practises.

The Government has also achieved the following:
•
•
•

It has introduced Development Interventions Programme in the North Rift districts to
compliment the disarmament programme during the year 2006/07
It has promulgated the Refugees Act, 2006 into law on 30th December, 2006. This
provides for the recognition, protection and management of refugees within the
country
It has given the concern about the problem of squatters and internally displaced
persons, and as a follow-up of the planning in the period 2006/07; Ksh 1.3 billion
has been set aside in the 2007/08 fiscal year to acquire land for settling them. With
allocation of land parcels, those affected are expected to improve their living
standards, increase food safety and be able to share in the growth of the country.

Following the post election crisis, Kenya found itself with an unprecedented number of IDPs
including children, women and people with disabilities. The Government in response to this
established 181 IDP camps located in various parts of the country to accommodate the
350,000 displaced persons.
The following measures have been undertaken in respect to the post-election IDPs:
•
•
•
•
•

•

With the help of the Red Cross, the Government provided food, drugs including
ARVs, clothing, blankets and other requirements to the IDPs.
The President, the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet visited the IDPs
Restoration of security in the affected areas
Resettlement of 106,651 of IDPs by mid May 2008
The Government has raised Kshs 457 Million out of the required Ksh 31 Billion for
the resettlement of IDPs as proposed in the National Reconciliation and Emergency
Social and Economic Recovery (NRESER) Plan.
The Government has urged members of parliament and local leaders to preach and
promote peace among affected communities

From the evidence we have gathered so far, there exists sufficient basis for
enacting a clear policy and legal framework for dealing with the IDPs.282
Moreover, the UN Guiding Principles on IDPs provide the necessary parameters
for such policy and legislative interventions. The guidelines oblige state parties to
ensure protection of and assistance to IDPs in all phases of displacement. While
there are coordinating organs for dealing with emergency situations, it is now
282
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imperative to put the problem of IDPs on a sound statutory footing where lines of
authority and responsibilities are assigned.

There is no reason why such an

enactment cannot be put in place within the next four months, and we so
recommend.
Secondly, we think that the statement issued by the Kenya Dialogue and
Reconciliation on 4th April 2008 provides a sufficient basis for providing a
benchmark for the needs of those displaced by PEV. An urgent evaluation needs
to be carried out to assess the effectiveness of the current programs in place to
address the plight of IDPs. Such a process needs to be carried out in an open
and transparent manner involving all the stakeholders. We recommend the
process commences immediately.
As the problem of IDPs has been with us for ages and is not going to be wiped
out with a magic wand, we recommend that the issue be submitted to the
Justice and Reconciliation Commission for follow up.
Lastly, we conclude that the successful return of IDPs will be based on three
outcomes namely the safety of returnees, restitution and return of property to
the displaced and the creation of an economic, social and political environment
that sustains them.

There is clearly a consensus that unless the root causes

that led to internal displacement are resolved, the problem of displacement will
continue to haunt us for a long time. And that is the duty of every Kenyan.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Media and the Post Election Violence
Before, during, and after the elections, politicians, government, NGOs, members
of the media itself, and parts of the public, all had views about whether and how
the spread of information through the print and broadcast media had
contributed to the 2007 post election violence. The Commission asked a number
of individuals to testify before it concerning the role of the media in the postelection violence.
The Commission therefore invited the Permanent Secretary from the Ministry of
Information and Communications, the Attorney General, and the Chair of the
Editors’ Guild, who also is the Managing Editor of the Nation Group, to testify
before it to solicit their views. Furthermore, a number of members of the public
who were victims or witnesses to the post-election violence outlined their
experiences to the Commission both in formal testimony and in other statements
to its investigators.
Many recalled with horror, fear, and disgust the negative and inflammatory role
of vernacular radio stations in their testimony and statements to the
Commission. In particular, they singled out KASS FM as having contributed to a
climate of hate, negative ethnicity, and having incited violence in the Rift Valley.
However there were also similar complaints in other parts of the country even
though they did not come directly to the attention of the Commission. These
included the vernacular music and negative ethnicity allegedly coming from
Kikuyu FM stations including Kameme, Inooro, Coro, and others in other
different parts of the country. This was mentioned critically in various sections of
Exhibit no. 125, the KNCHR’s report on Kenya’s post 2007 election violence.
Dr. Bitange Ndemo, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information and
Communications testified before us. He told the Commission that the media had
been controlled by the state formally from the 1930s until the mid- 1990s. He
explained that as KANU still was in power up to 2002, the expanding media
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continued to be subject to harassment, torture, imprisonment, and fines for
expressing their views. Censorship and self censorship also ensued, stemming
from fear of reprisals by the state. Dr. Ndemo told us that various media outlets
continued to voice the views of the ruling party KANU as late as the 1990s even
following the 1991 repeal of section 2A of the constitution and the return to
multi party democracy in Kenya. The witness noted that only after the 2002
election did the Government engage in a process of liberalization. This included
licensing many new stations, something he told us that positively affected all
parts of the media.
However, the witness mentioned that these changes took place in the absence of
a new regulatory and legislative framework, leading to something of an
uncontrolled free for all. In Dr. Ndemo’s view some media took advantage of this
lacuna and began to “operate freely and sometimes recklessly and irresponsibly”
including using individuals who were not trained journalists, who were partisan,
and sometimes were politically biased. In his statement to us he argued that
media houses took sides in the run up to the 2007 election, that there were
complaints that “most editors had been compromised”, and that “some media
houses became sensational and unnecessarily alarmed their audiences and
inflamed their passions”. He told the Commission that the live broadcast of vote
tallying of the 2007 election results at the KICC and the visible acrimony of
political leaders inflamed tensions, bringing “the country to the brink”. Faced
with an unprecedented outbreak of violence following the announcement of the
presidential results and threats of more violence, the witness said the Ministry
asked the media houses to desist from live broadcasts concerning politics even
though the Ministry itself had no way of fully enforcing its demand legally.
Instead, in the end, it was the Ministry of Internal Security which told the
Ministry of Information it wanted to invoke Section 88 of the Kenyan
Communications Act, to which the latter complied. In his testimony to the
Commission, Amos Wako, Kenya’s Attorney General stated emphatically that
“the ban was not proper”, was unconstitutional, and “definitely illegal”, an
opinion he conveyed in writing to the above ministries.
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The Commission also heard from the PS of the Ministry of Information and
Communications that it “found itself constrained to control FM media content at
the height of the post-election violence” as reputable media outlets around the
world used headlines like “Hate radio spreads new wave of violence in Kenya”.
After banning live political broadcasts by the media” on 31 December 2007, the
PS told the Commission they were criticized and resisted by the newspapers. The
witness explained to the Commission that the Ministry felt it was being criticized
unfairly on all sides: initially for not having done anything to “curb all the hate
radio” (later admitting the Ministry has the “power to license and cancel them”)
even though the Ministry had reprimanded “some of the worst offenders”, and
then later for banning live political broadcasts, which the Ministry also felt was
fuelling violence.
Dr. Ndemo told the Commission that he believed the actions taken by his
Ministry were in “good faith” and with the “overriding national interest in mind.”
He also said that there was “a need for a legislative framework governing the
media…underscored by media misconduct during the post-election violence”.
Nevertheless, he noted that the Ministry has continued to work with the existing
Media Council established under the Media Act and also has a variety of
informal forums through which it interacts with the media.
In addition, the Commission heard testimony from Macharia Gaitho, Chairman
of the Kenya Editors’ Guild. He told us that while the media had been “accused
of playing a part in fanning the [post election] violence” the accusations were not
specific and in his opinion came from various sides of the political spectrum
which were aggrieved because they felt they were not supported by the media. He
disagreed with Dr. Ndemo concerning the alleged partisanship of the media,
claiming it was very diverse, also stating that there was nothing wrong in taking
sides or positions as long as that was made clear to the reader. Contrary to the
PS, he thought the “media [had] played a very critical role in lessening tensions”.
In fact, he told us that in his opinion the media had acted very responsibly by
not airing the many inflammatory statements made by politicians designed to
incite people. Later, he explained that it might have been better if the media had
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aired more rather than fewer inflammatory statements by politicians who then
would have been exposed to the public for who they were.
Mr. Gaitho also reminded us that the media had used discretion in what it
printed and also noted that the ban, advocated by the PS of Information and
Communications against the media was eventually declared illegal, noting:
“People were talking about going to war, people were talking opening
about resisting and a civil war and all those kinds of things. Some of
those statements from very senior political leaders may have slipped
thought but I would say 90% of them were caught before they were
aired or published….We are seeing a situation where politicians
create a problem, politicians promote violence, politicians incite the
people and then when things do not go their way they start to blame
the media. That ban as we all know was unconstitutional, it was
illegal; the Editor’s Guild joined up with the Media Institute and went
to court and just before the hearing the Attorney General, the
government, revoked the ban and we went back to live broadcasting
and what was not acknowledged during that period is the role, very
positive role the media played in calming tensions.”
In contrast to the PS of Information and Communications, Mr. Gaitho argued
that cutting off live broadcasts from the KICC concerning the results of the
election “contributed much more to raising tension than continuing those
broadcasts, because then people started wondering what is happening”. The
witness explained to the Commission that the Editors’ Guild also supported
legislation against hate speech although he was not in favor of clamping down
totally against FM stations.
The Commission received testimony and other statements from a number of
individuals who included government officials, victims of the violence, and
witnesses to it. In particular, they singled out KASS FM, a Kalenjin language fm
station, for escalating the climate of hate and inciting violence, a phenomenon
that apparently occurred on other FM stations in other parts of the country too.
Witnesses made specific reference to KASS FM. They claimed KASS FM in
conjunction with politicians used derogatory language against Kikuyus, mouthed
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hate speech, and routinely called for their eviction, thereby helping to build up
tensions that eventually exploded in violence.
Dr. Bitange Ndemo submitted to the Commission of letters and internal memos
his Ministry had received from two pastors, one voicing concern about the KASS
FM breakfast show “Lee Nee Emeet” on 19 February 2007and another on 29
November 2007, complaining about various aspects of Kiss FM, Classic FM, and
Easy FM, including their promotion of “ethnic tension”. On 26 November 2007,
Dr. Ndemo wrote back to the first letter writer with a c/c to the Media Council of
Kenya, stating that “We are equally appalled by the presentations in various FM
stations and as per the law we can only complain to the Media Council. We have
therefore forwarded your letter to the Media Council”. Later on 12 February 2008,
the Media Monitoring Unit in the Ministry alerted him “that some individuals are
circulating e- mail messages which are a threat to law and order as well as
peaceful co-existence between Kalenjins and Kikuyus”. The email of 18 January
2008, attached to the memo called the law which allows all Kenyans to live in
any part of the country a “legal error in our [the Kalenjin’s] history”. It also argued
that Kalenjin have been systematically marginalized in terms of education, the
distribution of social services and infrastructure, unemployment and called for
the community to “defend ourselves to the bitter end” “urg[ing] our people to
ensure that every family is fully equipped with our normal tools; if we can afford,
ferry two warriors from upcountry fully armed and house them until we have this
thing sorted out”.
Correspondence submitted to the Commission by the Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting from May-August 2008, containing a few letters between the
Ministry and the Media Council, internal memos within the Ministry and
between the Ministry and the National Peace Forum

principally focuses on

KASS FM, but also mention a Luo station named Nam Lolwe and a Kikuyu FM
vernacular radio station, Inooro FM, which the Ministry thought could “entice
more youth to join the sect [Mungiki] that continues to pose security challenges to
the country”. With respect to KASS FM the Ministry found the international
transcript from 2 May 2008 “was inciting the public to violence” and
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communicated its views to the Media Council. In August, after having used a
firm, also hired by UNDP earlier to monitor KASS FM in the run up to the
December 27, 2007 election, the Media Council decided that Kass FM was
innocent of the charges of airing and inciting and inflammatory live broadcasts
on 31 May and 16 June 2008, but was found to be “negligent” in the way it
handled its discussions with its callers”. The Attorney General wrote to the PS in
the Ministry of Information and Planning on 17 July saying that it believed KASS
FM had “breached the provisions of the Media Act 2007 and specifically clause II
Section (a) of the Second Schedule”.
At the local level, the District Commissioner for Koibatek in the Central Rift
Valley testified to the Commission that “the vernacular radio stations did not do
a service to this country” and said “I have not heard any vernacular station
condemning the violence we had in this country. He told us he knew the
“message was not very good”, but “admitted not having monitored the radio
stations to find out what they were actually saying” since he did not understand
Kalenjin. He admitted that he did not have specific examples of what actually
was said either by KASS FM or by Changey FM, the two vernacular stations in
his area, nevertheless adding that “it is common knowledge that this is what
happened”, referring to the hate and incitement allegedly propagated by Kass
FM. In our view the D.C.’s failure to monitor the stations and obtain transcripts
from them to substantiate allegations made concerning what they said and what
activities they were engaged in meant that we were unable to substantiate his
views.
Bernard Kinyua, the D.C. for Uasin Gishu in the North Rift described a similar
scenario. When asked under cross examination whether any inciters were
arrested, any complaints were made, or any action taken once he became aware
of the problem, he told us, “I think the inciters were many. We had the media,
radios and such are not institutions that we were in a position to deal with,”
adding “We did not complain about the media, we did not complain about the
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general incitement that was there because it was obvious, it was very clear that
there were outbursts by politicians during campaigns.”
To compensate for the above lack of hard data, the Commission itself attempted
to obtain tapes of some FM radio stations from a variety of sources beginning
with the Ministry of Information and Communications. In his testimony to the
Commission, Dr. Ndemo said he would provide the Commission with tapes from
the Ministry’s monitoring from KASS FM from October 2007 until March 2008.
The Commission did receive some selected tapes from the Ministry, but only
starting from 18 February 2008. Our various attempts to obtain tapes from other
sources were also unsuccessful. These included unmet requests for tapes or
transcripts from FM vernacular stations to Strategic Relations and Research
Limited, a firm contracted by the UNDP to monitor the media during the 2007
election, the Communication’s Council of Kenya (CCK), and the KNCHR. The
result is that the Commission was unable to acquire any tapes or transcripts by
KASS FM or other FM vernacular stations from before, during, or immediately
after the 2007 election. Hence, to some extent the Commission’s situation is not
dissimilar to that of the DC for Koibatek: it heard many allegations of what was
said, but it does not have the actual transcripts of who said exactly what during
this very critical period.
Beyond this, one transcript the Commission received from the Ministry of
Information and Communication KASS FM’s Broadcast on 18 February 2008,
said various organizations were already conducting investigations into the postelection violence. It exhorted listeners to be cautious to whom they spoke about
these matters. It suggested that just speaking to anyone without knowing who
they are might cause them problems or be incriminating and that it might be
better for them to tell those who wanted information to see the chief or some
other opinion leader rather than answering questions themselves. As it noted,
“You may answer [a] question whose answer will in future spell doom for you”
“Be very careful and refer the investigators to political leaders, chiefs or church
leaders to answer the questions.” Also, it told his listeners “You may be asked to
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explain how a neighbour of yours left his farm or property and then you answer
in a manner that will later place you in an awkward position. I am not saying
you conceal the truth, but tell the truth if you have been appointed to undertake
that particular duty because not everybody should talk” “Some of you may be
offered money for information and then tomorrow you are in a very difficult
situation”. It added that given “the way the country is now, nobody likes you”,
pleading with listeners to “be careful”, noting that “not everybody who is
investigating is doing so in good faith, some will be doing so to incriminate some
particular people or community in the…violence”.
The Media Monitoring Unit in the Ministry of Information and Communication in
a memo it passed on to the Commission recommended that “Kass FM should be
held to explain why they are barring members of the community from disclosing
whatever they know about the post election violence.” They also noted that “The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other agencies interested in knowing
the truth on what happened in the run-up to the December general election and
the resultant post elections violence will not receive co-operation of the members
of the community at all” adding, “So what is the station hiding”.
Some few exceptions to the above generalization of no concrete information are
two examples of FM hate speech the Commission received. One from Bahasha
FM in Nakuru , recorded at 8 a.m. on 30 January 2008 and received by the
KNCHR notes, “Kikuyu are like mongoose which is ready to eat chickens. All
other tribes, i.e. Luo, Kisii, Luhyas are all animals in the forest. They cannot be
able to lead this country like Kikuyus”. Second, Nam Lolwe Station in Kisumu
broadcast the following from an anonymous caller “Our people are dying in
Naivasha and Nakuru and some other tribes are living with us. They should be
flashed (sic) out those who don’t belong to this town.”
The Commission would have liked to have thoroughly analyzed a full body of
transcripts from Kenya’s vernacular FM stations given the allegations against
them made by a number of the Commission’s witnesses.
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In his testimony to the Commission, Kenya’s Attorney General, Amos Wako
stated that in his opinion “the recent post- election violence” “w[as]coming very
close to…crimes against humanity”, a point he told us he made elsewhere as
early as 3 January 2008. The KNCHR goes one step further than the Attorney
General, arguing that “the violence following the 2007 General Election meets
the criteria of crimes against humanity under Customary International Law in so
far as it involved conduct including the multiple commission of acts of
inhumanity against civilian populations, pursuant to or in furtherance of an
organizational policy to commit such attacks in the theatres of violence.”283
That said, and with the full recognition of how close to the edge Kenya came
during the 2007 post election violence, the Commission would not recommend a
free for all monitoring of the press and other media. This would have the
negative potential of taking the country back to the draconian days of a state
controlled media, from which it has so recently just barely escaped. However, the
Commission does believe that speech in the media, including in vernacular FM
radio stations, aiming to foment ethnic hatred and/or incite, organize, or plan
for violence should be investigated thoroughly in a timely fashion when it occurs.
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Exhibit no. 125, p. 149 and pp. 144‐50.
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CHAPTER NINE
Extent and Consequences of the Post-Election Violence:
Deaths, Injuries and Destruction of Property

Deaths and Injuries
Loss of life through conflict is a measure of the scale of conflict hence the need to
ascertain the number and causes of death. Further, it is a recognition that
conflict is basically about human life and all else is secondary. The Commission
also understood its terms of reference as requiring it to “establish the facts and
circumstances surrounding the post election violence”. This means that we had
to establish the number of persons who died and those who were injured as a
result of the post election violence.
The Akiwumi Commission, which investigated the tribal clashes occurring in
country since 1991, did not aggregate data in respect of the clashes. The Kiliku
Report which also investigated ethnic clashes in 1992 documented 779 deaths
and 654 injuries in the districts that were the subject of the inquiry.284

Dr. Hezron Nyangito, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Medical Services,
gave evidence to the effect that his Ministry established several committees to
deal with, among other issues, the preservation and disposal of bodies and to
ensure that that post mortems were carried out. He emphasized that, “in the
case of post election violence, we gave instructions that we have to record it. This
is because we appreciated the fact that the violence of this nature and therefore
we had to do all we could to document those whose indications were victims of
post election violence.” Most of the medical officers who testified confirmed that
this was the position. Moreover, we were the Commission was informed that it
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Exhibit 136A at Page 78.
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was normal practice to take the history of the victim, his or her relatives to
determine the circumstances of death and therefore determine whether the
death or injury was as a result of PEV.
The multiple-cause-of-death information from 1,133 deaths was in respect of the
period between 27th December 2007 and 29th February 2008 which is the period
that the Commission has considered covering reflected the post election violence.
The period was merely indicative of the period when the PEV began and ended.
In seeking this evidence, the Commission relied upon information provided by
respective hospitals in the five provinces under inquiry. These were: Western,
Rift Valley, Nyanza, Nairobi and Coast.
The twenty nine districts covered are Bomet, Bungoma, Bureti, Busia,
Eldamaravine, Homabay, Kakamega, Kericho, Kiambu West, Kipkelion, Kisii,
Kisumu, Litein, Migori/Rongo, Mombasa, Mumias, Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru,
Nandi North Narok, Nyandarua South, Siaya, Sotik, Suba, Trans Nzoia, Uasin
Gishu, Vihiga and Webuye.
In analyzing the deaths, the Commission relied on specific sources of data,
including:
•

Medical and post-mortem reports submitted to the Commission by various
medical officers and government doctors and the Ministry of Medical
Services.

•

Various police returns, reports and statements submitted by Officers
Commanding Police Divisions (OCPDs).

•

Reports received from private hospitals and institutions.

•

Various witness statements, depositions and oral testimony.

In order to compile this report, multiple-cause records cited above were reviewed
and then linked with various other records on the corresponding individual
death records. Thus, data on age at death, sex and other variables, where
available, were added to each record on the multiple-cause file.
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The Police, according to Commissioner of Police, Maj. Gen. Hussein Ali,
documented 616 deaths as having occurred during post- election violence period
at the date of his evidence..285 The Commissioner of Police was emphatic that
only the police could give authoritative figures for those who died as a result of
PEV.286
While Commission has tried to establish the true extent of deaths and injuries
we recognize that for various reasons not all deaths that occurred as a result of
the post election violence may have been captured for various reasons.

Some of

the these reasons include the following:
a) Some deaths may not have been reported to the hospitals or to police
stations due to the prevailing security concerns situation at the time.
b) In many cases those who were injured did not report to hospital or health
centres for fear of their safety or because in the ordinary scheme of things
the injuries were considered minor compared to other problems being
experienced at the time;
c) In some cases injuries were not properly documented due to the fact that
hospitals were understaffed and supply of drugs and other medical
supplies were disrupted.287
d) In some instances, patient referrals were problematic as some roads were
blocked paralyzing efficiency in documentation of injuries. and violence. 288
e) Injured persons may have sought alternative medical attention, for
example, through traditional healers or unlicensed practitioners.
After considering all the available evidence before us as a whole, the Commission
concludes that it is unlikely that there would be any more or less deaths than
those reported to the Commission. It is unlikely that given the publicity given to
this Commission, existing evidence and information of undocumented deaths
would not have been brought to our attention.
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CW 1, Exhibit 1
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CW 63, Statement, Exhibit 63
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Because

of

the

lack

of

uniform

reporting

requirements,

some

of

the

documentation the Commission examined lacked all the details relating to the
person injured or deceased. For example, the age of the person would be
missing, or because of the situation prevailing at the time, the precise date or
time or place of death could not be ascertained.

In some cases, only a

preliminary cause of death could only be determined without the confirmation of
a properly conducted post mortem. For example, in Migori relatives of persons
who were shot during the skirmishes did not want post mortems carried out.289
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CW 94, Edward Mwamburi, OCPD Migori.
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District breakdown of deaths
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

District
Bomet
Bungoma
Bureti
Busia
Eldamaravine
Homabay
Kakamega
Kericho
Kiambu West
Kipkelion
Kisii
Kisumu
Migori/Rongo
Mombasa
Mumias
Nairobi
Naivasha
Nakuru
Nandi North
Narok
Nyandarua South
Siaya
Sotik
Suba
Trans Nzoia
Uasin Gishu
Vihiga
Webuye
TOTAL

No. of deaths
4
7
24
9
23
7
31
42
4
23
9
81
26
27
12
125
50
213
7
19
1
10
5
1
104
230
18
21
1,133

SUMMARY OF DEATHS PER
PROVINCE
Rift Valley
744
Nyanza

134

Central

5

Western

98

Coast

27

Nairobi
TOTAL

125
1,133
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Of the total deaths, there were 11 children, 74 females and 1,048 males killed.
The distribution of documented females and children who died as a result of PEV
is indicated in the table below.
Women and Children Deaths who died as a Result of PEV
Item

District

1

Naivasha

2

Nakuru

3

Female

Children

11

0

8

0

Trans Nzoia

14

0

4

Uasin Gishu

9

10

5

Kericho

1

0

6

Bureti

1

1

7

Kipkelion

1

0

8

Kakamega

3

0
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9

Mumias

1

0

10

Webuye

7

0

11

Homabay

1

0

12

Kisumu

5

0

13

Migori/Rongo

1

0

14

Mombasa

7

0

15

Nairobi

4

0

74

11

Total

The table below summarizes the deaths that were recorded in some districts as
unknown persons.

Some bodies were too decomposed for any reasonable

identification to be done while others were collected on the streets by police who
could not positively identify them. There were cases where bodies were burnt
beyond recognition.
Summary of Unidentified bodies per District
Item

District

Unidentified
Bodies

1

Nakuru

25

2

Nandi North

1

3

Trans Nzoia

18

4

Uasin Gishu

33

5

Eldama Ravine

1

6

Bureti

1

7

Sotik

1

8

Narok

2

9

Kakamega

1

10

Bungoma

1

11

Vihiga

8

12

Kisumu

7

13

Siaya

1
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14

Migori/Rongo

5

15

Kisii

2

16

Mombasa

2

17

Nairobi

10

Total

119

We were the Commission was informed by the Director of Medical Services, that
the Government’s DNA machine had broken down and was being repaired hence
the identification of bodies was in the process of being done in conjunction with
the Kenya Red Cross Society.
Causes of death
The causes of deaths as documented were burns, arrow shots, mob- injustice,
blunt

object,

severe

wounds,

sharp

pointed

object,

assault,

drowning,

hypothermia, suffocation injury, stoning, shock, hanging, gunshots and
unknown causes.
In cases where gun shot wounds were the underlying cause of death, the total
number of people killed as a result of this was 405, distributed in all the
districts. This represented 35.7% of the total deaths and stood at 405 out of the
total 1,133 deaths. It was followed with deaths through injuries sustained as a
result of sharp pointed objects at 28.2%. The third category were the killings
through burns which recorded 85 deaths representing 7.5% of the deaths.
Unknown causes caused 75 deaths representing 6.6% while 5% of the deaths
were as a result of injuries sustained through blunt objects which stood at 57.
The other causes of deaths were distributed amongst different causes as
indicated in the data below.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Analysis of Causes of Death Per District
District
A B C D E
Bomet
Bungoma
1
1 6
Bureti
1
Busia
3 1
7
Eldamaravine
Homabay
Kakamega
2
Kericho
Kiambu West
17
Kipkelion
1
Kisii
7 1
5 2
Kisumu
Migori/Rongo
8 1 3
4
Mombasa
1
Mumias
21 9
Nairobi
22 1
Naivasha
10
24
Nakuru
1 1 1
Nandi North
Narok
Suba
Siaya
1
Sotik
Nyandarua South
3
1
Trans Nzoia
32 4
16 42
Uasin Gishu
1
Vihiga
Webuye
85 31 28 57 61
TOTAL

F
2

G

I

J

K

1

L

M N

2
3
1
2

3
2

1

2

1

1

29
1
148
1
2
18
1

1
1
1
4

1

1
17
1

1
21
92
1
1
2
320 8

KEY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P

H

Burns
Arrow shot
Mob- Injustice
Blunt Object
Severe Wounds
Sharp Pointed Object
Assault
Drowning
Hypothermia
Suffocation
Injury
Stoning
Shock
Hanging
Gunshot
Unknown

313

1

1

11

1

3

41 3

1
2

2

O
2
7
11
8
7
6
26
33
3
4
4
64
24
4
11
23
7
22
1
1

P

Total
4
7
2 24
9
2 23
7
31
4 42
1 4
23
3 9
81
1 26
1 27
12
42 125
2 50
8 213
7
19
1
9
1 10
1
2 5
1 1
77 2 104
28 3 230
15
18
11 7
21
1,133
11 405 75

The causes of death as reported in each district illustrated in different charts are as follows:
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The causes of deaths as documented were burns, arrow shots, mob- justice,
blunt

object,

severe

wounds,

sharp

pointed

object,

assault,

drowning,

hypothermia, suffocation injury, stoning, shock, hanging, gunshots and
unknown causes.
In cases where gunshot wounds were the underlying cause of death, the total
number of people killed as a result of this was 405, distributed in all the
districts.
This represented 35.7% of the total deaths out of the total 1,133 deaths. It was
followed by deaths through injuries sustained as a result of sharp pointed
objects at 28.2%. The third category were the killings through burns which
recorded 85 deaths representing 7.5% of the deaths, unknown causes resulted
in 75 deaths representing 6.6% while 5% of the deaths were as a result of
injuries sustained through blunt objects which stood at 57. The other deaths
were distributed amongst different causes as indicated in the data below.
Provincial and district breakdown for causes of death
District

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Total

Rift Valley
2

Bomet
Bureti

1

Eldamaravine

3

Kericho

6

Naivasha

22

Nakuru

10
1

2
3

2
17

2

1

1
24

1

1

1

1

Trans Nzoia

3

Uasin Gishu

32

4

Sub Total

70

28

1
2

1

4

11

2

24

7

2

23

33

4

42

7

2

50

22

8

213

4
17

148

Narok
Sotik

1

7

2

Kipkelion

Nandi North

1
1

2

1
2

23

1

7

18

1

1

1

2

5

21

77

2

104

28

3

230

194

25

744

16

42

92

42

55
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3

0

1

1

11

1

2

31

3

0

0

19

Western
Busia

1

8
3

Kakamega
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2

26

9
31

District

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

7

Bungoma
1

Mumias

1

Vihiga

1

Webuye
Sub Total

0

0

2

1

0

1

1

2

2

5

1

0

0

2

0

0

Total
7

11

12

15

18

11

7

11

74

21
0

98

Nyanza
1

Suba

1

Siaya
1

Kisii
7

Kisumu

1

1

5

2

1

1

9

1

10

4

3

9

64

Migori/Rongo

1

24

Homabay

1

6

Sub Total

7

2

0

5

2

1

0

0

0

0

4

0

1

0

81
1

26

107

5

134

3

1

4

7

Central
Kiambu West
Nyandarua
South
Sub Total

1
0

0

8

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

4

0

0

0

3

1

2

5
27

Coast
Mombasa
Nairobi
85

TOTAL

31

3

4

21

9

28

57

1
29

61

320
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C
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I

Hypothermia

J
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L
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O
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P

Unknown
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1
8

2

1

3

41

3

2

11

4

1

23

42

405

75

125
1,133

Causes of death as reported in each district illustrated in different charts are as
follows:
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Key Indicators


The gun shot wounds represented 35.7% of the total deaths that stood at
405 out of the total 1,133 deaths.



Most shootings took place in Trans-Nzoia district recording 77 deaths,
followed by Kisumu with 64 deaths and Kericho with 33 deaths.



Nakuru recorded the highest number of victims who died of injuries
inflicted by sharp pointed objects with the number standing at 148 while
Uasin Gishu recorded 92 deaths.



Most burns were documented in Uasin Gishu district with 32 deaths
followed by Naivasha with 22 deaths.



Uasin Gishu recorded the highest number of deaths as a result of fatal
injuries which cased 42 deaths, while blunt objects caused 24 deaths in
Nakuru followed by Uasin Gishu at 16. Fatal arrow wounds were mostly
used in Kipkelion standing at 17.



Webuye district recorded 11 deaths as a result of hanging.

According to the statistics, most deaths in each given district took an ethnic
dimension in which, apart from killings by the police, most of those killed did not
belong to the ethnic tribe in the district. Apart from the 405 killings directly
linked to the police, the remaining 732 deaths were as a result of citizens killing
fellow citizens due to the political stand-off at the time of the killings or for other
unknown reasons.
Injuries
The table below illustrates an overview and is a summary of injuries sustained
by various individuals in 32 districts. These injuries did not result in death.
Individuals who sustained such injuries reported to various hospitals and
sought treatment. In the time available, details as to the degree and effects of
injury were not made available to the Commission. It is possible that while some
of the injuries may have been slight, a number of them were serious, possibly life
changing experiences.
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Provincial breakdown of reported injuries

District

Burns

Arrow
shot

MobInjusti
ce

Blunt
Object

Traumatic
Circumcision

5

0

Sharp
Pointed
Object

Assault

Fracture

Head
injury

5

0

0

0

4

0

20

1

1

5

14

1

1

3

13

6

14

4

52

0

30

55

0

35

52

0

0

0

2

Bungoma

0

0

0

0

0

3

Rachuonyo

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

Busia

0

0

0

0

0

11

5

Nyando

0

0

0

16

0

9

0

0

0

6

Homa Bay

0

0

0

7

0

10

0

0

0

7

Kakamega

0

0

0

0

0

8

Kericho/
Kipkelion

0

17

0

9

Gucha

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

Siaya

0

0

0

0

0

0

11

Kisii

0

23

0

1

0

12

Kisumu

0

0

101

13

Masaba/Bora
bu

0

0

0

10

0

0

14

1

8

7

0

0
5

0
7

16

0
1

Total

9

Bondo

8

Gunsh
ot

1

1

3

soft
tissue
injury

0

1

15

22

0

0

5

10

45

0

0

0

0

2

2

0

0

0

0

6

6

4

0

0

0

18

12

58

0

103

0

0

0

60

71

343

0

56

0

0

0

0

7

63

0

19

0

0

0

11

31

78

3

Migori/
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District

Burns

Arrow
shot

MobInjusti
ce

Blunt
Object

Traumatic
Circumcision

0

2

0
0

Sharp
Pointed
Object

soft
tissue
injury

Assault

Fracture

Head
injury

Gunsh
ot

94

0

0

0

12

10

133

0

0

0

0

0

23

23

Total

Rongo
15

Mombasa

13

16

Mumias

17

Nairobi

5

18

Naivasha

1

19

Nakuru

20

Nandi North

0

0

0

60

0

151

0

9

21

Uasin Gishu

73

29

0

0

0

173

0

14

28

22

Kuria

0

0

0

7

0

0

0

0

0

23

Nyamira

11

0

7

0

20

2

0

0

24

Nandi south

6

0

0

0

66

167

25

Trans Nzoia

36

0

0

0

137

26

Suba

0

0

0

0

0

27

Vihiga

0

0

0

0

0

28

Webuye

0

0

0

0

0

29

Koibatek

0

0

0

0

0

2
0
5
0

0

0

0

0

2

122

0

41

64

42

61
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0

0

4

37

0

0

0

0

11

53

16

359

8

228

117

71

505

0

0

7

0

44

163

3

49

0
329

4

131

1

0

2

0

1
50

45

337

0

0

0

0

9

511

0

0

0

0

0

6

6

0

0

0

0

0

18

18

1

0

0

0

7

17

24

0

0

3

33
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2

9
0

District

Burns

Arrow
shot

MobInjusti
ce

Blunt
Object

Traumatic
Circumcision

Sharp
Pointed
Object

Assault

30

Eldama
Ravine

0

7

0

0

0

8

0

31

Bureti

0

10

0

0

0

10

0

32

Narok North

0

18

0

0

17

0

TOTAL

164

267

0

4

604

6

1229

196

Fracture

2

Head
injury

soft
tissue
injury

0

11

0

0

6

0

0

74

104

0

360

Gunsh
ot

Total

0

28

25

51

4

43

557

3,561

As indicated previously, the injuries documented here in respect of persons who were attended to in hospitals and
other established institutions. Thus, this is only an indication of the persons who were injured during the PEV.
Highlights
SUMMARY OF INJURIES
PER PROVINCE
Nyanza
747
Western
146
Rift Valley
2193
Mombasa
133
Nairobi
342
TOTAL

3,561
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Key Indicators


The total injuries documented during the post-election violence were
3,561, of which, majority of the injuries occurred as a result of sharp
pointed objects. These injuries were recorded in most of the districts apart
from Vihiga, Suba, Kuria, Siaya, Gucha, Kakamega and Rachuonyo.
Uasin Gishu district recorded the highest number of injuries at 173, Nandi
North 151, Trans-Nzoia 137 while Nakuru recorded 1,341 injuries in this
category.

 Injuries sustained as a result of use of various blunt objects came second
overall with 604. In this category, Trans-Nzoia district recorded the highest
number of casualties with 329 injuries, Kisumu 101 injuries while Nandi
North district came third with 60 injuries in this category.
 Gunshot injuries that were not lethal to life. Kisumu and Uasin Gishu
districts recorded the highest gun shot injuries at 71 injuries each.
Nairobi at 61, Nandi South 45, Homabay 35 while Migori/ Rongo districts
at 31.
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 Traumatic circumcisions which are commonly referred to as forced
circumcisions were also recorded. 2 cases were recorded in Nairobi while
Naivasha recorded 4 similar cases.
 Most arrow shot injuries occurred in Nakuru with 163 shots followed by
Uasin Gishu at 29 and Kisii at 23.
 Uasin Gishu recorded the highest number of injuries as a result of burns
at 73 followed by Trans-Nzoia at 36 burns.
Overall, injuries sustained by citizens against fellow citizens were the highest at
3,004 while those caused by state agents- i.e the police stood at 557. In
analyzing the injuries, the Commission looked at the evidence submitted to it
from various medical officers, Kenyatta National Hospital statistics, Moi Referral
Hospital statistics and the Ministry of Health statistics.

Private and Government Properties Destroyed
The table below illustrates two major categories of property destroyed by civilians
during post-election violence period. The source of this information is from police
and administration records. The information is therefore classified into two
categories; private property and Government property.
Private properties destroyed, we opine that the number of private property may
only be in respect of what was reported and documented by the official sources.
The information is therefore classified into two categories; private property and
Government property.
Private Properties destroyed
There was destruction of motor vehicles reported in Nyandarua, Homa Bay,
Kipkelion, Uasin Gishu, Nandi North, Trans Nzoia West, Trans Nzoia East and
Kericho Districts. A total of 160 vehicles were reported destroyed as follows: 128
saloon cars, 8 buses, 6 tractors 15 trucks and 3 PSV matatus. Kipkelion district
recorded the highest number of destroyed motor vehicles at 44 followed by
Kericho at 39 vehicles destroyed. Uasin Gishu had a total of 56 motor vehicles
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destroyed, Koibatek 7, Nandi North 4, Trans Nzoia West 3, Homa Bay 3 and
Nyandarua 1.
Destruction of properties in Western Province was recorded in Busia, Vihiga,
Kakamega, Lugari, Mumias, Butere and Mt. Elgon districts. In most of these
districts, both residential and commercial buildings were destroyed. A total of
1,060 such properties were destroyed. Kakamega recorded the highest in
Western province with 444 destroyed properties, Lugari 431, Busia 66, Mumias
41, Butere 38, Mount Elgon 35 while Vihiga documented 5.
There was widespread destruction of residential home in the following districts:
Nyandarua, Migori, Kisumu, Kipkelion, Molo, Uasin Gishu, Koibatek, Marakwet,
Mombasa, Trans Nzoia West, Trans Nzoia East, Borabu and Sotik. A total of
64,832 houses were destroyed. Uasin Gishu recorded the highest destruction at
52,611, Kipkelion at 6,642 while Trans Nzoia recorded 860. The other districts
recorded significant destructions destruction as illustrated in the table below.
Kisumu, Nandi North, Mombasa and Kericho recorded the destruction of
commercial buildings. Kisumu had 50, Nandi North 335, Mombasa 240 while
Kericho recorded the highest destruction with 1,960. The total number of
commercial buildings destroyed stood at 2,256.

In Borabu district, 1 public

school and 10 farm machineries were destroyed. 60 kiosks and 30 shops were
burn in Sotik district.
Destruction of livestock was not widespread. It was recorded in Nyandarua and
Kericho. In Kericho, 85 livestock were killed while 10 goats and 6 cows were
killed in Nyandarua. Kipkelion was the only district that recorded massive
destruction of crops. 36, 566 bags of maize, 8,100 bags of beans, 800 bags of
Irish potatoes, 40 tones of cabbages, 30 tonnes of kales, 20 hectares of sugar
cane and 3,219 plants of coffee were destroyed.
Government Properties Destroyed
There was burning of Government vehicles in Homa Bay, Uasin Gishu and Nandi
North. A total of 12 vehicles were burnt made up as follows, Homa Bay district
recording the highest at 9, Uasin Gishu at 2 while Nandi North recorded 1.
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There was widespread destruction of government offices in Homa Bay, Kisumu,
Kipkelion and Nandi North. In Homa Bay, offices and equipment estimated at 10
million shillings was destroyed including the District Works office and Fisheries
department offices. In Kisumu the water company offices, Provincial Public
Works offices, Kondelle Chief’s office, and 32 government offices were destroyed.
Two zonal education offices were destroyed in Kipkelion and the chief’s office and
Kimondi forest offices in Nandi North were also destroyed. In Migori, 20 National
Cereals Produce Board buildings were destroyed, 1 Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation building was destroyed in Kisumu; 2 Administration Police posts in
Kipkelion; 3 government buildings in Nandi North; 16 government buildings in
Trans Nzoia East; and 3 government houses in Sotik district.
There was vandalism recorded in Kipkelion district where 8 dispensaries and 3
forest stations were totally vandalized. Forests and plantations were not spared
either. 367 trees were cut in Kipkelion, the Nyayo Tea Zone Nursery was
destroyed and Kimondi Forest plantation was destroyed in Nandi North district.
A total of 8 Government schools were destroyed in Kipkelion district while
Burende Primary School was destroyed in Nandi North district.
Properties destroyed per District during PEV period
District

Private properties
23 permanent
houses
104 Semi Permanent
houses
1 tractor
6 cows
10 goats

Government Properties

Nil

ii)

23 permanent houses
104 Semi Permanent
houses

iii)

1 tractor

iv)

6 cows

v)

10 goats

Vihiga

5 properties

1 property

Busia

66 properties

Nil

Kakamega

444properties

Nil

Lugari

431 properties

Nil

Mumias

41 properties

Nil

Nyandarua

i)

338

Nil

Butere

38 properties

Nil

Mt Elgon

35 properties

Nil
Fisheries department
offices; District works
office; 1 office; 8
Government vehicles; 1
motorcycle; office and
equipment worth Ksh. 10
million;

Homa Bay

1 tractor; 1 saloon
car; 1 lorry

i)

1 tractor

District works office

ii)

1 saloon car

1 office

iii)

1 lorry

8 Government vehicles
1 motorcycle
office and equipment
worth Ksh. 10 million

Migori

Kisumu

Kipkelion

13 houses
50 Commercial
buildings
200 residential
houses

200 residential6642
houses burnt
44 vehicles burnt
36566 bags of maize
8100 bags of beans
800 bags of Irish
potatoes
40 tones of cabbages
30 tones of kales
20 ha of sugarcane
3219 plant of coffee

20 NCPB
KBC building
South Lake Water Offices
Provincial public works
offices
Kondelle chiefs office
32 Government offices
South Lake Water Offices3
Chiefs offices
2 Administration Post
Posts
7 Dispensaries
vandalized
1 Dispensary staff house
destroyed
2 Zonal education office
destroyed
3 Forest stations
vandalized
8 Schools destroyed
367 Trees cut
Provincial public works
offices
Kondelle chiefs office
32 Government offices

Kipkelion

6642 houses burnt
44 vehicles burnt
36566 bags of maize
des

3 Chiefs offices
2 Administration Post
Posts

8100 bags of beans

7 Dispensaries vandalized
1 Dispensary staff house
destroyed

800 bags of Irish

2 zonal education office
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potatoes

destroyed

40 tones of cabbages

3 Forest stations
vandalized

30 tones of kales

8 Schools destroyed

20 ha of sugarcane

367 Trees cut

Molo

3219 plant of coffee
1564 Houses
torched

Nil

Uasin Gishu

52611 houses

2 GK vehicles

Koibatek

Nandi North

Marakwet

Mombasa

Trans Nzoia West

Trans Nzoia East

Kericho

Borabu

56 civilian vehicles
1215 houses torched
7 vehicles burnt
76 commercial
buildings
329 private buildings
4 vehicles burnt

6 commercial
buildings401 homes
torched
329 private
buildings29
residential houses
240 commercial
building

4350 houses torched
3 vehicles burned

860 houses burnt
3 vehicles burned
1960 Commercial
building
85 Livestock
6 Easy coach buses
14 James Finley
trucks
2 Akamba buses
4 Unknown tractors
10 private
3 PSV Matatus
310 houses torched
1 public school
destroyed

Nil
Nil
3 Government buildings
1 GOK vehicles
DO Residence Kosirai
Chief's office
Nyayo tea zones nursery
Burende primary school
Kimondi forest office
Kimondi forest
plantations
3 Government buildings

1 GOK vehicles

DO Residence Kosirai
Chief's office16
Government building
destroyed

Nyayo tea zones nursery

Nil

Burende primary school
Nil
Kimondi forest office
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Kimondi forest plantations
Marakwet

401 homes torched

NIL

Mombassa

29 residential houses
240 commercial
building

NIL
NIL

350 houses torched

NIL

3 vehicles burned

NIL
16 Government building
destroyed

Trans Nzoia West

Trans Nzoia East

860 houses burnt

Kericho

3 vehicles burned
1960 Commercial
building
85 Livestock
6 Easy coach buses
14 James Finley trucks
2 Akamba buses
4 Unknown tractors
10 private
3 PSV Matatus

Borabu

Sotik

310 houses torched
1 public school
destroyed
10 farm machines
destroyed
89 Residential
houses burnt
60 kiosks burnt
30 shops burnt
3 government
houses burnt
20 residential
houses brought
down

Nil

60 kiosks burnt

Conclusion
The information on the deaths that occurred during the post election violence
tells a number of stories. The Rift Valley Province accounted for 744 deaths that
is, 66% of all the deaths that occurred during the post election violence period.
The Commission’s conclusion is that Rift Valley was the epicentre of the post
election violence. Nyanza with 134 deaths, constituted 12% of the deaths
experienced, while Nairobi with 125 deaths constituted 11% of all the deaths, the
third largest number of deaths.
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The causes of death in the provinces lead to a number of broad conclusions. In
Western province, gunshots accounted for 74 deaths out of a total of 98
representing 72.5% of all the deaths in that province. In Nyanza 107 deaths out
of 134 or 79.9% were the result of gun shots. In Nairobi 23 out of 125 deaths or
18.4% were the result of gun shots and in Rift Valley gun shots accounted for
194 out of 744 or 26% of those killed. Coast Province recorded 4 out of 27
deaths or 14% as a result of gun shooting and in Central 3 out of 5 deaths were
reported representing 60% of the total gunshot deaths.

Summary of Deaths from Gunshots
Province
No. of deaths Percentage
72.5%
Western
74
79.9%
Nyanza
107
26%
Rift Valley
194
18.4%
Nairobi
23
14%
Coast
4
60%
Central
3
TOTAL
405

Summary of Deaths as % of deaths in provinces

Percentage

100
80

72.5

79.9
60

60
40

26

20

18.4

14

0
Western

Nyanza Rift Valley Nairobi

Coast

Central

Province

It is the view of the Commission that since no evidence to the contrary was ever
shown, police were responsible for all cases of shooting. The Commission
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concludes that the disparity in percentage terms of the number of those shot, as
a fraction of the total deaths in each province, may have a correlation with the
preparedness the police had to use ammunition on people. Evidently, this varied
from province to province, with Western province exhibiting the most robust use
of ammunition, followed by Nyanza. It appears that police in different provinces
did not respond uniformly with regard to the use of force, even when faced with
similar situations.
Further, it is the view of the Commission that all deaths other than those by
gunshot were caused by civilians. The number of deaths in the Rift Valley as a
result of arrow shots and sharp objects is very high. The picture that emerges
from these figures is that the Rift Valley faced an extraordinary amount of
violence between ordinary citizens. Bows and arrows as well as machetes played
a defining role in that violence. For these improvised weapons to have achieved
such a large number of fatalities demonstrates the concentration of the violence,
and is consistent with the testimonies received by the Commission.
The evidence received by the Commission was that in Nyanza and Western
Provinces, there were relatively low levels of fatality resulting from citizen-oncitizen violence. If it is assumed that gunshot deaths in these provinces were
caused by police and that non-gunshot deaths represent civilian-on-civilian
violence, the relatively low figures of 27 deaths representing 20% of the total
deaths in Nyanza province while in Western 24 deaths representing 24.5% of the
98 deaths corroborate the testimony. It follows, then that police shot and killed a
large number of people in these two provinces. If so this is inexcusable and
highly regrettable.
The Commission also examined the ethnicity of those who died where such
information was available from the evidence presented. The Commission decided
to disaggregate information on the ethnic identities of those killed in the post
election violence for the reason that it demonstrates that all ethnic communities
that were involved in the violence sustained losses of life. This conclusion
counteracts the notion which all the ethnic communities that were involved in
the post election violence were found to harbour that members of their particular
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community were the sole victims. The information shows that all sides sustained
significant losses.
Number of deaths during PEV distributed per tribe
Tribe
Kalenjin
Kamba
Kikuyu
Kisii
Kuria
Luhya
Luo
Maasai
Meru
Pokot
Taita
Tanzanian
Teso
Turkana
Uknown
Others
TOTAL

Number
158
11
268
57
2
163
278
7
1
1
2
2
4
6
165
8
1,133
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CHAPTER TEN
Findings

The findings we make in this Chapter are derived from the facts collated and
analysed from oral and documentary evidence submitted before the Commission.
There are 4773 pages of recorded sworn testimony from 156 witnesses and 144
other witnesses who submitted depositions and recorded statements. There are
nine volumes of exhibits running into more than 3500 pages and we had at our
disposal, in terms of our terms of reference, official reports of previous
investigations, investigations from other institutions or organizations and
research material from our own researchers and investigators. It must be said
that the Commission had only a limited period to carry out exhaustive
investigations and we do not doubt therefore that there may be information out
there which did not reach the Commission. We were nevertheless encouraged by
the enthusiastic support and response we received from members of the public
and we believe the information gathered enables us to state with confidence that
our findings are made fairly and fully.
The preceding chapters make various findings in relation to the topics discussed
and those findings remain valid.

What follows is a summary of the broad

findings as distilled by the Commission.

On the basis of those findings the

Commission has made its recommendations as required in the terms of
reference.

Findings in Relation to the Extent of Violence
6.•

A total of 1,133 people died as a consequence of the post-election violence.
The geographical distribution of the deaths was unequal, with most of the
post-election violence related deaths concentrated in the provinces of Rift
Valley (744), Nyanza (134) and Nairobi (125). The districts of Uasin Gishu
(230), Nakuru (213) and Trans Nzoia (104) in the Rift Valley Province
registered the highest number of deaths related to post-election violence.
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7.•

A total of 3,561 people suffered injuries inflicted by or resulting from sharp
pointed objects - 1229, blunt objects -604, Soft tissue injury - 360, Gunshot
- 557, Arrow shots - 267, Burns -164, Assault - 196, etc.

8.•

A total of 117,216 private properties (including residential houses,
commercial premises, vehicles, farm produce) were destroyed, while 491
Government owned properties (offices, vehicles, health centres, schools and
trees) were destroyed.

9.•

Gunshots accounted for 962 casualties out of whom 405 died. This
represented 35.7% of the total deaths, making gunshot the single most
frequent cause of deaths during post-election violence. It was followed by
deaths caused through injuries sustained as a result of sharp pointed
objects at 28.2%. The Commission has received no evidence to suggest that
where gunshot was recorded as the cause of death or injury, it was from a
source other than the police. This calls into question the contention that
post-election violence was a citizen-to-citizen violence, and it validates the
view that police action accounted for a good part of the post-election
violence.

Findings In Relation to the Causes and Patterns of the PostElection Violence
1.

In contrast to the pre-election violence, which was mainly between

candidates and their supporters, the post-election violence had a distinct ethnic
dimension.
2.

Initially, the violence witnessed was spontaneous and was in part a

reaction to the perceived rigging of elections. In areas like the Rift Valley and the
Coast, it targeted members of the Kikuyu and Kisii communities perceived to be
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associated with the PNU party and with President Kibaki who were seen as the
beneficiaries of the “rigged” election, while in Nyanza and Western, the
spontaneous violence was mostly directed towards government facilities and
gradually took the form of looting and destruction, and while it also targeted
Kikuyus and Kisiis, the intention appeared to be not to kill them but rather to be
expel them and destroy their property.
3.

Subsequently the pattern of violence showed planning and organization by

politicians, businessmen and others who enlisted criminal gangs to execute the
violence. That was the case particularly in Rift Valley and Nairobi. In places like
Naivasha, Nakuru and the slum areas of Nairobi, Kikuyu gangs were mobilised
and used to unleash violence against Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjins and to expel
them from their rented residences and, similarly, organised Kalenjin youth
particularly in the North Rift attacked and drove out Kikuyus living there.
4.

Some of the pointers to the organisation include the fact that:

•

In instances, warnings were issued to the victims before the attacks;

•

The violence involved

large numbers of attackers, often mobilized from

areas outside the location of the violence;
•

Petrol and weapons were used in various places to carry out the attacks
and destruction, which required arrangements as regards acquisition,
concealment and transport; and

•

Sometimes the attacks specifically targeted only members of given ethnic
groups to the exclusion of others.

5. Some responsibility for the violence must also be laid at the feet of the
country’s politicians who precipitated the violence by among other actions
and omissions:
(i)

Conducting

the

election

campaigns

in

a

strident

and

confrontational manner, thereby creating an atmosphere of
tension;
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(ii)

For party political ends, casting the majimbo debate in
ethnically divisive terms; and

(iii)

Failing to create confidence among voters around the electoral
processes and institutions.

6.

The administrative authorities, including the police, the security forces

and the provincial administration, must also take responsibility for various
omissions and commissions in regard to the violence arising from:
•

Failure to act on intelligence regarding the possibility of violence following
the elections;

•

Failure properly to respond appropriately and adequately to the violence
and its effects, thereby aggravating the suffering of the victims;

•

In the case of the security agents and the police, resorting to an
unjustified use of force and causing death and injury unnecessarily; and

•

Failure to act with discipline and impartiality and at times descending into
acts of serious crime against civilians.

Findings In Relation to Sexual Violence
General
7.

Because of the context in which it took place, the sexual violence

experienced took the form of gang and individual rapes, many of which were
ethnically driven, as well as horrendous female and male genital mutilation.
Women and children’s labia and vaginas were cut using sharp objects and
bottles were stuffed into them. Men and boys, in turn, had their penises cut off
and

were

traumatically

circumcised,

in

some

cases

using

cut

glass.

Furthermore, entire families, including children often were forced to watch their
parents, brothers and sisters being sexually violated.
8.

Aside from the above life shattering events, many victims of sexual

violence experienced other injuries, lost family members, their houses, property,
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had no place to go or to turn for help, and have ended up alone or in IDP camps
without a means of earning a living.
Perpetrators
9.

The Commission found that perpetrators of sexual violence were not just

ordinary citizens, neighbours, and gang members, but also significant numbers
of security forces. These included members of the General Service Unit (GSU) as
well as regular and administration police. Many victims let members of the
security forces into their houses assuming they would help them. Instead, they
found themselves being attacked by those they thought would help them. This
entailed a gross betrayal of trust.
10.

Members of the security forces also participated in gang rapes. In addition,

they colluded with each other, including having some of their own standing
guard outside victims’ houses while they raped and mutilated inside victims’
dwellings.
11. Even when victims told perpetrators (whether members of the security
forces, gangs or individuals) that they were HIV positive, perpetrators chose to
rape. This is likely to result in an increase in HIV AIDs in Kenya.
12.

Perpetrators often told victims the sexual violence inflicted upon them was

punishment for belonging to a specific ethnic group or purportedly having
supported a particular political party.
Victims
13.

For a variety of reasons, many victims were not able to access timely

medical care, including obtaining the drug PEP, which if taken within 72 hours,
prevents HIV AIDS and sexually transmitted infections. The reasons for not
obtaining medical care included the following: a breakdown in security and the
fear of leaving home, lack of transport, ignorance about PEP and not knowing
they would not have to pay and could receive free medical care, fear of being
stigmatized if it were known they had been raped, and an overriding concern to
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protect, feed, and shelter their children and family members at their own
expense.
Response by Authorities
14.

Authorities in general were totally unprepared to respond to sexual

violence. Although the police took many victims of sexual violence to hospitals,
the Commission also received evidence that in other instances they were
unprepared either to record or investigate criminal complaints of sexual violence.
This was exemplified by the Commissioner of Police, Hussein Ali’s testimony to
the Commission, where he stated “We will determine whether those crimes are fit
and whether the people have been arrested and charged”.
15.

The void created by the lack of official response to sexual violence was

partly filled by private hospitals, including the Nairobi Women’s Hospital, some
government facilities, and a number of NGOs, including the Kenya Red Cross.
Effects
16.

Other than the extraordinary physical and psychological trauma stemming

from being a victim of sexual violence, victims also suffered acute injuries,
permanent disabilities, contracting incurable diseases like HIV AIDs and
hepatitis B, ostracism, abandonment by their husbands and parents, loss of
abode and income, as well as extreme feelings of humiliation.
17.

The Commission learned from its own psychologist that many female

victims still are alone, unable to cope with the above traumas and in need of
help which is not available to them. A number of victims who had not received
medical attention by the time they came before the Commission only managed to
do so as a result of the Commission’s intervention.
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Findings In relation to Internally Displaced Persons
18.

As a result of the PEV approximately 350,000 persons were displaced from

their normal abodes of residence and or business. IDPs were concentrated in
Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Central, Nairobi and Coast Province. About 1,916
Kenyans sought refuge in Uganda.
19.

People were displaced as a result of violence and threats of violence. They

moved from their places of residence and business to places considered safe like
police stations, administrative posts, churches and trading centres.

20.

Thereafter they moved to formal camps or were integrated with their
relatives and friends in urban centres or their ancestral homes.
21.

Conditions in the IDP camps were less than satisfactory. We found that

security was wanting as IDPs were always subjected to threats by criminal
gangs.

We also found complaints about the inadequacy of food, shelter and

sanitation. Most of the inhabitants of IDP camps were women and children.
22.

Government and administrative response to the problems of IDPS was

initially slow and ad hoc. The Kenya Red Cross Society, local and international
NGOs and CSOs, faith based groups and individual volunteers played an
important role in alleviating the suffering of IDPs by offering refuge, food, shelter,
security, education, medicine, counselling and other needs.
23.

The Government initiated “Operation Rudi Nyumbani” in April 2008 aimed

at removing IDPs from camps and where possible resettling them back to their
homes. Due to constraints of time and resources, the Commission could not fully
make an assessment of the efficacy of this programme but found the following
inadequacies;
(i)

The sum of Kshs. 10,000.00 was considered inadequate by the
IDPs to meet their need once they left the camps.

(ii)

The so called “integrated” IDPs (i.e. returnees who went to live
within the community) felt neglected as the program concentrated
mostly on those who were settled in camps.
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(iii)

Security for those who wish to return to their farms and homes,
particularly in the Rift Valley, is not fully assured and is therefore
a hindrance to resettlement.

24. The IDP problem is likely to persist phenomenon until the Government
and people of Kenya address the political problems that led to eviction of
men, women and children from their homes and businesses.
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PART IV

Acts and Omissions of State Security Agencies and
Impunity
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
State Security Agencies

Introduction

The Commission was given a special role in relation to the State Security
Agencies (SSAs) and their involvement in the Post Election Violence. Articulated
clearly in the Terms of Reference (ToRs) it was mandated to “investigate the
actions or omissions of State security agencies during the course of the violence,
and make recommendations as necessary.” A broad interpretation of this task
was applied to include the actions of these agencies in the lead up to polling day
was a necessary step to take in determining the level of preparation and
planning undertaken. Also individual members, officers and employees of these
agencies were considered to be within the scope of the investigation.
The investigation drew from a range of reports from international organisations
and Kenyan civil society, independent witnesses and representatives of the
agencies themselves in determining just what these entities did or did not do in
discharging their various mandates in the months preceding the elections,
during the election process, and of course during the time of Post Election
Violence (PEV).
In discharging its mandate this Commission has been able to open doors
previously closed and to hear from the most senior government officials both in
public and in camera. Many Kenyans were hearing from these office holders for
the first time and the nature of their work would have been a revelation to many.
Key witnesses who appeared included the Chief of General Staff of the Kenyan
Armed Forces290, the Commissioner of the Kenya Police Service291, the

290
291

CW 07, General Jeremiah Mutinda Kianga
CW 01, Major General Hussein Ali
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Commandant of the Administration Police292, the Director General of the
National Security Intelligence Service293, the Permanent Secretary for the
Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security294, the
Commissioner of Prisons295, a number of Provincial and District Administration
officers and other Police personnel. The testimony of these witnesses has been
complemented by that of independent citizens and civil society organisations.
This approach has enabled the Commission to examine and make findings on
many aspects of SSA’s work that will effectively carve out new territory for the
Republic.

Indeed the finding relating to preparatory arrangements was as

insightful as those relating to the action and reaction of these agencies to the
violence when it did occur.
This volume of the Commission’s report is divided into three chapters dealing
with

Preparation,

Responses

and

the

aftermath

and

a

Rationale

for

Recommended Action (including major recommendations).

Identifying the key issues
The investigation focused on three main timeframes.

The pre-election period

primarily looks at the preparedness of SSAs, the period of the post election
violence itself to see just how agencies responded (between 27th December 2007
when the presidential results were announced and the 29th of February 2008)
and the time since then in terms of how they have dealt with the aftermath.
The examination of these matters was guided by a number of key elements
regarded as being minimum requirements for dealing with events of this type
and magnitude. These include:

292

CW 08, Kinuthia Mbugua
CW 19, Major General Michael Gichangi
294
CW 04, Francis T. Kimemia
295
CW 09, Gilbert Mithune Omondi
293
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•

Information and intelligence – the methodology of information
gathering, analysis and dissemination within agencies and across
the security sector.

•

Operational planning – The comprehensiveness of preparation
including

the

use

of

intelligence,

risk

analysis,

scenario

development, desk top exercises, contingency building, the timing of
overall preparation and communication. The execution of planning
arrangements including specialist training and drills, and orders
groups.
•

Command and control structures – the development of specific
arrangements to take account of the special nature of the 2007
elections operation and the clarity and decisiveness of lines of
command

and

communication

ensuring

officers

and

staff

understand and acknowledge their roles in the exercise.
•

Use of force – the appropriateness of response tactics including the
use of lethal force, tear gas and other methods of dealing with
crowds

•

Dealing with complaints – including the systems utilised to receive
and respond to calls for service and sensitivity in dealing with
traumatised citizens

•

Investigations – the capability of police investigations

including

issues of dealing with the behaviour of police officers
•

Resourcing – the level of resources acquired and applied to the
operation, how resource management was handled during the crisis

•

The utility of Police Statutes, Force Standing Orders, standard
operating procedures (SOPs) and other guidelines

•

The review processes, including de-briefings and a comprehensive
written analysis and review of the overall operation.
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How Prepared were the Agencies?

Our assessment of this aspect of the State Security Agencies activities falls into
two principal categories.

Firstly the activities, services and outturn of the

intelligence machinery were examined including national, provincial and district
components. Secondly the readiness of operational agencies was investigated in
terms of their own state of preparedness.

Kenya Security Intelligence Machinery (KSIM)296

The KSIM consists of a number of committees that are designed to keep security
issues in front of those who make the decisions at the top level through to
frequent interaction between delivery agencies on the ground at the provincial
and district level. The machinery is made up of the Cabinet Security Committee
(CSC), the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), the Joint Security
Intelligence Secretariat (JSIS), the Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee
(PSIC) and the District Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC).

The

respective roles and accountabilities are reproduced in appendix “B”.
The KSIM largely discharges its role in ensuring the development and delivery of
intelligence to inform an appreciation and understanding of the risks to internal
security amongst other roles.
NSAC.

At the national level the key committee is the

Consisting of senior officials from the security services and some

ministries its main role is to advise the CSC on internal security issues and to
provide direction and intelligence to the provincial and district intelligence
committees.

296

The Director General NSIS (CW19), presentation in public 17 July 2008 (organisation chart reproduced in appendix
“A”)
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At the outset the Commission learned that there is no established National
Security Policy to guide the development of operational strategies and tactics to
prevent or at least prepare adequately for such events as the PEV.297
Despite the lack of a national policy base or a high level strategic framework the
Commission heard evidence that the KSIM, especially the NSAC, had in its
possession a wealth of knowledge and intelligence around the great potential for
significant violence in and around the 2007 General Elections and that through
its role this knowledge was shared between security agencies.
The Commission also received no evidence as to the use made of the material
created and supplied to the members of the NSAC. It could not be established
that this intelligence was shared in a timely or appropriate way with the
government through the CSC or if it was, whether it influenced decision making
at that level. Nor could it be established whether the NSAC disseminated the
intelligence to the provincial and district committees.
Whilst it is clear that the Commissioner of Police was privy to this information it
is less clear how full and detailed intelligence reports were or should have been
provided to the provincial and district committees. The Commission was able to
establish that communications in the form of facsimiles were forwarded from the
Police Commissioner’s office to Provincial Police Officers from time to time in the
lead up to and after the general elections. These communications, sent between
August 2007, and the end of January 2008 contained a mix of information
relating to potential security issues.
Many Provincial Administration officers and police officers, however, stated to
the Commission that they had not, for example, received special guidelines and
directions on the PEV scenarios drawn up by the NSIS.298

297

The development of a National Security Policy is included in the agreed work programme as agreed through the
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation

298

Including CW 45, former OCPD Nakuru 30 July 2008
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Whilst the structure, roles and mandate of the KSIM is sound operationalising it
in times of great need is the test of its robustness and in the case of the 2007
elections there was a definite breakdown in its operation in terms of a top down
delivery of intelligence reports.
In the time it had, the Commission was able to review the discussions and
minutes of some District Security and Intelligence Committees (DSIC) and
Provincial Security and Intelligence Committees (PSIC).

These quite clearly

demonstrated knowledge and understanding of the security situation that was
developing in their areas of responsibility.

In Trans-Nzoia East and West the

committee meeting of the 30th December noted a worrying security situation in
the two Districts where Kikuyus were specifically being targeted and an
observation that, “whichever way the (Presidential) results go Kalenjins (Pokots,
Nandis, Kipsigis and Sabaots) are planning to attack Kikuyus and invade their
farms.” The same committee communicated to the PSIC that due to the fact that
security officers had been deployed from their area to support Molo, Nairobi and
elsewhere for security duties, local security was sorely compromised.
The Molo DSIC determined in its meeting of the 22 November 2008 that due to
glaring irregularities in the party nomination process and “blatant rigging” the
political atmosphere became charged leading to defections and acrimony.

It

commented that there was a strong need to strengthen security operations
preceding the elections and recommended that five police posts be established
and additional funding be allocated to support patrols and rapid deployment
operations. There is no record of these initiatives being followed through.
Minutes of the 20th December meeting of the Molo DSIC recorded that following
the period 22 November to 4 December when ethnic hostilities reached “fever
pitch” resulting in clashes causing death, injuries and destruction of property,
the entire PSIC led by PC Hassan Noor Hassan visited the area to assess the
security situation. Appealing for peaceful co-existence between the communities
a meeting between religious leaders, politicians and the PC was held on 5
December where peaceful resolutions were agreed upon and a document signed
off.

The same minutes, however, recorded some weaknesses in the existing
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security arrangements noting a need to recruit credible and reliable informers,
more transport, a requirement to properly vet officers sent to the district to
ensure reliability and a strengthening of the operational command structure and
communications arrangements.
There remains a question then around the utility of the machinery in its
mandated role in terms of planning and preparing delivery agencies for key
security tasks.

Whilst there is evidence of good information gathering,

intelligence preparation and understanding of the security issues both nationally
and at a local level, there is a significant weakness in translating this into clear,
demonstrable and useful operational interventions.
It appears that the entire security forces’ approach to dealing with security
issues relies almost exclusively upon the KSIM.

This simply will not achieve

anything on its own. This information and intelligence, assuming the smooth
operation of the machinery, only serves to inform and advise on what delivery
agencies need to do. The Commission received no evidence, for example, that
there were any joint planning and/or operational arrangements between
agencies.

Further, no evidence was provided regarding the use of desktop

scenarios, simulated emergencies and full joint exercises to ensure that each
organ is able to play its role when real emergencies such as the PEV occur.
It would be expected that such arrangements would be in place and form part of
the usual business of SSAs. Specific planning activities for the general elections
would have been expected to commence some considerable time before they were
to be held and at least one to two years in the case of the largest known
recurring security event in Kenya.

National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS)
Of all the State Security Agencies the NSIS was, it seems, with the possible
exception of the Military, best prepared. Evidence was received to the effect that
not only did the Service gather information and data about what could
potentially occur around the 2007 elections in terms of violence but developed a
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range of reports highlighting the issues and provided them to senior government
officials as well as the Police, Military, Prisons, and other agencies.
The NSIS produced both regular and special reports including Hotspots/Flash
Points Up-dates, Situation Reports, weekly and fortnightly reports and briefs,
security briefs at a provincial and district level as well as NSAC reports regularly
throughout the months leading up to the General Elections299.

As early as

September 2007 these reports warned of impending election related violence in
clearly specified areas and provided a continuing alert process through updated
assessments of potential PEV.
In many instances these documents identified various individuals suspected of
being involved in such activities as inciting, planning disruption and violence,
threatening behaviour and other offences.
The Service went as far as recommending that operational agencies prepare
specific contingency plans, take special and decisive action against inciters and
financiers of criminal gangs and ensure staff refrained from exercising partisan
behaviour.
The Commission heard and was provided with supporting evidence that the
Service was in fact uncannily accurate in its forecasting of just what scenarios
were likely to eventuate should either Odinga or Kibaki win the Presidential
elections.

The scenarios predicting possible 2007 election outcomes and

consequences sounded a clear warning that security organs may well be
overwhelmed by the high intensity and widespread nature of ensuing
lawlessness300.

299

For example a report entitled Flashpoints/Hotspots week ending 08.06.07 was forwarded under letter to Mr Cyrus
T. Gituai, PS Provincial Administration and Internal Security and copied to Maj. Gen. Mohammed Hussein Ali,
Commissioner of Police
300

Director General NSIS, Major General Gichangi, CW 19, Nairobi 17 July 2008 (See appendix “C”)
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A special report entitled Critical Dates and Events – General Elections 2007, was
forwarded on 6 December to Mr. Samuel M. Kivuitu, Chairman of ECK the
contents of which had been presented to the NSAC. It, amongst other things,
warned of “increased political activity and attendant lawlessness are likely to
overwhelm the security organs.”301 A further report dated 7 December addressed
to the same person and copied to Amb. Francis K. Muthaura, PS to the Cabinet
and Head of the Public Service and the Commissioner of Police warned further of
issues likely to inflame an already volatile situation including, “persisting claims
of election irregularities...formation of anti-rigging squads by parties, and hiring
and

use

of

criminal

gangs

against

opponents

and

persisting

ethnic

clashes/animosities in some parts of the country due to inflammatory political
utterances..” 302
Given the extensiveness of the intelligence developed and distributed by the
service it was disturbing to note that in the end there was an almost fatalistic
realisation that no or insufficient preventive action would be taken to ameliorate
the mayhem. In addition for many there is a case for believing that even with an
Odinga win some areas of the country, especially North rift, may well have still
seen high levels of violence due to the alleged level of Kalenjin organisation,
capability and ambitions to drive so-called outsiders out of the area regardless of
the results.
A question remains about the utility of some of the NSIS’s systems. Many at the
Provincial, District, and Division level were emphatic that they did not know of
the likely magnitude of the violence that ultimately ensued. This seems strange
since it is those very areas within which the NSIS operatives work and therefore
where knowledge of the impending crisis should have originated.
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Director General NSIS, Major General Gichangi, CW 19, Nairobi 21 July 2008
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Director General NSIS, Major General Gichangi, CW 19, Nairobi 21 July 2008
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It can only be assumed that if this is the case then the information obtained was
not shared with the PSICs or DSICs on the way up the chain.

Perhaps the

system that the Service utilises does not allow for this and insists that only well
developed intelligence through the instrumentality of a formal report will be
shared with fellow SSAs. Many Districts reported that they had no idea of the
nature of the extent of violence to come and did not in fact receive full reports
from their superiors.
If this is true then the failure to fully comprehend the situation could lie in both
the failure to utilise key information at source and in a failure of agencies
(especially the Police) to ensure that the formal intelligence reports of what was
happening on the ground reached those who could do something about it.
The NSIS also warned of “..emerging allegations that the government is planning
to use some sections of government organs including the provincial Administration
and the Administration Police (APs) to rig the forthcoming elections..”303

A

particularly disturbing allegation considering that the same report (dated 25
December 2007) identified indicators of the alleged rigging schemes including,
“The revelation that APs are involved in marking ballot papers in advance and that
some of them will be deployed in polling stations to disrupt elections and introduce
fake ballot papers, particularly in Lang’ata.”
Further, the intelligence agency in warning of the real potential for security
organs to be overwhelmed by “widespread lawlessness” pointed to the following
challenges;
•
•
•
•

An overstretched (capacity) and partly demoralised police force
Lukewarm working relationships between the regular and
administration police as a result of perception that the latter is
politicised and favoured by the government.
A partisan public service as well as the military
A Provincial Administration perceived to be involved in campaigns.304
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CW19, exh produced 17th July 2008
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CW19, exh (brief dated 17 December 2007) produced on 17th July 2008
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The Commission did, however, have grave reservations about the involvement,
and attempted involvement, of the NSIS in the elections process.

This

involvement was manifested in three specific instances. The first concerned an
attempt by the NSIS Regional Intelligence Coordinator (RIC), Nairobi Region to
secure ECK accreditation badges. The RIC wrote to the Chairman of ECK, Mr.
Samuel Kivuitu in a letter dated 13 December 2007, requesting the issuing of no
less than 50 accreditation badges to be issued to NSIS officers for the
elections.305
Mr. Kivuitu responded in writing the very next day, refusing the request outright.
In doing so he noted, “It is the first time such a request was ever made by an
intelligence agency.” He also pointed out, “The acceptance of your request would
contravene all known and well established international norms on elections...
there can be no basis for spying on its (ECK) electoral duties... for now your
application is impossible to accept.”
This issue also arose during the examination of the ECK Chairman306 when he
responded to a question about the matter;
Harun Ndubi: I see. Now, I'm asking that to reflect back on the
question of NSIS. Did they also ask you in any of those
correspondences to allow their officers either to disguise or to receive
badges as officers or observers of the ECK?
Samuel Kivuitu: They applied - now this did not come from the
headquarters. This came from the Nairobi office. They applied to
become observers, election observers and I wrote back and I said they
are not qualified. They cannot be election observers and if they were
to be taken it would be one of the biggest blows to the administration
of elections.

A second issue concerned what the NSIS described as a “Socio-Economic Political
Barometer field study report December 2007” that it conducted (or caused to be

305
306

Only two pages of the three page letter were received by the Commission.
CW 135, 25th September, Nairobi
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conducted) between 26th November and 2nd December 2007.307 In a letter dated
24th December 2007, General Gichangi provided survey results indicating the
relative position of the 3 presidential candidates in the polls. He also included
an assessment as to the final results on 27th December 2007.
In addition, correspondence about the survey appeared to be arranged outside
the KSIM framework. The Commission could find no reference to this work in
any other document and the letter was addressed to Amb. Muthaura in his role
as Secretary to the cabinet and Head of Public Service and not in his capacity as
Chair of the NSAC.
The consistent message, frequently communicated by the NSIS, around the need
for state organs and their officers to be neutral during the elections seemed
farcical in the face of these revelations.
The third area of concern for the Commission also related to a written
communication. Dated 6th December 2007, this letter from the Director General
to the Chairman of the ECK was headed “Critical dates and Events – General
Elections 2007”.308 The letter purported to be on behalf of the NSAC although it
was

not

forwarded

by

the

NSAC

Chair.

Amongst

other

things

the

communication identified counting, announcement and swearing in elements of
the ECK’s work that the NSIS felt necessary to comment upon.

This advice

included how certificates should be dealt with by agents and that ECK should
meet with media house owners and editors and the candidates “with a view to
striking a deal on the modalities of transmission and announcement of results.”
The Commission discovered that this type of advice had been provided by the
NSIS during the referendum of 2005 and was in fact welcomed by the ECK then
and during the 2007 elections. Despite this the Commission finds that specific
advice of this nature emanating from an intelligence agency is unwise and likely
to be outside its stated mandate.
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Evidence supplied by the NSIS in the form of a letter from the Director General to Amb. Francis K. Muthaura, PS
Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of Public Service.
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Further, this correspondence included a caution on the conduct of law
enforcement and other agencies in and around the elections processes, “The
involvement of government officials and the use of public resources for campaign
purposes could lead to accusations of rigging and provide grounds for violence and
subsequent petitions.” Clearly the Director General and his officers failed to heed
their own warnings.

The Military
Testimony was tendered by the Chief of General Staff of the Kenya Armed Forces,
General Jeremiah Kianga309 to the effect that the Military were well prepared for
the PEV.

By all accounts they not only took heed of the NSIS reports but

conducted their own assessments, scanning and planning arrangements based
upon their view that the 2007 elections would see a level of violence occur to at
least levels seen at previous elections.
The military prepared contingency plans, anticipatory orders, trained troops and
rehearsed in order to respond appropriately to likely scenarios, conducted
barazas with staff around their need to remain apolitical in accordance with
military values, and other work to ensure that should the need arise military
support could be provided quickly and effectively.
The official mechanisms and formal procedures utilised for calling for Military
assistance in aid of the civil power were, however, less clear. Section 3 (2) of the
Armed Forces Act (Chapter 199 of the Laws of Kenya) provides: -

“The Kenya Army, The Kenya Air force and the Kenya Navy are charged
with the defence of the Republic and the support of the civil power in
the maintenance of order, and with such other duties as may from time to

309

CW 05, Nairobi 14 July 2008
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time be assigned to them by the Minister after consultation with the Defence
Council.”
The Police Commissioner310 testified that,
“In the context of the events after the 27th December 2007 elections, military
resources were deployed for the limited purpose of supporting police in the
restoration of transport infrastructure. The role of the military did not include
quelling of riots.”
This was acknowledged by General Kianga, the Chief of General Staff of the
Kenya Armed Forces,311 in his statement where he stated that the primary role of
the Armed Forces is the defence of the Republic of Kenya against any external
threat and the secondary role is the support of Civil Power in maintenance of
order.312
It is notable that the Police Commissioner and the Chief of General Staff of the
Kenya Armed Forces did not refer to any other basis for military aid to civil
authority or elaborate on just what processes were used.
The Commission was provided with a copy of a Government of Kenya document
entitled “Instructions on the Use of Armed Force in civil disturbances” issued by
the Ministry of Defence in 1962.313 This was also referred to by a senior police
witness who referred to a number of publications that guide policing
arrangements.314 This document spells out that such requests should emanate
from the Provincial Commissioner or District Commissioner in any “sudden or
urgent emergency” after consultation with the local police commander.
PSIC and DSIC minutes refer to these requests having taken place.

310

CW 01
CW 07
312
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Some

The Police
The Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police are generally referred to
as the Police in this discussion except where issues touch specifically upon their
individual mandate and/or responsibility.
In terms of preparedness for dealing with the Post Election Violence, the Police
were simply too far off the mark. There was, and still is, a lack of understanding
and reluctance to accept that a comprehensive exercise in planning and
preparation for the elections were not only required but constitute a basic
responsibility for the Police. This was reflected early in the proceedings.
The Commissioner of Police, Hussein Ali, stated to the Commission that the
violence was unprecedented and indicated that it could not have been
foreseen315. The Commissioner was asked by the Commission to provide copies
of documents prepared by the Police for policing the 2007 General Elections and
undertook to do so.

By the time this report was written only two planning

documents were received.

The first was an operation plan from the Coast

Province in the form of an undated presentation, and the second was a plan
entitled “Operation Uchaguzi” from SSP Mwamburi former OCPD Migori/Rongo
Districts.316
In assessing the Police preparedness overall the Commission determined that
planning and preparation was scant, commenced far too close to the event, failed
to take account of the intelligence received and information available on the
ground, and did not encompass preventive activities designed to reduce and/or
ameliorate the impact of violence around the 2007 General Elections. There was
also no evidence provided that indicated the police were utilising their own
intelligence sources and systems that should have informed planning as well as
responses.

These fundamental failures set the scene for police preparedness,

and response, nationwide.
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The Commission sensed that the police approach to its task before, during and
after the 2007 elections reflected a misplaced arrogance that they would always
be able to control what came up. As we will see not only does this approach fail
to grasp the fundamental policing tenet that preventing violence and criminal
activity is the best means of protecting citizens and property, but further
underscores the grave underestimation of what was to ultimately occur.
Evidence was tendered to the effect that indeed some planning did take place.
The Commission was told that a process was in place whereby Provincial Police
Officers (PPOs) planned for service delivery in their provinces for the elections
and these plans were tested at national level, reviewed and ultimately
implemented.317

However, little evidence of planning was heard from mid-level

police commanders.
The Commission heard from a number of officials including the former PPO who
was in charge of police operations for the entire Rift Valley Province until 27
January 2008.318

He stated that due to his assessment of the issues, he

prepared “detailed operation plans” although the evidence suggests that in fact
there were, “adequate security arrangements made” through the instrumentality
of “detailed operation orders.”

These orders appear to consist merely of the

application of officers to areas where more violence was expected than others.319
There was no indication of initiatives and strategies designed to reduce and/or
ameliorate the possibility of violence.
Planning here also seems to be predicated on the need to supply at least two
officers to each polling station during the election process. In fact it could be
said that the Police planned for dealing with the elections process and little else.
It should be noted that the ECK counsel made much of the significant increase
in polling stations for the 2007 elections.

In the event some 27,555 polling

stations were utilised meaning the impact on policing was at least 55,110
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officers assigned to these duties, albeit many were seconded from other services,
at a time when there was little violence around the actual polling. The impact of
this and other requirements are discussed in detail in a following section.
In fact one provincial CID Officer Patrick Muhuni, Kakamega320, Western
Province was one of the few police officers to state that he actually had a plan.
Although not written, the plan did consist of some activities designed to reduce
the effect of pre-election violence and deal with the election process itself. In
addition the work involved focussed almost exclusively upon preparations for
dealing with violence with little emphasis on prevention.
He told the Commission that “In the month of October 2007, the provincial Police
Headquarters directed/advised the eight Divisional Police Officers (OCPDs) in the
province to start preparing and curb any unlawful activities before and during the
electioneering period (that is the pre-election and post election period).”
He further said “The preparation would involve the beefing up of security,
deployment of police on patrol and beat duties, rehearsing police officers on the
control of riot, lectures on providing security to presiding officers and clerks,
manning of the polling centres, stations and tallying centres.”321
Many however advised that their plans were not written and many seemed to be
in the nature of an action or reaction to events as they unfolded on the ground.
The PC, Coast Province Mr Ernest G Munyi told the Commission that “adequate
measures were put in place during the political campaigns preceding the elections
and during the election itself.”322 The Coast PPO, Deputy Commissioner King’ori
Mwangi said that, “In 2007 as part of my work, I directed all OCPDs in the Coast
province to prepare operation plans covering the build up to the general
Elections.”323 He also acknowledged that the general elections constituted one of
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the biggest security operations that the Police deal with at any one time in
Kenya.324
The former OCPD Mombasa Wilfred Mbithi, now Assistant Commissioner
Operations

Nairobi

testified

that,

“Before

the

elections,

we

prepared

adequately...and to our capacity.”325 He acknowledged that on the very first day
violence erupted on the Coast he called for reinforcements, and also stated that
no review of the police 2007 elections operations had ever been completed.
Despite assurances around preparedness the Police agencies have either not
been able to provide copies of their planning documents326, state clearly when
planning commenced or provide evidence that they conducted a full de-briefing
and review process post the 2007 operation.327 These fundamental failures were
indeed replicated all over Kenya.
There were also significant variations in the understanding of senior and mid
range police as to their level of capability in dealing with the violence that
occurred.

In some cases the Commission was told that the SSAs were quite

simply overwhelmed (even when heavily reinforced), in others views were
expressed that the police were always able to control events and in fact did so
(despite the fact that many days and weeks were taken to reduce the violence
and heavy tactics were used).
The Commission takes the view that the Police in fact were poorly prepared to
deal with the PEV.

Even with the intelligence provided by the NSIS and the

historical nature of elections in this country, police agencies quite simply failed,
and failed badly, in this fundamental requirement of their mandate.

Findings in relation to planning and preparing for the 2007 General
Elections
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The Commission could find little or no evidence to indicate that the Government,
either as an entity, or through individual politicians moved to prevent or
ameliorate the tensions leading up to the elections.

In fact there is strong

evidence that indeed the actions of some senior duty bearers exacerbated
tensions and violence through the misuse of executive power and authority. The
decision to deploy hundreds of administration police officers in apparently
clandestine circumstances to Nyanza just before the polling day confirmed for
many that the elections processes were indeed suspect.
There is clear evidence that Kenya has a strong collective approach to gathering,
processing and disseminating information and intelligence dealing with security
issues that is principally demonstrated through the Kenya Security Intelligence
Machinery (KSIM). The benefits of such a system were demonstrated through
the preparedness of the NSIS and Military in understanding their roles, planning
for the 2007 elections and executing their mandates in terms of preparedness
and service delivery on the ground.
Weaknesses exposed by the very nature of the Post Election Violence however
mitigated these positives. Key amongst these was the lack of leadership provided
by the Cabinet Security Committee and its co-opted members. This committee is
the highest level component of Kenya’s Security Intelligence Machinery yet the
Commission could find no evidence that it operated at all let alone effectively in
the lead up to and during the elections. It is expected that these senior members
of the government would demonstrate leadership and decisiveness in addressing
the issues they must have been aware of during the build up to the 2007 general
elections.

The Commission can only speculate that individual members were

more concerned about their personal political situation during the campaigning
and polling periods.

The Commission found a number of examples of activities undertaken by the
NSIS as extraordinarily poor judgement, constitute partisanship on the part of a
state security organ and are examples of activities that clearly fall outside the
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mandate of the agency. These included attempts to secure ECK accreditation for
NSIS officers to be part of the elections process, a NSIS sponsored survey of how
the

3

presidential

candidates

were

polling prior

to the elections

and

communicating this information to the Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of
Public Service, and advising the ECK on electoral processes.
Omissions were also found in sub-optimal decision making, the absence of joint
operational arrangements and the failure to translate good intelligence into
demonstrable operational delivery.

In the event much of the information and

intelligence that the NSIS developed and forwarded to the other agencies,
including police, simply did not get to those who could have used it most.
The Commission could find little evidence that delivery agencies were involved in
joint planning and preparation leading up to the 2007 elections. This came as a
surprise given the history of elections violence in Kenya, and the weight of
knowledge agencies had about the likelihood of significant violence being a
feature in 2007/8.

Given that general elections constitute the most serious

known security and safety issue in Kenya and that it recurs every five years,
operational planning needs to begin a minimum of 18 months ahead of any date
set for the next general election.
There was also no evidence that recognised preparatory arrangements such as
the use of desk top scenarios, simulated emergencies and full joint operational
exercises are a part of the SSAs’ repertoire.

These activities are a standard

operating element of many similar jurisdictions, utilising peer review strategies
where security specialists from similar agencies act as reviewers and umpires to
independently assess current strengths and weaknesses in the preparedness
and capability of SSAs.

Other issues that served to weaken the opportunity to reduce and/or ameliorate
the violence were the lack of a national security policy and security plan, the
failure to recognise the importance of utilising emergency management
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components (including a national plan), and full recognition of the role that the
military can play in dealing with these events.
One of the stronger findings of an omission on the part of State Security
Agencies before the elections was the failure of the Police to engage in
professional, timely and quality planning and preparation for the elections event.
It was apparent to the Commission that there was a “we will be all right on the
day” mentality emanating from the top to the bottom of the organisation.
Planning and preparation appeared to be something that is done close to the
event and on this occasion focussed on the wrong things.

Plans seemed to

consist of, where there was evidence of something written, simply an orders
group focussing on the polling arrangements.
Examples on the ground of the lack of planning and preparation by police
abound.

This despite strong evidence suggesting there was at an element of

planning and certainly organisation and facilitation in relation to much of the
violence experienced during the post election period, especially in the Rift Valley
Province.
Many citizens seemed to have known at least a few days in advance that there
would be targeting by tribal and/or political affiliation although the police
seemed either unaware or chose not to take the information seriously. In any
event the Police were unprepared and failed to take the necessary proactive steps
to reduce the opportunity for violence to eventuate.
This approach fails to take account of one of the most important roles of the
Police and that is the protection of life and property, the prevention of offences
and crimes and keeping the peace.

Best practice in this area demands that

quality, extensive and specialised planning arrangements should begin many
months if not years before such an event.

Senior personnel, from the Commissioner and his key advisers to provincial and
district commanders, must take full responsibility for this failure to perform in
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what is a critical and fundamental element of policing. As a result many more
people lost their lives, were injured, were displaced, their homes and personal
property destroyed and ability to continue their livelihoods severed than would
otherwise have been the case.
These factors combine to identify a further omission on the part of the police.
Little or no evidence was adduced supporting the existence of a police
intelligence capability. It is accepted that the intelligence committees provide a
useful mechanism to collectively assess intelligence and utilise it for decision
making, however Police organisations should and must have their own highly
developed information gathering and intelligence systems. Had these systems
been in place and operating effectively and the intelligence gained been acted
upon in a timely and effective way then perhaps more preventive action would
have been taken.

How Did State Security Agencies (SSAs) Respond to the PEV?
The operational delivery for SSAs primarily rests with the Police (Kenya Police
Service and Administration Police), the provincial and district security and
intelligence committees, the Kenya Prisons Service, the Provincial and District
Administration and from time to time other services including the Kenya Wildlife
Service, the National Youth Service, and the Kenya Forest Guards.
The National Security Intelligence service (NSIS) does not have a mandated role
to deliver services other than to advise security agencies. The Military provides
support to the civil authority when required to do so.
This chapter assesses the overall response by SSAs with a specific focus upon;
interventions including use of force; the role played by various SSAs, the
identification of some key incidents and issues arising from them; and chronicles
some good work completed by individuals and agencies that is worthy of
particular mention.
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Responses by SSAs to the Post Election Violence proved to be inconsistent. They
varied considerably.

There were instances where individuals, and agencies

performed well, many doing their very best to provide safety and security
services to citizens. There were also many instances where agencies could have
done much better as well as clear cases of neglect of duty, criminal offending and
the use of overwhelming and lethal force on many defenceless citizens.

KSIM
At a national level and in the time available the Commission was unable to firmly
establish just how well the CSC and NSAC operated. It would be expected that it
is around events such as the crisis that developed after the presidential election
results were announced that these important, high level components of the
Security Machinery should operate best. It is understood that in fact the NSAC
did not actually meet during the crisis period and communicated by other means
and it can only be assumed that the CSC was not functional during this
important period.
A special Nyanza PSIC meeting held on the 4th February 2008 specifically
referred to NSAC directives that were issued and noted for necessary action.328
The NSAC documents were described at directives to the PSIC contained in two
letters from the Permanent Secretary dated 7th and 28th January 2008 with
directions that: “PSIC and DSIC should arrest all criminals engaged in planning
and execution of killings and destruction of property; PSIC and DSIC should
provide security to targeted individuals who supported the Government and
PNU; PSIC and DSICs should forthwith ensure that all major feeder roads are
free of illegal barriers; The command and coordination relationships between
Security Committees and Security Agents while on Security Operations should
be streamlined. The Provincial Commissioner and District Commissioners will
exercise their functions of giving overall and general directions as chairmen of
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the PSIC and DSICs respectively while the Provincial Police Officer and Officer
Commanding Police Divisions remain Operational Commanders to execute
committee decisions.”
The performance of the Provincial and District Intelligence Committees appeared
mixed. An examination of the Rift Valley PSIC minutes for example disclosed a
functioning

group

demonstrating

some

leadership

and

decision-making

throughout the crisis. A special meeting held on 31 December 2007 reviewed
the situation all over the province, identified activities for priority action and
agreed that officers should exercise restraint “as killing was not the answer.” The
committee resolved to meet frequently during this period meeting on four
occasions during January 2008 and a number of times in February.
In contrast the Nairobi Provincial Intelligence Committee appears to have met
less frequently (according to the minutes provided) and not at all during
December 2007, January or February 2008.

The Nairobi North District

Committee met three times, during this period, Nairobi West not at all, and
Nairobi East met on 13th December and not again until 13th February 2008.
There was also evidence of clear and concise decision making by Committees. A
special PSIC meeting held at Kakamega in Western Province on 22nd January
2008 reported an agreement to allow planned peaceful demonstrations by ODM
for 24th January 2008.329

NSIS
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Evidence received by the Commission indicated that the NSIS did continue the
process of information collection and intelligence gathering during the PEV
period. Daily situation reports330 were prepared outlining key areas of concern
including, in some cases, the identification of specific people and events of
interest.

As stated earlier it is not clear, however, the extent to which these

reports were disseminated to key enforcement agencies and other recipients.
Although some of what might be described as standard reports were
discontinued partly in December 2007, throughout January and parts of
February 2008 this is not surprising given the nature of the events confronting
agencies throughout the Republic.

Unfortunately even the daily situation

reports were not produced during the critical period of 24th December 2007 and
2nd January 2008. The Commission believes however that in fact these events
provided an opportunity for the Service to develop and circulate special reports
focussing on perpetrators, planners and organisers of violence and possible
tactics and strategies to reduce their effect.

The NSIS did not take this

opportunity but should do so in the future.

Military
The Commission has been unable to establish the exact timing and mechanism
that triggered the involvement of the Military in the Post Election Violence.
Although, for example, the Commission was informed that their support began
on 27 December 2007 a schedule of action taken covers the period 6 January to
28 February 2008.331

In the event the military were involved in a number of supporting activities right
across the country.
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These activities included332;
•

Transporting IDPs from flash points to safe areas;

•

Guarding IDP camps;

•

Clearing and securing blocked roads;

•

Securing the rail line;

•

Distributing food and medical supplies to IDPs;

•

Escorting trucks from Mombasa destined for Rift valley, Western
Kenya and neighbouring countries;

•

Escorting passenger vehicles through unsafe insecure areas between
Nairobi and Western Kenya

Apart from a demonstration of force both on the ground and from a helicopter in
Naivasha there was never a requirement for the military to use force and none
was used. “My lords, yes we fired in the air that is a demonstration of force.
There were one or two occasions when we fired into the air to demonstrate
force.”333
The Commission’s view is that the Military performed its duty well, a position
that appeared to be shared with many commentators. What is surprising is that
more military support was not initiated as the circumstances of the situation
dictated that more resources of this nature applied quickly and judiciously, may
have reduced the impact, extent and duration of the PEV.

Prison Service
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The role of prison officers during the PEV period basically fell into three
categories.

Firstly very many officers were designated as police officers

principally for duties in and around the polling stations.334

Secondly a number of officers were co-opted to support the Police in a number of
enforcement roles, effectively as reinforcements, and carried out duties such as
patrolling.335

In some cases, such as in Naivasha, the Commission heard of

allegations of improper conduct on the part of some officers. In this particular
case it is alleged that due to pressure from the public, officers were withdrawn
from service on 27 January 2008. Unfortunately this occurred at the very time
Police were under severe pressure due to the retaliatory attacks that occurred in
the town on the same day, a curious coincidence.

Further evidence was received by the Commission to the effect that prison
officers did contribute well to the provision of a safe haven for IDPs. In Naivasha
the Assistant Commissioner of Prisons, Duncan Okore336 allowed victims of the
violence to stay in the outer area of the prison whilst more appropriate
arrangements were made. In the event, from a trickle of women and children
arriving on 30th December 2007 the number of IDPs rose to around 10,000 on
3rd February 2008. By 8th February 2008 all but 20 IDPs remained. These IDPs
were mainly women and children and were accommodated, supported and
protected by prison officers until the Red Cross and other agencies arrived.337

Police
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The Commission heard that the Police were in fact overwhelmed by the scope
and nature of the PEV.

One DSIC meeting held on the 1st of January 2008

reflected that “in some cases especially in Cherangany and Saboti Divisions
security forces were overwhelmed by the huge numbers of marauding gangs hence
there is very serious need for the forces in the two Districts to be reinforced.”
Further on 16th January 2008 the same committee recorded an appeal to the
PSIC to urgently facilitate reinforcements of two special detachments of RDU338
or GSU339 and two platoons of Kenya Army personnel.
It is difficult to see how the Police could have coped without initiating and
implementing preventive measures in the first place that may well have resulted
in, with more support from the military, far fewer deaths, injuries and
destruction of property. Simply put the incidents police were called upon to deal
with were all too much, too often and too widespread. These events sorely tested
police operating arrangements, systems, the training, ability and calibre of
officers, equipment and decision making. The lack of planning resulted in
effectively de-limiting available tactical options. Much was found wanting.

Policy Issues
There were a number of nationally initiated decrees and orders that may have
had an effect on the way in which operations were managed. The Commissioner
ordered a nationwide ban on political gatherings of any description.340

Many

felt this was a violation of the Constitution and contrary to law. Others such as
ODM felt it was a direct attack on them and their members and supporters.
Although there may have been some operational utility in the move in seeking to
ensure the police could control large, mobile populations, it will always be linked
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to the tactic of restraining people from moving out of the large informal
settlements that exist in and around the major towns and cities.
There were also rumours, a reality to many, that the Police had a shoot to kill
policy341. This rumour was heightened when it became apparent that the Police
were firing live bullets at citizens and the reality set in that many were being
killed. Whilst two witnesses342 testified that there was no such policy and that
there was no basis in law for there to be one, doubtless many will find this
position difficult to accept.
A ban on live media broadcasts may well have had negative unintended results
in terms of security issues343. Many citizens determined this act amounted to a
further infringement of their rights, indicated that the government had
something to hide and as a result heightened tensions that were already running
at very high levels. The Attorney General in fact testified that in his view the ban
was not legal.

344

The Operational Environment
The Police faced extraordinary operational issues across much of Kenya.
Ranging from individuals inciting and agitating for violence to occur, groups and
gangs ravishing communities, large numbers of youth and other citizens
damaging property and in some cases rioting, to attempts at organising and
conducting demonstrations, these events sorely stretched and tested the police
capability and responses. Ultimately 1133 people were killed, very many more
injured, thousands of private and public properties destroyed, vehicles and
equipment ruined and private possessions stolen.
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There were significant differences in the issues faced by the police around the
country.

For example those issues facing State Security Agencies in the Rift

Valley Province were quite different from other areas in Kenya. Violence started
in different areas at different times; Kuresoi on 4th December, Eldoret on 30th
December, Nakuru on 24th January and Naivasha on 27th January and violence
continued in one form or another until the signing of the accord on 28th
February 2008.
There were also a number of different aspects to the violence ranging from the
aim of expelling certain communities from areas including Uasin Gishu to the
so-called “revenge attacks” at Nakuru and Naivasha to even up the score.

It

should be said on this point that these attacks were not only unlawful and
criminal acts on defenceless men, women and children, but they did not in fact
target the actual perpetrators of the original violence.
It should also be remembered that a number of police officers and provincial
administrators lost their lives during this period some in the process of saving
lives and/or keeping the peace345.
It is against this backdrop that the following analysis was made.

Use of Force
Overall the Commission determined that a total of 1133 people died during the
PEV period of whom 1048 were male, 74 female, 11 children; 119 remain
unidentified.

Of these 405 died from gunshot wounds.

In addition 3,561

citizens sought medical treatment (many admitted to hospitals) and of these 557
were treated for gunshot wounds.

345
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Whilst the Commission acknowledges the possibility that some of those killed
and wounded by gunshots may have been the victims of people other than the
Police, no evidence to this effect was received.
It is also accepted that in fact these figures may not fully reflect totals of people
killed (some may have been buried without the knowledge of officials) and the
Commission heard from many witnesses that due to the PEV itself (road blocks,
no available transport and too dangerous) that many people could not travel to
medical facilities for treatment.
Both peaceful demonstrations and uncontrolled riots were significant events
throughout the country and are relevant to the Commission’s work for a number
of reasons. They address the issues of the lawful rights of individuals to protest
and the police interaction with peaceful demonstrators and their use of force. It
also addresses the issue of police resources and their inability to protect the
public.
The Commission investigations included an examination of several cases
involving both police related shooting and cases involving citizen against citizen.
It also examined the issue of the indiscriminate firing of live rounds of
ammunition into peaceful crowds and in riot situations.
On many occasions when the police intervened, they resorted to lobbing tear gas
and shooting into the air. Police themselves must have observed that this use of
force saw limited success. Many witnesses to these events have confirmed that
the police actions only dispersed crowds momentarily. The youth would simply
regroup and attack others with impunity. Some witnesses described this police
tactic as a game of hide and seek between the police and the gangs.
The evidence received included cases where there were good witness accounts
and where police units or senior officers involved could be identified. On many
occasions however further investigations will be necessary to identify officers
utilising excess force and deal with them appropriately.
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Of all the incidents of state agency responses none was more reported upon or
roundly condemned by commentators and observers alike than that which
occurred in Kisumu.346 Despite evidence being provided by the former PPO to
the contrary347 the OCPD Kisumu, SSP Kiragu stated that the violence starting
on 28 December 2007 came as a complete surprise to the police.348

On this

occasion police used tear gas to disperse a large crowd who had stormed the
Provincial Works Offices, destroying much property.
However after unsuccessfully attempting to disperse even larger crowds the
following day in the process of more significant acts of looting and property
destruction, a decision was taken to use live ammunition.349 Reinforced by both
the GSU and Administration Police (Rapid Deployment Unit) further police action
aimed at protecting the CBD was taken on 30 December. During that day 25
rioters were shot dead by police.
Further violence continued throughout until early February 2008 and when the
violence finally subsided Police reported killing a total of 48 people through the
use of firearms.

This figure was revised by the hospital pathologist whose

evidence was that there were in fact 50 people who died of gunshot wounds out
of a total of 56 bodies examined.
The Commission was provided with armoury records relating to the issue of
firearms and ammunition to police officers in Nyanza during this period.

An

analysis of these records showed that significant amounts of ammunition and
tear gas were expended, some officers used far more ammunition than others,
only one set of records recorded the issue and use of blanks (although these
particular records appeared to be a reproduction where all entries were written
by the same person), and in very many cases there is no record at all of
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ammunition expended. These records, and others, will form the basis of further
investigations into the use of force by SSAs.350
The Commission heard from the Ministry of Medical Services that a total of 111
people died in Nyanza during the PEV period. Made up of 101 males, 9 females
and one unidentified person the telling factor in causes of death were the 89
(80%) who died from gunshot wounds. In addition a total of 214 people were
admitted to various hospitals throughout the province, of whom 48 had gunshot
wounds.
One of the prime difficulties the police had in defending their use of lethal force
in these circumstances became evident through questions asked by the
Commissioners.

In response to specific questions, the OCPD Kisumu clearly

stated that unless there was a clear and present danger to life and/or property,
then the use of lethal force was not justified351. He further testified that police
should not use teargas or firearms when citizens were running away from the
police. “No my lordship, once they have run away we have achieved the objective
of dispersing them.”
This being the case it is difficult to rationalise the use of live bullets (or tear gas)
on retreating crowds.
Evidence from the pathologist Dr Odour352 revealed that of the 50 people shot by
police in Kisumu 30 were shot from behind and a further 9 from the side. In
addition 3 of the deceased were under the age of 14 years (one a 10 year old girl)
and 3 were female. One of the children, a 12 year old boy, was shot twice in the
back. Further a 45 year old woman was shot and killed whilst in her home just
outside the CBD.
The Commission could find no legal or operational basis for justifying the
shooting of civilians from behind at any time given the circumstances presented
to it.

These figures are complemented by other witnesses who told of
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circumstances indicating further indiscriminate use of firearms by the police in
terms of people who were shot and injured.
One witness Mr Gregory Ngoche353, a 53 year old volunteer social worker was
sitting at his home in Kisumu at about 9am on 17 January 2008 with his
mother and children.

He heard shouting and saw youths throwing stones at

police. The police were using bullets and he was hit by what is thought to be a
stray bullet in the lower stomach and he was hospitalised for several days. He
said that there were bullets flying everywhere and even hitting the trees.

Mr

Ngoche, who was paralysed in the right leg at a young age, was more than 200
metres from the police when he was hit and now suffers from sexual
dysfunction. He and his family remain fearful living in their neighbourhood as a
result of the police activity.
A further witness Ms Alice Atieno354, a former security officer arrived home in
Manyatta Estate, Kisumu town at about 6pm on 28 December 2007 from her
work.

Her six year old son was playing outside nearby when she saw youths

breaking into a nearby shop. On hearing gunfire she gathered up her son and
as they neared their house she was shot through the back of the head.
witness regained consciousness nearly two weeks later in hospital.

The

She is

unable to eat solid food, cannot now work, or afford to pay for an operation that
would remedy much of her disability.
Mr John Apiyo355 an Askari for the Kisumu Municipal Council testified that
whilst working at the Kibuye wholesale market at about 11am on 6 January
2008 some people decided to torch a building near his duty station. A lorry full
of armed GSU officers arrived and they ran towards the stall owners who wanted
to torch the building. As the GSU ran past his duty station firing their guns they
told him to, “Close that gate quickly” but while he was complying he was shot in
the back of the legs and his private parts were damaged. He was admitted to
Nyanza General Hospital.
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The OCPD of Homa Bay, Jimmy J. Mnene declared that in his division rioting
took place from 29th December 2007 and lasted a few days.356 However despite
telling the Commission that he, “had to restrain my officers from shooting at
people...” and “briefed the staff on each occasion not to use live ammunition, to use
tear gas,” the only 3 deaths recorded in the area died as a result of gunshot
wounds. He also told the Commission that his staff were only issued with live
rounds and not blanks or rubber bullets.
The former OCS of the combined Migori/Rongo police divisions, Edward
Maghanga Mwamburi357 told the Commission that he did not anticipate violence
of the nature that unfolded although he prepared officers in riot training and
used written materials in training activities.
In preparation he deployed static guards at vital installations and had standby
riot parties at each of the police stations. He further said in addition to the 11
civilians who were shot by police during the PEV, a 54 year old APC was killed
on duty and four others injured.

It is not known if post mortems were

conducted on all the deceased as he indicated that most of the bodies were
collected from the mortuaries and buried without the knowledge of the Police.
The Commission found that Western Province was virtually forgotten in terms of
Kenyans’ understanding of the level of violence that occurred. Although there
were no reports of rape, sodomy or forced circumcision from the health facilities,
areas that bore the brunt of the violence included Mumias, Vihiga, Kakamega
and Webuye. The Commission learned that no specific investigations had been
commenced into police action.

Events unfolding in and around the general elections of 2007 saw the majority of
casualties caused by the Police. With PEV starting in Mumias District on 27th
December 2007 culminating in Lugari Division on 31st January 2008 a total of
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98 people lost their lives with a further 129 people being treated in hospitals and
medical centres.
Of those who were killed no less than three quarters (74) were found to have died
as a result of gunshot wounds. Dr Onudi, Deputy Director of Medical services
and Provincial Medical Officer, Western Province provided data showing that in
some facilities, the dead were almost exclusively the result of gunshots.358
In Kakamega 26 of 31, Mumias all 11 of 12, Busia 8 of 9, Bungoma all 7, Vihiga
15 of 18 deaths occurred as a result of gunshots.

Only the Webuye district

hospital reported a different result with 7 of 21 deaths due to this cause.
In addition many victims of gunshots were treated in medical facilities.

The

pattern of injuries and their causes were similar in that virtually all injuries in
Kakamega, Mumias and Vihiga were caused by gunshots.
Whilst

these

post

mortem

results

were

not examined

by

Commission

investigators to determine how these victims were shot it is inconceivable that
there would be sufficient justification for police to shoot dead so many people.
The Commission received aggregated data from the PS of the Ministry of Medical
Services, Dr. Hezron O. Nyangito in mid August 2008. He stated that in the Rift
Valley a total of 779359 people died of which 170 were as a result of gunshot
wounds. The gunshot deaths amounted to a staggering 31% of the total deaths
that occurred and a careful analysis of the manner in which these people died
needs to be undertaken. The report also indicated that “the leading causes of
injury; - were gunshots...” In the Rift Valley this amounted to 189 of a total of
1324 – some 14.3%.

A closer analysis of those admitted and/or treated at

medical facilities also needs to be undertaken so that a complete picture of
shooting victims is forthcoming.
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It is clear that not all deaths and injury patterns were the same across the
Province.

For example in Trans Nzoia West/East, Dr PK Too,360 the District

Medical Officer of Health Trans Nzoia West District gave evidence to the effect
that a total of 105 people were killed in the two districts. Of these a total of 83
died of gunshot wounds – almost 80%. Whilst these victims were located all over
the area some places suffered much more than others including; Matunda,
Cherangany, Gitwamba, Kalaa and Munyaka.
As with other areas where many people were shot to death, closer and more
exhaustive investigations are required to determine the reason and establish the
operational utility of shooting victims by police and/or culpability where this is
established by the facts.
Eldoret was also the site of the Police GSU action at the Moi Teaching and
Referral Hospital that resulted in injuries to some hospital employees and
medical staff. This illustrates the way in which police used indiscriminate and
excessive force against innocent citizens. From the evidence of the Chief Security
Officer and one of his security supervisors361 it was reported that the police
where ‘chasing’ a gang of youth through the streets who headed in the general
direction of the hospital. Despite assurances by hospital security staff that none
of the youths had entered the compound, police resorted to the use of live
rounds and tear gas in what was a heavily populated operational hospital
environment. This amounted to a serious case of responding dangerously
without sufficient consideration for the safety of hospital staff, patients and
others in the immediate area.

The violence in the Coast erupted on the evening of 30th December 2007 and
continued until the 1 January 2008. During this time 5 people were shot and
killed.
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citizens Commission investigations nevertheless uncovered some disturbing
evidence.
Dr. Anderson Kahindi, Provincial Director of Public Health and Deputy Director
of Medical Services/Coast, produced evidence to the effect that out of the 5
people shot dead during this period four, including a woman, were shot in the
back. In addition to this information he also tendered evidence to the effect that
of the 22 patients admitted to hospital during the period where PEV was
occurring, 12 suffered gunshot wounds.362
The Commission heard from the police that in respect of these casualties,
inquest files were opened in respect of the five deaths, as well as 20 others, but
there is no apparent follow up action being taken in respect of those wounded by
gunshots.
The Commission heard from two further witnesses in respect of the shootings.
The first, 56 year old Rose Gathoni Mathenge told the Commission that after the
election results were announced on 30 December 2007 she and her husband
were at home when they saw people passing nearby with looted goods.

Her

husband left the house at about 8pm and when she could not raise him on the
mobile phone a short time later went out to look for him. Someone answered his
phone when she called saying he had been shot by the police. He was lying dead
a short distance away with bullet wounds.363 The witness told the Commission
that, “No one else was shot during that period,” and “The Police admitted later
that they shot him as he was looting.”364 She said that this would not be possible
due to the short time he was away and there was no evidence of looting near the
body.
The second witness, Alistair Msusa Mbotela365, told the Commission that he was
at home with his wife and two children on the night of 31 December 2007.
Hearing people making a commotion, he and his wife went to their fence and saw
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people running away from Mla Leo with looted items. They were running in the
direction of his house and away from the police so they turned to go back into
the house. He further said, “We heard a gunshot and as we turned to go to the
main door of our house my wife said that she had been hurt and she then took
two steps and fell on the floor as I was holding her. I saw blood on my hands
and started calling for help.”

“We took her to Jocham Hospital but she was

pronounced dead on arrival.”366
The witness reported the matter to the police and made several follow up
enquiries. He told the Commission, “The attitude of the Police has been most
distressing. There has been little or no progress in the attempt to identify my
wife’s killer and bring them to book.”
Police actions in respect of the use of lethal force in Mombasa replicate those in
other parts of the country.

Similarities including victims shot from behind,

victims shot whilst in and around their own homes and the rationale for using
lethal force at all in the circumstances require a close and thorough investigation
by specialists who are independent of the police.
In Nairobi the Commission learned that there were a total of 125 who lost their
lives during the clashes 23 of whom died from gunshot wounds. A further 342
victims were admitted to hospital during the period, 61 with gunshot wounds.367
In addition many denigrated the apparent heavy handed approach the Police
took to dealing with demonstrations and what the police called riots, especially
in the informal housing areas (slums) such as Kibera and Mathare.368
Commission investigations identified the extensive use of tear gas and firearms
in support of what appeared to be a tactic to keep citizens inside these informal
settlement areas. It also served to ensure that there were no demonstrations of
any kind emanating from these and other areas in and around Nairobi.
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Investigative Capability
The Commission was particularly disappointed with the lack of investigative
work by the police even when provided with strong evidence identifying
offenders. Witnesses told the Commission that, “many (complainants) identified
the looters by name and address and gave definitive information to the police
about the whereabouts of their property.

In some cases police just told

complainants that they should be grateful that they are alive and forget what
happened.”369
These sentiments were repeated to the Commission and its investigators all over
the country.
Even in accepting the pressures facing the Police during this period, the quality
of investigative work as well as the quantity of it left much to be desired. The
Commission heard on a number of occasions that no investigation would be
undertaken unless there was a complaint. This is particularly true in relation to
property offences and deaths by shooting. Even where there was clear evidence
that a serious crime had taken place (as in the case of a building being burnt
down) or where the circumstances demand a quality investigative effort (as in the
case of a child being shot twice in the back) little or no follow up was evident.
An examination of some inquest files revealed that at best a superficial
investigative effort was undertaken.370

Standard investigative work such as a

timely scene examination, gathering and submitting evidence secured during the
examination, interviewing potential witnesses from the area and pursuing lines
of inquiry to identify some of the likely suspects (marauding youth) were not
completed.371 On at least one occasion the investigation file was returned to the
police from the office of the DPP for further work to be completed.
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Other examples demonstrating the need to strengthen investigations work were
provided by victims themselves. The two case studies reported in appendices “C”
and “D” clearly indicate reluctance to follow-up on high level criminal offending
to the standard expected of a functioning police agency.
The Commission also learned that the investigation files relating to homicides
double as an inquest file. There is no separation of role and accountability for
dealing with what are quite different aspects of these incidents. In dealing with
arrangements relating to the actual death as well as a high level investigation
and the need to work closely with the DPP in establishing evidential thresholds,
the Police have found themselves managing a challenging environment that may
well have the effect of detracting from their main focus.
Some of the issues relating to investigative capability were highlighted by the
Attorney General, Mr Amos Wako372 who testified that, “On 21st June 2008, I
appointed a joint team of senior officers from the department of Public Prosecutions
in the State Law Office and the Police Department to review all cases on a case by
case basis related to post-election violence including the following categories;
Cases of persons charged and are in remand; cases of persons charged but are
out on bail, cases pending arrest of known persons, cases of persons in police
custody but are not yet charged.

The joint team is to determine and make

recommendations to the Attorney General through the Director of Public
Prosecutions on the basis of sufficiency of evidence whether the case should
proceed to full trial, be withdrawn or otherwise terminated. The team is yet to
complete its task.”
The Commission has since noted reports in the media that some alleged
offenders were released as a result of this examination and direction.
The Attorney General also alluded to some issues facing investigators that
mitigate quality investigative work. He said in relation to the PEV, “Most of the
would-be witnesses were displaced following the violence and could not be easily
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located for recording of their statements [and that] some of those located have
been reluctant to record statements, reluctant to participate in identification
parades, unwilling to appear in court and give evidence for fear of reprisals.”
Relating to investigations into a former Commission’s recommendations373
he commented that there were, genuine difficulties in investigating and
getting witnesses because of their fear of reprisals within the context of the
ethnic clashes, a lack of capacity and resources on the part of the
investigating authorities and self censorships or fear on the part of the
investigators who are susceptible to pressure and manipulation.
These issues were also raised independently by two other senior public officials
especially in respect of investigating individuals who could influence an
investigator’s work prospects or pose a personal threat.374
The Attorney General also told the Commission, “As of now we are awaiting
investigations. As of now we are awaiting the results of the Commission of Inquiry
into all these issues because it comes within the mandate of this Commission of
Inquiry to identify the perpetrators. But what you can rest assured that as the
Attorney General we shall take the recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry
together with any other investigations that have been carried out very seriously
and if, my position is that if the offences are disclosed against any person, I'll
prosecute.”

Criminal Conduct (by police) including killings and SGBV
In addition to the instances of excessive force used by the Police, there was
credible evidence of criminal behaviour. Instances ranged from murder to gang
rape and looting.
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Commission investigators obtained information that one police officer (from the
Rift Valley Province) was responsible for fatally shooting citizens, said to be at
least five and possibly more, during the unrest following the election at the end
of 2007.375 Further information was received by the Commission to the effect
that another innocent citizen was shot in the back and is now paralysed as a
result. Following information received from ‘M’ above investigators spoke to one
of the victims who confirmed the information outlined.376

Testimony also was

received by the Commission in relation to this event from Professor Anyang’
Nyong’o.377
Similar information was obtained by Commission investigators relating to an
Administration Police officer in Nairobi.

This officer, who is known to many

witnesses, allegedly shot a number of citizens on 30th and 31st December 2007
many of whom were killed. More examples were related to investigators.
In the course of investigations, allegations were heard that Police committed acts
of sexual violence.

The Commission’s investigators interviewed eight women

whose evidence was that they were raped by Police378. With one exception, these
were gang rapes, with women saying they were raped by up to seven men. In the
one instance where a victim was raped by only one officer, there was a second
officer present.
Of the eight women, five were attacked in their homes, two within their
neighbourhoods or local environs and one whilst in flight from the violence. The
women spoken to were attacked in Nairobi, Eldoret and Kisumu. Officers were
variously described as being GSU, Kenya Police and Administration Police.
Sometimes the victims, on seeing the approach of state security agents,
expressed initial relief at the arrival of Police who could afford them help and
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protection, only to be over-powered and gang-raped by them. At least one attack
by Police was accompanied by theft from the house of the victim (CW17).379
Some of the officers expressed tribal/political motivation behind the attacks.380
There was no attempt by the officers to disguise their identities and their
behaviour implied a disturbing confidence in their impunity for these serious
criminal acts. Perhaps this in part arose from the fact that these officers were
not local men, but it nevertheless portrays an alarming attitude on the part of
these officers.
Two female witnesses testified to various incidents of being raped by police
officers (CWs 98 and 99)381.

One, a 21 year old with 4 children, reported being

raped by up to 6 police officers at around 10am on 10 February 2008 near the
Ondiek Highway. The other, a 32 year old caring for 5 children, reported being
raped and sexually assaulted by 2 police officers at about 9pm on 4 January
2008 near USAID estate. Her friend was also raped by 2 other police officers at
the same time and was later found dead a kilometre or two from the scene.
The Commission received depositions from a number of citizens who related
events concerning the criminal acts of police officers. Two of these deponents
recounted an incident at Kabsoit Centre on 1st February 2008 when some GSU
officers allegedly hacked a man’s hand and then robbed him of a total of Ksh.
51,000.
Further evidence was received in statement form382 to the effect that police
officers failed to stop looting at the Ukwala Format Branch supermarket and
others stated they would only protect the Ukwala Kenshop Branch if they were
given KSH10,000 each.

Omissions and Misconduct (by police)
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The Commission heard a range of examples of police behaviour that fell into the
general category of unprofessional behaviour or misconduct. These ranged from
dereliction of duty, inconsistent or insensitive support arrangements for victims
to failing to prevent offending especially property offences.
Sexual violence appeared not to be a high priority for Police during the PEV and
arguably this is also the case during more peaceful times.

The testimony of many senior Police who gave evidence at the Commission’s
hearings was as interesting in what was not said, as to what was said. Some
had not included figures relating to sexual violence in their statistics, apparently
not deeming it important.

Many, when asked, indicated that they had not

received any (or many) formal reports of Sexual violence:

The Provincial

Commissioner, Rift Valley told the Commission: “We have not received any cases
of sexual assault throughout the one and half months of violence in Rift Valley”.

383

However it would have been known to anyone living in Kenya at the time of the
PEV that there were many allegations of sexual violence throughout the country,
including allegations of Police officers being offenders. So to merely omit this
category of offences, or to claim no formal reports of such, seems akin to burying
ones head in the sand, and does not speak to a strong will to uphold the law as
it relates to sexual offending.
It is a universal trend that Police figures in respect of sexual violence are lower
than hospital figures.

In some places the Commission went, Police reported

having received no such cases, and yet hospitals and NGOs were busy attending
to victims of sexual assaults and rapes.
Nairobi Women’s Hospital (NWH) has submitted its reports, including statistics
on sexual assault, to Police every year for the last 6-7 years. NWH’s CEO noted
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that the Police Commissioner has never questioned the hospital administrators
about their figures or the vast discrepancy between the two sets of numbers.384
There was a variable response to sexual violence by Police and investigations
indicated it was generally well below the standard of what can reasonably be
expected.
A number of victims described a dismissive response when they reported to
Police.

Some victims were met with what could be described as an

ineffectual/unresponsive policing effort (a Mathare victim of rape who reported to
Police several weeks later did not have her complaint accepted, with the officer
telling her - how was he to know if her allegation was true, given she had not
attended a hospital on account of her rape).

385

Still other responses could be characterized as cruel and indicative of a callous
disregard for human safety (a Mathare victim of gang rape who presented
bleeding and requesting help for her critically injured husband was waved away
by Police who simply told her to run for her life).386
From victims spoken to who had reported, or attempted to report to Police, it was
noted that many were arbitrarily discouraged or dismissed by Police if the victim
could not immediately identify by name the perpetrator.
In a number of cases, victims who had gone to Police to make statements about
serious crimes were turned away without so much as an OB (Occurrence Book)
number. The victim’s ability to name the offender should never be a prerequisite
to the reporting and recording of a crime. It calls into question many aspects of
the Police operation, including the training of frontline officers, the quality and
capacity of criminal investigation, commitment to addressing sexual violence and
the value that is placed on criminal intelligence.
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Many of these responses were given in the midst of the worst of the chaos and
occurred at a time when Police were struggling to control an anarchic situation
with multiple threats to life and property.

However the Commission’s

investigators are not aware of any significant attempts by Police in the
intervening, more peaceful period to follow up and investigate the serious
offences

which they must surely know took place and to which their initial

response was inadequate.
It was predictable, and borne out by the work of the Commission’s investigators,
that when women suffered sexual violence and brutality at the hands of Police,
they were unlikely to go to that same institution to lay complaints. However, one
did attempt to make a report to Kilimani Police of being raped by an officer:
“I told them that my house had been burned down and a policeman had
raped me. They asked me whether I knew the police who had raped me.
I told them I did not. They told me to choose between the two either the
issue of my house being burned or being raped”
“ I went back home and later went back, I reported and wrote statement
that my house had been burned but I left out that I had been raped....
They told me I was to blame for the rape and I should look into the issue
about house.” (CW18) 387

However formal, first-hand complaints to Police are not the only way in which
the commission of crime comes to the notice of Police.

When Police became

aware of allegations of these crimes, it would be expected that they would want
to solicit these complaints and thoroughly investigate them. Police would have
been aware of the allegations at the time of the PEV through the work of NGOs
and media. In the course of this Commission, the allegations were once again
put before the public and Police.
If Police do not act decisively in the face of allegations against their own, then
any progress or credibility they have managed to achieve in this area of sexual
violence is greatly undermined.
387
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developed in the Police when their own people stand accused of such things and
the matters are not investigated comprehensively and transparently.
There was a report of women victims being taken into a Police station and cared
for by the female Police officers. However despite this compassionate response to
the plight of the women, no statement was taken from the victims or
investigation commenced.388
There were indications that, at least in some places, improvements had been
made to the manner in which complaints of sexual violence were received. Some
of this derived from those primary agencies (often medical) most often dealing
with victims embarking on some liaison/training with Police. Nairobi Women’s
Hospital was one agency which reported such developments.389

On another

positive note, Nairobi Women’s Hospital CEO Dr Thenya pointed out that many
of the victims (over 100) were actually brought to the hospital by Police.
However it seemed that it was only in the week or two prior to Dr Thenya’s
testimony before the Commission on 15th July 2008 that Police had attended the
hospital seeking medical records. This raises questions in regard to the Police
response to the many cases of sexual violence which they knew, from first-hand
involvement, had taken place, and yet appeared to take little interest in following
up.

From evidence given at the public hearings, the number of active or

completed/successful prosecutions in respect of sexual crimes is few.
Some Police stations have established gender desks at which sexual crimes can
be reported. While this is a step in the right direction, the effort needs to be
extended so that all Police officers (not just those manning the gender desk)
should be aware of the particular needs and rights of victims at the time they
present to Police.
And the presence of a gender desk at a Police station is in itself no guarantee of
an appropriate Police response. A senior manager at a gender violence recovery
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centre described incidences where women presented to Police stations with their
medical report in order to make a complaint, only to have a Police officer peruse
the report and pronounce that there was no evidence of rape and thereby
dismiss the complaints as baseless.
Common themes seemed to be if the report contained evidence that the sexual
offence did not comprise the first sexual experience for the victim – or if there
were no lacerations (to the genital area) – or there was no evidence of presence of
sperm reported (from swabs taken from the victim).390 Clearly the medical report
is but one piece of evidence to be considered and to dismiss victims in the way
described represents poor police practice and is unacceptable.
Also, of course, reporting of sexual violence is only one step of the process.
There needs to be a strong investigative response which follows and there was
little evidence of this approach being taken during the PEV.
One NGO assisting victims of sexual violence told the Commission, “The
survivors felt that the police officers abdicated their role by taking sides during the
post election violence and failed to protect them or record their statements when
they reported the matters.”391
It would have been ideal for the Police to engage in some proactive strategies
aimed at the awareness and prevention of sexual violence and to increase the
efficacy of their response to it.

To do this prior to the violence breaking out

would have required a degree of foresight, receipt of criminal intelligence and
planning. However when the first violence broke out in some areas shortly after
the elections, there may have been the opportunity to be proactive in other
areas, with the thought that people in those areas may face similar risks.

It

could also have been apprehended that as IDP camps were established, there
would be a risk of SGBV in those places and gender-sensitive Police posts and
other strategies established there may have served both proactive and reactive
functions for the IDPs.
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As long as a substantial percentage of sexual violence remains underground, it
will be a crime which is not properly addressed and its incidence cannot be
expected to decrease.

The higher the confidence the public has in the Police,

the more likely it will be that these crimes will be reported and dealt with
effectively.
Many of the issues identified above were not reported to the police and victims
variously described their reasons as fear of the police, especially as they were the
perpetrators, and a sense that nothing would be done in any event.
There appears to be good reasons for victims holding these fears.

Police

informed the Commission that apart from the ubiquitous inquest files, no
internal investigations into the conduct of police officers were being undertaken
or contemplated.392

In addition no complaints of rape were recorded by the

police during the period.
Commission witnesses gave evidence to the effect that the Police in and around
Mombasa did not take preventive or remedial action against thieves and looters.
One witness, Titus Tommy Gichangi Lucas393, a businessman told of his three
businesses being looted between the 30th December 2007 and 1st of January
2008.

Informed by neighbours about the burglaries and looting, the witness

called Changamwe, Nyali and Likoni Police respectively reporting the crimes. He
was variously informed that the police, “already sent police officers to the area
and that there was nothing to worry about.”

“....their officers were on the

ground.” And “....that all officers were out quelling riots.”
However all the witness’s property was looted and despite providing police with a
video and photographs clearly showing numerous offenders looting, only one has
been brought before the court.
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Commission witnesses heard in camera supported the premise that the police
failed in their duty to protect property (CW 150 & CW 151)394. They informed the
Commission that the Police “were indifferent to the loss of property and
wealth...as they told looters to take what they wanted but not to harm anybody.”
They said that this message was a consistent theme all over Mombasa to the
extent that it must have been a police strategy in dealing with the violence.
Unfortunately this approach had unintended consequences as, “the failure of
police to take serious action only led to larger numbers taking part in the looting.
Word obviously spread that the police had taken an indifferent approach to the
chaos.

We ourselves witnessed women stealing household goods from their

neighbours’ homes in Mikindani as the police stood by and joked about it.” “It
was only on January 2nd with the arrival of the GSU that the looting subsided, but
by then all of the properties of Kikuyus and Kambas had been looted.”395
Communities used their own strategies to prevent further looting and violence
including creating vigilante groups and spreading the rumour that, “Mungiki had
arrived in town on a revenge mission.”

Outside influence on police decisions
The Commission received evidence that on a number of occasions the decision
making and behaviour of senior police officers was influenced by factors outside
the formal operating arrangements, chain of command and in direct conflict with
mandated duties.
Perhaps the most graphic example was depicted in evidence gained by
Commission investigations of actions taken by the Administration Police a few
days before polling day.

The evidence is that around the 23rd of December a

large number of officers,

about 1600, were assembled at the Administration

Police Training College at Embakasi to undertake training to act as agents for a
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political party during elections polling. The training was conducted by a senior
academic, and high ranking government officials including the hierarchy of the
Administration Police. These officers were deployed on the 24th December 2008
to Luo-Nyanza. Ostensibly their role was to disrupt polling and where possible
ensure that government supporters amongst the candidates and voters
prevailed.396
All officers deployed were dressed in plain clothes, easily identified as they were
not from the local community and travelled in large groups by more than 30
chartered buses.397 In addition they received Kshs. 21,000 each for their duties.
The entire exercise was called off a day or so later after some officers were killed
and many more injured by citizens.398 Some senior officers from the districts
called upon the senior command of Administration Police to cancel the
enterprise as they could see there being more serious loss of life if it was allowed
to continue.
Amb. Francis K. Muthaura, PS Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Public
Service, told the Commission that this deployment was approved by the
Government and was commissioned for security reasons.399 He also stated that,
“The reason for sending those people under plainclothes is that the area was very
unfriendly.” The explanation failed to resonate with Commissioners given that
there was little or no security issue in Nyanza at the time (or certainly no worse
than anywhere else), the exercise was clandestine in appearance and execution
and

fell

outside

the

overall

elections

security

command

and

control

arrangements led by the Commissioner of Police.
A further concern to the Commission were reports of instructions from as high
an office as the Commissioner of Police relating to the release of prisoners (CW
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97).400 These instructions arose on at least two occasions in Nyanza province.
One related to the arrests of criminal gang members including Chinkororo, and
Sungusungu who were intimidating citizens who intended to vote for a particular
candidate or not to vote at all. After some arrests the Commissioner of Police
gave instructions for them to be released. It is assumed that this directive was
due to the fact that a senior politician was purported to be behind the
Chinkororo.
On another occasion just after the violence broke out in Kisumu the Hon.
Shakeel Shabir and the Hon. Olago Aluoch were leading a procession around
Kondele without serving any notice to the authorities and they were arrested and
taken to the Central Police station. The Commissioner of Police was informed
but after two hours he instructed the local police to release the politicians and
the incident was not pursued further.
Further examples of interference by senior police were provided by a witness (CW
80) who provided written testimony describing two serious incidents.401
Incident #1
On 28th November, 2007 the O.C.S. Tambach Police Station C.I Paul Karani
received information from members of the public that there was a motor
vehicle Reg. No.KAX 361X Toyota RV4 which was distributing hate
campaign literature along Iten-Kabarnet road. The O.C.S. mobilized his
officers who later managed to intercept the motor which had the following
occupants:•
No. 970069003 AP Cpl. Patrick Ndatho of Harambee House Nairobi
who also had with him a ceska pistol S/No. 59608 with twelve rounds of
ammunition.
•
No. 2001005150 P.C. Kinyua Muriethi also of Harambee House
Nairobi who had a ceska pistol S/No. 9338 with twelve rounds of
ammunition.
•
Duncan Njagi Ndwiga of cell phone No. 0722-885876 – Businessman
Kasarani.
•
Irungu Gilzu of mobile No. 0723-034111 Nairobi.
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The detained motor vehicle was subsequently searched and the officers
managed to recover several bundles of hate literature in the form of posters.
The posters showed drawings of Hon. Raila armed with a pistol and
hanging retired President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi. Next on the hanging line
were Ruto, Philip, Cheserem, Kosgei, Gedion, Kulei, Sumbeiyo, Biwott and
Mark Too. The posters had also the following information written on them in
both Kalenjin and English languages.
•
“ Tetutiet Weo nebo Arap Mibei ( Raila) en Biik at Kutt”
•
“Kyojilil Kenyit ab tomonwok sisit ak aeng ( 1982), raini kokenamak
•
“On 5th September, 2007, Raila Odinga held a meeting on the 17th
floor of the J. Edgar Hoover building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue. NW,
Washington DC. In the meeting, which was taped by the FBI, Raila told
American Officers that he would finish former President Moi, Ruto and other
Kalenjins who had ruined Kenya as soon as he becomes President. The
tapes are available.
In view of the seriousness of the matter and the public anxiety it generated,
the then P.P.O. Rift Valley Mr. Everett Wasige directed that the motor vehicle
and all its occupants be immediately transferred to his Provincial
Headquarters Nakuru for further investigations.
In response to a request for information relating to this incident the Commission
received written advice from SSP F.M. Mwei of the Administration Police on 11
September 2008 saying, “The Department is not aware of the APs arrested in
connection with the alleged act said to have been committed in November last
year.”

This response combined with the testimony received from a further witness
tended to confirm this interference.402

This witness stated that these two

incidents (#1 and #2) were both reported to the Commissioner and that even if
the offenders were released at the time due to the volatility of the situation,
investigations should still have continued. The Commission was not provided
with such information.
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Incident #2
On the 22nd day of November, 2008 police officers from Naivasha Police
Station were manning Naivasha road block at Karai when they received
information that there was motor vehicle Reg. No. GK A545H white in colour
plying from Nairobi to Western Kenya and suspected to be ferrying some
crude weapons. At around 6.15 a.m, the said vehicle appeared from Nairobi
direction and was subsequently stopped by the officers. The vehicle had
three occupants who identified themselves as (1) Dick Nyaga Kivuti, a driver
with the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, (2) Livingstone Taabu Were, an
official driver to former Assistant Minister of Water and Irrigation Hon
Raphael Wanjala and (3) Fredrick Egesa Wasike a personal driver of the
Assistant Minister. The Vehicle itself belonged to the Ministry of Water and
Irrigation and was the official vehicle for the Assistant Minister.

The police officers conducted a search in the motor vehicle and managed to
recover the following crude weapons;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sixty (60) pieces of maasai rungus
Forty (40) pieces of Arrows
Three (3) pieces of bows
Two (2) pieces of arrow sheath
Fifty nine (59) pieces of maasai swords
Eight (8) pieces of small maasai swords
Two hundred and seven (207) pieces of whips (Nyahunyo)

The vehicle and the exhibits together with the occupants were later escorted
to Naivasha Police Station for further investigations. Mr. Maurice Amatta a
S/ACP of CID Headquarters Nairobi later took over the conduct of matter.

A further curious situation relating to the Police and the election process was
discovered by the Commission when it examined the Coast Province plan for
policing the elections.

Entitled “Presentation on the 2007 General Election

Operation within Coast Province” the document included the following special
tasking:
Mr. Hillary Birgen Ag. SP
•

Will deploy 1 IP, 6 constables at Provincial Radio Room.
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•

Task – to receive results of Presidential parliamentary and civic
candidates from all districts and compile them and forward them to
Police Headquarters.

•

Limit of exploitation – within the area of deployment.

•

Re-organization – at Provincial headquarters.

It is not clear to the Commission why the police were receiving polling data
relating to presidential, parliamentary and civic results. On the face of it the
material appears to disclose activity that is clearly not within the role or
responsibility of the Police and has disturbing connotations.

State Security Agencies and Systems Failures
It should be said that accounting for the exact numbers of people who died and
were injured during the PEV has been problematic. Amongst the reasons for
this

include;

antiquated

and

paper-based

systems

of

recording;

loose

arrangements for the receipt, recording and disposal of bodies; methods of
attributing cause of death to PEV; practical difficulties in getting to medical
facilities during the hostilities; and the attempts of some to ensure that at least
some confusion existed in the systems. This is particularly true of the Rift Valley
where violence occurred over a greater area, included the most significant
incidence of citizen to citizen confrontation, and where the facilities were not
acting as a coordinated whole.
Examples of these issues abound but there was no more glaring instance than
the issue of determining accurate figures relating to deaths, injuries and
instances of SGBV resulting from PEV.

The Commissioner of Police told the

Commission that the Kenya Police service were the custodian of the facts. He
further stated that no other person or institution would have the facts403. The
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He was supported in this assertion by M. Francis Kimemia (CW 04)
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efficacy of these statements has been soundly brought into question as for
example the Commission has established that a total of 1133 people were killed
during the PEV when the Commissioner testified that there were 616404. The
fact that the Police could only establish that around half of the actual number
who were killed signifies a major problem in how incidents are recorded and
published.
Further the Commissioner provided a table depicting the number of crimes
committed during the PEV. When pressed under cross examination as to why
there was no heading depicting sexual violence he stated that no such incident
was reported to the Police. Given the testimony of many victims who stated that
they in fact tried to report incidents but were discouraged and indications for
medical facilities to the effect that there were at least 800-900 victims treated
demonstrates a complete lack of leadership and interest in this insidious crime
as well as very poor systems indeed.
The Police were also asked on a number of occasions by the Commission to
produce figures relating to the PEV including annual crime statistics, copies of
planning documentation, resource allocation arrangements, personnel records
showing transfers and the reasons for them, total establishment as well as
actual numbers of police available for service. Virtually none of these records
were produced.

The Commission understands that the Police do not in fact

develop some of these documents in the first place and there are no systems in
place to retrieve other data.
A further example of the inadequacy of some systems relates to the reporting of
sexual violence. Commission investigators learned that in Nairobi, there is only
one Police doctor who has the authority to sign the P3 form necessary for the
reporting to Police of a sexual assault. This particular function is one of many
which this doctor must perform – and so it is no simple matter for a victim to
have the necessary paperwork completed – even if she has the will to report and
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the ability to travel to the hospital. She may be one of 50 victims waiting in line
for the doctor to attend the location and sign her form, only to find, after waiting
many hours, that as the 49th victim has her form signed, the doctor’s working
day is over and she is turned away – either to return and begin the process again
the next day – or simply give up.
From enquiries performed at health facilities across the country there did not
seem to be a consistent approach to the collection, storage and analysis of
forensic samples from victims. It is also not usual practice to take samples for
DNA analysis (and DNA analysis is expensive and its availability in Kenya is
limited).

These matters obviously have the potential to impact on the success of

any prosecution.
Sometimes, victims found there was a fee charged in order to obtain a completed
P3 form which they needed to make a complaint to Police405. In some cases this
cost was prohibitive.

Two of the possible conclusions which could be drawn

from the fact that Police appeared to take little or no interest in sexual violence
are that they did not regard it as serious crime and that they placed little
importance on criminal intelligence.
Decision-making and systems relating to the appointment and transfer of staff,
especially senior staff, in and around this period were also brought into
question. In the time available to it the Commission learned that at least four
senior police officers were transferred or retired from their area of responsibility
during the violence and at the height of operations.406 Although there may well
have been an operational or organisational imperative for these staff movements
it is difficult to see their efficacy given the timing.
Testimony was also received from Professor Anyang Nyongo’ to the effect that
“there were massive transfers of Police and APs, to especially ODM strongholds,
of select individuals or people from Central Kenya to assist in affecting the vote
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manipulations and to violently suppress and attendant protests.”407

The

Commission was not, however, provided with any supporting evidence by this
witness nor did its own investigations reveal evidence of such transfers.
The pressure on Police resources was not helped by the requirement (the
Commission was unable to establish by whom) that at least two police officers be
stationed at each polling station.

The Commission learned that indeed many

more officers were so deployed placing even more pressure on tactical options
available to the Police during the PEV.408
While the duration of this deployment was unclear doubtless it contributed to
difficulties in the quick transfer of staff to pressure points (especially in the
absence of contingency plans) with the result that many officers spent long
hours on duty in some areas.

NSIS reports indicated that in Nairobi some

officers were down on morale due to lack of replacements.
Evidence was adduced to the effect that the Kenya Police Service has the overall
responsibility and accountability for dealing with all deaths occurring from
sudden, violent or unnatural causes from start to finish.

The mortuaries,

pathologists, the Ministry of Health Services and other agencies merely provide
assistance throughout the process. The Police determine interim cause of death,
delivery bodies to the mortuary, sign the body in, initiate the inquest process,
and investigate the circumstances of the death.
This process can be problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, the absence of a
fully independent process impacts upon the transparency and professionalism
that is required in finding not only the causes of such deaths but also ways to
reduce or ameliorate them.

Second the establishment of an independent

Coronial service would free up police resources and reduce the burden of an
important area of accountability.
Positive Responses by State Security Agencies
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With investigations of this nature where reviewing activity and behaviours
reveals weaknesses in many systems and personal culpability in some cases it is
easy to overlook and/or dismiss interventions that were positive.
The Commission received evidence and heard of many instances where security
agencies and individual officers responded well to citizens in need.

These

responses included (but were not restricted to) performing rescue operations
where families and individuals were in danger of personal harm, providing a
temporary refuge in/near police stations and administration premises, providing
security for IDPs and others, demonstrating leadership in attempting to quell
violence and in some cases, giving their lives for others.
The Commission received testimony409 that on the morning of the 30th December
2007 after three houses had been set ablaze at Lelmolok farm in the Kesses
Division the District Officer, Mr. Benedict Odhiambo Omollo, “held a meeting
with local communities in a effort to bring the tension down. He proposed for the
Kikuyu community to elect 10 elders and the Kalenjin community to also elect the
same number, who would work together to help reconcile the communities. The
proposed meeting was to take place the following day at the Kesses DO’s office.
This was never to be because at around 6pm on the 30th December 2007, Kalenjin
youths attacked Kikuyu homesteads, looted and burnt the houses.”

Following

these attacks as many as 1200 people sought refuge at the DO’s office
compound where security was provided. Unfortunately DO Omollo was killed on
the afternoon of 1st January 2008 while on patrol with other officers.410 This
occurred in the Cheptiret area when the patrol came across an illegal roadblock
where it was attacked by youths using poisoned arrows, pangas, axes and
stones. The DO and AP C.I. Elias Wafula Wakhungu died whilst others on the
patrol were injured. Despite this situation, the IDPs at the DO’s compound, who
were continually threatened and often surrounded by Kalenjin youth, were
afforded security and the numbers of officers were reinforced on the 9th January
2008.
409

CW 85

414

The Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province told the Commission that a
leaders’ meeting was held at the Provincial Headquarters Board room to design
peace and reconciliation measures.

The attendees included the PPO, Chief

Kadhi, Bishop of the Anglican Church, Chairman of the Hindu Council, and PC.
Amongst other things they used five local FM radio stations appealing for calm,
and held a series of peace meetings on many estates. Given that the meeting
was only held on the 2nd January 2008 the Commission considered that
although this was a good initiative such interventions would have been more
effective had they been introduced well before the elections.

This was

acknowledged by the PPO.411
One hospital clinician from Nyanza reported a good working relationship with
the local Police station whereby she worked in concert with Police officers
whether cases were reported directly to the hospital or initially to police. She
noted that when female Police officers from the local station were not available to
deal with women victims, officers at the station would make efforts to get a
Policewoman from the central Police station to assist.412 Effective responses to
sexual violence require liaison between Police, medical and judicial services –
both “on the ground” and at the highest level to establish efficacious processes
which are consistently applied across the country.

Reviewing performance
During the seven months since hostilities ceased, SSAs have in the main, been
slow and/or resistant to reviewing their performance.

The testimony of the

Commissioner of Police413 for example clearly indicated that an operational
review of the Police had yet to be completed, “yes it is still going on my Lord.
You must bear in mind that what occurred, occurred recently, a few months ago,
and we as security services, we are not too quick to close chapters.” Further, the
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evidence from the PS of the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and
Internal Security414 was that he relied on his personal oversight saying, “I could
see what was happening”, and “I was able to make that observation.”
The Commission was also variously advised by many senior officers in the field
that reviews were not a formal (or normal) part of business.
Formal, written de briefing and operational reviews are a critical part of overall
performance management and developing new and improved ways of providing
services. These processes should be a mandated part of every security agency’s
role, especially following significant operational events such as the PEV.
This mindset was evident in most officers within the SSAs with the Military and
NSIS being the exception. Doubtless this state of affairs underpins the reasons
why many of the planning arrangements, operating guidelines, standard
operating procedures and standing orders fall short of the standard required for
modern security organs.

Findings on Responses to the Post Election Violence
In determining its findings around the various responses by SSAs the
Commission focussed primarily upon the delivery of services by the Police.
Given that it is this organ of the state that has primacy over the delivery of
security services within Kenya it is not surprising that it is here that much of the
analysis and assessment is made. Findings relative to the performance of other
agencies are also included.

The Police
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It is clear that the Police in Kenya face unique challenges in relation to policing
large demonstrations and protests. The post election period saw numerous
instances of both spontaneous and organised protests which in some cases
developed into riots. Some of these demonstrations and protests occurred in
rural towns and villages while others occurred in some of Africa’s largest urban
slums. Each situation was unique and required a different policing response.
Systems, functionality, operational and tactical option taking, command and
control, communications, complaint taking processes, investigation capability,
and the quality of the officers and their training are all sorely tested in situations
like those facing the police between December 2007 and March 2008.
During this time however it is clear that the Police response ranged across the
full gamut; from examples of heroism to abject failure in discharging even the
most basic of its mandated roles.

Findings on the use of Force
The Commission determined that the Police response in relation to the
management of protests and crowd control was inconsistent in its application,
jeopardized the lives of citizens and was in many cases a grossly unjustified use
of deadly force. Their actions resulted in the senseless death of scores of
innocent citizens which is in direct contravention of the Constitution of Kenya
and the mandate of the Police Service both of which clearly requires the police to
preserve the peace and protect life.
The Commission found that there was a heavy-handed Police response whereby
large numbers of citizens were shot – 405 fatally415 – by Police in Kisumu,
Kakamega, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Kericho, Nakuru, Nairobi, and other
places. Among the victims were some who were ostensibly going about their
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lawful business when they were hit by bullets and many more whose wounds
confirmed that they had been shot from behind.
Commission investigations also determined that in all the circumstances it is
highly likely that very many citizens were unlawfully killed by police officers. An
analysis of post mortem examinations provided to the Commission revealed too
many instances of citizens being shot from behind, a number of instances of
children being shot (some also from behind), and a further number of citizens
being shot while sheltering in and around their own homes.416
The Commission found that Police used a variety of tactical options during the
PEV. Tactical options included but were not limited to; the use of tear gas, the
use of blank ammunition, the use of rubber bullets and finally the use of live
ammunition. On many occasions police shot live ammunition into the air in an
attempt to disperse protectors and thereby protect life and property. In other
cases, police officers shot directly into groups of protestors and crowds of people
thought to be involved in looting or property destruction and scores were
seriously injured or killed as a result.
In the vast majority of cases, the force used by police occurred during lawful
enforcement duties to protect life and property. This does not however mean that
the force used was lawful, reasonable or desirable. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary the Commission determined that in all probability all persons killed
by firearms during the post election violence were the victims of police shootings.
This complete lack of consistency in the way in which police officers use force
constitutes an immediate need to establish a reasonable, balanced and
consistent national ‘Use of Force’ policy. This lack of consistency and at times
confusion on the part of police officers is not assisted by the fact that some of
the standard operating procedures utilised and laws guiding operations were
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promulgated during the colonial times.

For example one of the guidelines is

dated 1962 whilst another (undated) appears to emanate from the same era.417
There is a demonstrated need for police to evaluate all of their tactical options
and the effectiveness of each option. A tactical options policy or framework
would act as a decision support tool to assist front line Police members in
making decisions relating to tactical options and use of force issues. A
framework would clearly define the legal terms reasonable, proportionate and
necessary. It would require officers to continuously assess a situation and
should force be required, it would emphasize that the force should be reasonable
and necessary in the circumstances. The design and subsequent implementation
of a national ‘Use of Force’ strategy would have to be incorporated into the
existing police training regime.
This can be achieved through the complete overhaul of Police Standing Orders
and manuals of Best Practice in relation to the policing of demonstrations and
protests. There are some basic principles to apply in the policing of
demonstrations. Police must balance the need to maintain order against the
rights of citizens. Among those rights are; freedom of speech, the right to
peacefully demonstrate, the right to life and property and the freedom from
intimidation or interference.

These rights are expressly protected under the

Constitution.

The Commission also found that the current Constitution provides for the
authorisation and justification for using arms against citizens in circumstances
other than when life is in jeopardy. The provision for such force to be used in
the defence of property has little application in a contemporary society and such
measures need to be addressed in the development of a new Constitution and
review of the Police Act and the Administration Police Act.
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booklet for the Police Force)
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The

Commission

determined

that

full,

professional

and

independent

investigations into the use of force by police officers must be commenced
immediately.

Findings in relation to Investigations
The Police Service has a fundamental problem with its investigative capability
and capacity.

The Commission’s own investigations found that there was an

inability or reluctance to effectively investigate serious crimes and their
perpetrators even when strong evidence existed. Of a total of 1133 deaths the
police have initiated prosecutions for merely 19 homicides.418

The Commission found that for many other crimes, first hand evidence linking
an offender or offenders to the crime existed and still exists. However for reasons
known only to them the Police failed to fully discharge their duties in this
respect.

Police appeared unwilling or incapable of investigating and arresting

politically powerful individuals implicated in the PEV instead concentrating on
the lower level perpetrators.419

The Commission also established that the Police service has weak systems and
approaches to investigating incidents where police officers are involved. Ranging
from the use of lethal force to the deliberate killing of innocent citizens literally
hundreds of incidents are not being investigated with the thoroughness needed
or to the standards required. There is no professional standards capability
within the Police structure nor an internal investigations group tasked with
these roles.

418
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Findings relating to criminal offending by police officers
Credible evidence strongly linked a number of police officers with serious
criminal offending.

The offending ranged from murder and rape to theft and

bribery.
The extent of offending was worrisome especially considering the lack of
reporting on the part of victims (many determined that it would be a waste of
time considering police officers were the perpetrators), the lack of recording on
the part of the police (even when victims did go to the police they were often
actively discouraged) and the apparent lack of concern on the part of senior
officers.
To address issues of impunity, bringing to justice perpetrators of violence and
restoring confidence in the Police, these officers must be thoroughly and
professionally investigated and dealt with under the law.

Findings relating to partiality
Much evidence was received by the Commission relating to the activities of police
officers being driven by their ethnicity, political leanings or both.
In some areas, especially in the Rift Valley Province the Commission saw
evidence of an ethnic divide within the police who were reported to be primarily
Kalenjin. Some witnesses provided statements saying that police stood by and
watched as homes of the non-Kalenjin were being burned and looted. In some
cases it would appear the police members watched as individuals were killed in
their presence.

In Naivasha one witness stated that the Kikuyu members of

police were reluctant to assist and there was evidence of open defiance by some
officers in relation to their seniors.
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Findings relating to a lack of independence
Instances of inappropriate decision making due to outside interference and
influence were discovered by the Commission. These included instructions from
the Commissioner of Police to release arrested prisoners, the failure to continue
with and finalise cases of police officers and government employees who were
discovered committing offences, and the blatant use of administration police
officers in electioneering activities.
The marshalling and deployment of up to 1600 Administration Police officers, in
plain clothes, to act as agents of the government in disrupting or otherwise being
involved in the elections processes, amounts to a gross abuse of power by those
who initiated the exercise. This activity can have no legitimate explanation or
legal basis and in all probability was unlawful.
The special assignment of a group of KPS officers during the election in the
Coast Province in collating results and forwarding these to police headquarters
recorded in the operation orders seriously concerned the Commission, can have
no legitimate operational utility, and requires investigation and explanation.
Other issues surrounding the natural tensions between the role of provincial
administrators and police surfaced during the Commission’s investigation.
Administration Police Officers are subjected, within current structures and
operating arrangements, to multiple lines of command and control. For example
the Administration Police Act requires, amongst other things that every officer
shall assist chiefs and sub-chiefs when called upon, undergo training when the
District Commissioner so orders, and act as a messenger in matters of
administration or the public service.420 AP officers are also required to be under
the command of their Commandant who is the officer in charge of the
Administration Police. In addition AP officers can be seconded to the KPS and
act under that command structure when required to do so.
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The Commission finds this situation untenable and constitutes a fractured and
confused command and control structure that is not conducive to ensuring clear
accountability for policing service delivery. This situation, if allowed to continue,
will consistently reinforce the perception (and often reality) that the APs are not
impartial due to the close control over them that the Provincial Administration
system has.421

Findings relating to secrecy
The Commission found that the Police Agencies appeared to unnecessarily adopt
a defensive position quoting the need for secrecy as a rationale for not providing
some requested material.

This situation is extraordinary given the full

disclosures made by other agencies that are the repository of far more sensitive
information.
In failing to provide the Commission with basic information such as the
establishment and actual numbers of officers available for service, copies of
national planning documents, and other data including success rates in
investigations,

the

Police

underscored

an

insular,

introspective

and

uncooperative stance reminiscent of a bygone era.
In the final analysis it appeared to the Commission that the Police agencies
regarded the term security as synonymous with secrecy. They failed to grasp the
concept adopted by most contemporary law enforcement agencies that being
open and interactive with communities is not only the right of citizens but
fundamental to ensuring community support and in developing their trust and
confidence.

The provision of information should be a two-way street with

Kenyans receiving timely and relevant information on safety and security issues
from police about what is happening in their communities.

421

A similar finding was articulated in the Akiwumi Report p 286

423

Findings relating to failure to respond
Many people testified and expressed concern that in numerous cases police
officers failed to act to protect property and save lives. Evidence was collected
suggesting that on a number of occasions the police simply watched as property
was being destroyed and looting occurred.
In Coast Province in particular there was much concern over the failure on the
part of the police to intervene when they were clearly available and present. A
number of victims and witnesses expressed the belief that the police were
condoning the looting and property destruction. There appeared to be a ‘loot but
don’t kill’ policy. This saw the emergence of citizens from the Kikuyu and Kamba
communities banding together to protect their own property as there was no
confidence they would receive protection from the police.
In many instances however police did seek to respond in the best way possible
but were not always successful. The Uasin Gishu District for example was the
site of the Kiambaa church burning that resulted in the loss of many lives. Police
attempts to rescue the situation were thwarted through a combination of an
inability to respond quickly enough and encountering delays through unlawful
roadblocks.

Findings in relation to policies, systems and processes
The Commission found that some systems and policies, particularly relating to
deployments and appointments, planning and review, dealing with deaths,
operational policy and procedures are outdated and in need of urgent review.
Of particular concern was that operational planning arrangements, operating
guidelines, standard operating procedures and standing orders fall short of the
standards required for modern security organs.

A full review of these

arrangements needs to be conducted as a matter of urgency.
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While it is acknowledged that some progress has been made in relation to
dealing with victims of sexual violence (such as setting up gender desks in police
stations), the events of the PEV period clearly demonstrated that there is a very
long way to go.
The personal attitudes of officers, as well as systems to deal with the victims,
need to dramatically improve as a matter of urgency.

Findings in relation to dealing with complaints
The Commission felt that the best example of how police officers deal with
complaints is best illustrated by the approaches taken in relation to the victims
of sexual offending. There were very many instances of victims attempting to
report their cases to the police but being thwarted for a variety of reasons. Given
the circumstances, scale of offending, the shortcomings which seem to have
prevailed in regard to the investigation of these crimes and also the allegations
against Police, it is likely that a separate entity would be best placed to
investigate these matters.
With that underway, work can begin on building strategies which will achieve,
into the future, the matters set out in the mandate. Central to these strategies
will be an education/awareness component which will span public, medical,
Police and legal domains. The approach must be coordinated and consistent so
there is a common understanding of the best responses, from all parties, to
sexual violence.
All parties, including Police need to understand their rights and their
responsibilities with regard to sexual offending.

This base then needs to be

complemented by the training, logistics, and resources through which victims
can be treated and supported and have those who offend against them dealt with
effectively and in a timely fashion according to the law.
Sexual violence needs to be acknowledged by Police as a serious crime and
responded to accordingly.

Victims should be able to report crimes in an
425

environment which is secure and private and in a situation in which their dignity
is maintained. Police should respond in a way that is non-partisan. Reports of
this type of offending should always be recorded and properly investigated.
This investigation may include, among other phases, the examination of scene(s)
and the proper collection, storage, analysis and evaluation of evidence.

The

investigation must be carried out by Police officers who are adequately trained
and competent at investigating serious crime. Reports of sexual crimes should
form part of a criminal intelligence process.

Consideration needs also to be

given to the safety of the victim when considering whether the accused person is
released into the community pending the completion of the Police/judicial
process.

Findings in relation to resourcing
The Commission was frustrated in its attempts to fully assess resourcing issues.
Frequent use was made of raw numbers such as the ratio of police officers to
population422. Given that the Police agencies themselves failed to provide the
Commission with the actual numbers of officers or the establishment figure any
such ratio provided is speculative.
It is clear that the police were in fact overwhelmed by the extent and intensity of
the violence. One NSIS report commented on the fact that officers in Nairobi
were fatigued after being on continuous duty for several days.

However this

aspect only presents part of the picture. Contributing factors to this situation
include the requirement to provide more than 54,000 officers to be present at
polling stations, the failure to plan properly and the low level involvement of the
military.

422

Mr. Francis Kimemia (CW 04) told the Commission that the current ratio was 1:850 while the recommended ration
is 1:450
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Merely focussing on the total numbers of police officers is problematic. Whilst
there may be a case for an increase in police numbers, some basic imperatives
must pre-exist. These include; recruiting and training the right people, ensuring
the existing police culture is conducive to embracing reform, systems and
processes must be of a high standard, and organisational leadership must be of
the highest quality.
Other factors came to the Commission’s attention during its examination of this
area.

The conditions that Police officers work under require close attention.

Ranging from poor remuneration to often substandard living conditions these
issues combine to impact negatively on the moral and incentives that impact
personal performance. It is expected that any reform process will look carefully
at these issues.

Findings in relation to review and improvement arrangements
A key aspect of the planning cycle found to be absent was any form of formal
written de-briefing and operational review process. The Commissioner of Police
told the Commission that one had not yet been completed albeit several months
after the violence stopped.423

Other senior police officers reinforced this

approach by also confirming the absence of a formal, comprehensive and written
review process.
Whilst the Commission observed throughout its work that the Police were not
adequately resourced this does not detract from a finding that the absence of
these processes amounts to a serious failure on their part.

423

CW 01, Nairobi 9 July 2008
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Findings in relation to other Security Agencies
There was little, if any, leadership displayed by government in dealing with the
violence when it (inevitably) broke out. Although some evidence was provided to
the Commission that a hastily formed Cabinet Security Committee (CSC) met
early in January and the NSAC provided it a written briefing (dated 17th
January), there was more effort assigned to dealing with the outcomes of the
violence rather than any real effort to stop or reduce it.
Variable performances exhibited by the KSIM were also evident including an
apparent absence of leadership and functionality at the executive level exhibited
by the CSC.
Two of the directives communicated by the NSAC under the signature of the then
PS, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security
concerned the Commission.424 The instruction that “PSIC and DSIC should
provide security to targeted individuals who supported the Government and PNU”
appears to indicate a bias around just who to protect. A further concern for the
Commission was the advice that “command and coordination relationships should
be streamlined.”

Given that these communications were sent on 7th and 28th

January 2008 it can only be assumed that these important functions and
structures were not in good operating order prior to the elections of 2007.
The performance of Provincial and District Security and Intelligence Committees
also varied from well organised entities that met often during the crisis,
determined priority action and made key decisions, to others that did not engage
at all when arguably they were needed most
The Commission is satisfied that the Military along with supporting agencies
such as the Kenya Wildlife Service responded appropriately during the crisis. In
discharging their role in backing up the prime security agencies the Commission
heard nothing but positive commentary on these organs.

424

These communications were referred to in the Nyanza PDIC minutes. It is not known if they were sent to all PSICs.
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In most cases the Kenya Prisons Service also responded well and in the case of
the Naivasha Prison opted to receive victims of the crisis on their property and
provide basic necessities (including security) for a short period before relocation.
Although there was mention of inappropriate behaviour on the part of some
prison officers in Naivasha no firm supporting evidence was provided.
The NSIS also discharged its role reasonably well in that the daily situation
reports, apart from a period of eight days, continued to be developed throughout
January and February 2008. However the Commission felt that the NSIS could
have exercised more influence on the situation especially in the area of
developing special, focused reports aimed at assisting the police and others get
to the heart of the violence.

Rationale for Recommended Action Regarding the Police
This part recognises that, in terms of the Police, a reform programme has been
commenced and against that backdrop identifies a number of key areas that
require immediate action.

These should be approached in a planned,

coordinated and integrated way to ensure that the very best value is gained from
the resulting institutional strengthening.

Background
Like all large institutions, the Kenya Police Service is confronted with a host of
challenges stemming from a dynamic and demanding environment.

At times,

fundamental change must be made to address new challenges and respond to
the evolving and changing needs of Kenyan society.
Built over years of tradition and greatly influenced by British colonial
convention, the entrenched mandate, principals and functions of the Kenya
Police continue to influence its delivery of service and interactions with Kenyan
society.
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The experience of this Commission has shown that the Kenyan Police are not
always in a position to identify and address problems regarding their service
delivery. This is why an independent examination of policing police is critical and
must be undertaken with some urgency.
In spite of the development and production of a strategic plan the Kenya police
have been slow to accept that police reform is necessary and are reluctant to
accept that the public and others outside the police have a role to play in
shaping police policy and reforms. At the heart of the debate is deciding what
philosophy of policing the Kenya Police and the public desire.
The Commission has been in the unique position of having heard from many
members of the public, government officials, and from the police themselves. It
therefore brings a much needed perspective to the public debate about the
current status of the Kenya police and the issues and challenges it faces not only
in relation to post election violence but its overall structure and ability to deliver
day to day policing services to Kenya.

The Current Reform Programme
In determining key recommendations the Commission took account of a number
of key pieces of work signalled by the Government as a priority for action in the
medium and long term. Key amongst these is the Statement of Principles on
Long-term issues and solutions developed through the Kenya National Dialogue
and Reconciliation mediated by H.E. Kofi Annan, Chair of the Panel of Eminent
African Personalities on 28th February 2008.
Specifically identified issues for the Police in agenda item 4 under Constitutional
and Institutional reform are:
•

Constitutional review to establish an independent police commission
(12 months)

•

Review and definition of the role of the Administration Police (6
months)
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•

Review laws and issues related to security and policing (including
the independent complaints commission, citizen oversight of police
services,

enhanced

information

disclosures,

human

resource

management and capacity building) to make them consistent with
modern democratic norms (6 months)
•

Finalisation and rollout of the National Security Policy to enable the
relevant sectors to develop their sectoral policies

•

Recruit and train more police officers to raise the police – to
population ratio to UN standard (by 2012)

There are also definitive reforms of the State Security Agencies encompassed
within the Kenya 2030 plan and specific targets articulated in the First Medium
Term Plan 2008-2012425 as well as the recently announced civilian oversight
board.426
Informing these processes will be the overall constitutional reform that has the
draft constitution (Bomas and Wako drafts) as its base.427
The Commission also recognised attempts to initiate reforms by the Kenya Police
Service. In their strategic plan key shortcomings relating to service delivery, the
absence of strong institutional mechanisms for holding police accountable to
citizens and the law, and the overlapping functions of having two police agencies
are identified as issues for resolution.

Dealing with perpetrators
Issues and aspects relating to dealing with impunity are fully canvassed in
chapter two. It is, however, prudent that some focus is applied to this subject
here especially relating to the actions of police officers during the PEV.
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Kenya Vision 2030
Formed by way of Special Issue The Kenya Gazette Notice No 8144, 4 September 2008
427
The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya, [Kenya Gazette Supplement, 2005] dated Nairobi August 2005
426
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Given that more than nine months have passed since the start of the violence
around the 2007 general elections it is unlikely that many more, if any,
perpetrators will be held to account for their actions than have already been
dealt with by the authorities. Very many victims of these actions and events
have not been properly heard and many more not heard from at all. Some are
constantly being re-victimised as they re-live their experiences every day through
seeing their perpetrators living and prospering within their communities and
some who have even occupied victims’ land.
Large numbers of these perpetrators are known, considerable evidence is
available to use as a strong investigative base and yet any such activity on the
part of the authorities has ceased. It is unlikely that state authorities have the
capability or the will to rigorously pursue offending parties.
Evidence of offending by police officers is not being actively pursued.

The

Commission believes that special arrangements are required to deal with these
officers as well as to independently investigate reported excesses of force by the
Police. It is this way that victims and witnesses alike will have the confidence to
come forward to provide their evidence to an independent investigative entity.

Using a Reform Catalyst
The Commission has determined that there is a demonstrated need for major
police reform that takes into account international best practices while
recognising that policing in Kenya involves some unique challenges. In order to
put in place the type of reforms considered necessary the Commission believes
that the immediate establishment of specialised and independent Police Reform
Group (PRG) is called for. Consisting of both national and international policing
experts, this entity should be created and begin its work immediately.

It is

difficult to see such necessary and far reaching reform being implemented
otherwise.
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One consistent and unfortunate theme that emerged from the Commission’s
work was that many Kenyans simply do not have trust and confidence in their
Police.

This was borne out by the number of victims of violence, including

sexual offending, who simply felt they could not report their situation to police
officers. A variety of explanations were forthcoming ranging from the need on
some occasions to pay for this service, a general suspicion of authorities to the
fact that police officers were sometimes the perpetrators.
It is the view of the Commission that policing can in fact contribute to conflict
situations such as that experienced in the PEV. In many cases police were seen
as partisan in representing or favouring just one community and in some
instances supporting one political side over the other.
International best practice recognizes that successful policing is based upon a
number of broad principles. Those principles will doubtless guide the work of a
PRG in determining priorities, processes and a timetable for key aspects of
reform to be identified and addressed in the coming months. The five principles
agreed upon by this Commission are briefly outlined here.
The Police should be representative:

There is much value in paying close

attention to the ethnic makeup of officers in the Districts and down to division
and station level. While it is a rule of thumb that the police should reflect the
community it serves, Kenya’s multi ethnic makeup requires careful management
of these arrangements.
The police should be impartial: To achieve the former, the Kenya Police need
to exhibit impartiality in all aspects of their work.

In fact impartiality is a

requirement in achieving a representative police service. Of assistance to this
process would be measures in cultural sensitivity training, a common oath of
office where officers swear to respect all cultural differences and a rigorous code
of conduct stressing the need for equal treatment of all Kenyans.
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Policing should be decentralized:

Currently policing in Kenya suffers from

imprecise structural arrangements borne out of an antiquated policing model
based on colonial times.

Coupled with confused operational and executive

command across two police agencies and a provincial administration structure
this model manifests weaknesses in being sensitive to the needs of local
communities.

A single integrated command model based upon community

policing elements could potentially form the basis for overall policing reform.
Policing should be based on respect for human rights: The basic tenet here is
that police need to treat everyone equally and with respect.

Heavy handed

approaches to dealing with demonstrations and the liberal application of force
(much of it lethal) currently applied will require further and careful assessment
in determining the way ahead.
The police should be legally and politically accountable:

The development

and application of accountability mechanisms would seem to be an immediate
priority for action.
including

the

The current void could be filled by a number of reforms

establishment

of

a

Police

Service

Commission

and

the

establishment of an Independent Police Complaints Authority (IPCA)428 to deal
with complaints against police conduct.
Integration of the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police
The Commission believes that developing a world class police service for Kenya
would be best achieved through the creation of a single police agency.

This

means integrating the current two police organs. Given the revelations around
the unlawful use of Administration Police (APs) around the elections, the fact
that the current structure is inextricably linked to the provincial administration
system, and many of the senior officers are not police professionals integrating
the APs into the Kenya Police Service is a priority activity.

428

Both initiatives are fully discussed below
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It is recognised that there are difficulties in completing this important work
(merging two cultures, ideals, systems and approaches) but the benefits will
greatly outweigh these temporary obstacles.
Integration

will

provide

accountability,

resourcing,

service

delivery

and

performance benefits many of which are listed here. Benefits include but are not
limited to;
•

Total independence from the provincial administration structure and
separation from national government oversight

•

Unified command and control

•

Across the board consistency and uniformity in all facets of policing
including; standardised policing service delivery, standard operating
procedures

(SOPs),

improved

investigations

capability

and

intelligence gathering and dissemination
•

Increased trust and confidence in the Police and policing

•

A single and unified Police Services Board, one head of Police
(Commissioner), one strategic plan and a single integrated and well
understood service delivery offering

•

A single piece of enabling legislation, Force Standing Orders,
guidelines, practice and operational arrangements

•

Standard systems of recruitment options, entry standards including
lateral entry options, basic and specialised training, conditions of
service including living conditions and remuneration, human
resource management arrangements, promotion and advancement,
and leadership development including command and control

•

Significant efficiency gains from budgeting, purchasing, and utility of
resources (capital, equipment and people)

•

The elimination of inter-agency tension and conflicts that impact
negatively on service delivery
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Police Act
Existing legislation on the provision of policing services, and in particular the
governance, organisation and administration of the Kenyan Police, is inadequate.
Some of the key weaknesses of the present Police Act 1960 (revised 2002) and
the Police Standing Orders 1962 (revised 2001) include –
•

Unclear responsibilities and confused lines of accountability:

•

Constraints around the ability to place the right people in the right
jobs:

•

An inadequate system for managing staff performance and discipline
issues:

•

Little guidance to work with partner agencies, domestically or
internationally:

•

Few supports to enable the use of modern policing tactics

New legislation is needed to overcome these inadequacies; removing constraints
to the delivery of better policing services to the community, and setting a
platform for more effective policing in the future.
Police Act reform would equip the Kenyan Police to provide the best policing
services for Kenyans. In broad terms, reform would be undertaken to achieve two
fundamental tasks: first, to confirm and strengthen Police governance,
accountability and organisational arrangements in a way which is suitable for a
contemporary age; and second, to improve the Police’s effectiveness, and
establish a clear framework for the exercise of policing powers.

Police Service Commission
The Police should be politically accountable to a Police Service Commission.
Originally signalled in the 2005 Draft Constitution (the Wako draft) this
structure would be somewhat different in that it would cover a single
(amalgamated) Police agency. It could also oversee the amalgamation process
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and be made up of representatives from elected political parties, civil society,
business interests and NGOs (there is no shortage of precedents from other
international jurisdictions). It is envisaged that the Commission would play a
role in setting policing goals, budgets and appointing the Commissioner.

A modern Code of Conduct
The current Kenyan Police disciplinary rules and processes are contained within
Chapter 20 of the Kenyan Police Standing Orders and are inadequate. The move
to a new and modern Code of Conduct would see a transition from the current
Para-military style of managing behavioural issues in Police to a more
mainstream employment practice. It would establish the standards for behaviour
across the Kenyan Police service and ensure consistent behaviour. A new Code of
Conduct would have to be considered in conjunction with revised “Standing
Orders”, Regulations or Best Practices Manuals.
The simple truth is this: one of the essential components of a well-functioning
civil society is an effective, well-disciplined police service, in which the citizens
have implicit trust.
The purpose of a modern Police Code of Conduct is to establish the standards of
behaviour expected of all Kenyan Police employees not just its sworn members.
To be successful, a policing service must have the trust respect of the citizens it
serves. The Kenyan Police will be judged by the way its employees represent it. It
is therefore necessary to maintain a high standard of professional conduct. All
Kenyan police personnel sworn and non-sworn, permanent, temporary and
casual employees should be covered by the Code of Conduct.
The cornerstone of a modern Code of Conduct is that all employees of the
Kenyan Police work to the highest ethical standard. A Code of Conduct should
recognise and include the following basic principles: honesty and integrity,
professionalism, fairness and impartiality, respect for people and confidentiality.
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Strengthening Investigations
There was a general consensus that investigations per se require strengthening.
The Commission supports the notion that quality investigations are the
cornerstone of the justice system as far as bringing perpetrators to justice is
concerned. An option to address current issues was offered by Attorney General
Wako429 was that “the Directorate of Criminal Investigations be created by an Act
of Parliament as an independent and autonomous authority.”
In addition to the development of workable and functioning independent civilian
oversight arrangements430, there should still be provisions for some less serious
allegations to be investigated and resolved by police themselves.

When an

Authority accepts a complaint for investigation it should decide on the type of
investigation to be adopted. The matter may be appropriate for a Police
investigation and resolution. This means it would be investigated under the
supervision of a senior Police Commander in the area where the matter arose
and this would result in a speedier resolution of the complaint. At the conclusion
of the investigation, the police should advise the Authority of the results of the
investigation and the decision reached. If after a review of the police file, the
matter has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the Authority, there should be
provisions for the Authority to initiate its own investigation of the matter.
The Commission believes that structural changes alone can and will not address
identified issues. Investigations capacity and capability are best addressed in a
comprehensive review (as recommended) alongside other policing and justice
related components to ensure the best solutions are identified.

Civilian Oversight of Police (Police Conduct)
The Commission is of the view that the hasty and presumptive creation of a
Police Oversight Board (Kenya Gazette Notice 8144) on the 4th September 2008
ahead of the presentation of its report was unfortunate. An opportunity to get it
429
430

CW 134
See below
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right has been missed. The new entity has few, if any, of the key foundation
components or properly functioning arrangements necessary for the provision of
quality civilian oversight of the police.
This Commission carefully considered the acts and omissions of state security
agencies in the context of the PEV and determined that the establishment of a
well researched, legally based, professional and independent Police Conduct
Authority would serve Kenyans best.
Throughout both the public and private ‘in camera’ hearings, this Commission
was presented with clear evidence that the police use of force during the post
election violence period resulted in serious injury and death to many Kenyan
citizens. Some of these actions may well have been in compliance with existing
law. There is also a clear indication that police used excessive force in many
instances and the actions of some individual officers may have reached the
threshold of criminal conduct.
Under current legislation and convention, the police are the only state security
agency with the legal mandate and authority to investigate the conduct of its
own officers and for that matter the conduct of their service as an
organization.431
Whether justified or not, there is a perception in the community that
investigation by the police of complaints against the police is neither
independent nor appropriate.
The evidence before this Commission of Inquiry has identified a real need for
police oversight by an independent body, outside the police, with the legislative
power and authority to investigate complaints against the police and police
conduct.

431

Despite the recent introduction of a civilian oversight board

439

Although from time to time there are complaints about the actions of the police
and concerns as to the investigation of such complaints, the majority of Kenyan
citizens have not been directly involved or been exposed to the process.
The actions of police following the December election have intensified the
public’s concern about police conduct and reinforced the belief that there are no
systems in place for police accountability.
Kenyan society is such that the bulk of the law-abiding citizens do not come into
any open conflict with members of the police. The post election violence period
changed that completely. For the first time respected members of society found
themselves in direct opposition to the police. The police were faced with the
extremely difficult task of meeting their obligation to uphold the law and order in
the face of overwhelming odds and in an environment where innocent law
abiding people were ‘in the mix’ and therefore vulnerable to the police response
and use of force.
In addition, the ethnic and tribal tensions increased during the pre and post
election periods. These tribal loyalties and alliances were to be found within the
Kenyan Police itself and there is evidence that the police were seen as agents of
political parties and agendas and were therefore biased, complacent or outright
hostile to certain sections of the community.
The actions which have occurred during the post election violence are so serious
that an immediate remedy is essential.
It will be essential that any independent Authority to which complaints can be
made and which can be dealt with be outside the police service itself.
There are advantages to the police in adopting an independent investigative
procedure. The police would no longer be subject to the same criticisms, but
more importantly, they would be less likely to be affected by doubtful complaints
brought by suspected criminals, for ulterior motives. They would also be relieved
of the uncomfortable obligation to investigate professional colleagues.
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When the public complaint procedure for a policing service is discussed, there
are diverse interests that must be acknowledged and taken into account. A
public complaint procedure that favours the interest of a complainant at the
expense of the member of the service is no more likely to provide satisfaction
than a procedure which does the reverse. The interest of the general public and
the Police service involved must be accorded due consideration.
This is based on the premise that a system whereby the Police investigate
complaints against police members is fundamentally flawed because of the
suspicion that inevitably remains in the minds of complainants. A complaints
procedure generally acknowledged to be fair and impartial to the public and to
the police is essential if the police are to enjoy the degree of public support they
needed in order to discharge their own risky and necessary tasks.
International Police Oversight Entities
Many international jurisdictions have introduced police oversight arrangements
to ensure the independent monitoring and scrutiny of police organisations and
the actions of officers.

Moreover, a number of commonwealth countries have

embraced the concept including South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Trinidad
and Tobago, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Although many of these institutions are differently constituted, the fundamental
underpinnings are, in the main, similar.432 These include:
•
•
•
•
•

A legislative basis specific to the entity’s establishment, functions
and powers
The operational independence from the Police
Freedom from political interference
The power to conduct its own investigations
Transparent operating and reporting arrangements

432

For example the Independent Complaints Directorate in South Africa is constituted under the South African Police
Service Act, whilst in New Zealand the Independent Police Complaints Authority is constituted under its own
enactment.
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The Commission noted that the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) in
South Africa was established as a result of the work of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission who recommended that;
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) be governed by new
legislation, independent of general police legislation.
The ICD be genuinely independent of the Ministry for Safety and
Security.
The ICD have powers to compel the SAPS and others to comply with
its requests related to conducting an investigation, including powers
of search and seizure.
The ICD be given the authority to bring to the attention of relevant
officials any failure on the part of the SAPS to respond to ICD
recommendations to take disciplinary or legal action.
The ICD be mandated to investigate corruption within the SAPS,
rather than this task being allocated to a unit within the SAPS.
The ICD be given the capacity, resources and authority to conduct
proactive investigations and evaluations of overall policing policies
and practice, as well as to respond to complaints.

Examples of enabling legislation, from both South Africa and New Zealand, are
included in appendix “F”.
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CHAPTER TWELVE

Impunity

Definition of Impunity
Impunity means “exemption from punishment or loss”.433

In the international

law of human rights, it refers to the failure to bring perpetrators of human rights
violation to justice and, as such, itself constitutes a denial of the victims’ right to
justice and redress.

Impunity is especially common in countries that lack a

tradition of the rule of law, suffer from corruption or that have entrenched
systems of patronage, or where the judiciary is weak or members of the security
forces are protected by special jurisdiction or immunities. The amended Set of
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to
combat Impunity, submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights on 8 February 2005, defines impunity as:
“the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of
violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or
disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any inquiry
that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found
guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations
to their victims.”
The First Principle of that same document states that:

“Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those
suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure
that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the
inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other
necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.”

433

See Black’s Law Dictionary, (8th Ed).
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Background
According to its terms of reference, this Commission is required to recommend –
•

Measures to be taken to prevent, control and eradicate the
occurrence of similar deeds in future;

•

Measures with regard to bringing to justice those persons
responsible for criminal acts;

•

Measures

to

eradicate

impunity

and

promote

national

reconciliation.
In making such requirements, we think, the framers of our TORs recognized that
impunity lies at the heart of preventing the kind of violence that has been
witnessed in this country time and time again. The eradication of impunity will
therefore, not only blow off the cover for persons who break the law of the land
but also deter others who may contemplate similar deeds in future.

A firm

foundation in the rule of law would also promote national reconciliation.
The elements of systemic and institutional deficiencies, corruption, and
entrenched negative socio – political culture have, in our view, caused and
promoted impunity in this country. Election related violence provides the best
illustration of the malady where, in five-year cycles since 1992 when multiparty
politics was introduced, pre- and post-election violence has rocked various parts
of the country despite official inquiries and identification of the root causes being
made.

We shall examine the issues of investigation, prosecution and

adjudication of crimes in an effort to understand why impunity thrives in this
country.
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Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Guilt
The issue of impunity is directly related to the ability of the state to prosecute
persons for criminal offences.

It is our view that the Office of the Attorney

General occupies an important and strategic position in dealing with the issue of
impunity. With a view to shedding more light on that office, we invited the Hon.
the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, Mr. Amos Sitswila Wako, who has
been in office for the last 17 years, to testify before the Commission.
The power to undertake criminal prosecutions in Kenya is reposed in the Office
of the Attorney General under section 26 of the Constitution, which provides
that the Attorney General has the power to institute and undertake criminal
proceedings against any person; take over and continue any prosecution
commenced by any other person;

and also takeover and discontinue

proceedings at any stage before judgment is delivered. In practice, the power to
prosecute some cases is delegated to other agencies of state like the Kenya Police
and even where this done, it is done under the supervisory authority of the
Attorney General.

Under section 26(4) of the Constitution, the Attorney General

also has the power to require the Commissioner of Police to investigate any
matter which relates to any offence alleged or suspected. It is mandatory, once
the request is made, that the Commissioner of Police shall comply with the
request.
Mr. Wako,434 testified before us and enumerated some attempts made by various
institutions to investigate election related violence among them: •

The National Assembly which set up a Select Committee to
Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya
1992, otherwise known as “the Kiliku Committee”.435

•

The Standing Committee on Human Rights (Kenya), a government
appointed committee to advise on human rights violations.

434

CW134

435

Exhibit 136A.
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The

Standing Committee investigated skirmishes occurring at the
Coastal region in 1998 and released a report titled, “Recent
Disturbances at the Coast province: From 13th August to date.”
•

The Law Society of Kenya, in exercise of its mandate under the Law
Society of Kenya Act investigated and made a report on the Violence
in Coast Province related to the attack on Likoni Police Station on
13th August 1998.

•

The Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Tribal Clashes that
occurred in various parts of Kenya since 1991 otherwise known as
the “Akiwumi Commission.”

Various recommendations were made in those inquiries, but the Akiwumi
commission, which considered the earlier reports on ethnic violence, was more
comprehensive. How did the government deal with the report?

The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry
The Akiwumi Commission was appointed on 1st July 1998 and its life was
variously extended up to 31st July, 1999 when it completed its report and
submitted it to President Daniel arap Moi on 19th August 1999.

Its terms of

reference, which were not dissimilar to those of this commission, were as follows;
A) To investigate the tribal clashes that have occurred in various parts of Kenya
since 1991, with view of establishing and/or determiningi.
ii.

iii.

The origin, the probable, the immediate and the underlying causes of such
clashes;
The action taken by the police and other law enforcement agencies with
respect to any incidents of crime arising out of or committed in the course of
the said tribal clashes and where such action was inadequate or
insufficient, the reasons there for;
The level of preparedness and the effectiveness of law enforcement
agencies in controlling the said tribal clashes and in preventing the
occurrence of such tribal clashes in future;

B) To recommend
446

i.
ii.
iii.

Prosecution or further criminal investigations against any persons or
persons who may have committed offences related to such tribal clashes;
Ways, means and measures that must be taken to prevent, control, or
eradicate such clashes in future;
To do, inquire into or investigate any other matter that is incidental to or
connected with the foregoing

For three years, however, the contents of the report were not made public until
considerable public pressure was brought to bear on the Government and it was
released to the public in October 2002, but not without reservations.

The

Government rejected part of the report that related to the Rift Valley and
especially, the Kalenjin and Maasai communities, and in support of that
assertion it produced a 31 page undated document which had no author or
signatory, entitled “Comments on Commission of Inquiry Report”.436 Pressed
to identify the author, the Attorney General said it was authored by “the
Government”, presumably the President at the time, at whose instance the
Commission had been set up and to whom the report had been submitted. The
reasons advanced for the partial rejection was that “the report was not objective,
it took extraneous matters into account, ignored some evidence, did not give due
weight to some evidence and gave a lot of weight to some evidence more than
warranted. Its findings and recommendations were biased and prejudiced.”

The commentary, which the “Government” directed should be read together with
the Akiwumi Report concluded:
“….. the sad chapter of the clashes in the country’s history
should be brought to an end to give Kenyans a chance to start
afresh as brothers and sisters in this multiparty era…..
Accordingly, in the absence of evidence to form the basis for
prosecution to recommend charges or prosecution against any
person, (sic) but where there is evidence to show a lapse in the
performance of administrative duties or misconduct,
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recommendations can be made for other forms of condemnation
including:
(i)(a) naming and
(ii)(b) admonishing.”
Despite the position taken by “the Government”, the Attorney General testified
that he had, in exercise of his independent constitutional mandate, acted on the
report two years earlier. We quote the relevant part of his press release dated 1st
October, 2002;
“The Attorney General by letter dated 14th March, 2000, in exercise of
the constitutional powers under S.26(4) of the Constitution, directed
that expeditious, diligent and expeditious investigations be carried out
against all persons whom the Commission had recommended that
they be investigated regarding their role in tribal clashes – and in
particular those mentioned in paragraphs 526, 527 and 528 of the
Akiwumi report.
The Director of Criminal Investigations by his letter dated 19th
February, 2001 forwarded to the Attorney General the relevant
duplicate inquiry files 70 in number for my perusal and necessary
action. Of those 70 files, the Attorney General ordered further
investigations in 40 cases. Of these 40 files, 18 investigations files
were returned to the Attorney General on 1st October, 2001 after
further investigations. The Attorney General after further perusal
ordered further investigations in a number of the cases.
The investigations are therefore still continuing in a number of cases.
I assure the public that when I get an investigation file with sufficient
evidence, provable in a court of law which can establish a prima facie
case prosecution will ensue as a matter of course.”437

What became of those investigations? Again we shall quote the Attorney General
verbatim in his sworn testimony before the Commission on 25th August, 2008:
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“In some cases investigations were carried out and files submitted to
me with findings that no evidence was disclosed against named
persons and with recommendations that the inquiry file to be closed.
In other cases the files submitted to me were found to be incomplete
and deficient in critical aspects. In all such cases including some of
the cases where closure was recommended, the inquiry files would be
returned back to the police on my behalf by the Director of Public
Prosecutions with directives to carry out further investigations. Some
of those files would again be re-submitted to me often times after
inordinate long periods and without significant evidence having been
gathered. Many of the returned files would never be resubmitted
again. Many reasons could be attributed for this unsatisfactory state
of affairs including: (i)

Genuine difficulties in investigating and
getting witnesses because of their fear of
reprisals within
the context of the
ethnic clashes.
(ii)
Lack of capacity and resources on the part
of the investigating authorities.
(iii) Self censorships or fear on the part of the
investigators who are susceptible to
pressure and manipulation.
It should be noted that although the Attorney General has power to
request investigations to be carried out by the Commissioner of Police
he has no enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.
Furthermore, the Police investigators are subject to discipline and
control not by the Attorney General but the Commissioner of Police.”
In passing, we express our doubts about the impotence expressed by the
Attorney General in enforcing the directives given to the Commissioner of Police.
As stated earlier, the Constitution makes it mandatory for the Commissioner to
comply, and the consequences of breach should be obvious.

At the request of this Commission, the Attorney General forwarded further
correspondence to confirm further follow up of investigations and a bundle of
documents was placed before us.438
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Letter Ref: AG/CONF/6/D/121/ VOL 1 dated 25th August 2008.
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March, 2000 when the Attorney General wrote to the Commissioner of Police in
the following terms;
AG/CONF/6/D/69

14th March 2000

Mr. Philemon Abongo
Commissioner of Police
Police Headquarters
Nairobi
Dear
RE: REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO
TRIBAL CLASHES IN KENYA
By Gazette Notice No. 3312 of 1st July, 1998 H.E. the President appointed
the above mentioned Commission under the chairmanship of the Hon. Mr.
Justice A.M. Akiwumi to inquire into the tribal clashes that have occurred in
various parts of Kenya since 1991. The Commission presented its report to
the President in August 1999.
In CHAPTER FIVE of the said
RECOMMENDATIONS. I refer you
528 where the Commission has
investigated regarding their role in
Report.

report, the Commission has made its
particularly to paragraphs 526,527 and
recommended that certain persons be
the tribal clashes as recommended in the

In terms of S.26 (4) of the Constitution of Kenya this is to require you to carry
out comprehensive investigations on all persons as recommended in the
Report. As and when you complete investigations on any persons, let me
have the report. The investigations should be carried out diligently and
expeditiously.
You are requested to make arrangements to come and collect the report and
the voluminous attached documents.
With best regards.

Yours
S.Amos Wako, EGH, EBS, MP
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Cc. Mr. Francis Sang
Director of Criminal Investigations
Nairobi

Almost a year later the Director of Criminal Investigations Department
responded as follows;
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CID/SEC/2/2/12/10/VOL.111/87
S.Amos Wako EGH, EBS, MP,
Hon. Attorney General,
Sheria House,
P.O.Box 40112,
NAIROBI.

19th February,2001

Dear Amos,
INVESTIGATION INTO TRIBAL CLASHES IN KENYA AS RECOMMENDED BY
AKIWUMI JUDICIAL COMMISSION
I acknowledge receipt of copy of your letter AG/CONF/6/D/69 dated 14th
March, 2000 where you had, under the powers conferred to you by section
26(4) of the constitution, directed for expeditious and diligent. Investigations to
be carried out against the persons named in para 526,527 and 528, of the
Akiwumi Commissions Report. As a result of the instruction, I appointed
Investigating Officer who visited the affected districts in Rift Valley, Western,
Nyanza and Coast Province, scores of people mentioned in the Akiwumi Report
were traced as hereunder. Relevant duplicate inquiry files 70 in number are
attached herewith for your perusal and necessary action, please.

[The writer then analysed the allegations made, the evidence against the
named persons and his findings on each, and continued]
GENERAL OBSERVATION
The investigation team in the course of its investigations toured the areas
affected by tribal clashes, and having gone through the paraphernalia of
gathering evidence noted the following:
Χ)• The time lapse from the moment some of the incidences of the tribal clashes
occurred and the time the inquiry was conducted, resulted into some
witnesses not being traced, whilst some traced ones were unable to correctly
remember the sequence of events of the clashes, hence lack of corroboration.
On the other hand scores of witnesses, who volunteered their statements,
were ostensibly upset with the re-collection of what happened and therefore
ended up giving vindictive statements out of bitterness.
∆)• A survey on the list of witnesses in the Commission’s report show that, most if
not all of them, are public servants, politicians and lawyers. These by all
standards are administrative witnesses who were neither at the scene of
clashes nor victims of the clashes and could not therefore adduce direct
evidence in relation to the clashes.
Ε)• A more critical glance at the list of persons recommended by the Akiwumi
Commission to be investigated, revealed that they were the same people who
testified before the very Commission as witnesses, but on realizing that their
testimony before the Akiwumi Commission had started impinging negatively
on their well being, decided to assume defensive stand in recording of their
statement with the Police, a situation which gave rise to the concealment of
vital clash related information.
Φ)• Most of the politicians who recommended to be investigated was as a result of
their divergent and inflammatory political views as reported in Local
Newspapers produced as exhibits before the Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry.
However, the evidence to support the veracity of such political views were
obviously lacking, as the whole mill of allegations was only anchored on
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information captured by Local Newspapers without any fortification by the
evidence of Independent Witnesses.
Please advice.
Yours
(F.K.A. SANG) CBS
DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Encs. (70 Duplicate Inquiry Files)
Cc:
Philemon A. Abong’o MGH MBS
Commissioner of Police
Police Headquarters
P.O.Box 30083
NAIROBI.

That was seven years ago and the latest report from the Criminal Investigation
Department dated 21st august, 2008, shows that 37 out of the 70 files were
closed; 9 files are with the DPP having been re-submitted after further
investigations; and 24 are with the police for further investigations.

The

reference made by the Attorney General in the press statement issued on 1st
October, 2002 that 1324 persons had been charged for various offences ranging
from murder, inciting violence and taking part in riots relating to the clashes
which occurred between October 1991 and December 1992, was not related to
the findings of the Akiwumi report. The figures were presented to Parliament on
27th April, 1993 in response to a question by Member of Parliament for Gichugu,
Ms. Karua.
The same process of investigation in respect of the Kiliku Report and the report
prepared by the Standing Committee was no different.

The Attorney General

would make the request under s. 26 of the Constitution and the Police
investigators would dutifully report on the lack of evidence and difficulties
associated with collection of it.

In the end, the Attorney General testified that

he had done all he could within his powers to fight impunity. To quote him
verbatim in cross examination: -
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“Ahmednassir:
Now we’ve seen that impunity is a problem,
for the benefit of this commission can you highlight your
achievements of your 17 year tenure in your fight against
impunity? What have you done to fight impunity for 17 years?
[…..]
Amos Wako:
No, within my constitutional mandate, what
I’ve done is to do what I ought to have done and that is to direct
the Commissioner of Police to investigate. And that I have done
even in cases where politically I should not have done. Like the
Akiwumi Report, if you read the Akiwumi report and the rebuttal,
a weak Attorney General would not have directed the
Commissioner of Police to investigate all the people mentioned
there. He would have said these are politically correct I would
not investigate them, nor direct investigation of them and so on.
But I did direct even if those people were regarded as politically
correct, I did direct investigations.”

In view of the lack of any visible prosecution against perpetrators of politically
related violence, the perception has pervaded for sometime now that the Attorney
General cannot act effectively or at all to deal with such perpetrators and this, in
our view, has promoted the sense of impunity and emboldened those who peddle
their trade of violence during the election periods, to continue doing so.
The Attorney General readily acknowledged that there was a gridlock in the
criminal justice system and particularly at the investigative level. He proposed
the establishment of an independent investigative arm of Government, through
an Act of Parliament, for a Directorate of Criminal Investigations to match the
currently independent prosecution and judicial functions of the Criminal Justice
System.

Curiously, we note that at the time the Attorney General made a

request to the Commissioner of Police to investigate the persons named in the
Akiwumi Report, the Department of Criminal Investigations was directly under
the Office of the President. It follows, and we can safely conclude, that it was
indeed very difficult for the officers working directly under the same President
who had made strong reservations about the report, to come to a different view
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from the President’s.

The Attorney General himself candidly accepted this

reality;
“[…..]
I think it is precisely for this reason that during the
tenure of the first Attorney General in independent Kenya, the
criminal investigation arm of the police was under the Attorney
General and not under the Police Commissioner. This made the
Police investigators answerable to the Attorney General and
execution of the Attorney General’s general directives was
therefore prompt, effective and efficient, This arrangement also
insulated the CID officers from interference and manipulation.”
A flawed investigative process is the very antithesis of a successful prosecution.
In other words, the quality of investigation affects the outcome of both the
prosecution and adjudication of the matter. And where there are no successful
prosecutions the culture of impunity creeps in as people commit crimes with the
knowledge that it is unlikely that a proper investigation will be carried out.
The sorry state of the criminal justice system continued to play itself out even as
this Commission was in the middle of its hearings.

On 21st June, 2008, the

Attorney General appointed a joint team of his officers and police officers to
review all cases related to post-election violence including: cases of persons
charged and are in remand, cases of persons charged but are out on bail, cases
pending arrest of known persons, cases of persons in police custody but are not
yet charged.

No results of such exercise were furnished to the Commission,

despite requests and promises, up to the time of writing our report.

Other aspects of the Criminal Justice System
The other weakness in the criminal justice system as pointed out by the Attorney
General is the lack of professional manpower in the department of Public
Prosecutions where only 64 State Counsel serve the entire country against an
establishment of 94. The ideal compliment would be 450 to replace 365 police
prosecutors currently undertaking that vital function.
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It was necessary, in the Attorney General’s recommendation, to empower the
prosecution department by granting security of tenure to the Director of Public
Prosecutions and improving the terms and conditions for hiring and retaining
staff.

It is also necessary to revamp the capacity of the judicial function

commensurately to complete a fully independent and efficient chain of
administration of criminal justice.

Obstacles to Investigation of Post Election Violence (PEV)
This commission recognizes that there are real and genuine difficulties in
investigating violence of such magnitude as took place after the 2007 elections.
Some of these difficulties have been experienced by this commission in its work
and we do not doubt that any investigating agency will experience some
difficulty. Some of the practical problems any investigative agency would face in
investigating PEV include the following;
•

Most of the complainants and witnesses were victims of displacement
hence it may be difficult trace them to carry out full and proper
investigations.

•

The nature of violence is one that invites expectation of retribution if a
person gives evidence against a perpetrator.

In most cases the

perpetrators were persons known to the victim hence the fear for
retribution is real.
•

Where the perpetrator of violence is an agent of state or perceived to be
associated with an agency of state, there is reluctance to co-operate with
or give evidence to the state.

The Attorney General, in his testimony, lamented the lack of a witness protection
programme as part of the frustrations faced by investigators.

While it was

difficult enough to trace would be witnesses who were displaced following the
violence, those who were traceable were reluctant to record statements and
actively participate in identification parades, or appear in court to testify, for fear
of reprisals. Furthermore, the Witness Protection Act which became operational
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on 2nd September, 2008, remains untested and has received a budgetary
allocation of only Ksh.20 million this financial year.

Lack of political will and fear of the political establishment
The Akiwumi Report and the accompanying “Comments by the Government”
were released in 2002.

As this constituted an official inquiry into the endemic

problem of ethnic clashes, one would have thought that the contents of the
report would make compulsory reading for all government administrators
particularly those working in clash prone areas.

We were shocked, however,

that such an endeavour which was funded from the public purse, would provide
no lessons for those in positions of leadership. The Permanent Secretary in
Charge of Provincial Administration and Internal Security439 confirmed that he
had not read the Akiwumi Commission Report and to us it did not come as a
matter of surprise either that his subordinates, the PCs and DCs, had no
knowledge of the report let alone the issues raised therein. For example, the DC
Molo, who testified before us, confirmed that he had not read the Akiwumi and
Kiliku Reports yet his district was at the epicentre of ethnic and land clashes.
He stated that he had, “intelligence reports in my office and these were
sufficient.”440

Our view is that the lackadaisical manner in which the government dealt with
the Akiwumi Report only goes to illustrate that the state was not particularly
interested in resolving once and for all the issue of ethnic violence. Those who
benefited from it were secure in the knowledge that the report, notwithstanding
its deficiencies, would continue to gather dust and the issue of ethnic violence
would be on the back burner to be resurrected when the next election came.

439
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CW 56.
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During the hearings, the Commission explored why a concerted effort had not
been made by the government to arrest and prosecute those who are alleged to
have incited, funded and promoted violence instead of concentrating on minor
actors in the mayhem. Most administrators spoke of fear of the general
population and also fear of the political leadership. Commission Witness No. 80
gave the example of three councillors who were arrested in Litein in Bureti
District on account of inciting violence. He stated;441
“…… when you arrest the so-called politicians people don’t look
into the crime. They say that the police have arrested one of
their own.
We arrested some councillors in Buret and the
crowd was so rowdy. They stormed the whole Buret Police
Station so much so that we were compelled to release those
councillors.”

There is of course, a symbiotic relationship between the politicians and their
supporters which continues to fuel impunity.

Politicians rely on their

supporters to enforce immunity while their supporters, who are the hand
maidens of the violence, get protection from the political god fathers.

This

interference normally comes in the form of “orders from above.” A senior police
officer testified to this.442
Q: We have also noted that there was tension in Kisii/Luo border. It is
a common phenomenal?
A: My lord, this I found to be common and when I followed the genesis
of this problem, even in 2002 and 1997, that is the area where the
Luos were fighting the Kisii. So it was potentially charged area, My
Lord. But what we were seeing is that the politicians were now
working up the youth, so that the two sides, the Luo from the Rongo
and Kisii South District, could now be at loggerheads.
Q: Did you manage to find these people inciting and organizing the
youths?
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A: Well, we were able. We didn’t really arrest them because we didn’t
want to create more tension than before. So what we were doing is
that, we used to call the politicians and talk to them and say we know
what you are up to and most of them, once they know we know, they
sort of die down. So, actually there was no fighting at that border.
Q: And you talked about some criminal gangs called Chikororo. Did
you monitor this gang?
A: We monitored Chikororo and My Lords, incidentally in that area,
the criminal gangs are very many there. You find the Nchikororo, you
find Sungusungu, and you find Amachuma. This is all in that area
and Ochororo area. These are groups which are basically according to
our investigations we found that these are men and not really boys,
My Lord who are used specifically when the elections are near, to
scare away potential voters who are against a particular candidate.
So they are used every time there is an election.
Q: And you do anything about that?
A: We sort of arrested most of them, because most of them are known.
We arrested most of the Nchikororo and Sungusungu; and we had a
lot of problems.
Q: You had what?
A: A lot of problems, because there was a lot of tension. We arrest,
pressure is put, I release them. That they should at least be released.
Q: When you talk about pressure, what kind of pressure was it?
A: You find that I get calls from Nairobi, my boss says, did you arrest
these people? I say, yes for this and that. Then he says, well, warn
them, let them go home. I comply.
Q: And you said your boss is the Police Commissioner.
A: My Lords, my boss is the Commissioner of Police.
Q: So they would get arrested and you have to release them.
A: Yes, we release them.
Q: And when you arrested them, there would be tension in all those
areas, because you have arrested them of course?
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A: Yes, My Lords, that is what we were noticing that now there will be
a lot of tension even than before. So that is why I am saying these are
just imaginations to play to the psychology of people or us, because
they know that once we arrest them, they indicate everybody else so
that now we can’t even more or operate.
Q: Did you find any politicians who were either organizing or inciting
these particular youths?
A: My Lords, for this particular Chinkororo Hon. Nyachae was behind.
Q: And when you say behind, what exactly do you mean?
A: He is the one who organize, financed. They were known as his
people.
Q: And did you find any tangible evidence of this organization of
financing?
A: That is where the problem is, My Lords, because to get tangible
evidence was very difficult. But as we go along investigating, you
come across some evidence that so and so we have arrested that
person, that person is aligned to so and so. So you see a pattern. Of
this group you arrest, you see which group now turns up, making a lot
of noise or even calling my boss or whatever. But to get tangible
evidence, you say yes, he paid them money.
Q: Do you know that whoever was organizing them has direct
connections to your superiors, at least?
A: No, my Lords, not direct connection. I won’t call it direct connection,
My Lords.
Q: Or had connection to level above you.
A: What they were doing according to me is that, once we arrest, they
couldn’t call me direct, here in Kisumu. But there is a way of
circumventing I don’t know who and then they get my boss. So it
would come from my boss when I report, because we kept on talking
many times in the cause of the day. In the morning hours or even in
the evening briefs. I will inform him I have all these people arrested, I
have detained them in this Police station, may be after a day he will
call me and say, you remember those people you arrested, give them
unconditional release and I will comply and people will go.
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Q: The issue I am putting to you obviously these people you were
arresting have direct connections to persons who are higher up, who
are able to talk or find their way to the Commissioner obviously, even
if they were not financing. At least you can say they had some
influential connections somewhere.
A: Yes, My Lord, I can say that.”
This symbiotic relationship between the politicians and their supporters creates
a real and genuine fear among those who enforce the law.

One Provincial

Commissioner testified that he feared to order the arrest of senior politicians
involved in the incitement of violence because his job would be at stake. The PC
echoed the words of his police counterpart, Francis Gichuki, made 10 years ago
before the Akiwumi Commission:
“My Lords, in a political Government, we have to be cautious. This
is a political Government.”443
There must be an end to this cowardice and pious sense of self preservation in
public service if impunity will be eradicated in this country!

The Judicial Function
In order to seek further clarification on and find solutions to the gridlock in the
criminal justice system, we also invited the Registrar of the High court to shed
some light on the measures the Judiciary has taken to address the situation.
The Registrar was unable to testify in person but forwarded a statement dated
28th August, 2008.
For a long time now, the judiciary has been vilified for failure to play its pivotal
role in the democratic governance of this country.

Of the three arms of

Government, it is the least understood and has therefore acquired the notoriety
of losing the confidence and trust of those it must serve because of the
perception that it is not independent as an institution even if some individual
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members of it were. That is why, for example, the leadership and members of
the ODM refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts to resolve the dispute
that arose after the 2007 general elections in relation to the Presidential results.
The institution has also been accused of delays in the administration of justice
and for non-transparency in its functions.
In response to those accusations the Registrar stated that there has been major
reform initiatives made by the judiciary so far, and they continue to be made.
Some interventions for speedy delivery of justice effected so far include:
recruitment of more magistrates and expansion of the capacity to appoint more
Judges, establishment of Court Users Committees where all actors in the
criminal justice system meet and resolve operational difficulties; customer care
desks to address public concerns; mobile courts for remote areas; construction
of new courts around the country; annual open day sessions for interaction with
consumers of justice; publicizing judicial service charter for education of the
public; introduction of continuous legal education for judicial officers through
the Judicial Training Institute; comprehensive review and simplification of Rules
of Procedure, both civil and criminal; and the establishment of the Expeditious
Disposal of Cases Committee which has devised modalities for reducing backlog
of cases.
In our view, while the administrative reform initiatives so far undertaken are
commendable, nothing short of comprehensive constitutional reforms will restore
the desired confidence and trust in the judiciary.

The non-contentious

provisions in the draft new constitution provided a new hope in the institution,
but there is no certainty as to when it will become law.

Proposals for the

enactment of the Judicial Service Bill which would guarantee financial and
operational independence; appointment, discipline and removal of judicial
officers, independence and autonomy of the Judicial service Commission,
amongst other provisions, are yet to be considered by Parliament.
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In the context of the post-election violence the police arrested numerous
suspected offenders in more than 13,000 incidents and 1337 cases were taken
to court. The Registrar was unable to confirm the progress in the hearing and
adjudication of those cases.

Many more are pending under investigations;

others are pending arrest of known persons. The influx of post-election violence
cases, in our view, poses a big challenge to the judiciary considering the special
nature of those cases, and desirability of expeditious disposal.

Amnesty
Meaning
We undertook in our various briefs to address the so-called “amnesty debate” in
our final report. It is “so-called” because both sides of the debate have varying
definitions for “amnesty” and consequently how it can be applied in the context
of post-election violence. The difficulty is not misplaced as indeed controversy
has dogged the term since the Greeks gave it to the world from “amnestia”, the
same root word for “amnesia”. In common parlance, amnesty is the act of an
authority (e.g. parliament or government) by which the State restores those who
may have been guilty of an offence against it to the positions of innocent
persons.

It includes more than pardon, in as much as it obliterates all legal

remembrance of the offence.444 The dictionary meaning is “a general pardon,
especially for political offences.”445
Amnesty may be extended when the authority decides that bringing citizens into
compliance with the law is more important than punishing them for past
offences. Some advantages cited for using amnesty include avoiding expensive
prosecutions, especially when massive numbers of violators are involved;
prompting violators to come forward who might otherwise have eluded
authorities; and promoting reconciliation between offenders and society.

The

application of amnesty nevertheless raises issues of justice. It implies impunity,
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that people can commit atrocities and say that they will only stop it if they are
given amnesty.446

The debate
Simply put, the proponents of amnesty contend, and passionately so, that the
thousands of youth who were arrested and detained in the post-election violence
were exercising their democratic right to demonstrate against a stolen election
and therefore committed no offence.

It was the reaction of the police to the

peaceful demonstrators which caused violence.

Indeed, if it was not for the

youth, there would be no coalition Government. The release of arrested youth
has also been tied up with resettlement of IDPs as a quid pro quo. We take it
from the Secretary General of ODM party, Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o

447

thus:

“The youth who were arrested should be set free as they were
exercising their democratic right to express themselves when police
procured violence.”
On the other hand, the opponents contend, equally passionately, that human
rights violations and crimes of unprecedented gravity with serious ramifications
for the future of this country were committed and the perpetrators at all levels
must face the full force of the law. Amnesty would encourage impunity.

The numbers
Intertwined with the issue of amnesty in principle, was the issue of the number
of “youths” arrested and detained in police custody and once again the parties
on both sides of the debate were unhelpful. In our effort to establish the exact
number and identities of those who were arrested and were still in police custody
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we invited several witnesses to shed some light on it. One was Prof. Nyong’o who
stated:
“Q:……….you made an allegation that there are youths still being held in police
custody, first and foremost who are these youths, how many are they and would
you know where they are being held in police custody?
Anyang’ Nyong’o: Mr. Chairman, the Attorney General has details on these youths
and indeed I do believe that he has made presentations to the Commission, but Mr.
Chairman if you want more details we are quite prepared to do so but I do know
that the Attorney General has made presentations to this Commission and although
some of his figures can be doubted. But I think that is for further examination by
the Commission to prove how many youths are still in custody.
Chairman: Unfortunately, the Attorney General did not give us anything; he says
the police have the information. So if you have the information we would like to
have it.
Anyang’ Nyong’o: Okay, Chairman, I could do so; not now, but I know that the
evidence exists.
Chairman: That’s alright. If you undertake to produce it, we will be happy to have
it. Thank you.”

Despite the promise to shore up the claim, no further information was received
by the time we made our report. The other example was the Chairman of the
Luo Council of Elders, Ker Riaga Ogallo, who responded thus:
“Protas: Yes. On the issue of the Luo Youth who have been arrested as a
consequence of the violence that erupted in Kisumu, I was wondering if the
Luo Council of Elders or any other institution of the Luo community that you
are aware of, if there are any keeping of any records kept somewhere, either
with your organization the Luo Council of Elders or any other Luo or Kisumubased community organization that you know of that have kept records, the
number and the names, if possible of all the youth who were arrested at
that time.
Riaga Ogallo: The, I think even Police Commissioner, issue those who were
arrested in Kisumu; they issue them. I think if you were here and yourself if
you were able to listen to radios and papers, they issue them – not their
name, but the number. Though the number was small but those who were
arrested were bigger than the number which was given out by the police
spokesman. And those who were killed were also, the number police gave
out were small, but those who even Kisumu Mortuary were full of those
people who were killed by – they were over 46 people and they say 15
people.
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Protas: Yes, that’s the reason why I was hoping that may be sources other
than police and I was hoping that may be the Luo Council of Elders or any
other community-based organization could have kept some non-official
records of these arrests and the reason is because you allude to, you
obviously support their release and you must be aware of the debate that
surrounds this issue whereby some in government and elsewhere argue as
you do that these youths should be left free and others oppose this. And a
related issue on that debate concerns the number of these youths arrested.
Some people put the number figure to thousands and even more, and I think
the number that police – the police have given has been strongly disputed by
some people including some in the government.
So there is obviously a problem with number, with number of youths who
were arrested and I was hoping that may be we could have in addition to
figures that have been provided to us by police, I was hoping that you may
be aware of some other sources where we could get other figures.
Riaga Ogallo: You know this thing when it happened, police were all over
Nyanza. In every district, they were there and demonstrations were being
carried out all over. IN my area, or in Oyugis, in front of my home they killed
one boy when I am seeing like this one. I am seeing like this and then they
shot at him and in the town of Oyugis alone over 100 boys were gunned
down and those who were arrested, because police cells were full, with
those people who were arrested. We could not know the number, but what
we know, they were arrested.”

The Ker continued:
“Chairman: … and that is why we are talking about the amnesty debate,
because it is an important aspect of our investigations which we must
address; are there youths who were arrested, If so, how many; are there
youths who were charged in courts, if so, how many; are there still youths
who were detained in some place and nobody knows how many they are;
are there some who were killed; are there some who disappeared? And we
would suspect that your Council would have information of that nature this
is why I revert to the question my brother asked. You don’t have that
information as a Council?
Riaga Ogallo: No. We don’t have the number but the information we’re still
having there are some youths who participated in this election violence who
have not been seen in their respective areas. Though some were killed and
those who were killed, their families took them for burial, so they knew that
so-and-so is killed and those who disappeared they were there they were
arrested until now they have not been captured where they are.
Chairman: that is the question.
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Riaga Ogallo: We’re still also asking that question.
Chairman: That is the question, because if my family was affected
assuming that I was in Luo Nyanza and my family was affected my son
was – went out that day we suspect he got involved, we never found him in
the mortuary, he was nowhere in any hospital, we have never found him for
the last six months I would come to the Council of Elders to assist me if I
was helpless. Are you saying no one has ever come to complaint about any
missing person?
Riaga Ogallo: No, no, no, sir.
Chairman: Any missing young person?
Riaga Ogallo: Your honour sir, no they have come. When we also go to the
police station they told us that we don’t have them you know where they
are. That is the answer we’re getting from police.
Chairman: Yes, that is so but you have the list of those who are missing?
Riaga Ogallo: No the list we have not compiled yet.
Chairman: Is it possible to compile that list so that we can address that
issue instead of hearing there are young people who are missing?
Somebody has that list or can compile one and nobody is giving it to
anybody that we’ll never find any solution unless we address that issue.
Riaga Ogallo: No but this time at the moment, I cannot commit that one
because I don’t have funds for going round because it is a wide area. When
I commit myself I will avail the list. Now that, I cannot do that one, you
honour.”

As for the definition of “youth” Ker Ogallo said “When I refer to youths; these
young people who still have – hot tempered people …these young people from 30
coming to 18, they are high tempered people.

To control them is becoming a

problem when something comes abruptly.” It did not matter whether they were in
school, work, business or just idle.
The flipside was the police version and the Commissioner of Police categorically
denied the accusation that the police had arrested any youths, who were still in
their custody as at the time he testified on 9th July, 2008. The police, he said,
had received complaints on 13,416 cases which they were investigating. They
had taken all the people arrested to court in accordance with the law and their
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release was no longer in the hands of the police. When the Attorney General
testified before the Commission on 21st August, 2008, he alluded to an audit of
all cases before the courts but did not disclose any figures as the matter was
before the Cabinet. He said in part:
“I may here mention that I received very many complaints that there
are some people who are being charged or who are in custody and
there is no sufficient evidence. Some have not even been charged and
so on although they are in remand. Actually very many complaints
from all over the country. So I set up in – towards the end of June,
beginning of July, a joint team of two senior officers from my office
and from the police to carry out an audit of those cases which are
before the court and look at the files and to see where there is
evidence, to recommend continuation and where these is no evidence,
termination.
But purely from the point of view of evidence or no evidence. So that
this allegation that there are some people who are being charged, who
were charged, there is no evidence, and the State is deliberately
delaying the hearing of those cases for a long time so as to delay
those people in custody is not there. So there is a team now which is
carrying out what I would call an audit of the cases which are before
the court.”
In sum, there was no evidence before us which we could evaluate to determine
the number of youths, if any, arrested and still being detained by police.

The law
It would be against the Constitution to arrest and hold any person suspected of
committing a crime for more than 24 hours or 14 days if the offence is
punishable by death.448 The amnesty debate would therefore be misplaced if it
makes reference to persons arrested and detained beyond such periods since
they would not be lawfully held. There is further protection of the law under
section 77 of the Constitution. The power to prosecute any offence or not also

448

Section 72 (3) (b) of the Constitution.
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lies exclusively in the office of the Attorney General under section 26 of the
Constitution as discussed earlier. When the amnesty debate was put to him, the
Hon. the Attorney General stated:
“Pascal Kambale: There is this issue about the so called amnesty debate.
And what we understand is that this is being discussed within the Cabinet
and you obviously are a member of the government. What can you tell us
about where this debate is now?
Attorney General: I cannot of course mention anything that is discussed in
cabinet. I have prescribed to a constitutional oath of secrecy. In fact that’s a
top secret you see, so I cannot even mention what is there. But what I can
tell you is the position of the Attorney General now is that all cases where
there is evidence must be prosecuted to the logical end, and all cases where
there is no sufficient evidence should be terminated. That is the position of
the Attorney General. There are some people who will say that oh no
everything should be. The debate is going on, it is in the public domain, I am
not part of that debate.”

The law also provides in section 27 of the Constitution that the President
has the prerogative of mercy on various categories of persons listed under
that section. He also has the liberty to consult with an advisory committee
set up under the same constitution in sections 28 and 29.
Apart from relevant legal provisions in municipal law, we are also guided
by International Criminal Law which does not recognise amnesty for gross
human rights violators.

Conclusion
From our own analysis of the amnesty debate we think it has been unduly
politicized

on

both

sides.

It

is

imperative

to

guard

against

further

encouragement of the culture of impunity by granting blanket amnesty to all and
sundry in the post-election mayhem. There were obvious and serious criminal
offences committed under the laws of this country as well as breaches of human
rights under international law.

The victims of the violence and international
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human rights defenders would be devastated if such amnesty was granted. It is
incumbent on the Attorney General therefore to apply the law firmly and
equitably for as long as it takes to bring to justice those persons who were
culpable.
Having said that, we realize, and we have stated it above, that there are special
challenges in terms of investigations and prosecution of post-election violence
offences. It may be necessary to consider an offer of amnesty to some minor
offenders in exchange for truthful confession and assistance in the arrest and
prosecution of the planners, organizers, financiers and, in the case of security
agencies, the perpetrators of the post-election violence. Other creative initiatives
must also be devised to aid in investigations and prosecution of the offenders.
Most importantly the provisions of the new Witness Protection Act 2008 should
be fully utilized in aid of PEV related investigations and prosecutions.

Findings
We find in our assessment that the chain of criminal justice system is generally
weak and the weakest link is the investigative function. The weakness in the
system impacts on the rule of law and therefore promotes impunity.
corrective measures must therefore be taken.

469

Urgent

PART V

Recommendations

470

471

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Recommendations

This chapter contains the Commission’s recommendations that relate to the
State Security Agencies and to issues of impunity. The discussion, findings and
conclusions that the recommendations are based upon are fully laid out in the
preceding chapters.

In

accordance

with

the

established

Terms

of

Reference

regarding

recommendations for measures to eradicate impunity, legal and administrative
measures and following an investigation into the actions and omissions of the
State Security Agencies, the Commission makes the recommends appearing
below. These recommendations should be implemented under the auspices of
the Panel of Eminent African Personalities acting in consultation with the
President and the Prime Minister of Kenya, with the full co-operation of
Parliament, the Judiciary and the office of the Attorney General as more
specifically described below.
1. A special tribunal, to be known as the Special Tribunal for Kenya be set
up as a court that will sit within the territorial boundaries of the Republic
of Kenya and seek accountability against persons bearing the greatest
responsibility for crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to
the 2007 General Elections in Kenya. The Special Tribunal shall achieve
this through the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of such
crimes.
2. The Special Tribunal shall apply Kenyan law and also the International
Crimes Bill, once this is enacted, and shall have Kenyan and international
judges, as well as Kenyan and international staff to be appointed as
provided hereunder.
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3. In order to fully give effect to the establishment of the Special Tribunal, an
agreement for its establishment shall be signed by representatives of the
parties to the Agreement on National Accord and Reconciliation within 60
days of the presentation of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
the Post-Election Violence to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, or
the Panel’s representative. A statute (to be known as “the Statute for the
Special Tribunal”) shall be enacted into law and come into force within a
further 45 days after the signing of the agreement.
4. The date of commencement of the functioning of the Special Tribunal shall
be determined by the President, in consultation with the Prime Minister,
the Chief Justice, the Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and
Constitutional Affairs and the Attorney-General, within 30 days after the
giving of Presidential Assent to the Bill enacting the Statute.
5. If either an agreement for the establishment of the Special Tribunal is not
signed, or the Statute for the Special Tribunal fails to be enacted, or the
Special Tribunal fails to commence functioning as contemplated above, or
having commenced operating its purposes are subverted, a list containing
names of and relevant information on those suspected to bear the greatest
responsibility for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the proposed
Special Tribunal shall be forwarded to the Special Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court. The Special Prosecutor shall be requested to
analyze the seriousness of the information received with a view to
proceeding with an investigation and prosecuting such suspected persons.
6. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall ensure that the Special
Tribunal is insulated against objections on constitutionality and to that
end, it shall be anchored in the Constitution of Kenya.
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7. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall provide that the Special
Tribunal shall consist of four organs: the Chambers (including an Appeals
Chamber) and the Prosecutor, which shall be independent of each other,
the Registry, and the Defence Office.
8. The Bill establishing the Tribunal shall provide that Chambers shall be
composed of 6 independent judges, three in the Trial Chamber, and three
in the Appeals Chamber. The Presiding Judge of each Chamber shall be a
Kenyan while the other two judges in each chamber shall be non-Kenyan
and drawn from member states of the Commonwealth.
9. The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall provide for the following
procedure for the appointment of the judges for each chamber and the
Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal:
i.

The President shall appoint the Chair of the Trial Chamber in
consultation with the Prime Minister, both acting on the advice of
the Chief Justice, from among persons qualified to be appointed
judge of the High Court of Kenya.

ii.

The Panel of Eminent African Personalities shall identify the other
two

members

who

will

be

appointed

by

the

President,

in

consultation with the Prime Minister, from among persons qualified
to serve as judge of a superior court of record in any part of the
Commonwealth.
iii.

The same procedure shall be applied for the appointment of the
Chair and members of the Appeals Chamber.

iv.

The Prosecutor of the Tribunal shall be appointed by the President
in consultation with the Prime Minister from among persons
qualified to serve as judge in a superior court of record in any part of
the Commonwealth, from a list provided by the Panel of Eminent
African Personalities.
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10.

The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall further provide for:
i.

The jurisdiction of the Tribunal which shall include the jurisdiction
to adjudicate over the criminal cases brought against persons
bearing greatest responsibility for serious crimes, particularly crimes
against humanity, related to the 2007 post election violence.

ii.

The right of appeal from the decisions of the Trial Chamber to the
Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal.

iii.

The ouster of the Jurisdiction of ordinary courts from the in relation
to the proceedings of the Special Tribunal.

12.

The Bill establishing the Tribunal shall provide for sufficient authority and
independence to the Special Tribunal to conduct investigations and shall
in particular provide that:
•

The Special Tribunal shall have authority to recruit

and

control its own staff, including such staff, working under
the

Prosecutor,

as

will

be

necessary

to

conduct

prosecutions;
•

The head of investigations and not less than three other
members of the investigation team shall be non-Kenyan so
as to provide an independent approach to the investigation
function of the Tribunal.

•

The investigations team shall report to and work under the
general direction of the Prosecutor.

13.

The Special Tribunal shall take custody of all investigative material and
witness statements and testimony collected and recorded by this
Commission.
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Other Recommendations
The Commission makes the following further recommendations:
1.

The International Crimes Bill 2008 be fast-tracked for enactment by
Parliament to facilitate investigation and prosecution of crimes against
humanity.

2.

The Witness Protection Act 2008 be fully utilized in the protection of all
witnesses who will need such protection in the course of investigation,
prosecution and adjudication of PEV cases.

3.

The Freedom of Information Bill be enacted forthwith to enable state and
non-state actors to have full access to information which may lead to
arrest, detention and prosecution of persons responsible for gross
violations.

4.

All persons holding public office and public servants charged with criminal
offences related to post-election violence be suspended from duty until the
matter is fully adjudicated upon.

5.

Upon conviction of any person charged with post-election violence offences
of any nature, such persons shall be barred from holding any public office
or contesting any electoral position.

In relation to overall operational and service delivery issues emanating
from the 2007 elections period in Kenya.
The development and application of the National Security Policy, as articulated
in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Agenda Item 4 and the First
Medium Term Plan (2008-2012), be finalised as a matter of urgency, and
The Conflict and Disaster Early Warning and Response systems, articulated in
the First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012), are developed and implemented as a
matter of priority, and
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The State Security Agencies develop, under the oversight of the NSAC,

joint

operational preparedness arrangements (to be conducted at least once every two
years) including desk top scenarios and full operational exercises to assist in
their readiness for dealing with high level security and emergency situations,
and
The joint security operational preparedness arrangements comprise all key
participants including, in the case of elections, the ECK, the Ministry of Health,
and the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (Disaster Management), and
The NSAC take a greater leadership role in determining security priorities,
focusing on preventive strategies and actions, and providing clear direction to
State Security Agencies, and
The NSAC develop and implement security review arrangements to ensure that
agencies’ performance in security events such as the PEV are assessed, lessons
learned and appropriate improvements and modifications to standard operating
procedures are completed, and
The NSAC immediately conduct a full review of the functionality of the
committees that make up the KSIM to determine their relative performance
during the Post Election Violence, and
Where improvements are identified they are implemented immediately, and
The results of the review are made public within 14 days of completion, and
Immediate steps are taken to put in place independent oversight arrangements
of the operation of the NSIS, and
The NSIS shall be required to report annually to parliament and the annual
report to be made public.
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Specific Recommendations for the Police
1.

A comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police Service and
Administration Police be undertaken. This reform shall be
initiated immediately and shall:
a. Involve a complete audit of the current police management,
structures, policies, practices and procedures.
b. Include extensive consultation with a wide variety of national and
international stakeholders.
c. Undertake extensive and comprehensive public consultations
d. Include

an

examination

and

consideration

of

applicable

international law and best practices
e. Include a thorough examination, review and revision of all tactics,
weapons and ‘Use of Force’ employed by the Kenyan Police.
f. Explore international capacity building possibilities for policing in
general

with

a

specific

focus

on

criminal

investigations,

community based policing and information collection analysis
and dissemination.
g. Include the creation of a modern Code of Conduct
h. Include a complete revision of the Police Act
i. Incorporate a review of issues relating to the ethnic and tribal
balance and deployment within the Kenya Police Service.
j. Include an examination of the structures of the police including
the Senior Executive
k. Include the establishment of a Police Services Commission for the
Kenya Police.
l. Investigate and make recommendations relating to any other
areas of policing and law enforcement that are, in the opinion of
the Police Reform Group (PRG), relevant to the improvement of
policing services in Kenya.
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2.

An ‘Independent Police Conduct Authority’ is established with
the legislative powers and authority to investigate police conduct
and provide civilian oversight. Establishment will be undertaken
in the following way:
a. Enactment of an Independent Police Conduct Authority Act
b. Involve a complete review of the current police complaints and
disciplinary processes within the Kenya Police Service.
c. Include

an

examination

and

consideration

of

applicable

international law and best practices
d. Report directly to parliament through the Minister responsible
e. Work under the authority of its own Act and have sufficient
powers to properly investigate all police conduct issues.
f. The ‘Authority’ is to be a person qualified to be a judge of the High
Court Kenya
g. The ‘Authority’ is to have the power to investigate public
complaints against police and ‘own motion’ conduct issues.
h. Legislation will require that some, more serious policing actions
‘must’ be reported to the Authority i.e. allegations of corruption,
deaths in custody, serious injury and police related shootings.
i. Have the legislative power to make recommendations for change
to policing policy, practices and procedures.
j. The ‘Authority’ is to have retrospective powers to deal with
historical serious misconduct.

3.

The Administration Police is integrated into the Kenya Police
Service creating a single police entity. The integration shall:
a. Commence with the command, responsibility and accountability
for every aspect of the Administration Police transferring to the
Commissioner of Police with immediate effect.
b. Effectively uncouple policing from the Provincial Administration
structure.
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c. Enable a combined police organ to function in an unencumbered
fashion exercising constabulary independence in performing its
functions.
d. Ensure that all police services adopt an operational role
independent of executive influence.
e. Ensure that a new and contemporary police entity is led by
professional police officers.

4.

All of the reforms articulated in the recommendations
immediately above relating to the Police be initiated immediately
and shall:
a. Be undertaken and completed by a panel of policing experts
(Policing Reform Group - PRG) who will work completely
independent of but alongside the Kenya Police Service and
Administration Police.
b. Be comprised of a team of four experts including Kenyan and
international specialists in transformational change, strategic
auditing and policing.
c. Source the international experts from likeminded common law
countries.
d. Have the PRG established and begin their work immediately with
a mandated duration of 6 months.
e. Have the PRG report directly to the Minister of Justice
f. Furnish progress reports to the Government of Kenya and the
African Union, regarding the conduct and findings of the PRG and
to provide a final report within two (2) months of the end of the
mandated period, unless otherwise agreed.
g. Ensure that the PRG identify, early in the process, appropriate
‘milestones’ or ‘check points’, at which time meaningful interim
reports may also be generated.
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h. Provide that the PRG be able to make interim and immediate
recommendations for reform and change at any stage during the
six months process.
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Appendix “A”
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Appendix “B”

Roles and Functions of SSAs

In examining the various aspects of how SSAs performed during the PEV period
the Commission found it necessary to familiarise itself with the roles and
accountabilities of the key agencies involved within the overall security
structure.

NSAC
Officials at the highest level participate within the NSAC. Chaired by the Head of
the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet and meeting monthly or on an ad
hoc basis its role includes:

•

Monitoring and advising the Cabinet Security Committee and the
President

•

Keeping threats to security under constant review

•

Designing

and

preparing

a

national

security

strategy

and

contingency plans
•

Guiding and directing PSICs and DSICs in dealing with issues
posing threats to law and order

•

Reviewing the effectiveness of security agencies in consultation with
existing machinery

JSIS
Chaired by Director A&P (NSIS), meets once a month and is responsible for:
•

Collating and deliberating on operational reports from security
agencies and established operational and communication centers.

•

Preparing and circulating reports and agenda for NSAC meetings.
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•

Following up implementation of NSAC decisions.

PSIC
Chaired by the Provincial Commissioner and meets monthly or on ad hoc basis
and is responsible for

•

Coordinating and directing security intelligence matters, including
efforts against terrorism and serious crimes.

•

Reviewing the internal security situation in the Province

•

Directing and initiating actions on issues highlighted in DSIC
minutes

DSIC
Chaired by the District Commissioner, meets monthly or on ad hoc basis and is
responsible for:
•

Reviewing the internal security situation in the district.

•

Liaising with relevant departments on issues of security and
intelligence interest

NSIS
The Service’s mandate is spelt out in the NSIS Act as follows:

Collect, analyze and disseminate information for the purposes of:
•

Detecting and identifying any threat or potential threat to the
security of Kenya;

•

Advising the President and the Government of any threat or
potential threat to the security of Kenya;

•

Taking steps to protect the national security interests of Kenya
whether political, military or economic.
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Gather Ministerial Intelligence at the request of any Government Ministry or
Department, evaluate and transmit as appropriate
Coordinate in cooperation with other Government departments a

steady flow of

intelligence
Carry out security vetting
Make recommendations to the Government in connection with:•

Policies concerning security intelligence

•

Security intelligence priorities

•

Security measures in Government Ministries, Departments or
Agencies

Perform such other functions as may be determined by the President to be in the
national interest

Military
In relation to the situation around the PEV the Military provides support to the
civil authority when called upon to do so.

Section 3 (2) of the Armed Forces Act (Chapter 199 of the Laws of Kenya)
provides: “The Kenya Army, The Kenya Air force and the Kenya Navy are charged
with the defence of the Republic and the support of the civil power in
the maintenance of order, and with such other duties as may from time to
time be assigned to them by the Minister after consultation with the Defence
Council.”
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The Armed Forces Act therefore allows for military aid to civil authority limited to
the maintenance of order. However it also provides that other duties may be
assigned by the Minister after consultation with the Defence Council.

Police
This applies to the regular police and special units such as the General Service
Unit (GSU) and Anti stock theft Unit (ASTU).

Section 14(1) of the Police Act sets out the functions of the Kenya Police as: •

Maintenance of Law and Order

•

The preservation of peace

•

The protection of life and property

•

The prevention and detection of crime

•

The apprehension of offenders

•

The enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is charged.

The duties of a police officer are set out under section 15 of the Police Act and
they include:•

Obedience of all lawful orders from his superiors.

•

Obedience of all orders and warrants issued to him.

•

Collect and communicate intelligence affecting Law and Order

•

Take all steps necessary to prevent the commission of offences and
public nuisance.

•

Detect offenders and bring them to justice

•

To apprehend all persons who he is legally authorised to apprehend
and for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists.
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Administration Police
The Administration Police Force is established under the provisions of section 3
the Administration Police Act, Chapter 85 of the Laws of Kenya under the
command of the Commandant appointed under the provisions of that Act.
The Administration Police Act was enacted to commence on 20th June 1958.
Various sections of the Act have since been amended over the years and a
revised edition was published in 1986. The latest amendments to some of the
sections were done in 2000.
Powers and Duties (Part III 8)
•

Every officer shall –
When called upon by any chief or sub-chief assist him in the
exercise of his lawful duties;
Obey and execute promptly all orders and warrants lawfully issued
to him by any competent authority;
Preserve the public peace, prevent the commission of offences and
apprehend all persons in respect of whom he holds a valid warrant of
arrest;
Undergo

such

training

as

may

be

ordered

by

the

District

Commissioner;
Act as messenger in any matter connected with the administration or
the public service.
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Other Enforcement Agencies
Under the provisions of Section 48 of the Kenya Police Act, the Commissioner of
Police is empowered to co-opt members into the police force, in the capacity of
special police officers. The section provides: “The Commissioner may at any time, if it appears to him to be expedient in
the interests of public order and safety so to do, appoint persons to be
special police officers for such period and within such area as he may
consider necessary, and every such officer shall during the period of his
service as a special police officer be deemed to be a police officer.”
Under those provisions the various co-opted officers form part of the human
resource available to the Kenyan Police in execution of its mandate. In practice,
members of other disciplined forces

and other government agencies can and

have in the past been co-opted into the police force under the provisions of the
Kenya Police Act including: •

Kenya Prisons Service Officers

•

Kenya Wildlife Service Personnel

•

Kenya Forests Guards personnel

•

National Youth Service

This aspect is important in that the time when most of these officers are coopted as police officers during the general elections. Many are simply allocated
duties at polling stations, of which there was a significant increase in the 2007
elections, whilst others (such as prison officers) can be deployed with firearms
and occupy positions usually the preserve of police officers.449

449

CW 34, Sup Willy Lugusa, OCPD Naivasha 29 July 2008
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Appendix “C”

Possible 2007 Presidential Election Outcomes and Consequences

Scenario 1: A Kibaki win
A combined Opposition likely to dispute the results, leading to;
•

Resorting to legal redress and possible attempts to form a parallel
government,

•

Incitement of their supporters to violence especially in major towns such
as Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and Kakamega and other urban
areas where criminal elements could capitalize on the shaky environment
to perpetuate crime.

•

Spontaneous explosion/intensity of ethnic clashes mostly in traditional
hotspot areas and heightened activities by criminal gangs like Mungiki,
Taliban, Kamjesh, Chinkororo, SLDF and RRC.

Scenario 2: A Raila win
•

Unlikely to generate the kind of violence associated with an ODM loss,
more so if PNU concedes defeat.

•

Overzealous ODM supporters may engage in celebration related violence in
Nairobi, Luo Nyanza and in other major urban centers

•

Blame game and acrimony within PNU and its affiliate parties, leading to
possible disintegration of the party

•

Kibaki diehard supporters reject result, putting the President under siege
not to hand over power. This may lead to civil strife.
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Appendix “D”
Case Study #1450
The witness is a 49 year old farmer and mother of 12 children of whom seven
remain alive.

She lives in Kisumu.

This study demonstrates the desperate

personal situation that some victims have found themselves in as a result of the
PEV. There also seems little follow-up or contact with the victim on the part of
authorities. Identifying material has been removed from the original statement.
She told the Commission that,
“I have lived there throughout my married life. My neighbours were Luos and
Kisiis, the majority of them being the Luos. Before the violence, we used to live
well with our Kisii neighbours. We were good friends. Things changed during the
voting. The Luos would say that all Kisiis will leave our Kisumu. On 29 December
2007, Luos were screaming and heading to town.
On 10 January, 2008, at around 8 am in the morning, my husband and I went to
our shamba, in Nyamthoi. I wanted to get some vegetables for the family and my
husband had accompanied me there. At around 1 pm, my son came running to
where we were. I asked her what he wanted. He told me that our house was on
fire. My husband boarded his bicycle and left to check. My son and I walked home
on foot. On arriving at my house, I found that everything had been burnt but the
house was still on fire. The fire began at the bedroom area. I found people trying to
put the fire out using water. The fire was then at the roof and had started burning
the iron sheet. I do not know who burnt my house and why.
I do not think is had anything to do with politics because none of my children were
vying for the civic seats. I did not report to the police then because people were
demonstrating in town and the police were shooting regardless whether or not you

450

Commission Witness 100 heard by the Commission “in camera” 12 August 2008
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were on the wrong. The roads toward town were impassable. I however was able
to report 7 June 2008. They police officers gave me an OB number. I also
registered the number of things burnt in my house. The police have done nothing
from the date when I reported till now.
On 15 January, 2008, I went to the same shamba, but this time I was alone.
I went there to get vegetables for the family. It was about 11 am in the
morning. As soon as I started plucking the vegetables, on turning I saw 5
men coming towards me. They were young men, dressed in trousers and
vests. The conspicuous thing about them is that they had ‘rastasdreadlocks.’ They said to me ‘Ooh wewe ndio unasikia mzuri, unachuna
mboga na sisi tunasikia mbaya…sasa tumepata- oh you are the person
feeling good…you are still plucking vegetables when we are feeling
bad..now we have found you. They were speaking in Kiswahili. I was not
able to tell their tribes because they were all speaking in Kiswahili and they
all had dreadlocks.
One of the men held me on the waist, lifted me and threw me on the ground.
Another man tore my panties and they started raping. One held my mouth so that
I do not scream. I was trying to keep my legs together but one man held one of my
legs while another held my other leg and kept my legs apart. There were no
houses nearby. They raped me in turns. All the men raped me. Once they were
done with me, they headed to a bush that on the way to Nyalenda. The bushes
are near a river, Nyamasaria.
I was not even able to pluck the vegetables that I had gone to cut. I just picked my
basket and headed home. I was walking slowly. I was under a lot of pain; my
hips were paining very much. I got to my house at around 4 pm. I told my
husband, who was at home by then, of what had happened to me. I did not go to
the hospital then because as I had started, the roads were impassable. I still
haven’t gone to the hospital to seek medical advice. I fear that since I have taken
long before going to the hospital, the people at the hospital may never understand
my predicament. I also did not report this to the police.
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I still live in my burnt house and I fear that should it be very windy, the wind is
going to blow off the roof. I have not been able to repair my house and when it
rain, water get into my house.
My husband passed on 23 February 2008 at his place of work where he had
been employed as a watchman. He was employed at the Wandiege Primary
School. On the night of 23 February, 2008, my husband was attacked by
unknown people, killed and placed in a classroom. His body was picked by the
police officers from Kondele Police station on 24 February 2008. They still have not
done any investigation to ascertain who killed my husband.
I have been affected by post election violence. My life has changed since I was
raped, my house was burnt and the death of my husband. I do not have a
livelihood. My husband is dead and there is no income. I do not even know who
will rebuild my house. I rely on people to help me. The clothes that my children
wear, those that I wear, beddings have all come from people. Food has been a
problem. I have to sell some vegetables to get some flour.”
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Appendix “E”

Case Study #2
This male witness is a 70 year old who gave evidence of multiple murderers
killing seven members of his family, being evicted from his home, being currently
an IDP and that at least one of the original perpetrators is now occupying his
land.451
He reported a full account to the Police but there has only been partial follow-up.
It appears that in spite of compelling evidence only one perpetrator has been
charged with murder. Identifying material has been removed from the original
statement.
The witnesses recounted that,
“During the referendum campaigns of 2005, I was asked by my Kalenjin
neighbours, where I would go if the Orange/No vote carried the day, because
Majimbo would be implemented and I am not of their jimbo. I also asked them
where they would go, because they are Keiyo and we were in Uasin Gishu.
A councillor, while campaigning for the No vote, used to state that whether
Banana/yes vote or Orange/No vote won, all Kikuyus must vacate the area.
Having lived in the area since 1970, the local community used to invite me to their
get-togethers. Previously, I was a senior headman. From 1982, I was a village
elder of a sub-location, where a majority of the residents are Kalenjins followed by
Kikuyus and Kisiis.
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During the 2007 campaigns, the Kalenjin politicians used to make utterances that,
“….you ‘kimirio’ or ‘bunyot’ (both meaning enemy) must leave the area whether
Kibaki wins or loses in the General elections.”
On the 27th of December, 2007, I and my family members woke up very early to go
and vote. The Kalenjin PNU agents had been denied entry into the polling station
and were not even allowed to vote, though the ODM agents were allowed into the
polling stations.
At about 6 am, the Kalenjins started voting and this was on until about 9 p.m. The
Kalenjins were allowed to vote up to six times.

Vote counting then continued

throughout the evening, until the morning of 28th December, 2007. Tension started
building up from the 28th and the 29th, and when a certain Councillor won, it
exacerbated.
On the 30th of December, after a church service within my compound, I noticed that
whereas ordinarily after the service the Kalenjins would join us in my home, on
this day, they declined. We felt that all was not well.
On the 31st of December, I was in my home with my wife, four sons, daughter and
two grandchildren. At about 5 p.m., while we were discussing family matters in
the compound, my neighbour visited us and told me that some youth wanted to
cause violence, but that the elders were against it. He assured me that the elders
would not allow the violence to take place and I was consoled.
I went and got charcoal from a neighbour and then and headed toward my house.
When I got there, my wife informed me that there could be trouble, and further,
that two people had visited us and told her that is the youth

intending to cause

violence came to our compound, she should scream and they would come to our
rescue. At the time, my sons were in the men’s house.
When I went outside, I saw about 40 armed youths at the end of my farm. The
said armed youth were talking with two neighbours so I alerted my wife that there
was trouble.
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The said armed youths ran into my compound screaming and my sons got out of
their houses. I asked one of the attacking youth, why they were attacking us. I
told him that is it was land they wanted, they should just let my family leave. All
this time, they were shooting arrows at us and throwing stones, while they made
sounds like dogs.

He then replied that they wanted five heads from my

compound.
My sons asked me to get back into the house and my wife and I retreated to the
bedroom, where I continued pleading with the attackers through the window. The
attackers had torched all the houses. While I was still at the window, I saw one of
my sons being hit with a club on the chest and he screamed. I called to him to get
into the house. I got under a bed with my grandson. My wife also got under
another the bed, but on the side facing the door. The attackers gained entry into
the house by forcing the door open. They got hold of my grandsons whom they
threw out of the door where they were murdered.

My wife screamed and the

attackers pulled her out from under the bed and hit her on the head with a club
before they slit her throat with a knife. Before they killed her, she was screaming,
“brother, why are you attacking us?’

He replied telling her that the time for

brotherhood was over and she had better pray.
While I was at the window pleading with them to allow us safe passage out of the
village, I recognized 14 people who I knew to be amongst the attackers. Four of
them killed members of my family including my wife, three sons, my daughter and
two grandchildren. One carried petrol, one was and elder, one was the leader and
carried a gun, one was a teacher and there were others.

Only one has been

arrested.
One son escaped through the window and was pursued by the attackers for over
two kilometres. My daughter-in-law who was also hiding under the bed with her
daughter and another granddaughter, escaped after the attackers pursued my son
and hid under some bushes near the fence.
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I also ran out of the burning house and hid under some bushes. At about 10 p.m.,
I heard wailing as of a child, and on going to investigate, I found a grandson of
mine ( 2 years), injured but still alive. I took him and we went to hide in the bush.
We stayed in the bush until the morning of 1st January, 2008, when I went to the
Administration Police Post.

There were a lot of people camping there already.

Upon arrival at the camp, I fainted.

I came to three hours thereafter.

An

Administration Police Officer took my grandson and cleaned and bandaged his
wounds.
My neighbour led other neighbours in burying my family in a shallow grave, 3
days after the attack, with the assistance of the AP officer giving guard services.
The AP officer advised that our security was not good and that we should move to
St. Muge Secondary School in Subukia, where we moved to, on or about the 4th of
January, 2008.
I know the details of the motor vehicles that were used to transport the armed
youth from to my village. They are owned by a village resident.
On the 7th of January, my son-in-law came and picked me up from the camp and
took me home to Njambini.
On the 28th of April, 2008, the bodies of my family were exhumed and we gave
them a decent burial.
It is my prayer that the perpetrators of these heinous crimes are brought to book. I
have been informed that one of the perpetrators has started building a house on
my parcel of land.
That is all I wish to say.”
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Appendix “F”

Civilian oversight of police
(Police Conduct)

South African Police Service Act, No. 68 of 1995
CHAPTER 10
INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS DIRECTORATE
50. Establishment and independence
50.1
a. The independent Complaint Directorate, which shall be structured at both
national and provincial levels, is hereby established.
b. The date on which the provincial structures of the directorate will come
into operation, shall be determined by the Executive Director in
consultation with the Minster.
50.2
The directorate shall function independently from the service.
50.3
a. No organ of state and no member or employee of an organ of state nor any
other person shall interfere with the Executive Director or a member of the
personnel of the directorate in the exercise and performance of his of
power and functions.
b. Any person who wilfully interferes with the Executive Director or a
member of the personnel of the directorate in the exercise or performance
of his or her powers or functions shall be guilty of an offence and liable on
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two
years.
50.4
All organs of state shall accord such assistance as may be reasonably required
for the protection of the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of
the directorate in the exercise and performance of its powers and functions.
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51. Appointment of Executive Director –
51.1
The Minister shall nominate a suitably qualified person for appointment to the
office of Executive Director to head the directorate in accordance with a
procedure to be determined by the Minster in consultation with the
Parliamentary Committees.
51.2
The Parliamentary Committees shall, within a period of 30 parliamentary
working days of the nomination in terms of sub-section (1) confirm or reject such
nomination.
51.3
In the event of the nomination being confirmed
a. Such person shall be appointment to the office of Executive Director
subject to the laws governing the public service with effect from a date
agreed upon by such person and the Minister; and
b. Such appointment shall be for a period not exceeding five years: Provided
that such person shall be eligible for consecutive appointment in
accordance with this section.
51.4
The Executive Director may be removed from his or her office under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the Minister in consultation
with the Parliamentary Committees.
52. Personnel and expenditure
52.1
The personnel of the directorates shall consist of persons appointed by the
Executive Director in consultation with the Minister subject to the laws
governing the public service and such other persons as may be seconded or
transferred to the directorate.
52.2
The terms and conditions of service of the personnel of the directorate shall be
determined by the Minister in consultation with the Executive Director and the
Public Service Commission.
52.3
The functions of the directorate shall be funded by money appropriated by
Parliament for that purpose.
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52.4
The Executive Director shall, subject to the Exchequer Act. 1997 (Act No. 66 of
1974)
a. be the accounting officer charged with the responsibility of accounting for
all money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose of the performance
of the functions of the directorate and the utilisation thereof; and
b. cause the necessary accounting and other related records to be kept.
53. Function of directorate
53.1
a. The principal function of the directorate shall be the achievement of the
object contemplated in section 222 of the Constitution.
b. The Executive Director shall be responsible for –
a.i.
b.ii.

the performance of the functions of the directorate; and
the management and administration of the directorate.

53.2 In order to achieve its objects, the directorate –
a. may mero motu or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any misconduct
or offence allegedly committed by any member, and may, where
appropriate, refer such investigation to the police action; and
b. shall mero motu or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any death in
police custody or as a result of police action; and
c. may investigate any matter referred to the directorate by the Minister or
the member of the Executive Council.
52.3
a. The Minister may, upon the request of and in consultation with Executive
Director, authorise those members of the personnel of the directorate
identified by the Executive Director, to exercise those powers and perform
those duties conferred on or assigned to any member by or under this Act
or any other law.
b. The members of the personnel referred to in paragraph (a) shall have such
immunities and privileges as may be conferred by the law on a member in
order to ensure the independent and effective exercise and performance if
their powers and duties.
52.4
A document, in the prescribed form, certifying that a person is a member of the
personnel of the directorate and has been authorised to exercise the powers and
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perform the duties of a member, shall be prima facie proof that such member
has been authorised as contemplated in subsection (3).
52.5
Any member of the personnel of the directorate who wilfully discloses any
information in circumstances in which he or she knows or could reasonably be
expected to know that such disclosure would or may prejudicially affect the
performance by the directorate or the Service of its functions, shall be guilty of
an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a periods not
exceeding two years.
52.6 The Executive Director may –
a. at any time withdraw any referral made under subsection (2) (a);
b. request and obtain information from any Commissioner or police official as
may be necessary for conducting any investigation:
c.
d.i.
e.ii.
f.iii.

monitor the progress of;
set guidelines regarding ; and
request and obtain information regarding an investigation referred to
a Commissioner under subsection (2) (a);

d. request and obtain the co-operation of any member as may be necessary
to achieve the object of the directorate;
e. commence an investigation on any matter notwithstanding the fact that an
investigation regarding the same matter has been referred under
subsection (2) a pending or has been closed by the Service, or the docket
regarding the matter has been submitted to the attorney-general for
decision; Provided that in the case of a –
f.i.
g.ii.

referred or pending investigation, directorate shall act after
consultation with the member heading the investigation; or
docket regarding a matter having been submitted to the attorneygeneral for decision, the directorate shall act in consultation with
the attorney – general;

f. request and obtain information from the attorney – general’s office in so as
it may be necessary for the directorate to conduct an investigation:
Provided that the attorney – general may on reasonable grounds refuse to
accede to such request;
g. submit the results of an investigation to the attorney – general for his or
her decision;
h. in consultation with the Minister and with the concurrence of the Minister
of Finance, obtain the necessary resources and logistical support or
engage the services of experts, or other suitable persons to enable the
directorate to achieve its object;
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i. make recommendations to the Commissioner concerned;
j. make any recommendation to the Minister or a member of the Executive
Council which he or she deems necessary regarding any matter
investigated by the directorate or relating to the performance of the
directorate’s functions: Provided that in the event of a recommendation
made to a member of the Executive Council, a copy thereof shall be
forwarded to the Minister; and
k. subject to the Exchequer Act, 1975 (Act no 66 of 1975), delegate any of his
or her powers to any member of the personnel of the directorate.
52.7
The Executive Director shall, in consultation with the Minister, issue
instructions to be complied with by the directorate which shall inter alia include
instructions regarding –
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

the lodging, receiving and processing of complaints;
recording and safe-guarding of information and evidence;
disclosure of information;
the making of findings and recommendations; and
all matters incidental to the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c)

52.8
The National or Provincial Commissioner shall notify the directorate of all cases
of death in police custody or as a result of police action.
52.9
The Minister may prescribe procedures regarding –
a. protecting the identify and integrity of complaints; and
b. witness protection programmes.
54. Reporting. – The Executive Director shall –
a. within three months after the end of each financial year, submit to the
Minister a written report on activities of the directorate during that
financial year, which report shall be tabled in Parliament by the Minister
within14 days after receipt thereof or if Parliament is not then in session,
within 14 days after the commencement of the next ensuing session; and
b. at any time when requested to do so by the Minister or either the
Parliamentary Committees, submit a report on the activities of the
Directorate to the Minister or that Committee.
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The Independent Police Complaints Authority Act (New Zealand)

12. Functions of Authority
(1) The functions of the Authority shall be:
(a) To receive complaints
(i) Alleging any misconduct or neglect of duty by any member of the Police; or
(ii) Concerning any practice, policy, or procedure of the Police affecting the
person or body of persons making the complaint in a personal capacity:
(b) To investigate of its own motion, where it is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds to carry out an investigation in the public interest, any incident
involving death or serious bodily harm notified to the Authority by the
Commissioner under section 13 of this Act:
(c) To take such action in respect of complaints, incidents, and other matters as
is contemplated by this Act.
(2) In the course of taking action in respect of any complaint the Authority may
investigate any apparent misconduct or neglect of duty by a member of the
Police, or any Police practice, policy, or procedure, which appears to the
Authority to relate to the complaint, notwithstanding that the complaint itself
does not refer to that misconduct, neglect, practice, policy, or procedure.
Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall authorize the Authority to
investigate any matter relating to the terms and conditions of service of any
person as a member of the Police.
17. Action upon receipt of complaint
(1) On receiving or being notified of a complaint under this Act, the Authority
may do all or any of the following:
503

(a) Investigate the complaint itself, whether or not the Police have commenced a
Police investigation:
(b) Defer action until the receipt of a report from the Commissioner on a Police
investigation of the complaint:
(c) Oversee a Police investigation of the complaint:
(d) Decide, in accordance with section 18 of this Act, to take no action on the
complaint.
[(2) Subject to subsection (2A) of this section, the Authority shall, as soon as
practicable, advise the Commissioner and the complainant of the procedure it
proposes to adopt under subsection (1) of this section.
[(2A) Where—
(a) A complaint is made to the Police; and
(b) The Authority decides to adopt the procedure provided for in paragraph (a) or
paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section; and
(c) The Authority is satisfied that the Police will inform the complainant of the
procedure

to

be

followed,

the Authority is not required to inform the complainant in accordance with
subsection (2) of this section of the procedure it proposes to follow.]
Where any complaint appears to the Authority to be capable of resolution by
conciliation in accordance with any conciliation procedure established by or
under the Police Act 1958, it may indicate that view to the Commissioner.
The Authority may decide to take no further action in certain circumstances.
19. Subsequent powers in relation to complaint
The Authority may at any time
(a) Review a Police investigation of a complaint:
(b) Decide to investigate a complaint itself:
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(c) Where it oversees a Police investigation, give such directions to the Police
concerning the investigation as it thinks fit:
(d) Direct the Police to re-open an investigation, and thereafter oversee the
investigation:
(e) Direct the Police to reconsider their proposals for action on a complaint:
(f) Decide, in accordance with section 18 of this Act, to take no further action on
the complaint:
(g) Decide that no action by the Authority is required on the ground that it
considers that the outcome of a Police investigation is satisfactory.
20. Duty of Commissioner to report to Authority on Police investigation of
complaint—
(1) The Commissioner shall as soon as practicable, and in no case later than 2
months, after the completion of a Police investigation of a complaint, report to
the Authority—
(a) Whether the complaint has been upheld and, if so, what action has been
taken or is proposed to be taken to rectify the matter:
(b) Whether the complaint has been settled by conciliation.
(2) When reporting to the Authority under this section, the Commissioner shall
supply to the Authority accompanying material sufficient to enable the Authority
to assess the adequacy of the Police investigation.
The Commissioner may consult the Authority on any Police proposals for action
on a complaint before reporting to the Authority under this section.
21. Commissioner to provide information and assistance at request of
Authority—
(1) The Commissioner shall, whenever the Authority so requests, provide to the
Authority all such information and assistance as is necessary for the proper
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performance by the Authority of its functions in relation to its investigation of
any complaint, incident, or other matter under this Act.
(2) Where the Authority oversees a Police investigation of a complaint, the
Commissioner shall, whenever the Authority so requests, provide to the
Authority—
(a) Any or all information in the possession or under the control of the Police that
is relevant to the complaint:
(b) A report on the progress of the investigation.
23. Proceedings of Authority—
(1) Before proceeding to investigate any matter under this Act the Authority shall
inform the Commissioner, the complainant (if any), and, unless the interests of
justice otherwise require, any person alleged to be aggrieved (if not the
complainant) of its intentions to make the investigation.
(2) Every investigation by the Authority under this Act shall be conducted in
private.
(3) Subject to section 31 of this Act,—
(a) The Authority may hear or obtain information from such persons as it thinks
fit, including, where it considers that cultural matters are a factor relevant to a
complaint or investigation, information from such persons as the Authority
thinks have knowledge or experience in those matters:
(b) It shall not be necessary for the Authority to hold any hearing:
(c) No person shall be entitled as of right to be heard by the Authority.
[(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Authority may regulate its
procedure in such manner as it thinks fit.]
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24. Powers of Authority in relation to investigations—
(1) The Authority may require any person who in its opinion is able to give
information relating to any matter under investigation by the Authority to
furnish such information, and to produce such documents or things in the
possession or under the control of that person, as in the opinion of the Authority
are relevant to the subject-matter of the investigation.
(2) The Authority may summon before it and examine on oath any person who in
its opinion is able to give any information relating to the matter under
investigation, and may for the purpose administer an oath to any person so
summoned. Every such examination by the Authority shall be deemed to be a
judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 108 of the Crimes Act 1961
(which relates to perjury).
29. Implementation of recommendations of Authority—
(1) The Commissioner shall, as soon as reasonably practicable after receiving any
recommendation of the Authority under section 27(2) or section 28(2) of this
Act,—
(a) Notify the Authority of the action (if any) proposed to be taken to give effect to
the recommendation; and
(b) Give reasons for any proposal to depart from, or not to implement, any such
recommendation.
(2) If, within a reasonable time after a recommendation is made, no action is
taken which seems to the Authority to be adequate and appropriate, the
Authority may, after considering any comments made by the Commissioner,—
(a) Send a copy of its opinion and recommendations on the matter, together with
the comments of the Commissioner, to the Attorney-General and the Minister of
Police; and
(b) Where it considers it appropriate, transmit to the Attorney-General for tabling
in the House of Representatives such report on the matter as it thinks fit.
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The Attorney-General shall, as soon as practicable after receiving a report under
subsection (2) (b) of this section, lay the report before the House of
Representatives.
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APPENDIX G
SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS MOVED DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER POST ELECTION VIOLENCE
NO.

NAME

POSTING IN
JANUARY

CURRENT
POSTING

POSTING AND TRANSFER
DATES

OTHER NOTES/ COMMENTS

1.

ANGELUS
KARURU

OCPD
ELDORET

OCPD ITEN

Posted to Eldoret on 18th
November 2006 until 17th
January 2008 when he was
transferred to Keiyo Division.

The transfer was in the middle of
the post election violence

2.

STEPHEN
MUNGUTI

OCPD
NAKURU

STAFFING
OFFICER AT
POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

Posted to Nakuru on 16th April
2007 until 25th January 2008
when he was transferred to
Police headquarters.

The transfer was in the middle of
the post election violence.

3.

EVERETT WASIGE

PPO
NAKURU/RI
FT VALLEY

RETIRED

Posted to Rift Valley on 15th
November 2005 until 27th
January 2008 when he was
retired.

He was not due for retirement
until 23rd February 2008. He was
called to Nairobi on 27th January
2008 by the Commissioner of
Police and told that he would be
retired a month earlier than
scheduled.

4.

GRACE KAINDI

PPO NYANZA

DIRECTOR OF
COMPLAINTS AND
CUSTOMER CARE
AT POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

Posted to Nyanza on 18th April
2006 until 28th January 2008
when she was transferred to
Police Headquarters.

The transfer was in the middle of
the post election violence.
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APPENDIX H
NYANZA PROVINCE
SAMPLE ANALYSIS OF ARMS MOVEMENT REGISTERS SHOWING USAGE OF ARMS
AND AMMUNITION FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN 27/12/2007 AND 17/01/2008
1. KISUMU POLICE STATION
NOTE: a) The armoury records for the period between 28th December and 30th
December 2007 were not provided.
b) The armoury records for the other dates do not show any usage apart from
the two appearing below.
NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

1.

27/12/2007

2.

29/1/2008

NAME OF
OFFICER
AND RANK
E. MONGERE
CHIEF
INSPECTOR
MAOSA
INSPECTOR

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

20TEAR GAS
CANNISTERS
20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62 SP

ALL 20 TEAR
GAS
CANNISTERS
NINE (9)
ROUNDS

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

20 ROUNDS
OF
7.62M

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3
G3

20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62 SP
20 ROUNDS

TWELVE (12)
ROUNDS
TWO (2)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

SEVEN (7)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62

SEVEN (7)
ROUNDS

FN

20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

FN

20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62
20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62

SEVEN (7)
ROUNDS
SIX (6)
ROUNDS

20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62MM
9MM

SIX (6)
ROUNDS
THIRTY (30)
ROUNDS

AK47

ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

2. KISUMU DIVISIONAL REGISTRY
NO.

DATE OF
ISSUE

1.

29/12/2007

2.

29/12/2007

3.

29/12/2007

4.

29/12/2007

5.

29/12/2007

6.

29/12/2007

7.

29/12/2007

8.

29/12/2007

9.

29/12/2007

10.

29/12/2007

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
WINSTON
SHIKORI
POLICE
CONSTABLE
ROSE MWANJE
CORPORAL
JOHN MBURU
POLICE
CONSTABLE
T. OLABIRO
POLICE
CONSTABLE
L. MUNGAI
POLICE
CONSTABLE
D. LITHANDA
POLICE
CONSTABLE
F. AMUGUNE
SERGEANT
MACHOKA
POLICE
CONSTABLE
ENOCH ASANDE
CORPORAL
DAVID LANGAT
CORPORAL

FN
FN
MPS
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ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

11.

29/12/2007

LUKA BUNGEI
POLICE
CONSTABLE

AK 47

90 ROUNDS
OF 7.62MM

TWENTY ONE
(21)ROUNDS

12.

30/12/2007

WESTER
N

64 ROUNDS
OF 9MM

ONE (1)
ROUND

13.

30/12/2007

G3

40 ROUNDS
OF 7.62MM

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

14.

30/12/2007

A. ABDI
SENIOR
SERGEANT
B. KABITI
POLICE
CONSTABLE
J. ROTICH
POLICE
CONSTABLE

MP

64 ROUNDS
OF 9MM

THIRTEEN (13)
ROUNDS

THE RECORD
APPEARS TO
HAVE BEEN
ALTERED
SEVERAL
TIMES

The following entries from the divisional registry are incomplete in that they do not have
any entries on the remarks as to whether any rounds were used or not
NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

1.

29/12/2007

2.

29/12/2007

3.

30/12/2007

4.

30/12/2007

5.

30/12/207

6.

31/12/2007

7.

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
I. A. NOOR
POLICE
CONSTABLE
I. BETT
POLICE
CONSTABLE
DAVID LANGAT
CORPORAL
E. ASANDE
CORPORAL
E. NATIYWA

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITIO
N USED

FN

20 ROUNDS OF
7.62M

NO ENTRY

NO
ENTRY

3 ROUNDS OF
7.62SP

NO ENTRY

6 ROUNDS OF
9MM
6 ROUNDS OF
7.62MM
40 ROUNDS

NO ENTRY

S. MBOGO
CORPORAL

NO
ENTRY
NO
ENTRY
NO
ENTRY
NO
ENTRY

100 ROUNDS OF
9MM

NO ENTRY

31/12/200
7
31/12/200
7

S. MBOGO
CORPORAL
S. MBOGO
CORPORAL

NO
ENTRY
NO
ENTRY

NO
ENTRY
NO
ENTRY

9.

31/12/200
7

NO
ENTRY

10
.

31/12/200
7

LUKA
BUNGEI
POLICE
CONSTABLE
A. LIHANDA
POLICE
CONSTABLE

100 ROUNDS
OF 7.62SP
1000
ROUNDS OF
7.62SP
13 ROUNDS
OF 7.62SP

NO
ENTRY

20 ROUNDS
OF 7.62

NO
ENTRY

8.
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ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

NO ENTRY
NO ENTRY

NO
ENTRY

THE OFFICER
PICKED A TOTAL
OF 1,200
ROUNDS ON
THE SAME DAY
AS THE
FOLLOWING
TWO ENTRIES
RELATE TO HIM
AND THERE WAS
NO ACCOUNT
FOR ALL
ENTRIES

11
.

31/12/200
7

LUKA
BUNGEI
POLICE
CONSTABLE

CESKA

60 ROUNDS
OF 7.62SP

NO
ENTRY

3.
HOMA BAY POLICE STATION
The entries in the arms movement register show that no ammunition was used in the
period between 28th December 2007 and 28th February 2008.
However according to a letter dated 24th June 2008 from Homabay Police Divisional
Headquarters the OCS Homabay Police Station is given authority to strike off
ammunition used between the dates 29th December 2007 and 15th January 2008. The
ammunition is listed in the application as follows: a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

993 rounds of 7.62x51mm
303 rounds of 7.62 x 51mm blanks
231 rounds of 7.62x39mm
191 rounds of 9x19mm
76 rounds of .38 special
245 rounds tear gas canisters
182 bore cartouche propulsive
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4.

KISUMU EAST DISTRICT STATION

NOTE: 1.a) Most of the officers issued with arms and ammunition from this station are
administration police officers.
2.b) This is the only record viewed by the Commission that shows issue and use of
blank ammunition.
3.c)
The records appear to have been reconstructed from the original records (they
appear to have been hand written by the same person.
NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

1.

28/12/2007

2.

29/12/2007

3.

29/12/2007

4.

29/12/2007

5.

29/12/2007

6.

29/12/2007

7.

29/12/2007

8.

29/12/2007

9.

29/12/2007

10.

29/12/2007

11.

29/12/2007

12.

29/12/2007

13.

29/12/2007

14.

29/12/2007

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
AUSTINE ONITI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JACOB EKETA
ADMINISTRATION
POLICE
CONSTABLE

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

20 ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

G3

40 LIVE
ROUNDS
20 BLANK
ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

SYPRIANO SUNA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MICAH KITETU
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOTHAM OJUMBO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JACOB OSANO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PETER
NYAMWANGE
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
SAMUEL NDOLO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
LAMECK
MACHARIAH
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOHN MOHERAJ
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
DANIEL TOO
CORPORAL
WELLINGTON
ODHIAMBO
CORPORAL
RONALD MATAKA
CORPORAL
OBEDI MISATI
SENIOR
SERGEANT

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

SMG

40 ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

20 ROUNDS

FOURTEEN
(14) ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

60 ROUNDS

THIRTEEN (13)
ROUNDS

BROWNI
NG

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

EIGHT (8)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS
20 BLANK
ROUNDS

FIFTEEN (15)
ROUNDS
SIXTEEN (16)
ROUNDS

20 BLANK
ROUNDS
40 ROUNDS

FOUR (4)
ROUNDS
ONE (1)
ROUND

G3
G3
G3
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ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

THERE IS NO
INDICATION
WHETHER
THE
ROUNDS
USED WERE
LIVE OR
BLANKS

NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

15.

29/12/2007

16.

29/12/2007

17.

29/12/2007

18.

29/12/2007

19.

29/12/2007

20.

29/12/2007

21.

29/12/2007

22.

29/12/2007

23.

29/12/2007

24.

29/12/2007

25.

29/12/2007

26.

29/12/2007

27.

29/12/2007

28.

29/12/2007

29.

29/12/2007

30.

29/12/2007

31.

29/12/2007

32.

29/12/2007

33.

29/12/2007

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
JOHN NGOCHO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KIBET NYANGWEI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MASAI K. RONO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
BENSON SAWE
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
THOMAS TORIEBE
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MARTIN RIONGO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MOHAMMED
HASSAN
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MAURICE OTIENO
CORPORAL
NEHEMUEL
NYANGAU
SERGEANT
STANLEY
CHEROTICH
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
LOCHIAN
CHEPCHOI
SENIOR
SERGEANT
PAUL ATOTO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
CLISTUS
WANYAMA
CORPORAL
BENARD OCHOLLA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
VINCENT SAMBU
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
NICHOLAS
MASWAI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PHILIP OBUOLA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PAUL MAGUT
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MAURICE ONDUTO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

NINETEEN (19)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

60 ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

THIRTEEN (13)
ROUNDS

G3
SMG

40 BLANK
ROUNDS
20 ROUNDS

EIGHT (8)
ROUNDS
FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

60 ROUNDS

SIXTEEN (16)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

49 BLANK
ROUNDS

FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

EIGHTEEN (18)
ROUNDS

G3

60 BLANK
ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

TWO (2)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

EIGHT (8)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS
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ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

34.

29/12/2007

35.

29/12/2007

36.

29/12/2007

37.

29/12/2007

38.

29/12/2007

39.

29/12/2007

40.

29/12/2007

41.

29/12/2007

42.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

43.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

44.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

45.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

46.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

47.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

50.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME

51.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME
30/12/2007
DAY TIME

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

30/12/2007
DAY TIME
30/12/2007
DAY TIME
31/12/2007
DAY TIME
31/12/2007
DAY TIME

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
HARDSON
ONUONGA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
WELLINGTON
ODHIAMBO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JACOB OSANO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
DANIEL TOO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOTHAM OJUMBO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOHN NGOCHO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MAURICE OTIENO
CORPORAL
DANIEL ONDURO
CORPORAL
MAURICE ONDUTO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
STEPHEN MBUVI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOEL ONDIEK
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOASH NYABERI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOSEPHAT
OKETCH
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PIUS KIMAIYO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOSEPHAT RONO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
ONESMUS ODUOR
CORPORAL
ISMAEL KIRUI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
NICHOLAS KOOME
CORPORAL
JAVAN
CHEMANGARI
CORPORAL
STANLEY VOYEGA
CORPORAL
DUNCAN KAVUO
ADMIN POLICE

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

71 ROUNDS

TWENTY SIX
(26) ROUNDS

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS

NINE (9)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

FORTY (40)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

NINE (9)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS
40 BLANK
ROUNDS
40 BLANK
ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS
TWO (2)
ROUNDS
FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

SEVEN (7)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

60 BLANK
ROUNDS

ELEVEN (11)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

NINETEEN (19)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

20 BLANK
ROUNDS
20 BLANK
ROUNDS

TWO (2)
ROUNDS
EIGHT (8)
ROUNDS

20 BLANK
ROUNDS
60 BLANK
ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS
TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS
TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3
G3

G3
G3
G3
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ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

57.

31/12/2007
DAY TIME

58.

31/12/2007
DAY TIME

59.

31/12/2007
DAY TIME

60.

31/12/2007
DAY TIME

61.

2/01/2008
DAY TIME

62.

3/01/2008
DAY TIME

63.

3/01/2008
DAY TIME

64.

3/01/2008
DAY TIME

65.

3/01/2008
DAY TIME

66.

3/01/2008
DAY TIME

67.

3/01/2008
DAY TIME

68.

3/01/2008

69

3/01/2008

70.

3/01/2008

71.

3/01/2008

72.

3/01/2008

73.

3/01/2008

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
CONSTABLE
DAVID WAFULA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
CHRISTINE
ONYANGO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
WILFRED MAGATI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
AUGUSTINE
TERER
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KOBIA BARIU
INSPECTOR

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

EIGHT (8)
ROUNDS

G3

40 BLANK
ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

PHILIP OBUOLA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
EVANS OTANDO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PAUL MAGOT
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
WILFRED MAGATI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KIBET NYANGUSEI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOTHAM OJUMBO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
AUGUSTINE
TERER
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KOBIA BARIU
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
THOMAS MAKORI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
BENARD OLOO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
DANIEL TOO
CORPORAL
GEORGE MAGETO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE

G3

20 ROUNDS

TWENTY (20)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

SEVEN (7)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

SIXTEEN (16)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

EIGHT (8)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

TWO (2)
ROUNDS

BROWNI
NG
G3

6 ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS
THIRTEEN (13)
ROUNDS
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40 ROUNDS

ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

THE
HEADING
FOR THIS
DAY
ERRONEOUS
LY READS
2ND
DECEMBER
2007

NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

74.

04/01/2008

75.

04/01/2008

76.

04/01/2008

77.

04/01/2008

78.

04/01/2008

79.

04/01/2008

80.

04/01/2008

81.

04/01/2008

82.

15/01/2008

83.

16/01/2008

84.

16/01/2008

85.

16/01/2008

86.

16/01/2008

87.

16/01/2008

88.

16/01/2008

89.

16/01/2008

90.

16/01/2008

91.

16/01/2008

92.

16/01/2008

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
PHILIP OBUOLA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KIBET NYANGOSE
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
WILFRED MAGATI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PAUL MAGOT
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MASAI K. RONO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
BENARD OCHOLLA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
CHRISPINE
OCHIENG
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
MASAI K. RONO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
PHILIP OBUORA
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JAPHETH
MUTUNGA
CORPORAL
NAVIGATOR
ABERE
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
EVANS OLANDO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KIBET NYANGUSEI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
FRANCIS
NYACHIRO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
EFFY VIDOLO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
DUNCAN KAUVO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JOHN MAHERAI
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
KOBIA BARIU
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
JAPHETH
MUTUNGA
CORPORAL

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

40 ROUNDS

SEVEN (7)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

FOUR (4)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

THREE (3)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

40 ROUNDS

FOURTEEN
(14) ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

ONE (1)
ROUND

G3

40 ROUNDS

TEN (10)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

TWO (2)
ROUNDS

G3

60 ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

60 ROUNDS

FOUR (4)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

TWO (2)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

FOUR (4)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

TWO(2)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

FIVE (5)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

TWELVE (12)
ROUNDS

G3

40 ROUNDS

FOUR (4)
ROUNDS
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ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

NO

DATE OF
ISSUE

93.

16/01/2008

94.

16/01/2008

95.

17/01/2008

NAME OF
OFFICER AND
RANK
GEORGE MAGETO

WEAPON
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
ISSUED

AMMUNITION
USED

G3

60 ROUNDS

NAVIGATOR
ABERE
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE
FRANCIS
NYACHIRO
ADMIN POLICE
CONSTABLE

G3

20 ROUNDS

SIX (6)
ROUNDS
FOUR (4)
ROUNDS

G3

20 ROUNDS

ANY OTHER
COMMENTS

TWELVE (12)
ROUNDS

c)5.
MIGORI POLICE STATION
There are no entries from this station for the period between 3rd December 2007 and 3rd
January 2008
For the entries available there was no usage of arms or ammunitions.
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